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Abstract 
Since the transformation from command-and-control to laissez-faire capitalism in the 
late 1980s, China has stood out as one of the largest and fastest growing emerging 
economies. The phenomenal rate of development has brought about auspicious 
growth, at the expense of damaging the environment. One of the key problem facing 
energy policy makers in China revolves around climate change due to the 
interrelationship between economic development and energy use. Chinese CO2 
emissions exceeded the US for the first time in 2006, resulting from heavy reliance on 
coal, strong emphasis on economic growth, focus on developing energy intensive 
sectors, and an inefficient energy infrastructure. This path of energy generation and 
consumption calls for a greater commitment to a more balanced set of energy policy 
goals encompassing not only stronger pollution abatement, but also security of energy 
supply, social equality, and governance. 
 
The research seeks an in-depth understanding of what constitutes a successful energy 
policy with a particular focus on other collateral goals that Chinese policy makers 
should take into consideration. As a result, the research has proposed and successfully 
tested a Chinese Framework for Energy Policy Strategy (CFEPS). CFEPS employs 
and assesses a combination of qualitative analysis of Chinese energy policies and 
quantitative analysis of energy generation pathways by using Integrated Assessment 
Modelling (IAM). This study has been one of the first applications of the hybrid IAM 
on the Chinese energy sector and involved customising the hybrid IAM to make it 
applicable to the Chinese context. It has resulted in a decision support tool for 
Chinese authorities to make informed energy policy choices.  
 
CFEPS provides guidance on the identification of relevant factors in energy policy 
assessment and implementation in China. The most important factors, as CFEPS has 
highlighted for an improved energy policy outcome in China, includes pollution 
abatement, security of energy supply, economic growth, social equality, and 
governance. The extensibility to other similar nations has been suggested. Empirical 
studies at different stages of the research have been carried out to establish the 
applicability and validity of CFEPS.  
 
Keywords: Energy generation, China energy policy, security of energy supply, 
atmospheric carbon emissions, hybrid integrated climate assessment modelling 
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Glossary of Terms 
CFEPS – China’s Framework for Energy Policy Strategy, a framework proposed by 
this research to evaluate and highlight areas of possible improvements in China’s 
energy policy outcome. CFEPS is made up of three components, namely a (i) Policy 
Assessment Framework, (ii) Hybrid IAM Climate Model, and (iii) Feedback Loop.  
 
Climate Model or Hybrid IAM Climate Model – the use of the WITCH hybrid 
Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) to generate future energy generation pathways, 
other energy related and economic projections from 2010 up to 2050. 
 
Feedback Loop – the iterative process used in CFEPS that alternates between analysis 
using the climate model (the base-case before policy change), switching to energy 
policy assessment to propose policy outcome improvements, and reverting back to the 
climate model (revised state after energy policy action). The logic behind the 
Feedback Loop assumes in the base-case that there are shortcomings portrayed in the 
climate model outputs. These shortcomings are assessed using the policy assessment 
framework. Areas of possible energy policy improvements are highlighted. To 
improve the highlighted areas, policy actions are proposed which revised the inputs of 
the next round of climate modelling. The revised-state of the climate model inputs 
produces a revised state of climate model outputs, once again using the policy 
assessment framework. This is one complete loop. The loops are infinite in nature. 
Outputs from revised-states are re-assessed using the policy assessment framework to 
suggest and propose additional energy policy changes. One single loop does not 
address all outstanding issues highlighted via the policy assessment framework. Each 
loop only offers marginal improvements in China’s energy policy outcome.  
 
IAM Methodologies – Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) for quantitative climate 
modelling and analysis of interactions between the economy, energy sector and 
climate change. 
 
IAM Methodology Classification – the different types of IAMs considered, namely 
Welfare Maximisation, General Equilibrium, Partial Equilibrium, Simulation, Cost 
Minimisation, and Hybrid models. 
 
6 
Mapping Policy Assessment to Model Output – using the Policy Assessment 
Framework to determine whether and where possible improvements can be made to 
China’s energy policy outcomes. If improvements are to be made, they will be 
executed according to a set of Policy Actions 
 
Mapping Policy Action to Model Input – changes in the WITCH model inputs 
resultant from Policy Action. The changed inputs will allow WITCH to be re-run with 
new base-year model inputs to project what the long term impacts are after Policy 
Action has been taken. 
 
Policy Actions – actual energy policy actions and changes in legislation to alter the 
current state of the energy sector. These actual policy actions are grouped into 
Legislative (command and control), Economic (market intensive based), and 
Organisational (e.g. evaluating, monitoring, and holding stakeholders responsible) 
action. 
 
Policy Assessment Framework – multi criteria set of indicators for the assessment of 
China’s base-case, revised case and subsequent cases of policy outcomes. 
 
Policy Dimensions – the five key areas as part of the Policy Assessment Framework, 
namely, Economic Growth, Climate Change Mitigation, Security of Energy Supply 
(SoS), Social Equality, and Governance. 
 
Policy Criteria or Indicator – more detailed subthemes within the 5 policy dimensions 
to tangibly assess policy outcome. For example, the Economic Growth dimension is 
assessed by examining its components, consisting of Balanced GDP Growth, Energy 
Consumption to Production, and Energy Investments. 
 
WITCH – World Induced Technical Change Hybrid, a global energy-economy-
climate model. The model groups the world into different macro regions that 
strategically interact with one another playing an open loop Nash game. The model is 
solved numerically in GAMS/CONOPT every 5 years from 2010 to 2050.  
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1. Introduction 
This research sets out to better understand China’s energy policies and the policy 
making process, as the world’s largest polluter. At present, the generation of energy in 
China is not sustainable. One way to define sustainable energy generation is to 
consider it as the indefinite consumption of electric and non-electric energy, at 
acceptable levels of emissions as projected by the IPCC (2007). With the progression 
of this research, other factors important for balanced energy policy making are 
introduced. 
 
China’s energy infrastructure can still see further development. This presents the 
perfect opportunity today to conduct energy policy analysis and reshape the 
generation mix, in anticipation of ever increasing levels of energy consumption in the 
future. The following section will elaborate on China’s emission concerns in addition 
to other key issues facing Chinese energy policy makers. 
 
1.1. Background and Motivation 
China could benefit from drastic policy change to curb its increasingly unsustainable 
levels of emissions. Rapid economic growth in China has been at the expense of 
environment and social inequality.  
 
From a sustainable energy perspective, GHG emissions are a major concern for 
Chinese energy policy makers. China’s policy concerns were partially spurred on by 
its CO2 emissions exceeding the US for the first time in 2006 (MNP, 2007). This was 
due to China’s reliance on coal, over-riding commitment to growth, development of 
energy intensive sectors, and an inefficient energy infrastructure. Firstly, 
approximately 70% of China’s energy currently comes from coal. For the US, coal 
only accounts for 14% of generation (Fu, 2009). China’s skewed generation mix is 
resultant from an abundant endowment of coal supply and policy choice. Coal-based 
generation receives favourable provincial tax incentives. The policy outcome is more 
economical local generation, rather than importing cheaper hydropower from 
neighbouring provinces in the absence of tax distortions. Secondly, according to the 
Chinese government’s development plan, the sustainable GDP growth rate balanced 
16 
against emissions is 7.2% per annum (Yang, 2008). Actual annual growth rate has 
been 10% for the past three decades. China has demonstrated its commitment to 
economic growth as the primary objective, with emissions as a secondary 
consideration. Thirdly, to support economic growth, China has favoured energy 
intensive industries such as the industrial sector and viewed emissions as a secondary 
concern. Since 1991, China has experienced a relatively lower annual growth in the 
agricultural sector of 5%, whereas the industrial sector grew on average at 13% per 
annum (Yang, 2008). Finally, a significant portion of China’s energy infrastructure is 
inefficient. In the power generation sector, 60GW or 16% of total thermal power 
generation was inefficient in 2008 (Yang, 2008). Out of the 42 GW installed wind 
capacity in August 2010, the China Electricity Council confirmed that only 55% was 
grid connected, thus requiring infrastructure improvements (IEA, 2011a).  
 
Given China’s large and growing carbon footprint, this research is both timely and 
necessary. Whilst China’s energy infrastructure is still relatively less mature than 
some Western counterparts, it presents policy makers the ideal opportunity to take 
radical energy policy action today in order to move towards more balanced energy 
generation and consumption. China’s 12th Five Year Plan has proposed ambitious 
emissions abatement goals by reducing fossil fuel based energy generation (coal, oil, 
and gas) from 90% to 78% and to increase cleaner generation technologies (hydro, 
nuclear, and other renewables) from 8.8% to 13% during the period 2011 to 2015 
(APCO Worldwide, 2010). However, there are limited longer-term goals which are 
beyond a five year horizon released on a regular basis.  
 
The research aims at establishing suitable energy generation strategies in light of CO2 
and emissions concerns over the medium to long-term. Energy policy makers have 
additional goals of security of supply objectives and cost reduction. The balance 
between the three goals is conceptualised by the Policy Trilemma Triangle 
(Hamakawa, 2002). The Policy Trilemma Triangle depicts the three goals of 
achieving target emissions levels, whilst maintaining economic growth (via cost 
minimisation) and improving Security of Energy Supply (SoS). 
 
CO2 Emissions Concerns  
China is the world’s largest emitter of CO2 as a result from overreliance on coal-
powered generation. China’s atmospheric carbon emissions from energy combustion 
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have increased 2.4 times since 2000. Compared to 1990, they have seen a 310% 
increase (Enerdata, 2011).  
 
It is apparent that pressure from the international arena persuaded China to endorse 
the COP16 provisions in Cancun during December 2010. Provisions included the 
acceptance that deep cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions are required, with a 
view to reducing global greenhouse gas emissions so as to limit the increase in global 
average temperature to less than 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Subsequent rounds 
of discussions during COP17 resulted in agreed abatement action with legal force. In 
COP17, negotiators agreed to be part of a legally binding treaty to address global 
warming. The terms of the treaty are to be defined by 2015 and become effective in 
2020. The agreement, referred to as the Durban Platform, is notable in that for the first 
time it includes countries such as China and the US, where China and the US 
originally refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (IEA, 2011a). This step in December 
2011 was a crucial and urgent step and underlines the importance for China’s energy 
policy makers to have the appropriate tools for setting appropriate energy policy 
decisions. 
 
Cost Concerns 
Increasing energy costs of energy generation results in higher costs for factors of 
production. The more expensive factors of production become, the less output is 
generated under and the slower the economic activity. Cost minimisation promotes 
economic growth (Rao et al., 2006). With reference to the Cobb-Douglas production 
function which calculates GPD as a function of capital and labour, economic growth 
is further enhanced if three factors of production can be secured cheaply (Van der 
Werf, 2008). Alongside labour and capital, the supply of energy is one of the key 
factors of production that also needs to be supplied cheaply to boost economic growth 
(Bosetti et al., 2010). In accordance with the production function described, low 
energy costs are a key driver of sustainable GDP growth.  
 
China realises the needs to promote energy generation sustainability, as observed by 
the 12
th
 Five-Year Plan (2011-2015), China has placed greater emphasis on end-use 
sectors to reduce energy intensity and increase efficiency which seems to indicate a 
greatest interest for long term energy sustainability. A suggestion would be to 
promote energy supply-side generation via sustainable sources such as nuclear, 
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hydropower, and renewables. Preliminary observations suggest that the Plan only 
provides short-term targets. For clearer and more coherent energy strategies, a long-
term perspective may be required. 
 
Security of Energy Supply Concerns 
Security of Energy Supply (SoS), in the context of this research, is concerned with 
access to sustainable supplies of natural resources without interruption. If a nation is a 
net importer of a particular natural resource and is dependent on that resource for 
energy generation, growth can be easily curtailed if supplies are disrupted. Depending 
on the availability of specific natural resources, nations may be forced to use 
alternative and more polluting generation fuels, thus reversing efforts of pollution 
abatement. A secure supply source is vital for a stable level of growth and emissions. 
 
Energy supply stability poses policy concerns for China. China is sensitive to global 
wholesale oil and gas prices. It became a net importer of oil in 1993 and a net 
importer of natural gas in 2007 (IEA, 2011a). Furthermore, China has been a net 
importer of coal since 2009, importing 103 million tonnes that year (Yu, 2010). The 
economic slowdown since 2008 coincided with the highest oil prices historically, 
peaking to USD147 per barrel in July 2008 (Kahn, 2009). Subsequently wholesale 
power prices also peaked due to indexation of oil to gas prices, and of gas to 
electricity prices. The oil price shock further points to the importance of moving away 
from traditional hydrocarbon sources. SoS concerns for China calls for the 
development of a policy making tool, such that China can move away from its 
reliance on imported fossil fuels without sacrificing other important policy goals.  
 
The Energy Policy Trilemma Conundrum 
Hamakawa (2002) suggests there is a trade-off between the various energy policy 
goals is commonly assumed to be depicted via the Energy Policy Triangle, which 
postulates that (out of emissions, cost, and SoS), only two goals can be satisfied at one 
time; the third goal is most likely be foregone. Using this approach, three examples of 
generation technologies were positioned in the triangle to illustrate the trade-offs 
between cost, SoS, and emissions. The chosen technologies are coal, natural gas, 
nuclear, and renewable energy technologies (Figure 1.1).  
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Better Policy Outcome
Nuclear, Hydro,
Wind & Solar
Growth  
Figure 1.1: Policy Trilemma Triangle (after Hamakawa, 2002) 
 
Coal plays a major role in China’s energy mix due to its abundance and cheap supply. 
This technology ensures a high SoS and low costs compared to other technologies. 
However, coal is one of the most polluting of the generation technologies available to 
China, which places it opposite to the emission corner of the Triangle. 
 
Natural gas is representative of a relatively cleaner fuel (out of the fossil fuels) with 
reasonable costs. Since China is a net importer of natural gas, there are SoS issues for 
China, thus it is placed opposite SoS on the Triangle. Natural gas could be considered 
the most environmentally friendly fossil fuel, given its lowest CO2 emissions per unit 
of energy and due to its high efficiency when used in combined cycle power stations.  
 
Nuclear power enjoys lower GHG emissions and reasonable SoS for uranium, but is 
costly to construct and operate. Nuclear is placed on the opposite side of the cost 
minimisation corner of the Triangle. Other generation technologies which could be 
situated in the same position as nuclear could be renewable sources such as hydro, 
wind, and solar power. Hydro has been established but requires large upfront 
construction costs. Wind and solar technologies are relatively less established 
compared to hydropower or fossil fuel generation technologies. As technologies 
improve, costs will fall for nuclear, hydro, wind and solar. There is a case to propose 
that nuclear, hydro, wind, and solar power are the most likely candidates for China to 
reach better policy outcomes. Whether China can move towards the centre of the 
Triangle remains to be analysed.  
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The research is motivated by the hypothesis that nuclear, hydro, wind, and solar play 
important roles for China to pursue sustainable levels of emissions, whilst maintaining 
economic growth and being self-sufficient in natural resources. Other forms of clean 
generation technologies such as tidal power, biomass and biofuels have not been 
considered in the Policy Trilemma Triangle because of the following reasons. Tidal 
power, or biomass could have replaced wind and solar as one of the corners of the 
Trilemma. However, as nuclear, wind, and solar have grown at a substantially faster 
pace of development, they were selected to represent the clean generation corner of 
the Tilemma Triangle. Additionally, hydro power is needed to satisfy peaks in the 
grid of power demand. Tidal power is more restrictive compared to wind and solar for 
deployment. Biomass and biofuels have feedstock risk, in that biological material to 
power biomass and biofuel projects could run out leading to SoS concerns. This is 
less of an issue for wind and solar. For simplicity, the research will consider nuclear, 
hydro, wind, and solar power as the main newer clean generation technologies. With 
research motivations discussed, attention shifts to the key research questions as shown 
in the following section. 
 
1.2. Aims, Objectives and Research Questions 
A starting point to understanding the issues facing China’s policy makers in this thesis 
is to use an Energy Policy Triangle. However, the Policy Trilemma Triangle only 
conceptualises the problem; it does not offer guidance on how to reach a better policy 
outcome by moving towards the centre of the Triangle. This research aims to 
formulate an energy policy decision support tool for simultaneously achieving all 
three aspects of emission reduction, cost minimisation, and ensuring SoS 
simultaneously.  
 
To achieve the research aims, the following objectives have been identified: 
• To understand the historical and current Chinese energy policy landscape; 
• To criticise and qualitatively assess energy policy making in China; 
• To criticise and quantitatively assess climate modelling for China; 
• To develop an overarching energy policy assessment framework that combines 
both quantitative and qualitative assessment features and criteria to support 
informed decision making by Chinese energy policy makers; 
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• To apply the energy policy assessment framework to China and test its policy 
suggestions; and 
• To generalise the research outcomes, such that it can potentially be applied 
across other similar nations. 
 
The aforementioned research objectives are vital in formulating the direction the 
research should move towards. Based on the identified aims and objectives, a concrete 
set of research questions had been established to help focus the research direction. 
These research questions are: 
 
Main Question: What kind of overarching framework is suitable, and what 
qualitative and quantitative elements are appropriate, to help 
Chinese policy makers take informed energy policy actions
1
 for 
reducing CO2 emissions in light of its ambitious economic growth 
targets and SoS issues and how it can be applied? 
 
Sub Questions:  
 
 
• Do clean generation sources such as nuclear, hydropower, 
wind and solar power offer a viable alternative generation mix 
for China in the future to reduce emissions, minimise energy 
security issues, whilst boosting growth? 
• What energy policy lessons can be learnt for China? 
• What is the value of generalising the assessment methodology 
and policy lessons learnt, for application to China’s 
neighbouring nations? 
• To what extent is the proposed methodology (including the use 
of IAMs
2
) appropriate for energy policy making? 
 
The main research questions along with the sub questions offer suggestions for energy 
policy assessment and policy actions, in a static and one-off context. As China keeps 
                                                 
 
1
 Policy action relates to discretionary policy change and action taken by policy makers. Policy Action 
is grouped into Legislative, Economic and Organisational legislations. It is further defined in the 
Glossary of Terms towards the start of this Thesis 
2
 IAMs are Integrated Assessment Models and are defined in the Glossary of Terms towards the 
beginning of this Thesis. 
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evolving, its energy policy framework also needs to continuously adapt. Thus, a 
longer lasting research deliverable would be to create a dynamic energy policy 
decision support framework for the formation of clearer energy strategies. A decision 
support framework can be repeatedly used for China and potentially can be applied to 
other neighbouring nations. This decision support tool will be referred to as a 
“Framework for Energy Policy Strategy” or “FEPS”. Globally integrated policy 
action is sometimes hampered by localised agendas. To avoid dealing with localised 
agendas across different nations, attention is only focused on one nation, namely 
China as the world’s largest CO2 emitter (IEA, 2011a). Subsequently, the research 
deliverable becomes a “China FEPS” or “CFEPS”. To address the proposed research 
questions, the following section introduces the research scope and methods. 
 
1.3. Research Scope and Methodology Adopted  
The research questions are characterised as multi-factor and highly context-dependent 
which call for a mix of qualitative and quantitative analysis. Amongst various 
research methodologies, Design Science Research (Hevner, et al. 2004; March and 
Storey, 2008), adapted by supplementing with Action Research (Baskerville and 
Myers, 2004), have been chosen to guide the design and execution of the research.  
The research demonstrates a number of key features of Design Science Research:  
• Understanding of the problem context of energy policy in the international 
landscape leads to a sound foundation for initial conception of CFEPS. 
• Empirical studies (e.g. surveys, interviews, and statistical data analysis) at 
several stages enable the initialisation, execution, and refinement of CFEPS.  
• The application of CFEPS produces outputs which are subjected to the analysis 
and lead to further alterations of CFEPS itself. This is reflected in the Feedback 
Loop of CFEPS, which possesses a tied coupling between the design artefact 
(CFEPS components) and their evolution.  
• One key principle of Design Science Research is the verification of research 
methods and outcomes on both theoretical and practical grounds. This principle 
has been reinforced in this research by maintaining a high degree of integration 
of the outcomes from running CFEPS and the input from experts in the energy 
policy field. The work will be subjected to the examination for internal and 
external validity (Trochim, 2006, Watt and van den Berg, 2002). 
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The research starts with an analysis of the main components of Chinese energy policy. 
In doing so, it will become clearer which goals should be aimed at for balanced 
energy policies through a survey, to produce a set of criteria for Policy Assessment 
Framework
3
 for energy policy. The Energy Policy Trilemma Triangle proposes that 
energy policy should seek to balance cost reduction, emissions abatement and SoS.  
 
These three energy policy objectives were expanded through the literature review and 
a survey of energy policy experts. The objective of the survey was to assess 
interviewees’ views on the five key Policy Dimensions that were thought to offer 
greater details of the various energy policy goals that Chinese policy makers should 
consider. These five key Policy Dimensions are refined to be Economic Growth, 
Climate Change Mitigation, SoS, Social Equality, and Governance.  
 
To complement the Policy Assessment Framework, this research has also undertaken 
a quantitative climate modelling exercise via a Hybrid Integrated Assessment 
Model (IAM)
4
 to simulate China before and after energy policy change. IAMs are 
physics-based model (rather than a statistical model) that seek to replicate real life, 
albeit in a simplified fashion. The IAM methodology used by the research is WITCH. 
WITCH combines more than one IAM approach in modelling climate change and 
economic growth in the energy sector. In the base-case (before energy policy change), 
the Hybrid IAM simulates China. Through the use of the Policy Assessment 
Framework, areas of possible energy policy outcome improvement are highlighted 
and suggestions proposed. In the revised-case (after implementing energy policy 
change), the Hybrid IAM is re-run to see whether under the Policy Assessment 
Framework, China has experienced improvements in its energy policy outcome.  
 
                                                 
 
3
 Policy Assessment Framework is a multi criteria set of indicators for the assessment of the merits and 
drawbacks of different energy policy actions. It is further defined towards the beginning of this thesis 
in the Glossary of Terms. 
4
 Hybrid IAM Climate Model refers to the use in this thesis of the WITCH hybrid Integrated 
Assessment Model to generate future energy generation pathways, other energy related and economic 
projections from today up to 2050. It is further defined in the Glossary of Terms towards the start of 
this thesis. 
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This back and forth switching between energy policy analysis and the Hybrid IAM 
Climate Model is represented by the Feedback Loop
5
. The Feedback Loop assumes 
that changes in energy policy can only offer incremental policy outcome 
improvements. A one-off change in energy policy is not enough to get China an 
“optimal” policy condition. The act of (i) running the Hybrid IAM and assessing the 
outcomes via the Policy Assessment Framework, (ii) taking energy policy action, and 
(iii) re-running the Hybrid IAMs and assessing the outcomes via the Policy 
Assessment Framework after policy change, is aimed to move China towards an 
improved energy policy outcome. The more times the Feedback Loop is performed, 
the faster China experiences these incremental policy outcome improvements in its 
energy policy landscape. The maximum number of runs would be restricted by the 
amount of time and resources the user had at hand.  
 
The Chinese Framework for Energy Policy Strategy (CFEPS) encapsulates the three 
aspects of Policy Assessment Framework, Hybrid IAM and Feedback Loop. CFEPS 
has been subjected to a series of testing and refinements through the execution and 
empirical studies for validation and demonstration purposes. The information sources 
for quantitative analysis are drawn from the IPCC (2007) for emissions data, IEA 
(2011) for energy data, and United Nations (2010) and World Bank (2011) both for 
macroeconomic data. 
 
1.4. Thesis Preview 
The workflow is segregated into five sections, which are the i) research impetus, ii) 
qualitative energy sector and policy review, iii) quantitative Hybrid IAM Climate 
Modelling, iv) Feedback Loop, and v) analysis of the research questions. A preview 
of the thesis chapters and works flow is offered through Figure 1.2. A review of work 
from existing research is presented in Chapters 2 and 3 is indicated in grey font and 
presents a literature review of international and Chinese energy policy respectively. 
Chapter 3 is presented in black font and reviews the literature of IAM methodology. 
                                                 
 
5
 The Feedback Loop is an iterative process used in CFEPS to make incremental improvements in the 
outcome of energy policy. For a more detailed explanation, please refer to the Glossary of Terms. 
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CFEPS is highlighted in red, alongside the three constituent parts of the Policy 
Assessment Framework, Hybrid IAM, and the Feedback Loop. 
 
Chinese energy policies overview
• Historical and current market structure, 
and regulatory overview
Chinese energy sector review
• Supply and demand analysis
China is the world’s largest CO2 emitter
• China overtook the US as the largest CO2 emitter in 2006
Increasing pressure from Conference of Parties (COP) 
• China and the US acceded to COP17 with legal cuts to GHG by 2020
China’s Energy Plans and Legislation sets out ambitious abatement targets
• Reduce carbon emissions increasing energy efficiency through clean generation
Global energy policies overview
• Overview for energy policy tools to 
promote sustainable gen and cons
Emission assumptions
• Survey carbon emission caps to meet 
temperature targets from IPCC.
Energy Sector & Policy Analysis (Ch2)
Energy sector assumptions 
• Sector assumptions from IEA
Research Impetus (Ch1)
Policy Evaluation Feedback Loop and Possible Energy Policy Actions (Ch5&6)
Climate Modelling Assumptions (Ch3)
Macro assumptions
• Macroeconomic assumptions from UN
• Population projection from World Bank
Critique / synthesis an eval frmwrk
• Critique of in use assessment frameworks 
for energy policy evaluation
• Synthesise via survey a set of criteria
Policy Assess Frmwk Critique (Ch2&4)
Critique / adapt IAM methodology
• Critique of Global IAM methods
• Critique of Chinese IAM methods
• Adapt existing IAM method for China
Hybrid IAM Critique (Ch4)
Climate model run of base case (Ch5)
• Modelling base case without policy intervention
Base Case Energy Policy Assessment (Ch6.2)
• Apply policy evaluation criteria to model results and   highlight 
areas for improvement (economic, environmental, SoS, social 
equity or institutional governance)
Energy Policy Action (Ch6.3)
• Suggest energy policy change or additional 
policy tools to improve areas highlighted 
Revised Case Policy 
Assess (Ch6.4&6.5)
• Re-run IAM to evaluate 
the impact of proposed 
policy changes on China 
to make suggestion for 
improvements
CFEPS
Addressing the research questions
• Chinese and global energy policy.
• Energy generation mix and the role of nuclear and renewables.
• Appropriateness of proposed methodology using IAM and feedback loop.
Analysis of Research Outcome and Approach Adopted (Ch7)
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Figure 1.2: The thesis preview 
 
Research impetus, related to Section 1.1, introduces why energy policy research is 
timely and necessary with respect to reducing emissions to a sustainable level in 
China. During COP17, China agreed to cut emissions and ushers in a new era of 
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global pollution abatement. China’s plans and legislation propose energy policies that 
target ambitious abatement levels. China’s Five Year Plans in particular, offer an ideal 
opportunity for an updated and on-going understanding of China’s energy policies, 
because it outlines the nation’s goals in all areas of the economy, including the energy 
sector in five-yearly time blocks. With the research impetus set out, two parallel 
strands form the next step, which are the qualitative energy policy review, and 
quantitative Hybrid IAM Climate Modelling section. 
 
A qualitative discussion of energy policy legislation forms the first part of the parallel 
strand of analysis in Chapter 2 and 3. Situated alongside the qualitative discussion is 
the quantitative Hybrid IAM Climate Modelling as presented in Chapters 4. This 
section, related to Chapter 2, provides the literature review on energy policy actions 
globally and for China. The review seeks to gain a stronger understanding of the 
Chinese energy system through examining the policy making process set against a 
detailed supply and demand stimulation of the Chinese energy infrastructure. It also 
examines further the Chinese energy sector to form a better grasp of where policy 
outcome improvements can be applied via discretionary energy policy in China. In 
anticipation of energy policy suggestions, the second half of this section surveys and 
produces a synthesis of energy policy assessment framework
6
.  
 
Quantitative Climate Modelling forms the second parallel strand alongside qualitative 
energy analysis. The Hybrid IAM Climate Model
7
 consolidates economic, climate 
change and energy sector data which feeds as input into climate modelling. As shown 
in Chapter 3, the quantitative modelling element refers to Integrated Assessment 
Modelling (IAM) to simultaneously address concerns of economic growth, emission 
and energy sustainability. From the review of global and Chinese IAMs, an adapted 
climate model is selected as the basis of the quantitative analysis for this research. 
Chapter 4 sets out the research methodology that extends a parallel analysis of the 
qualitative and quantitative components of the research. Section 4.1 takes a qualitative 
                                                 
 
6
 Policy Assessment Framework provides indicators to assess energy policy actions. It is further 
defined in the Glossary of Terms towards the start of this Thesis 
7
 Climate Modelling refers to the use of IAMs to project energy generation pathways subject to 
different levels of pollution abatement. The full definition is located in the Glossary of Terms at the 
start of this Thesis. 
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perspective of Chinese energy policy and produces a synthesis of CFEPS assessment 
framework via an in-depth survey analysis of crucial policy assessment criteria items. 
This synthesis allows the research to examine the impact of energy policy suggestions 
before and after they are applied to China. Section 4.2 proposes and adapts the 
WITCH
8
 model to evaluate China energy landscape and forms basis of the 
quantitative analysis for this research. WITCH is used to study four different pollution 
abatement scenarios ranging from Business as Usual (no abatement efforts) to 750pm, 
600ppm and 450ppm (450ppm as the harshest abatement effort). Model outputs 
related to economic growth are based on the Growth Module of the WITCH model 
(Equations (3) and (4) from Section 4.2.1). Model outputs on the energy sector are 
based on the Energy Module of WITCH (Equations (5), (6), and (7) from Section 
4.2.1). Emission outputs relate to the Climate Change Module (Equations (8) and (9) 
from Section 4.2.1). Data is drawn on publications from international organisations 
IPCC (2007) for emissions data, IEA (2011) for energy data, and United Nations 
(2010) and World Bank (2011) both for macroeconomic data. Domestic data are 
drawn from Chinese governmental institutions including NDRC, NEA, and NEC 
(Burke et al., 2009). 
 
The research combines the qualitative policy review with the quantitative Hybrid 
IAM Climate Modelling in a Feedback Loop
9
. Results from the base-case model runs 
are presented in Chapter 5. From the synthesis of the policy evaluation framework 
proposed under CFEPS
10
, the Feedback Loop is established in Chapter 6 to make 
proposals for policy action. China’s base-case is evaluated via sensitivity analysis in 
Chapter 6.2 with a view to highlight areas of possible energy policy outcome 
improvements. Policy action is proposed to improve China’s energy make-up, which 
impacts the climate model inputs. Suggested areas of policy outcome improvement 
are summarised in Chapter 6.3 which sets out where policy action is advisable for 
                                                 
 
8
 WITCH stands for World Induced Technical Change Hybrid. This is a global energy-economy-
climate model and solved numerically in GAMS/CONOPT via 5-yearly periods. It is further defined 
before the Table of Contents within the Glossary of Terms. 
9
 The Feedback Loop relates to the interaction between climate modelling and energy policy review. It 
is defined in the Glossary of Terms towards the start of this thesis. 
10
 The CFEPS stands for China’s Framework for Energy Policy Strategy and is defined in the Glossary 
of Terms towards the beginning of this thesis. 
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energy policy implements. Chapter 6.4 re-runs the climate model after policy actions 
have been taken to generate a revised state. The assessment of the revised state is 
performed in 6.5. Chapter 7 presents an analysis of research outcomes and revisits the 
research questions. Chapter 8 makes concluding remarks, highlights limitations and 
proposes future work to overcome the limitations. 
 
The thesis links the qualitative energy policy review and the quantitative Hybrid IAM 
Climate Modelling in two ways. Firstly, the model projects how energy should be 
used in the future. Clearer energy policies can be inferred from the climate model 
output to map future policy decisions. Areas of energy sector deficiencies and policy 
outcome improvements are highlighted by analysing the model outputs over time. 
Secondly, the iterative loop encapsulated by CFEPS, aids government official make 
sustainable energy policy choices. Today’s energy policies are assessed against a 
synthesis of what constitutes a successful energy policy outcome. The synthesis 
highlights possible areas of policy outcome improvements and which energy policy 
actions can help. The suggested policy change alters the model input. Based on the 
revised inputs, the climate model is re-run to assess the effect on the economy. Re-
running the model also gauges the sensitivity of China’s energy systems to specific 
policy changes. This re-running of the model in addition to the Hybrid IAM Climate 
Model has seen limited use in the field of Chinese energy policies studies. The 
research contribution of applying the model in an iterative manner, along with other 
contributions, is discussed next. 
 
1.5. Potential Research Contributions 
From the set of research objectives and research questions, there are three potential 
contributions to the existing body of research: theoretical contribution - the creation of 
an energy policy assessment framework to help examine policy effectivenss in China, 
practical contribution - the application of this assessment framework to China and 
novel contribution - feedback loop to study Chinese energy policy in a dynamic 
fashion. 
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Theoretical Contrition: the Creation of the Multi-criteria Energy Policy 
Assessment Framework 
The creation of a framework to examine Chinese energy policy is the first potential 
research contribution. For effective and efficient energy policy making, there must be 
a set of evaluation criteria to help set the policy in the first place and subsequently to 
evaluate the policy. The Energy Policy Trilemma offers a starting point for what 
constitutes a balanced set of sustainable energy policy criteria. This research sought to 
elaborate further and tailor these energy policy assessment criteria items for China via 
a survey of European and Chinese energy policies and climate change experts.  
 
This research is amongst the first to use a hybrid IAM methodology, to explicitly 
study China. The proposed hybrid methodology simultaneously performs a top-down 
and bottom-up analysis, via the WITCH IAM. It allows policy makers to keep a 
strategic macro oversight of growth and welfare maximisation (top-down), whilst 
capturing greater energy sector cost-minimisation detail (bottom-up). WITCH has 
benefits over other IAMs, as the top-down view is useful for the centralised Chinese 
Communist Party to design energy policies to be executed, whilst the bottom-up 
perspective allows local Chinese provincial authorities to receive guidance on how to 
execute the energy policies.  
 
Practical Contrbution: the Application of the Multi-criteria Energy Policy 
Assessment Framework 
The application of the the framework is the second main potential contribution. The 
proposed framework will be run to examine targets of the current five year plan (the 
base-case). Energy policy analysis is performed on whether China can achieve those 
five-yearly targets. If the targets are deemed as not achieved, areas for improvements 
on the current targets are highlighted policy actions prescribed. The model will be re-
run to capture the improved policy outcome (revised case), which completes one turn 
of the Feedback Loop.  
 
Novel Contribution: the Feedback Loop and Future Applications of the 
Framework 
A one time application is a static approach to examine policy effectivenss. The thesis 
has presented a (dynamic) looped application to examine China’s current energy 
policy effectives. In this thesis, a feed-back loop between the Hybrid IAM Climate 
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Model and energy policy analysis will be created whereby an iterative policy decision 
support approach helps move China towards a better state with respect to climate 
change, SoS, and growth, as described in the Policy Trilemma. The loop starts off 
with the climate model as the base-case before policy change. From the model outputs, 
this research switches to energy policy assessment to propose policy outcome 
improvements (the cause), subsequently switching back to the climate model 
depicting an altered state of a nation after implementation of energy policy changes 
(the effect). The logic behind the Feedback Loop assumes in the base-case there are 
shortcomings portrayed in the climate model outputs. These short comings are 
assessed using the policy assessment framework. Areas of possible energy policy 
outcome improvements are highlighted. To improve the highlighted areas, policy 
actions are proposed which revise the inputs of the next round of climate modelling. 
The new revised-state of the climate model inputs produces a revised state of climate 
model outputs. This is one complete loop. The loops are infinite in nature. Outputs 
from revised-states are re-assessed using the policy assessment framework to suggest 
and propose additional energy policy changes. One single loop does not address all 
outstanding issues highlighted via the policy assessment framework. Each loop only 
moves China marginally closer to an improved policy outcome state. Having 
discussed the research methodology and potential contributions to the existing body 
of research, the initial research observation is made in the following section. 
 
The Feedback Loop as shown in Chapter 6 is infinite in nature; one single policy 
change is not the ‘silver bullet’ that allows China to address all outstanding energy 
policy issues. Instead, the effect of policy change builds over time to seek gradual 
outcome improvements. The thesis has run 1.5 loops to show the mechanics of the 
link between IAM modelling and policy analysis. Future work would be to run the 
analysis in a dynamic fashion, with more iterations, to get greater accuracy. The 
research does not show additional iterations, which can be performed in future work.  
 
1.6. Initial Observations  
Initial observations suggest nuclear, hydro, wind, and solar power could make 
significant contributions for China’s pollution abatement efforts whilst both 
minimising the dampening effect on growth, and adhering to strict pollution 
abatement scenarios. China has acknowledged the importance of nuclear and 
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renewable power generation in the latest 12
th
 Five Year Plan which spans from 2011 
to 2015 through commitments to increase nuclear generation capacity by over 400% 
(Meisen and Hawkins, 2010). Furthermore, China is making progress towards 
reducing its dependence on traditional fossil fuels, especially to reduce coal-based 
generation. In light of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant incident on 11 
March 2011, the Chinese government has temporarily put on hold new approvals of 
nuclear plants. Hence further analysis of which exogenous shocks may occur and how 
they impact public sentiment and policy makers’ decisions require further 
consideration. The risk of future natural disasters should be taken into consideration 
to gauge public opinion and social sensitivities towards nuclear power.  
 
This Chapter introduced the research motivations, research questions, methodology, 
contributions and initial observations. The following Chapter reviews the literature on 
global and Chinese energy policies.  
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2.  Literature Review of Energy Policy 
China has been overly dependent on conventional carbon-heavy energy sources for 
energy generation with over 70% of generation coming from coal (Fu, 2009). 
Problems with pollution have been exacerbated by issues concerning the security of 
energy supply since China became a net importer of oil in 1993 and of natural gas in 
2007 (IEA, 2011a). Furthermore, China has also been a net importer of coal since 
2009, importing 103 million tonnes in that year (Yu, 2010). To move away from 
carbon-based energy and seek more sustainable generation capacity, China should 
consider implementing policy change.  
 
To better understand China’s energy policy landscape, this thesis firstly reviews 
energy policies in use across other nations. Energy policies from the rest of the world 
will form the basis of what can be implemented in China. This section will examine 
how other nations have promoted sustainable energy generation before concentrating 
on China’s energy policy.  
 
2.1. Global Energy Legislations and Policy Actions  
In most of the major polluting countries, it is possible to identify a flagship legislation 
that represents the key piece of energy and climate change related legislation through 
which lawmakers have attempted to abate pollution. The nations reviewed in 
alphabetical order include Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, the EU, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, the UK, and US. 
 
Australia passed its Clean Energy Act in 2011. The objectives of the Clean Energy 
Act are to enforce Australia’s obligations under the Climate Change Convention and 
Kyoto Protocol. The Act supports the nation’s interest in ensuring that average global 
temperatures increase by not more than 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels (Marchal 
et al., 2011).  
 
Brazil passed its National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC) in 2009. The NPCC is 
based on Brazil's international commitment with the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The policy incorporates all previous 
government instruments such as the National Plan on Climate Change and the 
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National Fund on Climate Change. It hopes to achieve a reduction target of between 
36.1% and 38.9% of projected GHG emissions by 2020 (Townshend et al., 2011). 
 
Canada passed its Environmental Protection Act and Efficiency Act in 2007. The 
purpose of the Act is to ensure the nation takes effective and timely action to meet its 
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol (Crook, 2010). 
 
Chile passed its National Climate Change Action Plan in 2008. The plan proposes the 
goals of evaluating environmental and socioeconomic impacts of climate change. This 
creates mitigation measures to reduce GHGs. The plan also encourages more public 
participation in terms of better education of the general public and greater 
investigation into climate change damages (Townshend et al., 2011).  
 
China’s Five Year Plan which was introduced in 2011 will be discussed in detail in 
Section 2.2 (Fu, 2011).  
 
The EU’s Climate and Energy Package (CARE) was introduced in 2008. The package 
comprises four complementary legislations. It firstly, sets out to revise and 
strengthening of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). Secondly, it aims to 
increase efforts in sharing and reducing GHG emissions fairly, via accounting for the 
relative wealth of the EU Member States. Thirdly, its goal is to create a common 
framework for the production and promotion of energy from renewables. Finally, its 
goal is also to create a common legal framework for the environmentally safe 
geological storage of CO2 (Krebel, 2009).  
 
India’s National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) was introduced in 2008. 
The NAPCC outlines existing and future energy and climate change policies directed 
at climate change mitigation and adaptation. The plan aims to increase generation 
capacity in solar and wind, in addition to lifting energy conversion efficiency levels 
(Marchal et al., 2011).  
 
Indonesia’s Presidential Regulation on the National Council for Climate Change 
(NCCC) was also introduced in 2008. The national goals of the NCSS are to improve 
adaptation, mitigation, transfer of technology, funding, and forestry and land use 
(World Bank, 2011).  
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Japan’s Law Concerning the Promotion of Measure to Cope with Global Warming 
was first introduced in 1998 and later amended in 2005. This law establishes the 
Council of Ministers for Global Environmental Conservation and develops the Kyoto 
Achievement Plan (Hirata, 2010). 
 
Mexico’s Law for the Use of Renewable Energies and for the Finance of the Energy 
Transition (LUREFET) was introduced in 2005 and later revised in 2008. LUREFET 
seeks to reduce the nation’s dependence on hydrocarbons by promoting renewables 
and clean technology for electricity generation (Marks, 2008). 
 
Russia’s Climate Doctrine was introduced in 2009. The doctrine sets strategic 
guidelines for the development and implementation of climate policy. Its primary 
focus is on improving research to better understand the climate system and assess 
future impacts and risks (Townshend et al., 2011). 
 
South Africa’s Vision Strategic Direction and Framework for Climate Policy was 
introduced in 2008. The policy proposes better actions in GHG emission reductions, 
intensification of current initiatives, preparing for the future, vulnerability and 
adaptation, and alignment, coordination and cooperation among climate stakeholders. 
Its main objective is for emissions to stop growing by 2025 and to stabilise for up to 
ten years to 2035 (Marchal et al., 2011). 
 
South Korea’s Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth was introduced in 2009. 
This law creates the legal framework for mid to long-term emissions reduction targets. 
There are also provisions for, cap-and-trade, carbon tax, carbon labelling, carbon 
disclosure, and the expansion of renewables (Lee, 2010). 
 
UK’s Climate Change Act was introduced in 2008. The Act provides a long-term 
framework for improving carbon management, promoting the transition to a low 
carbon economy, and encourages investment in low carbon goods. It also specifically 
includes to set emissions reduction targets (at least 80% reduction from 1990 levels 
by 2050) and creates five-yearly carbon budgets (DECC, 2010). 
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Although the US does not have integrated federal climate change legislation, there are 
several meaningful measures. These meaningful measures include the Executive 
Order 13514, Energy and Economic Performance, and the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act. Executive Order 13514 makes GHG emission reduction a priority 
for federal agencies. It establishes a report requirement with detailed targets and 
deadlines. The focus is on transportation, overall energy use and procurement policies. 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act promotes the stimulus package that 
supports new and existing renewables and energy efficiency projects to the value of 
USD18.6bn (United States Library of Congress, 2011). 
 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) Conference of 
Parties is a global climate change policy. In 2009 the COP developed and developing 
countries pledge to reduce emissions by 2020 under the 'Copenhagen Accord' and set 
the goal of limiting global temperature rise to below 2°C. In 2010, the 'Cancun 
Agreement' formalises Copenhagen Accord pledges of the 2°C.  
 
This flagship legislation section is summarised in Table 2.1. Appendix 1 shows more 
comprehensive details. They are commonly integrative laws that bring together the 
various strands of current and newly proposed climate change regulations under a 
single legislative umbrella.  
 
Table 2.1: Global climate change policy initiatives and flagship legislation (Marchal 
et al., 2011 and Townshend et al., 2011) 
Country Flagship national legislation 
Australia Clean Energy Act 
Brazil National Policy on Climate Change 
Canada Canadian Environmental Protection Act and Efficiency Act 
Chile National Climate Change Action Plan 
China Five Year Plan 
EU Climate and Energy Package 
India National Action Plan on Climate Change 
Indonesia Presidential Regulation on the National Council for Climate Change 
Japan Promotion of Measure to Cope with Global Warming 
Mexico Inter Secretariat Commission on Climate Change 
Russia Climate Doctrine 
S Africa Vision Strategic Direction and Framework for Climate Policy 
S Korea Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth 
UK Climate Change Act 
US Executive Order 13514, American Recovery and Re-Investment Act 
Global United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC)  
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This overview of global flagship legislations indicates that in every nation, there is a 
mixture of hard targets that are adhered to and soft incentives that promote a 
particular energy generation development. This notion of applying a mixture of hard 
targets and soft incentives is also observed in China and shall be revisited in Section 
2.3. With an introductory understanding of global energy policies, attention now 
focuses on China to understand its energy policies in detail. Before examining the 
mixture of hand and soft targets, it is important to review China’s energy legislation 
to understand the evolution of energy policies as they have developed and key policy 
makers of the nation. 
 
2.2. Chinese Energy Legislations and Policy Actions  
Chinese energy policy discussions are made in reference to policy historically and the 
current decision makers in China’s energy policies. China’s natural resource 
endowment, patterns of resource consumption is also examined, before looking at 
various nations’ flagship energy and climate change legislations. In reflection of these 
legislation and policy actions, Appendix 2 charts the performance of China’s 
historical energy policy performance quantitatively. The indicators include economic 
growth, economic structure (for example R&D investment and urbanisation), 
population and resources (carbon and sulphur dioxide), and public services and 
quality of life. This development criteria items are how the World Bank quantitatively 
assesses the performance of China. These quantitative indicators show that China is 
developing economically at a fast speed, where GDP grew at 18% per annum during 
2010. However, the figures for carbon dioxide (120% growth per annum during 2010) 
and sulphur dioxide (80% growth per annum during 2010) show that economic 
growth has been at the expense of the environmental damage.  
 
2.2.1. Energy Policy in Recent History  
Chinese energy institutions are part of a complex, hierarchical Chinese political and 
economic system. Much like China’s other institutions, governmental energy agencies 
have experienced drastic change since the 1940s (Zhao, 2001). In this section, the key 
time periods in China’s energy policy history is examined from its Soviet era to today.  
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Soviet-Style Policy Era (1949-1980) 
The Soviet-style policy era (1949-1980) centred on central resource allocation. 
Procurement quantity and prices are set with little attention to the environment and 
efficiency. As a result, the energy sector was dominated by the central government. 
The State Planning Commission (SPC, currently the State Development Planning 
Commission, SDPC), was established in 1952. The State Economic Commission 
coordinated and monitored the implementation of annual and short-term plans.  
 
The central ministries concentrated on short-term 5 year planning for energy 
production; and provided only rough guidelines in the medium to long-run strategies. 
Aside from the 15-Year Electrification Program formulated in the early 1950s, no 
long-term strategic plan was established for the development of the energy sector 
before 1979 (Levine, 1990). 
 
Transition from Central Planning to a Market Economy (1981-1992)  
The era of initial reforms (1981-1992) began to place equal emphasis on energy 
supply and conservation. During the 1980s, China opened trade and commerce to the 
rest of the world. China experienced rapid economic development and a shortage in 
energy supply.  
 
The Ministry of Energy was formed as a coordinating body of the newly created 
corporations. However, its functions were limited to developing an energy strategy, 
planning long-term production, and overseeing major energy-development projects. 
Large energy corporations, formed from former ministries, still maintained 
administrative powers. Hence, no single institution was actively coordinating the 
various sub-sectors of the energy industry during the period between 1980 and 1992 
(NRC, 2000). 
 
Reassertion of Central Government Control (1993-1998) 
From 1993, the SPC and the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) 
coordinated policies across energy sub-sectors. During the 1980s, central government 
could not control energy production and consumption due to the lack of institutional 
capacity of the Ministry of Energy to coordinate production in the energy sector. The 
government disbanded the Ministry of Energy and used the SETC as a coordination 
agency to manage short-term production planning and to supervise the production of 
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energy in different energy subsectors. The SPC was responsible for long-term 
planning and macroeconomic policy and project selection. The distribution of 
authority among an increased number of government agencies reduced effective 
coordination among sectors and at times resulted in the duplication of policy action 
(Sinton et al., 1999). 
 
Further Market-Oriented Management (1998-2005) 
In March 1998, the government announced a radical reorganisation and streamlining 
of government agencies (Yang, 2008). The number of ministries and commissions 
under the State Council was reduced from 40 to 29. In the energy sector, the 
reorganisation sought to simplify, and further centralise coordination. The outcome of 
this reorganisation was more control was given to the SDPC (formerly the SPC), 
responsible for national social and economic planning. It formulates medium and 
long-term plans and allocates resources for sectoral development. The Department of 
Basic Industry within the SDPC formulates policy strategy and plans for energy and 
transportation development. This included railway, aviation, transportation, power, 
coal, and energy conservation subsectors (Zhao, 2001). 
 
China’s 11th FYP (2006-2010) 
The 11
th
 FYP held growth and development as its primary goal, but started to reflect 
the nation’s growing concern with the environmental costs whilst addressing social 
inequality and governmental responsibilities. The World Bank (2009) evaluated the 
successfulness of the 11
th
 FYP, which are categorised into economic development, 
environmental and pollution abatement, energy imports, social inequality and 
urbanisation, and monitoring and responsibilities of governmental institutions. The 
summary of findings is presented in Appendix 3, with a detailed discussion presented 
below.  
 
Economic Development 
China targeted 7.5% GDP growth per annum over the 5 year period leading up to 
2010, as compared to 9.5% achieved over the previous 10
th
 FYP. From 2006 to 2007, 
growth was 12% and remained in double digits for the remainder of the period leading 
up to 2010. This growth-centric outcome exceeded both the 7.5% target rate of the 
11
th
 FYP, but more importantly, it exceeded the growth figure calculated by Yang 
(2008) that sought to balance economic development against emissions. Higher rates 
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of growth need greater energy production. This associated energy production has a 
level which balances generation output against emissions. In this context that level is 
deemed as the “efficient” level of energy generation, or the associated “efficient” 
level of growth. Before the balanced growth level is reached, one additional MW of 
electricity produced one GT of carbon at a decreasing rate. Beyond the balance 
growth rate, one extra MW of electricity results in an increasing GT of carbon 
production. Growth of 7.5% exceeds the balanced rate (Yang, 2008).  
 
A 2% share of GDP was expected to be spent on R&D by 2010, compared to a target 
of 1.5% of GDP for 2005. The continuing upwards trend of R&D spending saw China 
achieving its 2% of GDP spending target, with an increasing proportion of R&D 
spending coming from the private sector. From 2003-2006, 9% of R&D spending 
came from private, rather than public sources (Bloom, 2011).  
 
China aimed to remove remaining distortions in the tax system that subsidises 
manufacturing to discourage waste. The changes in fiscal and tax policy are expected 
to help adjust the structure of production; they included a VAT system as well as 
remaining preferential tax treatment of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Successful 
policy outcome is dependent on creating a fair and competitive market environment 
so one industry is not favoured over another (Yang, 2008).  
 
Environmental and Pollution Abatement 
One of the most high profile targets of the 11
th
 FYP is the 20% intensity reduction 
(equating to an average of 4.4% reduction per annum) via decreasing energy 
consumption per unit of GDP. China previously achieved a 4.1% per annum reduction 
in energy intensity over 1980-2000. For 2010, this policy goal had mixed results. 
Between 2005 and 2010, energy intensity dropped by 1.3% and in 2007, energy 
intensity dropped by 3.3%. Although the reduction in energy intensity is far less than 
the annual average of 4.4% per annum needed to achieve the 20% reduction target. In 
2010, energy intensity was reduced by 19.1%. Despite China’s efforts, the target 
suffered setbacks due to a number of reasons, including a lack of clear pathways, and 
a higher than anticipated economic growth taken by Chinese leaders in response to the 
global economic crisis (Seligsohn, 2010).  
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China’s 10% reduction of emission of major pollutants relates to chemical oxygen 
demand (COD) and sulphur dioxide (SO2). COD grew by 1% from 2005 to 2006 and 
fell by 3% in 2007. Again for SO2, levels grew by 1.5% in 2006 and fell by 5% in 
2007. A 10% fall from 2005 levels proves to be a challenging task for both types of 
major pollutants (Hannon et al., 2011).  
 
The “Ten Key Projects” initiative, launched in 2004, is incorporated into the 11th FYP. 
It provides financial incentives for local governments and industry to pursue a wide 
range of energy-saving projects. The nation earmarked USD 1bn in incentives for the 
implementation of the ten key projects in the areas of coal industrial boilers or kilns, 
waste heat recovery/waste power recovery, petrochemical conservation or substitution, 
electrical machinery energy saving system, and energy system optimisation. Payment 
mechanisms work in two phases, whereby 60% of the project’s capital costs are paid 
upfront and the remaining 40% are to be provided after the technology is installed and 
actual energy savings are evaluated. In 2007, officials approved 546 projects and in 
2008 more than 1,200 applications were received. The stimulation of activity proved 
to be a success, but the acid test of success may be clearer when the remaining 40% is 
paid when projects are operational (Bloom, 2011).  
 
The “Top 1000 enterprises energy conservation action” aims to reduce energy 
consumption of the top 1000 companies. The energy consumption of the top 1000 
enterprises accounted for 33% of national and 47% of industrial energy usage in 2004. 
In 2007, the National Department of Resource (NDRC) released interterm results 
through the Top-1000 Enterprises Energy Use Report 2007. The report indicated that 
final energy consumption of the Top-1000 enterprises had increased from 733 Mtce 
(21.5 EJ) in 2005 to 797 Mtce (23.4 EJ) in 2006. In the absence of additional reports 
by the NDRC, it is difficult to evaluate the degree of policy success (NDRC, 2007). 
 
The goal of establishing a national energy conservation centre aims to facilitate 
information dissemination and training for energy stakeholders. It hopes to strengthen 
the capacity of provincial energy conservation centres and promote the use of a 
standardised auditing and benchmarking system of energy consumption. The ultimate 
aim is to promote energy efficiency and conservation in government agencies and 
private sector enterprises. The effect on the economy may be observable more in the 
medium to long-term, than a five year time horizon (Levine et al., 2009).  
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The objective to strengthen existing and create new financial incentives for energy 
efficiency, including preferential tax policies on energy conservation is currently not 
implemented nationwide and only in isolated areas. Various tax incentives including 
resource taxes, consumption taxes, and energy and carbon taxes were proposed. 
Resource tax programs were piloted in coal-rich Shanxi province, during the 11
th
 FYP 
period but have yet to see country wide implementation (Hannon et al., 2011).  
 
Energy Imports (SoS) 
The 11
th
 FYP targeted a balanced trade in its foreign trade accounts. In the first half of 
the target period, export growth continued to exceed import growth and China’s 
current account surplus has grown to 11% of GDP. China does not specify an import 
or export target for its energy use. Increases or decreases in dependence of China on 
oil and natural gas (in conjunction to other forms of natural resources) was not 
explicitly addressed in this FYP (Zhou et al., 2011).  
 
Social Inequality and Rural Urbanisation 
The government has been increasing spending on rural issues from 1.6% of GDP in 
2005 to 2.0% of GDP in 2008. Central government spending on agriculture and rural 
areas has increased significantly since 2005. At the March 2008 State Council 
meeting, the importance of agriculture was highlighted with an additional RMB 25bn 
(or USD 4bn assuming an exchange rate of 1 USD to RMB 6.24) granted to the rural 
sector in excess of the RMB 4tn (or USD 641bn) budgeted amount for that year, 
largely in the form of increased subsidies or transfers. However, spending as a 
percentage of GDP has remained static at 9% over the period. In other words, 
although the rural population are enjoying a better standard of living, the income 
inequality gap is not narrowing significantly (Hannon et al., 2011).  
 
The urbanisation rate set to increase to 47% in 2010 from 43% in 2005. To achieve 
the 47% urbanisation target of 2010, the 11
th
 FYP promoted rural surplus labour 
transfer. This was achieved via RMB 2.6 billion (or USD 417m) spending between 
2000 and 2007 on these different programmes with the emphasis shifting from 
transferring rural surplus labour to scaling up the transfer of better skilled labourers. 
Several programmes have also improved the skills for agricultural labourers in 
support of agricultural modernisation and rural off-farm employment in agro-
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processing. There is currently no confirmation from official sources on the policy 
success in this area of the 11
th
 FYP (Levine et al., 2011).  
 
Monitoring and Responsibilities of Governmental Institutions 
The 11
th
 FYP aimed to establish a system for monitoring, evaluating, and public 
reporting of energy use and intensity. The process of monitoring energy intensity 
could be improved. The World Bank’s assessment noted that the Plan did not have 
adequate management information systems or monitoring frameworks which enable 
systematic tracking of policies, programmes, and investments at the various levels of 
government. Many core provincial level energy officials have remained in place 
throughout the period, without new institutes dedicated to energy efficiency and 
energy intensity reduction best practices being established in support of the Plan’s 
goals. In certain cases, municipal officials have not reported energy intensity data 
under the 11
th
 FYP. Additionally, the reporting system has been far from uniform 
(Bloom, 2011). 
 
The goal of expanding media programmes was expected to improve awareness of 
energy conservation in end users. The Plan called for better training in energy 
conservation. Examples of this policy in action include the Best Practices in 
Sustainable Building for Design Professionals course in the Solar Valley of Dezhou, 
in China’s Shandong province. Leading industry and academic experts in the field of 
renewable energy, energy efficiency and building technologies deliver courses to 
participants from Chinese state construction and architectural design institutes, 
individual architects, and building professionals from real estate developers.  
 
In the closing months of the 11
th
 FYP, government official had stringent 
environmental targets imposed on them. In attempting to meet the stringent targets, 
the policy makers took environmentally counter-productive actions. For example, 
electricity supplies were cut to hospitals to reduce demand; supplies were also cut to 
traffic lights and factories which brought other negative consequences of energy 
shortages. Additionally, there was an unanticipated pressure on diesel supplies as 
factory owners switched to their off grid-connected generators, producing electricity 
and pollution. Setting targets helps to give energy policy a clear message, but 
successfully achieving the targets is dependent on China’s laws and regulations 
working together in harmony (Hannon et al., 2011).  
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2.2.2.  China Key Energy Policy Decision Makers in 2012 
The previous section elaborates on the historical and current energy legislations in 
place. Only appreciating polices is not sufficient. The review of energy policy in 
China is not complete without a better understanding of China’s energy policy makers. 
China’s energy policy is set by many political institutions. Figure 2.1 depicts the 
regulatory structure and highlights the way the decision makers interact. The 
stakeholders who have input into the formulation of energy policy are the CPC, State 
Council, NDRC, NEC, NEA and SASAC.  
 
CPC
State Council
NDRC NEC
NEA
Local Government
Local SOE
National Level
Local Level
SASAC
 
Figure 2.1: China’s regulatory structure (Burke et al., 2009) 
 
Communist Party of China (CPC) 
The Communist Party of China (CPC) is led by President Hu Jintao. The CPC is the 
supreme political authority in China and develops policies in accordance with the 
Charter of the CPC and the Constitution of the People Republic of China. The policies 
developed by the CPC are executed by the administrative branch of government 
headed by the State Council. The CPC is the supreme political authority, it develops 
energy (and other) policies and sets out the FYP (Constantin, 2007).  
 
State Council  
The State Council is led by Premier Wen Jiabao. The Council is the highest executive 
organ of state power and the highest organ of state administration. It oversees the 
main ministries, bureaus and other institutions and is responsible for carrying out the 
principles and policies of the CPC (Kim, 2008).  
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National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)  
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is the strategic body 
which performs daily management of the State Council’s policy decisions. The 
NDRC sets prices and utilisation of resources. Formerly called the State Planning 
Commission and State Development Planning Commission, the NDRC is a 
macroeconomic management agency directly under the State Council with broad 
administrative and planning control over the economy.  
 
The NDRC has an important role in the development of energy policy which it now 
shares with the recently established National Energy Administration (NEA). The 
NEA manages coal, oil, electricity and gas use. Key areas such as price setting remain 
the responsibility of the NDRC’s pricing department. The major responsibility for 
energy conservation has been taken by the NDRC’s department of resource utilisation 
and conservation (Burke et al., 2009). 
 
In 2010, the National Energy Commission was created in order to better coordinate 
the various bodies involved in the energy sector. It supervises the NEA, created in 
2008, for the organisation in charge of the formulation and implementation of 
medium and long term social and economic growth plans (Enerdata, 2011). 
 
National Energy Commission (NEC) 
The National Energy Commission (NEC) is the strategic body which forms the 
guiding principles and coordinates energy policy. The NEC stems from the National 
Energy Leading Group (NELG) that was established to improve policy formulation. 
Its establishment was announced in March 2008 together with the NEA, the two 
institutions work closely together. The NEA carries out the day-to-day policy action 
functions of the NEC (Zhao, 2007). 
 
National Energy Administration (NEA)  
The National Energy Administration (NEA) takes the lead on energy policy execution. 
The establishment of the NEA and the National Energy Council was announced 
during the March 2008 National People’s Congress. The NEA was initially under the 
jurisdiction of the NDRC as it commenced operation in July 2008. The NEA 
subsequently moved out of the NDRC and established its own office. Since January 
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2009 it has been independent of the NDRC. The NEA’s independence is limited by 
the fact that the key tools it needs to effectively manage the energy sector remain in 
the hands of the NDRC, as the NEA does not possess the authority to set energy 
prices (Constantin, 2007). 
 
State Assets Supervision & Administration Commission (SASAC) 
The State Assets Supervision & Administration Commission (SASAC) is the majority 
shareholder of all State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and lobbies on behalf of them. 
SASAC’s importance as the owner of all SOEs, the institution’s power is extremely 
limited. SASAC does for example not have representatives on the ground in the 
offshore operations of the SOEs, it does not have control over budgets and it does not 
have the authority to collect earnings from the SOEs. This is instead the responsibility 
of the Ministry of Finance (Burke et al., 2009). 
 
In summary, although the CPC sets the unified policy goals, the many different 
institutions that contribute to the implementation of sustainable energy policy in 
China do not always provide a unified policy outcome. The power struggle between 
the NDRC and NEA/NEC is a prime example of the inefficiencies in implementing a 
sustainable energy policy (Constantin, 2007). The CPC set goals, which in theory may 
be effective for pollution abatement, but in practice executing these policies becomes 
inefficient as many organisations are involved (Burke et al., 2009). With a better 
understanding of issues facing the policy decision making process, the following 
section provides a better understanding of China’s resource endowment and 
consumption patterns today.  
 
2.2.3. Natural Resources Endowment and Consumption  
China has a coal-dominated energy resource endowment. Coal makes up 96% of the 
proven fossil-fuel reserves. In contrast, petroleum and natural gas together account for 
the remaining 4%. China’s historical natural resource endowments in coal, has 
allowed it to remain independent on foreign natural resources. Coal represents the 
70% of China’s total primary energy consumption (Fu, 2009). However, due to the 
rapid increase in hydrocarbon demand, China’s oil and gas imports are also increasing. 
Figure 2.2 presents this dependency calculated using imported national resource as a 
percentage of total resource consumption. China became a net importer of oil in 1993 
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and a net importer of natural gas in 2007. Furthermore, China has been a net importer 
of coal since 2009, importing 103 million tons (Yu, 2010). In 2008, China’s net 
import of gas was 9% of total gas consumption and its net import of oil was 48% of 
total oil consumption. The dominance of coal has allowed China to remain less 
dependent on foreign natural resource imports, purchasing 9% of all fossil fuels from 
abroad in 2008. However if the trend is extrapolated into the future, China’s 
dependency on foreign imports of all three natural resources, but especially oil, will 
become a major concern from the perspective of  energy supply security (IEA, 2011a). 
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Figure 2.2: China’s resource self-sufficiency (IEA, 2011a) 
 
The recent oil price increases on the international market and the country’s 
dependence on oil and gas imports have made energy security an important national 
goal. Moreover, the country’s population and economic activities are concentrated in 
the eastern coastal areas, while the majority of the country’s coal, natural gas, and 
hydropower resources are located in the west. This makes it difficult to explore and 
transport energy across the breadth of the country. The resulting impact is that 
China’s generation mix is highly skewed (Yu, 2010).  
 
The skewed generation mix is evident in China’s consumption patterns. Historically, 
China’s consumption and supply has increasingly been dependent on coal and peat. 
As seen in Figure 2.3, this rose from 46% in 1971 to 65% in 2008, whereas combined 
renewables (geothermal, solar, wind, combustible renewables and bio-waste) has 
fallen from 40% in 1971 to 10% in 2008. In absolute terms, combined renewables 
have increased, but the speed of newly commissioned coal-fired plants dwarfs all 
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other forms of energy generation (IEA, 2010a). In the context of pollution abatement 
the reduction of dependence on coal-based generation can benefit from policy change.  
 
Figure 2.3: China’s primary energy supply (IEA, 2010a) 
 
According to BP’s Annual Statistical Review (2011), China is still dependent on 
carbon intensive energy generation mixes today. Fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural 
gas) account for 90% of total consumption, with coal increasing to 70% compared to 
2008 levels. Cleaner energy than the fossils (hydro, nuclear, wind and solar) accounts 
for less than 10%. Hydropower makes a major contribution at 7% through the Three 
Gorges dam. Figure 2.4 illustrates the breakdown between the different generation 
sources; the aggregate percentage exceeds 100% due to rounding.  
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Figure 2.4: China’s energy consumption by generation type (after BP, 2011) 
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The natural resources endowment and availability is heavily biased toward depleting 
carbon-heaving sources. China’s 12th FYP seeks to alter this mix. The targets set out 
by the latest FYP and other flagship energy legislations are discussed in the following 
section. 
 
2.2.4. Flagship Chinese Energy and Climate Change Legislations  
The energy legislation selected as the most relevant to climate change and current are 
the 12
th
 FYP, Renewable Energy Law, Clean Development Mechanism, National 
Climate Change Programme, Energy Conservation Law and public participation. 
These important pieces of legislation are discussed in detail as follows. 
 
12
th
 FYP  
The 12
th
 FYP (2011-2015) intensifies China’s commitment to energy sustainability. 
China’s overall energy objective during the 12th FYP is to maintain coal as the 
dominant source of energy, whilst steadily increasing the proportion of nuclear and 
renewable energy generation. China expects to add 91 GW of additional power 
generating capacity each year from 2010 to 2015. As presented in Figure 2.5, the 12
th
 
FYP sets out ambitious plans to increase the share of sustainable energy (APCO 
Worldwide, 2010).  
 
The 12
th
 FYP (2011-2015) also strengthens China’s green commitment. The 12th FYP 
has ambitious plans to increase the share of sustainable energy. Over the 5 year period, 
coal and oil are to be reduced from 90% to 78%, whereas hydro, nuclear and other 
renewables are to increase from 8.8% to 13% (APCO Worldwide, 2010).  
 
The interaction between different energy generation technologies is vital for greater 
pollution abatement. The CPC believes that growth should not be put in jeopardy 
following the implementation of pollution abatement plans. If GDP growth can be 
taken somewhat as a fixed variable, the energy demand is also a fixed variable. 
Pollution abatement is thus likely to come in the form of switching the generation mix 
away from fossil to cleaner technologies.  
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Figure 2.5: China’s targets for 2015 under the 12th FYP (APCO Worldwide, 2010) 
 
To better understand the interaction between different energy policies, this research 
will base discussion on the six policy goals as set out by the 12th FYP, namely 
decarbonisation, alternative energy, energy efficiency, energy infrastructure, 
transportation and innovation (Table 2.2). The expanded form of Table 2.2 is 
presented in Appendix 4.  
 
Table 2.2: China’s 12th FYP (after Fung and Chu, 2011; Ng and Mabey, 2011) 
Key Policy Area Key Policy Actions 
Decarbonisation 
Carbon intensity reduction  
Pollutants reduction  
Power generation sector 
GHG Tax  
Alternative Energy Increase in sustainable (non-fossil fuel) generation 
Energy Efficiency Energy intensity reduction target 
Energy Infrastructure 
Investment into the power industry 
Investment into the Grid 
Transportation 
Road based 
Rail based 
Innovation % of R&D spending as part of GDP  
 
Decarbonisation 
The 12
th
 FYP recognises the importance of decarbonising China and prescribes a suite 
of mainly regulatory instruments. The FYP attacks decarbonisation via four prongs 
Firstly, carbon intensity is targeted for a 17% reduction per unit of GDP output 
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produced, compared to 2005 (3.5% in 2011). Secondly, the reduction in pollutants is 
aiming at 8% to 10% emissions reduction target of other pollutants such as sulphur 
dioxide, chemical oxygen demand and nitrogen oxides. Thirdly, the power generation 
sector is to be overhauled. The construction of smaller new-built thermal power plants 
(around the 260-270 GW mark) will gradually be phased out over the next five years. 
Coal production will be capped at 3.8 billion tonnes per annum by 2015. Fourthly, A 
GHG tax is expected by 2012 starting from RMB 10 per tonne of CO2 emitted, rising 
to RMB 40 per tonne by 2020 (Fung and Chu, 2011). This is equivalent to USD 1.6 
per tonne of CO2 rising up to USD 6.4 per tonne by 2020. 
 
Alternative Energy 
China expects to reduce its generation mix from traditional energy generation 
technologies to alternative technologies. China’s current generation mix is heavily 
skewed towards coal, accounting for 70% of the generation mix and hydrocarbons 
making up 91%, any policy instruments which require a reduction in emissions may 
naturally move China away from fossil fuel-powered generation towards alternative 
and sustainable generation technologies. China has targeted a 13% generation 
capacity from sustainable sources by 2015 compared to 8.8% in 2010. This is 
expected to cost RMB 2-3 trillion (USD 320-480bn) for renewable energy over the 
next 10 years: RMB 1.5 trillion (USD 240bn) for wind and RMB 200-300 billion 
(USD 32-48bn) for solar (Ng and Mabey, 2011). 
 
Energy Efficiency 
Emissions reduction does not only come from changing the generation mix. If 
consumers were to conserve energy and consume diligently, emissions would also fall. 
Furthermore, energy efficiency could be better targeted by China. The targeted 
outcome of the 12
th
 FYP is a 16% reduction per unit of GDP produced (Fung and Chu, 
2011). 
 
Energy Infrastructure 
The energy infrastructure goal of the FYP is aimed at the electricity generation and 
transmission network across the length and breadth of China. Investment in power 
generation is expected to be RMB 2.75 trillion (USD 440bn) for building new plants. 
This is expected to rise to RMB 11.1 trillion (USD 1.8 trillion) by 2020. China also 
hopes to invest in its transmission network. It plans to invest RMB 2.55 trillion (USD 
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409bn) for power grid construction by 2015, RMB 500bn (USD 80bn) of investment 
on ultra-high voltage (UHV) lines by 2015 and an investment of RMB 4 trillion (USD 
640bn) on “smart grids” by 2020 (Ng and Mabey, 2011).  
 
In January 2009, the State Grid completed China’s pilot UHV line, running 640 km 
from the coal-rich Shanxi province to Hubei province. Subsequently in 2010, the 
NDRC approved expanding the pilot line. An UHV line linked up Shanghai with 
Sichuan’s Xiangjiaba in 2010, while another UHV line linking Sichuan’s Jinping with 
Suzhou in Jiangsu province is expected to be completed in 2012 (EIU, 2011). 
 
Transportation 
Fossil fuel powered vehicles continue China’s reliance on crude oil imports. Not only 
is this a concern for emissions, but also for China’s SoS. The use of new fuel 
technologies and greater fuel efficiency in the transport sector could reduce China’s 
imports of crude oil by 676 million barrels a year by 2020. The 12
th
 FYP 
predominantly targets road and rail transportation energy use. Road-based 
transportation is expected to be RMB 100bn (USD 16bn) of government investment 
in alternative-energy vehicles industry by 2020, with annual sales of 1 million units of 
new energy vehicles by 2015. Rail-based transportation investment is expected to 
reach RMB 3-4 trillion (USD 480-640bn) on its high-speed rail network between 
2011-2015.It is anticipated there will be more than 16,000 km of track-lines by 2015 
(APCO Worldwide, 2010). 
 
Innovation 
Technology finds a way to reduce emissions whilst increasing efficiency. This way, 
China may not need to sacrifice its rate of growth as much, whilst pursuing a climate 
change reversal agenda. The main way China expected to increase the pace of 
innovation is through additional R&D spending. R&D spending is to reach 2.2% of 
GDP by 2015 and 2.5% of GDP by 2020 (Ng and Mabey, 2011). 
 
Renewable Energy Law 
The objectives for China's renewable energy development in the next decade are to 
increase the proportion of renewable energy in total energy consumption. The basis of 
the legal framework for renewable energy is the Chinese Renewable Energy Law. 
Released in its current format in 2006 earlier versions of a renewable energy 
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framework dates back to the 1980s. They included previous recommendations on 
promoting renewable energy for the development of rural energy and rural access to 
electricity. The Law moved China towards market supporting policies of renewable 
energies. It encompassed among others the establishment of responsibilities for 
targets via a market based incentive mechanism as shown in Table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.3: China’s Renewable Energy Law Provisions (Rommeney, 2008) 
Renewable Energy Law Provisions 
Obligation for developers to conduct a competitive tendering process if there is 
more than one applicant for a project licence. 
“Economic and reasonable” fixing of the grid power price, based on bidding 
results, is placed in the hands of the pricing authorities of the State Council. 
Renewable energy priority grid-access and obliges state grid corporations to offer a 
grid connection service in their grid area and to purchase all electric power 
generated from renewable resources according to the feed-in tariff. 
Grid operators pay compensation if unable to meet their purchase obligation. 
Support of renewable energy power systems in rural areas and encourages the 
setting of technical standards, especially for solar energy. 
Promotion of renewable energy through fiscal and tax measures (low-interest loans, 
tax concessions or a development fund) has to be made available. 
 
The three key energy policy actions are proposed in the Renewable Energy Law 
regard grid connection, feed-in-tariffs, quotas and tax relief.  
 
Grid Connection 
The Law provides for the compulsory connection of renewable energy generators to 
the grid and covers hydropower, wind power, biomass, solar power generation, 
geothermal power generation, and tidal power. This may be encouraged via local 
power grid companies being obliged to provide grid-connection services. Furthermore, 
utilities are responsible for the construction of transmission lines for renewable power 
stations and related technical support (Andrew-Speed, 2006). 
 
Feed-in-Tariff 
The China Renewable Energy Law has defined the guiding principles of China’s feed-
in tariff. Although feed-in-tariffs did not originally apply to wind and solar energy, 
the NDRC introduced them for wind power in July 2009 and for solar power in July 
2011 (EIU, 2011). Directives regarding feed-in tariff implementation have been 
enacted in China, such as the Directive on Renewable Energy Power Generation and 
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the Directive on Renewable Power Pricing and Incremental Cost Sharing (Cruz et al., 
2007).  
 
Quotas 
The government introduced a quota system requiring major domestic power producers 
to generate 5% of their power from renewable energy sources (apart from hydro) by 
2010, rising to 15% by 2020 (EIU, 2011).  
 
Tax Relief 
The Renewable Energy Law imposes tax measures to support China’s renewable 
energy industry development. Taxation for renewable energy in China can be 
classified as shown in Table 2.4. For VAT, general rates are at 17%, whereas small 
hydropower, biogas and wind have lower VAT rates. A favourable taxation rate can 
be applied to some renewable energy, such as wind, biomass and small hydropower. 
Income tax is lower than the 33% general tax rate for biogas and wind power at 15%. 
Furthermore, the import of wind power equipment and accessories is presently 
exempt from custom duties. These favourable tax reduction incentives promote the 
use of hydro, biogas and wind as more cost effective (post taxation) compared to 
other technologies without the reduced tax rates (Gao, 2007). 
 
Table 2.4: Taxation policies for renewable energy promotion (Gao, 2007)  
Items VAT Income Tax 
General 17% 33% 
Small hydro power 6% 33% 
Biogas 13% 15% 
Wind 8.5 % 15% 
 
Grant Incentives 
The central government financial authority is to set up a renewable energy fund. It 
hopes to support investments in renewable energy projects by providing a grant or 
incentive subsidies of low interest rates. As an example, Research & Development 
funds on renewable energy offered by the Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MOST) and the central government was RMB 1bn (USD 160m) in total in the last 
decade (IEA, 2007). 
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Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is an instrument allowing industrialised 
countries to invest in projects that reduce emissions in developing countries as an 
alternative to more expensive emission reductions in their own countries. China’s 
ratification of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol 
in 2002 underscored its commitment to developing renewable energy. The protocol 
sets limits on emissions of GHGs in signatory countries, obliging member states to 
reduce GHG emissions by an average 5.2% from 1990 levels for the period 2008-12 
(Romeney, 2008). 
 
Approximately 48% of all CDM trading takes place in China and is popular with the 
Chinese government, which sees it as a model for a future domestic GHG emissions-
reductions regime. However, Chinese companies have been criticised for deliberately 
creating GHGs in order to be paid not to produce them. In December 2009 the UN 
rejected CDM applications from ten Chinese wind projects, stating that the Chinese 
authorities had deliberately cut subsidies in order to make those projects eligible (EIU, 
2011). 
 
The CDM Board China identified three priority areas for CDM project development 
in China which are energy efficiency improvement, development and utilisation of 
new and renewable energy, and methane recovery and utilisation (GTZ, 2007).  
 
Energy Efficiency Improvement 
China’s resources consumption is guided by the principle of developing the energy 
supply and energy conservation simultaneously with priority given to energy 
conservation. To achieve energy conservation, it is fundamental to rely on 
technological improvements. Progress has been made by issuing energy-saving 
policies. These include cogeneration and district heating supply, increasing the 
efficiency of industrial boiler and kiln, recovery and reuse of residual heat, spreading 
energy saving equipment and buildings. 
 
Energy utilisation efficiency has improved in China. However, compared with 
developed countries, energy utilisation efficiency is still low. Energy consumption for 
unit production value is 2.4 times more than that of the international average level and 
the unit energy consumption for major industrial products is 40% higher than that of 
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the international advanced level. The gap in energy utilisation efficiency between 
China and its foreign neighbours indicates a thoroughgoing work of energy 
conservation should be urgently conducted. There exists immense energy saving 
potential in China (Bjørkum, 2005). 
 
Development and Utilisation of New and Renewable Energy 
The use of renewable energy resources plays a key strategic role in maintaining 
balance between energy supply and demand in China. The Chinese Government has 
therefore consistently promoted renewable energy. Small hydropower installations 
provide 100kWh of power annually.  
 
Renewable energy has begun to play a role in the energy structure, and it has the 
potential for large scale development. Until 2020, the major renewable technologies 
for CDM projects may be wind power, small hydropower, and biomass power. 
Considering that project lifetimes are on average 15 years, the accumulated carbon 
emission reduction will reach 2 billion tonnes, equivalent to 7.5 billion Certificated 
Emission Reductions (Romeney, 2008). 
 
Methane Recovery and Utilisation 
Coal Bed Methane (CBM) is a non-conventional natural gas accompanying coal, with 
its reserve equivalent to conventional natural gas. CBM is a clean energy and 
developing CBM can increase the energy supply and reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. Its proven coal reserve and future reserve is estimated to exceed 5 trillion 
metric tonnes. China also possesses rich CBM resources, with CBM resources of 
between 300-2000m in depth and averaging around 30-35 trillion m
3
.  
 
China began utilising Coal Mine Methane (CMM) at the end of 1970. Today, over 
100 CMM utilisation projects have been completed, all of which are located in the 
coal mining areas, and most of them are designed to supply the household fuel gas for 
the purpose of improving the living standards of the citizens in the coal mining areas. 
With increasing awareness of climate change mitigation, CMM has been given more 
recognition as an energy resource. 
 
The CDM can play a substantial role in greenhouse gas emission reduction. In 
Chinese government documents, the CDM is taken as not only a way of offering 
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financial assistance, but also of obtaining advanced technologies from more 
developed neighbours. The mechanism created a market for GHG emissions with 100 
million credited institutions and is an important step towards the integration of climate 
change issues in the political and economic decisions. China has no binding emission 
limits under the first commitment period (2008-2012) of the Protocol but is able to 
participate in the CDM. China has the largest source of CDM credits generated at 
48% (Heggelund, 2007). 
 
China National Climate Change Programme (CNCCP) 
In 2007, the Government announced China’s National Climate Change Programme 
(CNCCP). This identifies China's basic policy stance concerning climate change. The 
Programme is the first ever comprehensive policy paper issued by the Chinese 
government in the context of growing global climate concerns (NDRC, 2007). The 
guiding principles of the CNCCP are listed in Table 2.5 (Altmeyer and Yi, 2007). 
 
Table 2.5: The Six Guiding Principles of the CNCCP (Altmeyer and Yi, 2007) 
Guiding Principle 
Address climate change within the framework of sustainable development 
Place equal emphasis on both mitigation and adaptation 
Integrate climate change policy with other interrelated policies 
Rely on the advancement and innovation of science and technology 
Follow the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
Actively engage in wide international cooperation 
 
Addressing Climate Change within the Framework of Sustainable Development 
In 1994, China formulated and published its sustainable development strategy - 
China’s Agenda 21. This was a White Paper on Population, Environment and 
Development in the 21
st
 Century. In 1996, China adopted sustainable development as 
the key guideline and strategic goal for its national social and economic development. 
In 2003, China further formulated the Programme of Action for Sustainable 
Development in China in the Early 21
st
 Century. China hopes to continue to actively 
tackle climate change issues in accordance with its national sustainable development 
strategy in the future (Rommeney, 2008). 
 
Place equal Emphasis on Both Mitigation and Adaptation 
Mitigation and adaptation are both integral to reducing climate change. For 
developing countries, mitigation is a difficult challenge while adaptation to climate 
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change poses a greater risk and is an imminent task. China has taken practical 
measures to enhance its capacity to adapt to climate change via key projects for 
ecosystem protection, disaster prevention and reduction and other key infrastructure 
construction (Wang, 2006). 
 
Integrate Climate Change Policy with Other Interrelated Policies 
China considers energy conservation, energy structure optimisation, ecological 
preservation and construction, and overall agricultural productivity advancement as 
important components of its national climate change policy. The country has given 
full consideration to climate change issues by integrating the policy of climate change 
mitigation and adaptation into its national social and economic growth programme 
and pushing forward the policy in a coordinated manner (Wang, 2007). 
 
Reliance on the Advancement and Innovation of Science and Technology 
Technological advancement and innovation are the effective way to mitigate GHG 
emissions and enhance the capacity of adaptation to climate change. China is trying to 
develop new and sustainable energy technologies and new technologies of energy 
conservation, to promote carbon sink technologies and other adaptive technologies, to 
accelerate scientific and technological innovation and importation, and to provide a 
strong scientific support to address climate change and promote the capacity of 
sustainable development (NDRC, 2007). 
 
Following the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities 
Developed countries should take the lead in the reduction of GHGs as well as 
providing financial and technical support to developing countries. The extent to which 
developing countries may effectively implement their commitments under the 
Convention may depend on the effective implementation by developed countries of 
their basic commitments (Wang and Lin, 2007). 
 
Actively Engaging in Wide International Cooperation 
Countries differ in the understanding of climate change and in ways and means of 
addressing this issue they share a basic consensus for cooperation and dialogue to 
jointly address the challenges of climate change. China could strengthen international 
cooperation addressing climate change, including cooperation in a clean development 
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mechanism and technology transfer, to make a joint effort with the international 
community to tackle global climate change (Rommeney, 2008). 
 
Energy Conservation Law 
A number of programmes remain in place to increase energy efficiency including the 
“Top 1,000 Enterprise Energy Efficiency Action Plan” and “10 major energy-saving 
projects.”  
 
One major effort is the amended Energy Conservation Law. China’s Energy 
Conservation Law came into force in 1998. The Energy Conservation Law now 
explicitly stipulates (Article 6) that the State will implement a system of 
accountability for energy conservation targets and a system for energy evaluation. The 
law aims to achieve the fulfilment of energy conservation targets to be taken as one 
part of the evaluation of local governmental entities and officials 
 
The law proposes a broad range of areas to increase energy efficiency in buildings, 
industry and the production and use of consumer goods, aiming to promote energy 
conservation activities throughout society. The “Medium and Long Term Energy 
Conservation Plan” came into force in 2004. This highlighted key sectors of emphasis 
and provided a conceptual roadmap for increasing energy efficiency. It also set 
conservation targets for the demand side like industry, transport and buildings, as well 
as for the supply side like energy transformation, transmission and distribution 
(NDRC, 2005). 
 
Civil Society, Public Participation and End-User Choice 
Chinese civil society is increasingly active. Think tanks and research institutions are 
influencing policy making. The “26 Campaign” was an initiative of several NGOs to 
urge companies to set their air conditioning during the summer to 26°C and save 
electricity. The Chinese media is also playing a growing role in pushing for 
environmental reforms. Media outlets contribute to public education, awareness 
raising and mobilisation of the society. Additionally, they may enforce or support the 
implementation of or compliance with environmental standards. However, channels 
and mechanisms for civil society to participate in the decision-making process 
directly are rare (Romeney, 2008). 
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The varied range of energy policies in use across China can be categorised according 
to their common feature. This categorisation is discussed in the following section.  
 
2.2.5. Summary of Chinese Energy Actions  
The review of energy policy actions suggests there is scope for improvements in 
China’s currently energy policy landscape. Although there are many energy policy 
actions in force, including the Renewable Energy Law, Conservation and Climate 
Change laws, there is still a difference between what the laws theoretically hope to 
achieve and what is observed in practice as has been reviewed above. The power 
struggles between the NDRC and NEA has resulted in inefficient energy policy action 
(Burke et al., 2009). Additionally, the disconnection between the aim of the central 
government and what is put into practice by local authorities requires energy policy 
reform (Constantin, 2007). With some potential issues in China’s energy policy 
landscape now highlighted, the next section reviews the policy actions which can be 
implemented to improve Chinese energy policies and provide improvements in some 
areas of the policy making process.  
 
2.3. Categorisation of Energy Policy Actions 
Cherni and Kentish (2007) take the view that China’s energy policies can be separated 
into a dual system of command-and-control and market based. The Chinese electricity 
industry has evolved since the early 1990s into a dual type system. The dominant state 
planning is at the core, whilst a decentralised generation system sits at the periphery, 
owned by Government organisations at different levels and by private enterprises. 
This research adds a third classification of energy policy, namely organisational.  
 
The three categorisation of energy policy actions focussed on are legislative (the core), 
economic incentive-driven (the periphery) and organisational policies (a third 
category proposed by this thesis). Legislative policies set out public goals in a 
command-and-control manner. Economic and market driven policies are market based 
policies which target the private sector. Institutional policies ensure that the 
framework of laws and regulations are followed. Organisation policies ensure both 
command-and-control and market-based policies are adequately executed, monitored 
and enforced through the duration of the policy life. Table 2.6 outlines the three types 
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of energy policies that the thesis uses and these had been adapted from Sims et al. 
(2007).  
 
Table 2.6: Categorise energy policy actions (after Sims et al., 2007) 
Legislative  
(command-control) 
Economic Driven 
(incentives) 
Organisational 
(evaluation monitoring) 
• GHG limits  
• Generation standards 
• Stricter targets for use 
of low carbon sources 
• Min efficiency 
standards 
• Supportive transmission 
tariffs and access  
• Best available 
technology 
• Emissions restrictions 
for major emitters 
• GHG Taxes 
• Emissions Quotas 
• Emissions Trading 
• Capital grants & 
subsidies for sustainable 
generation 
• Feed in Tariffs 
• Public project initiatives 
• Investment and subsidies 
for R&D 
• Increasing 
transparency of 
decision making 
process 
• Holding policy makers 
accountable for 
decisions 
• Monitoring 
 
2.3.1. Legislative Energy Policies 
Legislative policies are the command-and-control element in achieving energy 
strategies and targets. Regulatory instruments are goals, limits and targets that central 
and local governments set. In essence China’s energy policies are top-down 
regulatory instruments. They set the nation’s aims and targets for the short to medium 
term (Gunningham et al., 1998). Social and societal considerations are also included 
in this legislation in order to develop a subsidy programme for vulnerable groups of 
citizens in order to enable them to satisfy their minimum needs for electricity, heating 
and fuel (Sims et al., 2007). 
 
GHG Limits  
GHG limits set targets for level of atmospheric GHG emissions. The most commonly 
monitored GHG is carbon. Globally, the Copenhagen Accord sets a 2 degrees 
Centigrade cap on temperature increases by 2020 from pre-industrial levels. Hence a 
range of ppm limits ranging between 450ppm and Business as Usual (BaU) should be 
targeted in this study. China aims to achieve limits on the emissions of GHGs per unit 
of economic activity. This energy policy relates to the decarbonising objective of the 
12
th
 FYP. The carbon limit sets an explicit cap on the amount of emissions and 
subsequently the speed at which China emits carbon into the atmosphere.  
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The 12
th
 FYP is targeting an 8% to 10% emissions reduction target of other pollutants 
such as sulphur dioxide, chemical oxygen demand and nitrogen oxides. Additionally, 
it hopes to achieve a 17% reduction per unit of GDP output produced by 2015, as 
compared to 2005 (NDRC, 2007).  
 
Generation Standards 
Minimum power plant generation standards are a set of regulations to ensure the 
effective and efficient operation of generation capacity. Generation standards enforce 
a level of energy conversion guidelines that move away from traditional carbon heavy 
sources.  
 
China’s Energy Conservation Law aims to lower emissions per MWh of electricity 
generation and improve efficiency of energy generation. If power plants are to meet 
minimum specification with regards to size and use of technology, they may need to 
be updated with newer technology. The new technology may possibly offer better 
efficiency standards. The Plan recognises the requirement for better plant efficiencies 
through its consolidation efforts of coal plant companies and by closing plants of less 
than 600MW. Alongside minimum plant size, the FYP aims to cap new build thermal 
power plants at 260-270 GW and to cap coal production at 3.8 billion tonnes over the 
next five years, it is currently at 3.2 billion tonnes. As technology improves, plant 
standards also improve and efficiency rises (Cheung, 2011). 
 
Stricter Targets for Use of Low Carbon Sources 
Stricter targets for the use of low carbon energy generation sources help economies 
move away from high carbon content fuelled generation sources. One benefit of 
stricter CO2 targets may cause the shifting away from of high carbon energy mixes 
and moving towards sustainable generation technologies.  
 
China’s Renewable Energy Law promotes the reduction of dependence on non-
renewable generation sources. The 12
th
 FYP expects that generation from non-fossil 
fuels (hydro, nuclear and renewables) will increase from 8.8% of total capacity in 
2010 to 13% by 2015. This target sends out a strong and clear target for stakeholders 
in the energy industry to aim towards. However it may be the case that the ground lost 
in the early stages of the 2010-2015 period cannot be made up towards the end of the 
5 year period. For example, in the closing months of the 11
th
 FYP, policy makers’ 
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took drastic actions to reduce electricity use to meet emissions target, which led to 
blackouts (Hannon et al., 2011). To ensure targets are met by 2015, it may also be 
advisable to set yearly interim targets for stakeholders to adhere to and thus avoid a 
rush to meet targets every five years. For example, generation by sustainable 
technologies could be set at 9% for 2011, 10% for 2012, 11% for 2013, 12% for 2014 
and 13% for 2015 (APCO Worldwide, 2010). 
 
Minimum Efficiency Standards 
Minimum efficiency standards form the backbone of the regulatory instruments for 
enhanced energy efficiency. China’s Energy Conservation Law requires end users to 
only purchase appliances that are compliant with energy regulations or Chinese 
builders to construct houses that meet efficiency standards. This can be implemented 
via labelling. It is hoped that labelling appliances regarding energy efficiency will 
require households to adhere to minimum efficiency levels. For buildings, there may 
be use-obligations, which places an obligation to install a certain proportion of 
sustainable energy in buildings as they are constructed or refurbished. A 
comprehensive standard implemented from generation, transmission all the way to 
consumption, can minimise energy waste (Cheung, 2011). 
 
Supportive Transmission Tariffs and Access  
Supportive transmission tariffs and access may help China acquire a better energy 
infrastructure. Currently, only 74% of renewables capacity is connected to the grid 
due to renewable projects being situated in remote locations. The policy intention is 
that better support for low carbon emitting generation technologies (even if situated in 
remote locations) may lead to superior energy infrastructure and better grid coverage. 
 
To meet ambitious emissions targets, the NDRC introduced the Renewable Energy 
Law in January 2006 (NDRC, 2008). The Renewable Energy Law was introduced in 
Section 2.2.4. In order to provide a comprehensive overview, this Law which was 
amended in December 2009, is discussed in greater detail specifically on issues of 
transmission. The Law forms the policy guidance for the promotion of grid 
connectivity to renewable generation and priority grid access. The Law obligates 
power grid companies to connect all renewable generation sites that fall in their grid 
coverage. The Law’s amendment in 2009 requires coordinated renewables and 
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transmission planning. China expects USD 59.7 billion in investment in the 
development of UHV infrastructure (APCO Worldwide, 2010). 
 
Best available Technology 
New technologies for the increase of energy efficiency can be implemented by 
encouraging the use of the best available technology (Ng and Mabey, 2011). For 
transportation, the 12
th
 FYP aims to increase investment to RMB 100 bn (USD 
160bn) in alternative-energy vehicles industry by 2020 and to generate annual sales of 
1 million units of new energy vehicles by 2015. It is hoped that investments into 
vehicle research will generate a snow ball effect; increased attention towards 
technological improvements may be observed, as more enterprises are attracted into 
the vehicle industry. As the technological advances gather pace, a spill over effect 
may drive technological improvements across the wide economy.  
 
R&D for purposes of innovation may reduce energy waste and increase efficiency. 
The best available technology may also be able to keep up with the increasing demand 
and the electricity load exerted on the grid network. As the smart grids become 
operational in the upcoming decade, China may be able to avoid blackouts, which so 
far has plagued its rural communities. The CNCCP supports smart grids as China 
intends to invest RMB 2-3 trillion (USD 320-480 bn) in renewable energy over the 
next 10 years, which has been split into RMB 1.5 trillion (USD 240bn) for wind, 
RMB 200-300bn (USD 32-48bn) for solar and the remainder for hydropower. It is 
unclear what exactly this spending will be used for. If it subsidises R&D, there may 
be a direct stimulation for the development of new technologies. If the amount is 
spent on tariff support, then R&D may be stimulated indirectly, as stakeholders seek 
to lower costs through technological advancement against proposed tariffs. Whatever 
the type of funding application, it may increase R&D activities (Ng and Mabey, 2011). 
 
Emissions Restrictions for Major Emitters 
Emissions restrictions for major emitters are additional legislation to cap emissions 
from the largest and most polluting energy stakeholders. Through the act of actively 
capping emissions from the most polluting stakeholders, they would be actively 
incentivised to investing in innovation and new generation methods to reduce their 
emission levels. Whereas a capital grant is a carrot to foster innovation, emissions 
restrictions for major emitters is equivalent to the stick to force innovations to occur. 
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Using the best available technologies not only reduces generation costs, but also helps 
China achieve its energy goal of efficiency enhancement (State Council, 2006). 
 
2.3.2. Economic Energy Policies 
Economic driven policies depend on the market moving to a clearing level. It 
establishes tariff and pricing policy for fuels, taking into account market based costs 
(including climate change mitigation costs) and profit. Unlike legislative policies 
explicitly stating energy targets, market driven policies calculate the levels of 
incentives in order to arrive at the energy targets (Price and Wang, 2007). China is a 
command-and-control economy. Its state-owned enterprises (SEO) form the largest of 
corporate entities in China. Assuming the central government is able to decide on the 
optimal allocation of resource, and assuming the SEO follow the centrally planned 
allocation China is (in theory) able to allocate scarce resources as efficiently as in the 
private sector. However, in the face of corruption of inefficient central resources 
allocation, market-based policies driven by economic incentives are best suited to 
reduce emissions (Cheung, 2011). 
 
GHG Taxes 
GHG taxes are an additional levy on emissions. Taxes impose an additional cost 
which is borne by the energy producer and the energy consumer. Without explicitly 
limiting the amount of carbon emissions, GHG taxes let the market mechanism adjust 
production and consumption patterns away from high carbon energy use. This push 
may result in greater acceptance and support by the general public for alternative 
energy both in generation and in transportation. There is also great incentive to reduce 
generation costs via finding new and innovative ways of increasing efficiency.  
 
Taxes on GHG are expected to be imposed by 2012 under the FYP. The tax rate will 
start from RMB 10 (USD 1.6) per tonne of CO2 emitted, rising to RMB 40 (USD 6.4) 
per tonne by 2020. In early 2010, the government introduced a pilot resource tax in 
Xinjiang. The 12
th
 FYP proposes to adopt the pilot scheme nationwide (Ng and 
Mabey, 2011). However, the European Commission (2011) is contemplating a EUR 
20 (RMB 170 or USD27) per tonne of CO2 emissions to be imposed. If it is argued 
that China should abate more than Europe, then it can be argued that GHG taxes in 
China should exceed the EU. Additionally, the OECD (2010) has calculated a need 
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for RMB 160 (USD 25) per tonne of CO2 emissions to be imposed for sustainable 
levels of emissions and achieve a fall in global emissions to 21% by 2050, as 
compared to 2000. Thus it can be argued that China’s plans are far below what is 
deemed sustainable globally.  
 
Emissions Quotas 
In a quota system, the state sets a generation target with corresponding obligations on 
producers, suppliers or consumers to source its energy from particular generation 
technology. Obligated parties failing to meet its quota will be penalised monetarily. 
This incentivises polluters to directly invest in new sustainable generation plants or to 
purchase unused quotas from other energy producers. The certificate price is market 
driven and depends on the level of quota target, the size and allocation of the penalty 
and the duration of the obligation. Quota obligation systems are technology-neutral. 
They aim at encouraging generation via the most cost-efficient technology options 
and lowest pollution methods (Klessmann et al., 2007).  
 
A disadvantage of this support mechanism is setting the eligible amount of emissions. 
When the supply of emissions permits exceeds demand (more certificates are issued 
than required by the market) the quota price will become ineffective falling to close to 
zero (Fouquet and Johansson, 2008). This results in a zero cost on emissions and 
negates the effect of quota based mechanisms. This is an extremely relevant lesson for 
China, as it is preparing to introduce its own permits trading system for emissions 
quotas, discussed as follows (Sorrell and Sijm, 2003). 
 
Emissions Trading 
Emission trading is a quota based mechanism for allowing stakeholders to exchange 
additional allowable units of emissions for a set price. Following a similar logic as the 
GHG taxes (a price incentive for pollution abatement) emissions trading is a quantity 
based market incentive for pollution abatement (Zhang 1998). An emissions trading 
market will allow China to price emissions uniformly across the country. For this to 
be effective there needs to be a quota of caps to the amount of emissions. If 
implemented for all Asia Pacific nations, it would represent a normalised market and 
may discourage cheating by secretly emitting more. China is benefiting from joining a 
carbon trading market, especially if other top emitting countries also participate in a 
market with the same carbon price. This would ensure the top emitting nations would 
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have a common playing field regarding the additional carbon pumped into the 
atmosphere as a result from economic activity (Ng and Mabey, 2011).  
 
There are four shortcomings of the emissions trading system. Firstly, the EUETS is 
solely concerned with cutting GHG emissions and does not encompass other concerns 
such as SoS and job creation (Blanco and Rodrigues, 2008). Secondly, trading 
systems may generate large excess profits. This primarily benefits established 
incumbents and mature generation technologies. A global system with a uniform price 
for sustainable energy would generate large excess profits for those countries with 
lower natural levels of emissions (Jacobsson et al., 2009). Thirdly, it is difficult to 
avoid intra-country distortions. Distortions result from differences in the composition 
of eligible portfolios of technologies and maturities. Finally, the lack of electricity 
price convergence between neighbouring markets would undermine the fundamental 
prerequisite for a functioning trading platform (Jacobsson et al., 2009).  
 
The trading, although not proposed currently, is being contemplated as a carbon-
trading pilot programmes in the cities of Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, Tianjin and 
the provinces of Hubei and Guangdong by 2013 (Zhou, 2011). Specifically related to 
transportation, aviation emissions trading is currently opposed by China. China joins 
the US in condemning the EU plans to incorporate flights to and from Europe in its 
emissions trading scheme as part of the EU ETS. China believes it should not be 
liable to pay for GHG emissions at a price set by the EU.  
 
Capital Grants and Subsidies for Sustainable Generation 
Capital grants and subsidies for sustainable generation are investments into 
sustainable generation projects. The grant reduces the cost of generation and 
production of electricity, heat and motion for all stakeholders. The ways in which 
private sector participation is encouraged are via direct investments, government 
loans and state guarantees. Direct investment from central and local authorities allows 
the government to take direct ownership of new-build generation capacity. This is the 
most flexible way of introducing additional capacity. Government loans are extended 
in cases where the private sector is reluctant to provide debt finance. This could be 
due to unstable jurisdiction, or unfavourable project economics. The loans are usually 
made at a discount to commercial financing. Whereas before, the government made 
the direct investment, in this case, the private sector invests a small amount and 
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borrows the rest from the government. This helps reduce project costs, and increases 
profitability yields for private investors. Loan guarantees are provided by local or 
national governments. Lenders are deterred by events which could prevent the 
repayment of their loans. Loan guarantees provide lenders with a sovereign guarantee. 
In the event of non-payment, lenders will be reimbursed by the government. This 
form of guarantee not only encourages risk-averse lenders to participate, but also has 
the added benefit of decreasing financing costs given a reduced risk profile. 
 
The main drawback with government backed funding is the time delay. When 
governmental entities are involved in financing energy projects, the decision making 
and due diligence process are often long winded. The time frame required for 
governmental agencies to get approval far exceeds the timetable expected from 
private sector financial institutions. Furthermore, delays in securing financing sources 
may cause projects to lose their permits, if construction does not commence within the 
allotted timeframe.  
 
The grant would be provided upfront and directly compensates for construction costs 
of the generation plant. Under the supportive frameworks of the Renewable Energy 
Law and CNCCP, the 12
th
 FYP anticipates a RMB 2-3 trillion (USD 320-480bn) 
investment in renewable energy over the next 10 years: RMB 1.5 trillion (USD 
240bn) for wind and RMB 200-300bn (USD 32-48bn) for solar (Holt, 2011). 
 
Feed in Tariffs 
Tariffs are price-based instruments. These determine the cost at which electricity is 
sold at. The instrument allows producers using a particular generation technology to 
sell electricity at a higher price than the prevailing wholesale levels. This instrument 
is often combined with priority grid access. Two common examples are Feed in 
Tariffs (FIT) and Feed in Premiums (FIP). These are granted to operators of 
electricity plants to feed electricity into the grid. FIT and FIP are technology specific. 
FIT pays for electricity to producers a bonus above the wholesale price for generating 
via a targeting technology (Fouquet and Johansson, 2008). FIP introduces competition 
between producers through a competitive bidding process. Producers tender to 
generate electricity. The state selects producers who offer to generate at the lowest 
premiums above prevailing wholesale prices. The tariff duration ranges from 10-20 
years encouraging long-term certainty and lowers risk to investors. FIT is 
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implemented in the majority of EU member states (IEA, 2008a). The tariff also 
indirectly stimulates innovation. If the revenues of the tariffs are set, any cost 
reduction through technological advances is a corresponding increased cost to the 
utility companies.  
 
This instrument has two important shortcomings. The first shortcoming is that the 
mechanism fails to make power suppliers and consumers bear the cost of 
environmental damage. Subsidies allow the sustainable producers to ignore the higher 
cost of sustainable generation. This does not discourage fossil-fuel producers to 
reduce activity levels if fossil-fuel generation is cheaper than the subsidised 
sustainable generation technology. The lack of penalties paid by fossil-fuel generators 
means the sector has little R&D incentive to improve generation technology costs 
(Tamás et al., 2010). The second shortcoming is that the cost of renewables obligation 
is born not by the energy industry, but by the end user. The costs of subsidy payments 
are passed on to the household consumers. The FIT scheme raises money from the 
economy to subsidise the production of sustainable energy. The end result is a more 
expensive energy generation cost for the rest of the economy (Tamás et al., 2010).  
 
In China, wind and solar feed in tariffs are expected to be RMB 1.15 (USD0.18) per 
kWh, but are subject to finalisation in the 12
th
 FYP. These represent a significant 
premium on the average rate of RMB 0.34 (USD 0.05) per kWh paid to coal-fired 
electricity generators. As long as this price is above RMB 1.1 (USD 0.18) per kWh, 
what private sector investors believe to be an economic viable tariff, renewable 
energy generation will be on the increase (Xie, 2011).  
 
Public Project Initiatives 
The economic instrument for better energy infrastructure and grid connections are 
public works initiatives. This policy action best supports the energy infrastructure 
goal. Large infrastructure projects can only be taken on by the government. China has 
dedicated significant resources to a new high voltage electric grid and upgrading its 
existing transmission networks. The FYP aims for an additional investment of RMB 
2.55 trillion (USD 408bn) for power grid construction, which is expected by 2015 and 
RMB 500bn (USD 80bn) on ultra-high voltage (UHV). Additionally, China expects to 
spend RMB 4 trillion (USD 640bn) on “smart grids” by 2020 (Ng and Mabey, 2011). 
 
69 
Investment and Subsidies for R&D 
Investment and subsidies for R&D result in cheaper energy generation and more 
efficient energy conversion. The FYP intends to invest RMB 2-3 trillion (USD 320-
480bn) in renewable energy over the next 10 years, which is split into RMB 1.5 
trillion (USD 240bn) for wind, RMB 200-300 billion (USD 32-48bn) for solar and the 
remaining for hydropower. A significant portion of this amount will be spent on 
improving technological innovation. The additional spending is investment into R&D, 
which overlaps with the capital grants energy policy measure. Whereas capital grants 
directly stimulate sustainable generation in the short to medium term, R&D 
investment seeks to create a positive environment of sustained generation over the 
long term through technological advances (Tamás et al., 2010). 
 
2.3.3. Organisational Energy Policies 
Organisational policies are aimed at improving policy execution, monitoring and 
enforcement. Carefully designing command-and-control policies by the Chinese 
government and market-based incentives does not ensure a successful execution of 
the intended energy policy outcomes. Organisational policy actions are necessary to 
build the capacities of governmental administrations to achieve the original intentions 
of energy targets and incentives during the term of the policy life. As discussed earlier 
in Section 2.2.2, the various different organisations involved in the energy policy 
execution process calls for organisation energy policy changes for China. 
Organisational policies include increasing transparency of decision making process, 
holding policy makers accountable for decisions and better monitoring (Price and 
Wang, 2007). 
 
Increasing Transparency of the Decision Making Process 
End users of energy are not all educated in the way energy policy decisions are made. 
The general populous would benefit from public education programmes and 
information seminars to better understand how new energy policies are drawn up and 
presented in the CPC, with a view of implementation at local authority level. If the 
government were to start educating the public, they would also benefit from a more 
transparent decision making process. This coherency and better understanding leads 
to greater transparency of the energy policy decision making process (Gao, 2007).  
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Holding Policy Makers Accountable for Decisions Made 
The decision makers of the CPC and associated decision making entities take a top-
down view of new policies and energy goals. In theory, a clear overview of the energy 
goals should produce positive end-results in terms of action for a successful policy 
outcome. In practice this is not always the case. The execution of energy policies are 
at a local level. The intended outcome at CPC levels may not be realised in practice if 
local authorities implement it incorrectly. If all official, central and local authorities, 
were accountable for ensuring successful policy outcomes (rather than simply 
following top down notices), the intended outcome of energy policies would be 
realised more easily and quickly in practice (Price and Galitsky, 2007). 
 
Monitoring 
Monitoring and increasing levels of control over policy execution is not heavily 
emphasised in China’s energy policies. The 12th FYP sets out measureable goals to be 
achieved in the medium term. In theory, these goals may help Chine reduce emissions. 
However, with the best set targets and more efficient market-clearing markets, there is 
still an operational risk that policy intentions which work in theory do not materialise 
in practice. China should provide more guidelines concerning how to reduce 
corruption increase monitoring and enhance transparency for a successful policy 
outcome (Lai, 2007). 
 
Through a systematic examination of the various energy polices in a structured 
manner, the energy policy actions along with China’s future proposed policy changes 
meets the theoretical benchmark of being comprehensive and effective. The next 
section assesses how successful policy outcomes are in China, using a synthesis of 
energy policy assessment framework indicators as part of the CFEPS.  
 
2.3.4. Summary of Energy Policy Action Categories 
From reviewing various energy policies in use globally and adapting it to China’s 
legislative landscape, it is clear that legislative policy actions take the central role in 
the current political landscape. This is mainly due to China’s economy being a 
command and control type setup. To aid the legislative policy actions, economic or 
incentives driven policy actions would start to play an increasingly larger role. The 
reason for the lack of connection between the “theoretical” central government energy 
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targets and “practical” implemented outcome by local authorities is due to a lack of 
sufficient incentives at the local level. With the taxes and subsidies in place, it reduces 
the need of monitoring by central government and may increase the success of policy 
outcomes for reform at a local level. Policy actions can only be deemed to have led to 
a successful outcome if the actual outcome matches the expected policy goal. The 
institutional element that promotes evaluation and monitoring of energy policy goals 
forms the catch-all that the previous two energy policy categories (legislative and 
economic) do not capture. Although it seems that institutional energy policy actions 
are the vital missing link to a successful policy outcome, it is also the most difficult to 
implement, as elements of governance and social equality are had to quantify and 
measure. 
 
This section outlined three key areas of policy action. Simply suggesting that three 
categories of policy action can make a positive contribution is far from accurate. The 
research must employ a method to assess whether policies proposed are balanced and 
sustainable in all important areas of energy policy making. In the next section, efforts 
are made toward synthesising an Energy Policy Assessment Framework.  
 
2.4. Energy Policy Assessment Framework  
One research objective sets out to develop a sustainable energy policy assessment 
framework as part of efforts to form a better understanding of energy policy decision 
support tools. Sustainability is too broad a term and needs further clarification. To 
better define sustainability in the context of energy policy making, this research draws 
inspiration from policy assessment frameworks from the IEA. UN, OECD, WEC and 
Eurostat consider balanced set of sustainable energy policy assessment criteria. In 
Chapter 1, the research initially referred to the Policy Trilemma Triangle (cf Figure 
1.1) as a starting point to define sustainability as the balance between growth, cost and 
emissions. For a more refined set of sustainable energy policy assessment indicators, 
this Chapter amends and refines the Policy Trilemma Triangle by reviewing the 
literature of more current multi-criteria policy assessment frameworks. 
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2.4.1. Policy Assessment Frameworks Currently in Use 
Several multinational institutions have authored analytical frameworks designed for 
assessing the success of policy outcomes. This section presents commonly used policy 
criteria items
11
 from institutions including the International Atomic Energy Agency 
IAEA/IEA (2005), UN (2007), OECD (2005), World Energy Council (WEC, 2008) 
and Eurostat (2005).  
 
Although the three goals (cost, SoS, and emissions) proposed by the Policy Trilemma 
Triangle provides a good starting point to forming a set of CFEPS assessment 
indicators, there are additional criteria to be considered. This chapter comprises a 
literature review of the additional indicators to improve the original three criteria 
items proposed by the Policy Trilemma Triangle. 
 
The following section discusses each of the five policy assessment dimensions in 
detail in order to synthesise a set of policy assessment indicators that offer an 
improvement to the originally proposed Policy Trilemma Triangle. Additionally, this 
section will summarise the similarities between the surveyed policy assessment 
framework and an amended framework applicable to the Chinese energy policy 
assessment. Appendix 5 sets out the full set of sustainable development and energy 
policy assessment frameworks and indicators. 
 
IAEA/IEA Energy Indicators for Sustainable Development 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, 2005) has engaged in a multi-
agency effort together with the International Energy Agency (IEA) since 1999 to 
develop a set of indicators for sustainable development especially aimed at assessing 
energy policy. The effort follows a three policy dimension approach of social, 
economic and environmental assessment indicators. From the three policy dimensions, 
7 general policy themes were proposed, which are key for energy use and 
sustainability. 19 sub-themes or indicators are outlined by the IAEA. The relative 
importance of the three policy dimensions is set as equal. IAEA allocated an even 
spread of themes, the social (2 themes: equality and health), economic (two themes: 
                                                 
 
11
 Policy Criteria or Indicator are detailed indicators with which to assess policies. It is further defined 
in the Glossary of Terms at the beginning of this thesis. 
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consumption and generation patterns, and SoS) and environmental (three themes: 
atmosphere, water, and land) assessment indicators. Sub-themes are not used in 
establishing importance across the three dimensions, as often sub-themes are created 
on the basis of whether they could be tangibly measured, rather than at the level of 
understanding needed (IAEA, 2005). 
 
UN Indicators for Sustainable Development 
The United Nations (2007) recognised the importance that indicators play in helping 
countries make informed decisions concerning sustainable development. The first two 
sets of indicators were developed between 1994 and 2001. A revised edition was 
developed in response to the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002. 
This introduced indicators at the country level in line with national conditions and 
priorities and invited the international community to support efforts of developing 
countries. In contrast to the IAEA, the UN’s work is designed as a general 
sustainability indicator and is not energy specific. These guidelines set out 14 policy 
themes and 44 sub themes and policy indicators. Although not explicitly separated 
into policy dimensions as proposed by the Policy Trilemma, the UN’s framework can 
be grouped into dimensions of economic, environmental, social equality, and 
governance. The importance of the UN’s indicators can been seen through a greater 
emphasis on climate change mitigation (six themes: natural hazards, atmosphere, land, 
oceans, freshwater and biodiversity), versus social equality (three themes: poverty, 
health, and education), economic growth (four themes: demographics, development, 
global trade, and energy consumption and production patterns) and governance (1 
theme: governance). Since the goal was general development and not to focus on 
energy policy, there is no analysis of SoS. Hence the UN’s framework lacks SoS 
indicators that the IAEA sets out in the previous section. What the UN does not 
consider has been replaced with broader development indicators, especially for social 
equality and governance (UN, 2007). 
 
OECD Economic, Environment, Social Themes & Indicators 
The OECD (2005) measure of sustainability proposes 11 different themes which are 
population, macroeconomy, prices, energy, labour, science, environment, education, 
public finances life quality and globalisation. These themes can be broadly classified 
into economic (seven themes: population, macroeconomic, prices, labour market, 
science and technology, public finance, and globalisation), social equality (two 
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themes: education and quality of life), environment (one theme: environment and 
natural resources) and SoS (one theme: SoS). Like the UN, the OECD’s policy 
indicators are more detailed regarding economic and social policy dimensions. Unlike 
the UN, the OECD indicators have greater detail on energy policy such as SoS 
(OECD, 2005).  
 
WEC Energy Policy and Practices Index 
The World Energy Council (WEC, 2008), consists of governmental members and 
private institutions. Alongside the IAEA’s framework, this is also a policy assessment 
framework focussed on evaluating energy policies. The foremost goal of the WEC is 
to seek the policies that balance cost-effectiveness, social equality, environmental 
sustainability, security and effectively enhance the general welfare of the citizens of a 
nation or region in response to energy policy marking. Additionally, there is a strong 
emphasis on the role of private institutions to invest in new technologies, 
infrastructure, and products. The six main policy dimensions are economic (three 
themes: macroeconomic, cost of living and availability of credit), environmental (four 
themes: energy intensity, emissions intensity, generation efficiency and air and water 
pollution), SoS (five themes: consumption growth, energy production to consumption 
ratio, wholesale petrol prices, generation diversity, and resource imports to exports), 
social equality (two themes: affordability of petrol and affordability of electricity), 
political considerations (three themes: political stability, regulator policies, and 
effectiveness of government), and societal considerations (four themes: control of 
corruption, rule of law, quality of education, and quality of health). For this research, 
political and societal dimensions were consolidated into organisational governance, 
resulting in the five main policy assessment areas.  
 
The other indicators surveyed do not attach weight of importance to the policy areas. 
The WEC offers explicit weighting to indicate criteria importance. The weightings are 
economic (8.3%), environmental (25%), SoS (25%) social equality (25%) and 
governance (16.6% consisting of 8.3% each for political and societal themes). It can 
be seen that the three most important themes to the WEC are environmental, SoS and 
social equality (WEC, 2008).  
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Eurostat Indicators of Sustainable Development 
The sustainable development indicators used to monitor the EU development strategy 
is published by Eurostat (2005) every two years. Eurostat has so far published four 
monitoring reports, in 2005, 2007 and 2009. The most recent 2011 report charts 
progress in the implementation of the strategy’s objectives and key challenges, but the 
objective have not changed since 2005. Classified into four policy dimensions, they 
are economic, social, environmental and participation by stakeholders.  
 
For this research, the participation indicator has been relabelled as governance, as 
participation from energy stakeholders directly impacts on governance. The four 
resulting dimensions (economic, environmental, social equality, and governance) are 
expanded into ten themes. The importance and analysis of detail of the Eurostat 
framework ranks environmental (four themes: climate change, production and 
consumption patterns, management of natural resources, and transportation) as being 
the most important, followed by social equality (three themes: poverty, ageing society 
and public health), governance (two themes: good governance and global partnership) 
and economic growth (one theme: economic development). The Eurostat indicators 
are very similar to the UN’s. Like the UN, SoS is not accounted for by Eurostat in its 
policy assessment framework, which is not energy specific, but a generic sustainable 
development framework (Eurostat, 2005). 
 
2.4.2. Summary of Reviewed Energy Policy Assessment Framework  
Reference is once more made to the Policy Trilemma Triangle as the starting point for 
energy policy evaluation. The Policy Trilemma Triangle highlights the importance of 
economic growth climate change mitigation and SoS goals offer a starting point for 
the most important CFEPS policy assessment framework and indicators. From 
reviewing the five policy assessment framework (Table 2.7), it is observed that the 
two sets of the policy assessment frameworks are dedicated to the assessment of 
energy policy, instead of generic development policies. The two energy policy 
specific frameworks are from the IAEA (2005) and WEC (2008), with possibly more 
weight attributable to the indicators mentioned specifically for energy policy 
evaluation.  
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Table 2.7: Commonly used Policy Assessment Frameworks 
Authoring 
Institution 
Policy Assessment Framework Specifically 
Energy Policy  
IAEA (2005) Energy Indicators for Sustainable Development  
UN (2007) Indicators for Sustainable Development  
OECD (2005) Economic, Environ, Social Themes & Indicators  
WEC(2008) Energy Policy and Practices Index  
Eurostat 
(2005) 
Indicators of Sustainable Development  
 
The synthesis of previously assessed indicators shows the Trilemma does not 
encompass all of the important areas of balanced policy making. The analysis shows 
that legislative, organisational and economic driven policies make significant 
improvements to China’s policy landscape. This is more evident for the policy criteria 
of governance.  
 
To take a more focussed view towards assessing energy policy rather than generic 
development policy, it is suggested that two additional policy assessment objectives 
are also vital in addition to the three (cost, SoS, and emissions) mentioned in the 
Policy Trilemma Triangle. These are social equality and governance. These were also 
mentioned implicitly or explicitly for IAEA (2005) and WEC (2008), the two energy-
policy specific assessment frameworks. Figure 2.6 summarises the five authoring 
institutions into policy indicators beyond the three themes originally proposed by the 
Policy Trilemma Triangle (cf Figure 1.1).  
 
In the absence of detailed guidance, the weighting between the five different 
assessment dimensions are all taken as equal at 20% each. Only WEC offers an 
indication for policy dimension weightings, whilst the others surveyed do not. 
Economic growth and climate change mitigation aggregates to the highest subthemes. 
This is because the surveyed frameworks all include some measure of GDP growth 
and pollution policy dimension as part of evaluating economic growth. SoS is not 
featured in many frameworks as they are not energy policy specific, but vital for this 
research as it is a key factor as presented in the Policy Trilemma Triangle. Social 
equality and governance is not heavily featured in the survey frameworks. However, 
governance is crucial for energy policy assessment in China. Social Equality needs 
inclusion as the income disparity between cities and the country side in China is wide. 
City salaries are over three times the levels of the countryside (Ha, 2009). Governance 
is critical in China. Corruption and embezzlement in a command and control economy 
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is common (Ng and Mabey, 2011). Thus, even though aggregating the subthemes 
across each area does not yield equal totals, a 20% weighting is allocated to each of 
the most important policy themes, in the absence of better weight allocation 
suggestions and to simplify the analysis process, weighting is set equally.  
 
Cost
SoSEmissions
20%
weight
Economic 
Growth
Climate Change 
Mitigation
Governance
Security of 
Energy Supply
Social 
Equity
20%
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20%
weight
20%
weight
20%
weight
Additional energy policy 
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Policy Trilemma
Synthesis of Energy Policy 
Assessment Criteria
Policy Trilemma 
Triangle
 
Figure 2.6: Energy Policy Evaluation Synthesis, mapped onto the Policy Trilemma 
 
The level of analysis detail is aggregated into Table 2.8. Each cell counts the number 
of CFEPS policy dimension. The two more frequently considered policy dimensions
12
 
are economic and environmental indicators. This is expected, as all frameworks 
considered economic growth and climate change. Not all surveyed frameworks 
examine energy specific policies.  
                                                 
 
12
 Policy Dimensions are the five key areas as part of the Policy Assessment Framework, namely, 
Economic Growth, Climate Change Mitigation, SoS, Social Equality, and Governance. They are 
defined in more detail in the Glossary of Terms. 
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Table 2.8: Five Policy Dimensions aggregating the number of sub-themes for each 
dimension 
 
Authoring 
Institution 
(weight) 
5 Policy Dimensions 
Economic 
Growth 
(20%) 
Climate 
Change 
Mitigation 
(20%) 
SoS 
(20%) 
Social 
Equality 
(20%) 
Governance 
(20%) 
IAEA (2005) 1 3 1* 2 - 
UN (2007) 4 6** - 3 1 
OECD (2005) 8*** 1 1 1 - 
WEC (2008) 3 4 5 2 7**** 
Eurostat (2005) 1 4 - 3 2***** 
Subthemes 17 18 7 11 10 
* The SoS component is separated out of Economic Development 
** Includes Natural Hazards  
*** Includes Population and migration, Macroeconomic trends, Price, Labour market, 
Science and technology, Education, Public finance, and Economic globalisation. 
**** Includes Political and Societal Strength 
***** Referred to as Participation by Eurostat 
 
2.4.3. Preliminary Synthesis of Energy Policy Assessment Framework  
From reviews in the previous section of commonly employed policy assessment 
framework, the following section discusses each of the sub-themes and indicators 
considered for the synthesis of the energy policy assessment framework used to assess 
Chinese energy policy. The policy assessment framework for evaluating the energy 
policy suggestions resultant from the model output is presented in Table 2.9 The full 
table with indicators is presented in Appendix 6.  
 
Although many of the consulted frameworks include general sustainable development 
criteria and indicators, the assessment framework to be used in this research will only 
focus on sustainable energy policy. Hence some of the important criteria and 
indicators for general sustainable development have been less drawn upon in the 
synthesised energy policy assessment framework. As expected, the two frameworks 
of the IAEA and WEC that are specifically tailored to energy policy, offer more 
energy policy relevant indicators. 
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Table 2.9: Selected and amended energy policy dimensions (after IAEA/IEA, 2005; 
UN, 2007; OECD, 2005; WEC, 2008; Eurostat, 2005) 
5 Key Policy Dimensions 
(weight) 
Sub themes 
Economic growth 
(20%) 
Balanced GDP growth 
Energy consumption to production balance 
Energy Investment 
Generation cost 
Climate Change Mitigation 
(20%) 
CO2 Emissions 
Energy efficiency & intensity 
Emissions intensity 
SoS 
(20%) 
Hydrocarbon and coal dependence 
Generation mix diversification 
Social Equality 
(20%) 
Affordable Energy 
Grid energy access 
Governance  
(20%) 
Political stability & policy coherence 
Public participation 
Regulatory quality & control of corruption  
 
The process of choosing the subthemes and associated indicators for each of the five 
policy dimensions was via a practical approach of what could be achievable in this 
research given time and resource limitations. All the sub-themes that were selected 
were mentioned by the frameworks surveyed above. However the subthemes were 
chosen based on whether the chosen IAM methodology is able to calculate the 
indicator. Indicators were selected from the frameworks surveyed based on ease of 
calculation.  
 
Economic Growth (20%) 
Indicators of economic growth are covered in all five of the policy assessment 
frameworks surveyed. The framework with the most detailed indicators for economic 
growth is the OECD (2005) with eight policy themes including population & 
migration, macroeconomic trends, price, the labour market, science & technology, 
education, public finance, economic globalisation. The UN (2007) has four policy 
themes. The UN focuses on demographics, economic growth, global economic 
partnership and energy consumption and production patterns. The WEC (2008) has 
three policy themes that focus on macroeconomic stability, cost of living expenses 
and availability of credit. IAEA (2005) and Eurostat (2005) both have one economic 
growth policy theme each. The next step is to extract the relevant themes and 
indicators commonly used across the frameworks. Even though different frameworks 
do not share the same breakdown of policy themes, there are common policy sub-
themes and indicators to be extracted. The sub-themes and indicators especially 
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relevant to energy policy evaluation are productivity of economy, energy 
consumption, investment, and price.  
 
Balanced GDP growth measures the rate of GDP growth relative to the balance rate of 
growth should an economy take into consideration the negative externalities 
associated due to the increased pursuit of growth. For China’s this growth rate is 7.2% 
which may change in the future, but should not reach double figures (Yang, 2008).  
 
Energy consumption compares the amount of energy needed to the amount produced 
and is a measurement of energy supply and demand balance or in other words whether 
there are frequent blackouts expected. Since electricity and heat is difficult to store, it 
is vital the electricity generation to be balanced against consumption. IAEA (2005) 
looks at this from a resources view point calculating the natural resources reserves 
and production ratio. However, estimating the reserves is challenging because 
predictions of resources far into the future is required, which creates uncertainty in the 
accuracy of predictions. Hence the research uses the WEC (2008) method of total 
primary energy consumption and production ratio.  
 
Investment in energy is important to improve technological advances. This results in 
lower costs in energy generation, transmission and consumption. The OECD (2005) 
measures R&D as expenditure and investment into R&D. Eurostat (2005) calculated 
investments as investment as a percentage of GDP. To focus on energy specific policy 
criteria, this research uses R&D investments into energy per unit of GDP production.  
 
Energy price increases represents more expensive factors of production. Under an 
expanded Cobb-Douglas production function, the three major factors of production 
are labour, capital and energy. IAEA (2005) measures energy prices as costs of end-
use energy costs by fuel and by sector. WEC (2008), albeit in the social equality 
section, measures energy prices as affordability of petrol and electricity by comparing 
the percentage of household wealth spent on those items. This research uses the costs 
of primary energy generation resources as the indicator for the level of energy costs.  
 
Climate Change Mitigation (20%) 
Indicators of environmental damage and the associated need for protection are all 
present in the five frameworks. The UN (2007) has six policy themes regarding 
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environmental protection which are natural hazards, atmosphere, land, oceans seas 
coasts, freshwater, and biodiversity. WEC (2008) and Eurostat (2005) both have four 
policy themes. WEC (2008) accounts for energy intensity, emissions intensity, 
electricity generation efficiency, and air & water pollution. Eurostat (2005) includes 
environmental protection climate change, production & consumption patterns, 
management of natural resources, and transportation. IAEA (2005) outlines three 
themes including atmosphere, water and land. The OECD (2005) only has one theme 
namely environment and natural resources. The relevant policy sub-themes and 
indicators that can be extracted from the frameworks are energy efficiency & intensity, 
and emissions intensity.  
 
Atmospheric CO2 emissions are accounted for in all of the surveyed frameworks. This 
is commonly measured as the level of CO2 emissions. This research will allocate a 
cap to the level of emissions as a response to the IPCC’s guidance. The IAEA (2005) 
extends this research and also considers oceanic, freshwater, soil and woodland 
quality. Linked to abatement are natural disasters, as a function of pollution. The UN 
(2007) measures the vulnerability and preparedness of a nation’s policies to natural 
disasters.  
 
Energy efficiency & intensity accounts for the amount of energy used for units of 
output generated. The WEC (2008) measures energy efficiency as CO2/kWh from 
electricity and heat generation. It also measures energy intensity as the total Primary 
Energy consumption. Both energy efficiency and intensity can be proxied using 
energy consumption per unit of GDP output. If energy efficiency increases or 
intensity decreases, there may be an associated fall in energy consumption per unit of 
output.  
 
Emissions intensity for the atmosphere is the volume of GHG emitted per unit of 
output. The UN (2007) measures atmospheric emissions intensity as the ratio of 
energy use to economic activity. The WEC (2008) measures atmospheric emission 
intensity as total carbon dioxide emissions from energy consumption. There are other 
measures of land and water intensity. For example, the UN (2007) uses the proportion 
of total water resources used as the indicator for water intensity. Air pollution has 
been the focal point of the IPCC, so this research will account for emissions intensity 
via CO2 emissions per GDP and as CO2 emissions per unit of energy consumption.  
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Security of Energy Supply (20%) 
There are three frameworks that have included SoS as part of the selected indicators. 
They are the IAEA (2005), OECD (2005) and WEC (2008). IAEA and OECD both 
have one policy theme regarding this policy area (i.e. each further broken down into 
two SoS subthemes), whereas the WEC has five themes on SoS. The most relevant 
SoS indicators for China (given its dependence of oil, gas and coal imports) which 
were extracted and applied in this research are dependence on hydrocarbon and coal 
imports, and generation mix diversification.  
 
Dependence on hydrocarbon imports is the degree an economy is reliant on natural 
resources for its primary energy generation. The OECD (2005) measures this as oil 
production, inferring that the larger the amount of oil production, the more dependent 
the economy is on this fossil fuel for domestic consumption for exports. This is 
especially relevant when China became a net importer of oil in 1993, a net importer of 
natural gas in 2007 and a net importer of coal by 2009 (IEA, 2011a). Hydrocarbon 
dependency will be measured by the proportion of oil and gas as a proportion to total 
primary energy generation.  
 
Generation mix diversification is how varied an economy generates its energy. The 
more diverse the generation, the less adversely affected the economy on one 
generation technology becoming depleted. IAEA (2005) places this indicator in the 
economic growth theme as the diversity of fuel mix, monitoring the proportion of 
renewable energy to total energy generation. The WEC (2008) classifies this indicator 
as a SoS measurement, monitoring the production of electricity by various generation 
mixes. This research will consider the generation mix as part of SoS as the more 
diversified generation is, the less dependent the country is on foreign supplies of fossil 
fuels. These indicators will be calculated as non fossil fuel generation (sustainable 
energy generation) to total generation. 
 
Social Equality (20%) 
Social Equality and equality of welfare are represented in all five frameworks. The 
UN (2007) and Eurostat lists three policy themes, whereas IAEA (2005) and WEC 
(2008) lists two themes. OCED (2005) only lists one social equality theme. The 
relevant policy assessment framework indicators regarding equality focus on the 
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access to affordable energy for all members of society. The indicator used for this 
research in policy assessment will be energy access.  
 
Energy affordability is represented in the two energy assessment frameworks of the 
IAEA (2005) and WEC (2008) as the proportion of income spent on energy payments. 
The remaining frameworks, which are not energy policy assessment focuses on 
general affordability of necessity consumables, or the inequality of household 
incomes.  
 
Grid energy access is the ease with which the general populous is able to get grid 
connected electricity and local sources of heat. Lack of grid access, resulting in 
energy poverty is a critical issue facing China today given the large landmasses and 
mountainous terrains to cover under a grid connection program. Under social equality, 
IAEA (2005) includes accessibility, affordability and disparity. Affordability is 
accounted for in the fuel price sub-theme under economic growth. End user prices are 
a function of fuel prices and generation costs. So if a country seeks to reduce 
generation costs, it may also reduce the cost of energy to the consumer. Disparity is 
more of an income inequality indicator which is more appropriate for general policy 
analysis. Hence, this research will focus on accessibility of energy, which the IAEA 
calculates as the share of households without electricity or commercial energy. The 
UN (2007) and WEC (2008) also include this indicator measure. This research travels 
along similar lines and accounts for ease of energy access as the proportion of the 
population with electricity grid connection. Heat is not part of the measurement 
criteria, as individuals with access to electricity can also generate heat.  
 
Governance (20%) 
Institutional and legislative governance related policy criteria are assessed by the UN, 
WEC and Eurostat. The WEC (2008) includes 7 policy themes for governance, 
whereas Eurostat (2005) quotes 2 and the UN (2007) quotes 1 policy theme. The 
relevant indicators to assess governance in an energy policy context are political 
stability & policy coherence, public participation, and regulatory quality & control of 
corruption. 
 
Political stability & policy coherence measures how stable political parties in power 
are. If the government is unstable or parties often change power, it is less likely there 
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is a continuous energy policy in place. The WEC uses a political stability index from 
the World Bank as the indicator. This research will assess whether energy policies 
encourage more political stability and how successive energy policy outcomes are 
implemented. 
 
Public participation is the involvement of the general public in the decision making 
process of energy policies. Eurostat (2005) stresses the importance of public 
participation in the decision making process by measuring the number of voters to 
newly proposed policies. This research considers whether there is public consultation 
from all stakeholders in the formation of new energy policies.  
 
Regulatory quality & control of corruption measures the level of wrongdoing by 
public officials in terms of embezzlement and abuse of power. The UN (2007) 
measures corruption as the percentage of population having paid bribes. The WEC 
(2008) consulted a corruption index from the World Bank. This research will consider 
qualitatively whether government officials are accountable and if the system of 
punishments is effective. 
 
2.4.4. Summary of Energy Policy Assessment Frameworks 
Summarising the Policy Assessment Frameworks currently in use indicates that the 
Policy Trilemma Triangle was a sensible starting point for the understanding of the 
criteria needed as part of sustainable energy policies. Of the three policy goals 
proposed (cost, SoS, and emissions), two more goals are introduced (social equality 
and governance) after the survey and assessment of commonly used policy 
assessment frameworks. All five policy dimensions are important in the proposed 
synthesis of Chinese energy policy assessment framework. In the absence of further 
guidance, all five dimensions are deemed as equally important. This is counter-
intuitive, as for China it is logical that climate change indicators should have a higher 
weighting, given its status as the top CO2 emitter globally and the acceptance of 
COP17 in December 2011 (IEA, 2011a). An additional source of information is 
required to improve the policy assessment framework in terms of checking the 
validity of the policy assessment criteria items and the weighting allocated between 
the different criteria areas. In Chapter 4, primary data is gathered via a survey to 
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refine the selection process of criteria items that form part of the energy policy 
assessment framework.  
 
2.5. Conclusions  
The literature review of global and Chinese energy policies in use of suggests that a 
few flagship energy policies in use can capture the core of a county’s energy policy 
strategy. For China, the there are many policies in use, which are the Renewable 
Energy Law, Conservation and Climate Change laws, with the core piece of 
legislation as the Five Year Plans (the 12
th
 Five Year Plan being the latest iteration in 
use). From the Chinese legislations, common themes were extracted which 
summarised what types of policy actions are currently being used, mainly falling 
under the command-and-control category of energy policy actions that control the 
energy landscape under strict goals and rules. From the global legislations, common 
themes were also extracted which summarised what new types of energy policies 
China could implement in the future, mainly falling under the economic incentive 
category of energy policy actions that control the energy landscape under market 
driven incentives. Another category, beyond command-and-control and economic 
incentive policy actions, was introduced as organisational. Organisation policy actions 
aim to capture policy actions that neither fall under command-and-control nor under 
economic incentive driven policy action. Carefully designing command-and-control 
policies and market-based incentives does not always ensure a successful execution of 
the intended energy policy outcomes. The thesis, through organisational policy 
actions, proposes that improvement can be sought in the way these policies are 
designed in a theory, and eventually implemented in practice. Organisational policies 
are aimed at improving policy execution, monitoring and enforcement. 
 
Understanding the ways that politicians in nations are implementing energy policy 
change is important to see how China could improve its energy policy outcome. 
However, not all energy policy actions are applicable for China. A way of assessing 
the effectiveness of energy policy action is also needed. In the second half of Chapter 
2, a literature review studies how super-nationals are currently assessing policy 
effectives. The super-nationals surveyed include the IAEA, UN, OECD, WEC and 
Eurostat. The synthesis of the reviewed frameworks, as used by the super-nationals, is 
coined the Energy Policy Assessment Framework. The Energy Policy Assessment 
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Framework set out five energy policy dimensions, all important for a balanced energy 
strategy. The five policy dimensions are Economic Growth, Climate Change 
Mitigation, SoS, Social Equality, and Governance. To fine-tune the Energy Policy 
Assessment Framework, a survey of energy policy experts is conducted in Chapter 4 
to help adapt the assessment framework more towards China’s energy policy needs. 
Before discussion the survey results from Chapter 4, Chapter 3 presented the second 
parallel strand of analysis is reviewed, namely IAM modelling. The literature on 
IAMs is discussed in the following chapter. 
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3. Literature Review of Climate Modelling and Feedback 
Loop 
Climate modelling can take many forms, but they are predominantly physics-based, 
which captures the real physical cause of any relationship, rather than statistical 
models which imply a simple relationship that is fitted to observations (Giovanni and 
Richards, 2010). This research proposes using a physics-based model, rather than a 
statistical model. Physics based models seek to replicate real life, albeit in a simplified 
fashion. Statistical models normally seek to capture relationships, but do not always 
offer an explanation of why certain relationships exist. A study of natural disasters 
and extreme climatic events may benefit from a statistical approach. This research 
intends to understand real-world interaction via a simplified modelling framework, in 
order to understand where and what energy policies should be implemented, via the 
use of physics-based climate models.  
 
One subset of physics-based climate model that academics have continued to improve 
is the Integrated Assessment Model (IAM), which conceptualises the interactions 
between growth and pollution. The commonality that all IAMs share is their ability to 
combine several academic disciplines. Whereas traditional climate models only 
capture the cause and effect of climate change in relations to pollution intensities and 
climate change, IAMs also consider the economy and other sectors. This is vital for 
the understanding of energy policy strategies, as pollution abatement is dependent on 
also understanding economic growth and the energy sector. Referring back to the 
Trilemma (cf Figure 1.1), the integrated assessment methodology combines three 
domains (climate change, economic, energy sector) into a single framework. This 
method of climate assessment is called a hard-link between climate change and other 
sectors  
 
There are two ways to link the effects of climate change to economic growth and the 
energy sector, namely soft-link and hard-link. The soft-link approach involves 
combination of two or more models that have been developed independently from 
another and can be run on a standalone basis, not on an “integrated” basis. In other 
words, the climate model is run separately from the economic or energy sector model. 
Climate modelling results are then exogenously inputted into the economic or energy 
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sector model. This approach can be used to economically assess climate change 
impacts from those emissions with a greater country and sectoral detail and taking 
into account adjustments in national and international markets due to changes in 
relative prices (i.e. autonomous adaptation). However, due to the heterogeneity in 
complexity and accounting methods across different models, the soft-link approach 
suffers from problems in achieving overall consistency and convergence of iterative 
solution approaches. The hard-link approach of IAMs emphasises internal consistency 
and therefore makes use of a single integrated modelling framework. Information 
from other models is directly fed into the core model. Data and functional 
relationships from other models are condensed and synthesised in a way compatible to 
the structure of one core model. Many IAMs offer the full integration between growth, 
climate change and the energy sector. This research has chosen to apply IAMs for 
climate modelling based on this merit. Soft-linked methods apply two or more 
disjointed frameworks, for example, separate models for the economy, climate change 
and energy systems.  
 
The chapter firstly reviews global IAM methodology for modelling and projecting 
energy generation pathways. The chapter then moves into IAMs specifically used to 
study China. Finally, the review of literature on the proposed iterative Feedback Loop 
between climate modelling and energy policy analysis is discussed.  
 
3.1. Global Climate Modelling Methods 
IAM aims to capture the interaction between the economy and its impact on the 
environment. Economic activity and growth leads to GHG emissions. These 
emissions are accounted for through the use of the climate model. This model 
captures the impact of GHG emission on temperature change and eco-system damage. 
When stakeholders take into account the previously not considered negative pollution 
externalities (the cost of pollution on health and happiness), they reduce their 
economic activity to abate pollution. This causes the stakeholders to reduce economic 
activity. The discussed modelling cycle was assumed to be voluntary, with 
stakeholders adjusting their behaviour autonomously. The increase in pollution 
abatement and associated reduction in economic activity can also be imposed via 
legislation, for example forcing lower consumption of natural resources with a view 
of controlling emissions (Rutherford, 2006). This loop is depicted in Figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3.1: Schematic of an IAM (after Rutherford, 2006) 
 
IAM methodologies offer policy makers the possibility of performing 
interdisciplinary modelling, the flexibility in model design and extension, global 
coverage, long-time scale, and policy analysis.  
 
Interdisciplinary Modelling 
Integrated assessment models combine knowledge from multiple domains into a 
single framework. Operational modelling and model development are not restricted 
and cover all three areas of climate change, economic, or energy systems 
simultaneously. Since they use existing techniques from other areas of research, they 
are also able to draw from existing methodologies and data-sets from more 
established areas of research, such as trade and commerce. This is especially true for 
growth base macroeconomic models.  
 
Flexibility in Modelling Design and Extension 
IAM methodologies can be tailored to include less or more detail of the environment, 
economy and energy systems. The level of detail is dependent on the complexity of 
the problem studied and availability of data, amongst other issues. These models can 
be revised quickly and easily to aid the forecasting process of projection future energy 
mixes, emissions profiles and energy supply-demand trends. The integration between 
the economy, climate biosphere and energy systems allows for each area of the model 
to be compared to existing work. Results for the economy component of the IAM can 
be compared to purely economic research to sense-check the model outcomes. 
Climate results and energy systems results from the IAM can be compared to purely 
climate based and energy systems based research with the same ease. 
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Global Coverage 
The same flexibility exhibited by IAM to include more or less detail from the 
economy, environment and energy systems is applicable to country analysis. IAM can 
carry out projections on a global aggregate basis, or a regionally disaggregated basis. 
If data is not available for individual countries, many IAMs will accept aggregated 
regional data and still generate meaningful results. The most recent example whether 
this method has been employed is in the WITCH (Bosetti et al., 2010) and REMIND-
R model (Leimbach et al., 2009), where data for specific countries were limited. 
Instead of studying each country separately, an aggregation exercise of countries that 
had similar geographical and economic features were carried out that grouped 
together these nations.  
 
Long Time Scales 
In the short run, there may be cases, where disequilibrium persists. However, in the 
very long-run, economics models tend towards an equilibrium level for most macro-
economic indicators. To better understand pollution, IAM should also be run over 
very long time horizons in order to provide a consistent accounting of both the costs 
and benefits of climate policy. Generally speaking, over a long term horizon, perfect 
data is unavailable. This IAM offers one solution to data availability for long-term 
forecasting. Quantitative models are only as accurate as the input data. A model 
requiring the use of exact data input for dates far into the future would lead to a false 
sense of accuracy and predictive power. Even if the model was highly detailed and 
accurate, the data needed in the very long-term is not accurate. Forecasting the long-
term cannot be performed with a high degree of accuracy even with the most 
sophisticated model setups.  
 
Policy Assessment Framework 
The integrated nature of the IAM methodology makes it the ideal policy assessment 
framework with response to climate and energy policy making. It melds physical with 
social and economic aspects to visually communicate with policy makers from 
different areas of government.  
 
The flexibility and cross disciplined nature of IAM makes it an ideal framework to 
address trade-offs and synergies for policy makers. It also evaluates the cost and 
benefits of decision taken by all stakeholders. It forms the basis to perform scenarios 
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analysis on the various policy decisions. More important, there is a high degree of 
dynamic optimisation. Depending on what the objective of the IAM is, many IAMs 
offer time stepping between one period and the next. This dynamic optimisation 
framework allows projections to be path dependent and more reflective of reality; 
good or bad decisions in the current period will be reflected in the subsequent period.  
 
To better understand how IAMs work, it is important to distinguish between the 
different classifications of IAMs. Stanton et al. (2008) and Stanton and Ackerman 
(2009) produced comprehensive reviews on the different classification of IAMs. They 
classify
13
 IAMs into five main clusters, namely welfare maximisation, general 
equilibrium, partial equilibrium, simulation and cost minimisation. A sixth IAM 
classification is added, coined hybrid methodology, when a model spans more than 
one class of IAM. These classifications are presented in Table 3.1. A summary of the 
key model features is presented in Appendix 7. 
 
Table 3.1: IAM methodology classifications (after Stanton and Ackerman, 2009) 
Model Classification Global Aggregate Regionally Disaggregated 
Welfare Maximisation 
DICE-2008, 
ENTICE-BR, 
DEMETER-1CCS,  
MIND* 
RICE-2004, FEEM-RICE, 
FUND, MERGE, CETA-M, 
GRAPE, AIM/Dynamic Global, 
REMIND-R*, WITCH* 
General Equilibrium JAM, IGEM 
IGS/EPPA, SMG, 
WORLDSCAN, ABARE-
GTEM, G-CUBED/MSG3, MS-
MRT, IMACLIM-R, WIAGEM 
Partial Equilibrium - MiniCAM, GIM* 
Simulation - 
PAGE-2002, ICAM-3, E3MG, 
GIM* 
Cost Minimisation GET-LFL, MIND* 
DNE21+, MESSAGE-MACRO, 
REMIND-R*, WITCH* 
* Hybrid methodology that falls within more than IAM one classification  
 
The distinction between a global aggregate and regionally disaggregated analysis is 
that global analysis does not consider different regions; it optimises the world as one 
aggregate unit. Regionally disaggregated analysis accounts for disparities between 
                                                 
 
13
 Classification refers to IAM Classification and is defined in the Glossary of Terms towards the 
beginning of this thesis consisting of welfare maximisation, general equilibrium, partial equilibrium, 
simulation, cost minimisation and hybrid methodologies. 
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regions; it disaggregates welfare into regions and tries to achieve equalisation across 
regions in the optimisation function (Stanton, 2009). Given the research focuses on 
China, the study of China on its own is necessary. It cannot be aggregated into the 
global landscape. Hence, a regionally disaggregated approach of IAM methodology is 
necessary for this research.  
 
3.1.1. Welfare Maximisation 
Welfare maximisation aims to maximise welfare, or enjoyment of all the participants 
in an economy. The modelling assumes the role of the social planner and aims to 
maximise social welfare, also taken as the social utility function. Consuming goods 
and services provides citizens with enjoyment. The greater the consumption 
(assuming the same level of savings), the higher the economic growth and the happier 
the citizens become. In a climate change context, consumption of goods and services 
require energy. Since natural resources are limited, the supply of energy is also 
limited.  
 
The maximisation exercise is constrained by the production frontier, otherwise there 
will be infinite levels of consumption pursued. This is in accordance with real-life, as 
a limited supply of energy, the supply of consumption of goods and services also 
becomes limited. Hence, this type of IAM tried to maximise consumption, based on 
the constraints imposed by energy resources and other factors of production. Welfare 
models are based on a Ramsey-type neoclassical growth framework (Stanton et al., 
2008). Wealth accumulation and economic growth are driven by different regions 
intertemporally optimising investment and consumption decisions. The discounted 
present value of welfare is maximised, which increases in proportion to consumption. 
Policy makers choose the level of emissions abatement in each time period, via 
sacrificing levels of GDP production. Abatement can either occur passively via less 
economic activity, or actively via specific costs committed to abatement activities. 
Both result in reduced GDP growth (Nordhaus, 2008). This interaction is presented in 
Figure 3.2. 
 
Dynamic optimisation techniques are commonly used for welfare optimisation and 
cost minimisation. These models solve for all time periods simultaneously and 
decisions are made with perfect foresight (Stanton et al., 2008). Typical examples are 
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DICE-2007 (Nordhaus, 2008), ENTICE-BR (Popp, 2006), DEMETER-1CCS 
(Gerlagh, 2006), and MIND (Edenhofer et al., 2006). Additionally, there are seven 
popular regionally disaggregated welfare maximisation models, namely RICE-2004 
(Yang and Nordhaus, 2006), FEEM-RICE (Bosetti et al., 2006), FUND (Tol, 1999), 
MERGE (Manne and Richels, 2004), CETA-M (Peck and Teisberg, 1999), GRAPE 
(Kurosawa, 2004), AIM/Dynamic Global (Masui et al., 2006), REMIND-R 
(Leimbach et al., 2009), and WITCH (Bosetti et al., 2010). Since all these models 
follow a similar logic, their differences are not discussed in detail, but listed in 
Appendix 7 for completeness.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Stylised representation of Welfare Maximisation type models (after 
Nordhaus, 2008) 
 
Welfare Maximisation model are useful due to the ease policy makers can understand 
the implications of the model. Policy makers know that consumption brings about 
greater happiness. Hence they seek to increase the level of consumption as high as 
possible. However, this classification of IAM takes a macro level view and does not 
look into the details of the energy sector. This simplification does not lend itself to 
understanding China’s energy sector in sufficient detail to make energy policy 
suggestions specifically for China.  
 
3.1.2. General Equilibrium 
In the very long run, the output of goods and services will equilibrate at a level where 
the cost of supplying the goods is the cost of demanding the goods in all sectors. 
General equilibrium seeks to find the price at which supply equates to demand. At 
that price, the levels of output and the level of emissions it generates from producing 
the output is also known. Equilibrium models evaluate climate change via explicitly 
modelling the sub-sectors and factors of production. It calculates the equilibrium level 
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of prices, where all factors of production experience market clearing prices 
simultaneously. Changes in relative prices induce sectoral and trade-flow adjustments 
and changes trade flows. The equilibrium level triggers autonomous adaptation all 
over the world economic system (Bosetti et al., 2009). The dynamics of price 
adjustments are shown in Figure 3.3. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Stylised representation of General Equilibrium type models (after Bosetti 
et al., 2009) 
 
In recursive dynamics the previous period’s output is used as input for the following 
period’s modelling. Past decision are punished or rewarded accordingly; the 
modelling framework is more accurate than in the absence of recursive dynamics. 
Requiring all factor prices to clear makes general equilibrium models suitable for 
recursive dynamics (Stanton et al., 2008). Typical examples are JAM (Gerlagh, 2008), 
IGEM (Jorgenson et al., 2004), IGSM/EPPA (Babiker et al., 2008), SMG (Edmonds 
et al., 2004), WORLDSCAN (Lejour et al., 2004), ABARE-GTEM (Pant, 2007), G-
CUBED/MSG3 (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1999), MS-MRT (Bernstein et al., 1999), 
AIM (Kainuma et al., 1999), IMACLIM-R (Crassous et al., 2006), and WIAGEM 
(Kemfert, 2001).  
 
General equilibrium models are useful as they calculate the level of prices that clear in 
all markets simultaneously. Policy makers can use the single market clearing price to 
set level of energy production and consumption. However, generation equilibrium 
models can be extremely complex, combining very detailed climate models with 
intricate accounts of the economy. Despite their detail, general equilibrium models’ 
reliance on decreasing returns is a serious limitation to their usefulness in modelling 
endogenous technological change (the ability of the model to endogenously change 
the rate of technological improvement), as discussed in further detail under partial 
equilibrium models (Garnaut Review, 2008). This is also a problem for China, as its 
technological improvements will require policy makers to account for endogenous 
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technological change, especially in China’s rapid technological improvements in its 
renewable energy generation technologies. Without accounting for endogenous 
technological change, policy markets in China may underestimate the cost savings 
that wind and solar power will bring in the new few decades. 
 
3.1.3. Partial Equilibrium 
Partial equilibrium models are similar to general equilibrium models. General 
equilibrium models assume that all markets clear, whereas partial equilibrium does 
not assume that prices clear in all markets. This form of IAM was developed in 
response to issues relating to multiple equilibria under the general equilibrium 
framework. In dynamic versions of general equilibrium theory, multiple equilibria 
scenarios may arise. When multiple equilibria are present, general equilibrium models 
yield indeterminate results which may depend on details of the estimation procedure. 
For this reason, an assumption of constant or decreasing returns is often added to their 
production functions, an arbitrary theoretical restriction which is known to assure a 
single optimal result. Because increasing returns to scale are important to accurately 
model endogenous technological change, in other words they do not take the rate of 
change of technology as an exogenous input. Advocates of general equilibrium have 
to choose between oversimplifying their energy sector representation and allowing 
unstable model results. Focusing on a smaller number of economic sectors by holding 
prices in other sectors constant, modellers can avoid problems associated with 
increasing returns to scale. Increasing returns to scale is unrealistic in a growing, but 
stabilising global setting. The GDP of economies may grow, but the rate of growth 
will most likely fall on a global basis. Thus decreasing returns to scale setting is vital 
to the realistic portrayal of the future (Köhler et al., 2006). For example MiniCAM 
(Clarke et al., 2007) and GIM (Mendelsohn and Williams, 2004) make use partial 
equilibrium theory. 
 
Partial equilibrium models are useful due to their ability to overcome the trade-off 
between increasing returns to scale and multiple equilibria. Although partial 
equilibrium models circumvent the problem of increasing returns, it is at the expense 
of generality (Stanton et al., 2008). The study of energy policy in China becomes 
limited to small regions and provinces (under a very specific set of assumptions) with 
the loss of generality. Because China’s landmass and energy needs are so varied, the 
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partial equilibrium model, which provides analysis of specific areas and sectors, is not 
sufficient to aid Chinese energy policy makers. 
 
3.1.4. Simulation 
Simulation models use statistical data from the past to predict the future. The 
simulations run are in fact sensitivity analysis on the outcome of pollution using a 
“what-if” scenario. It allows policy makers to test their policy decision in theory first, 
before putting them into practice. A simulation model was used in the seminal Stern 
Review (Stern, 2006). Such models are predictions about future emissions based on 
exogenous policy targets. In other words, climate outcomes are not affected by the 
economic module. A predetermined set of emission values by period dictates the 
amount of carbon that can be used in production, and model output includes the cost 
of abatement and cost of damages. Simulation models allow policy makers to 
simulate the impact of policy on the economy as tangible costs and environmental 
costs. Figure 3.4 illustrates how the PAGE2002 decision chain for policy and impact 
analysis provided the analytical backbone for the Stern Review (2006). Although 
simulation models cannot address the questions of what policy makers should do in 
the pursuit of welfare maximisation or cost minimisation, they provide a useful model 
to estimate the costs of various likely future emission paths (ADB, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Stylised representation of Simulation type models (after ADB, 2009) 
 
Examples of simulation models include PAGE2002 (Hope, 2006), ICAM-3 
(Dowlatabadi, 1998), E3MG (Barker et al., 2006), and GIM (Mendelsohn and 
Williams, 2004).  
 
Simulation models are useful given their ability to represent uncertain parameters and 
develop long-term projections for energy based on pre-determined emissions 
scenarios. This is useful for Chinese policy markets to perform a “what if” scenario 
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on their chosen policy actions. However the usefulness of simulation models on 
policy analysis is limited by a lack of feedback between their climate and economic 
dynamics (Stanton et al., 2008). Simulation models take the choices of all agents in 
the base-year at the status quo for the entire modelling horizon. There are no game-
theory based interactions between stake holders. This is unrealistic, as what one agent 
chooses to do in current year will impact the decision taken by another agent in the 
subsequent year. This “static” modelling approach is not powerful enough for Chinese 
energy policy makers to use as an aid to making energy policy decisions when faced 
with constantly changing energy and political landscapes. 
 
3.1.5. Cost Minimisation 
Cost minimisation models are designed to identify the most cost effective solution to 
enjoy a level of consumption. With emissions being one of the costs associated with 
consuming goods and services, cost minimisation models also seek to limit emissions 
to levels that offer the greatest happiness to citizens. Some cost minimisation models 
explicitly include a climate module, while others abstract from the climate by 
representing only emissions, and not climatic change and damages. They can have 
very complex bottom-up energy technology descriptions. Bottom-up is taken in this 
research as starting off with the micro level detailed construction of individual energy 
sector items to obtain an overview of the energy sector. Schopp et al. (1998) depict 
the interaction between the economy and emissions in a concise manner as seen in 
Figure 3.5. Cost minimisation models address policy issues without requiring 
calculations of human welfare in money terms, but existing cost minimisation models 
may suffer from the same tendency towards spurious precision exhibited in some 
general and partial equilibrium models (Ortiz and Markandya, 2008). 
 
Figure 3.5: Stylised representation of Cost Minimisation type models (after Schopp et 
al., 1998) 
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Examples include GET-LFL (Hedenus et al., 2006), MIND (Edenhofer et al., 2006), 
DNE21+ (Sano et al., 2006), MESSAGE-MACRO (Rao et al., 2006), REMIND-R 
(Leimbach et al., 2009), and WITCH (Bosetti et al., 2010). 
 
Cost minimisation models are useful as they are able to capture the energy sector in 
great detail. Policy makers can choose to build the cost minimisation models to the 
level of detail that is needed to implements its policies. For example, if Chinese 
energy policy makers would like to influence the coal power generation sector via 
increased taxation on capital expenditure, a cost minimisation model can model to the 
level of detail required for this policy action to be accounted for. However, cost 
minimisation models often require large volumes of data to accurately capture the 
energy sector (Stanton et al., 2008). For China, detailed data is not always available 
for micro levels and often they are released many years later. Issues of data-
availability will limit the usefulness of a pure cost minimisation model for China. 
 
3.1.6. Hybrid Methodology 
The hybrid model is the most recent application of IAM methodology on climate 
change, combining more than one classification of IAM (Bosetti and Buchner, 2009). 
The greatest advantage is its ability to benefit from the strength of two classes of IAM 
methodologies, whilst hoping to remove some disadvantages if only using one class 
of IAM. The hybrid methodology chosen for research on China is the top-down 
(growth maximisation) overview of policy, as well as the bottom-up (cost 
minimisation) detailed review of the energy subsectors. Immediate drawbacks are also 
less evident than using an IAM belonging to only one classification. The choice of 
such a method is grounded on the factors that compare more favourably to other 
methods reviewed. Before committing to this hybrid IAMs, it would be useful to 
understand how IAM research has been especially applied to China. A survey on 
Chinese IAM analysis is presented below. 
 
3.2. Climate Modelling Methods Applied to China 
Academics focussing on China and other experts in this area have been reviewed by 
Teng et al., (2007). They have used a number of IAM methodologies that have been 
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applied to assess the impacts of climate change, mitigation and adaptation policies in 
China. General Equilibrium models are preferred in China, as well as Simulation and 
Cost Minimisation models (Table 3.2). A more detailed survey of Chinese IAM 
features can be found in Appendix 8.  
 
Table 3.2: Classifications of Chinese IAM methodologies (Teng et al., 2007) 
General Equilibrium Simulation Input-Output Cost Minimisation 
HE YE MARKAL 
PRCGEM Liang LEAP 
TEDCGE  AIM 
CNAGE  3E 
 
Surprisingly hybrid IAMs (welfare maximisation and cost minimisation) has not seen 
a widespread use. This section discusses the different types of IAMs already applied 
in China and explores the possibility of using hybrid IAMs in China. 
 
3.2.1. General Equilibrium Analysis 
General Equilibrium analysis is widely applied amongst Chinese IAM researchers. 
The most common are HE, PRCGEM, TEDCGE and CNAGE. 
 
HE 
HE is a static General Equilibrium model used to analyse the impacts of carbon tax on 
the national economy. The model includes detailed assumptions for capital, labour, 
coal, oil and gas. These factors of production can be substituted against each other. 
HE divides the national economy into nine sectors including three energy sectors and 
six non-energy sectors. The nine sectors are coal mining, oil and natural gas 
production, agriculture, electricity, manufacturing, construction, transportation and 
communication, commercial, and service.  
 
An application of HE has been used to assess the impacts of carbon tax on the 
emission reduction and national economy. HE has also been used to evaluate the 
impact of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in China. Four factors that help 
reduce emission are considered. These are economic structure adjustment, technical 
progress, energy structure adjustment and energy efficiency (He and Shen, 2002).  
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PRCGEM 
PRCGEM is a static large-scale General Equilibrium model, composed of 118 sectors 
across 30 regions. The model’s main objective is to simulate and analyse trade 
liberalisation energy policy. When the user considers the substitution amongst energy 
factors and emission equations, PRCGEM also can be used to determine the impacts 
of environmental policy and CO2 reduction on the national economy.  
 
The application of PRCGEM by the Institute of the Chinese Social Science academy 
and Monash University of Australia evaluated the cost of CO2 abatement under 
different abatement objectives. Under short-term assumptions the wage (cost of 
production for labour) is fixed and capital is limited within the same sector, therefore 
no equilibrium exists. Under the long term, the wage is variable and capital flows 
freely among sectors so that all factor markets are clear.  
 
The limitation is that PRCGEM only considers the emissions caused by fossil fuel 
combustion, while the emissions in industrial processes and non-industrial sources are 
excluded. The carbon tax theme in PRCGEM is a unit tax on the carbon content in 
fossil fuel instead of CO2 emissions (Zheng and Fan, 1999). 
 
TEDCGE  
TEDCGE is a dynamic General Equilibrium model used to understand the impact of 
carbon tax. The national economy is divided into 10 productive sectors: agriculture, 
heavy industry, light industry, transportation, construction, services, coal, oil, natural 
gas and electricity. The production function is the nested constant elasticity of the 
production function with capital, labour and energy (coal, oil, and natural gas).  
 
The application of TEDCGE has remained focused on analysing the impacts of 
carbon taxes on the market clearing prices of carbon. At different abatement levels, 
TEDCGE is used to calculate different additional investments for technology and 
estimate the marginal abatement cost function in China. TEDCGE is also useful in 
assessing the potential of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in China (Wang 
et al., 2009). 
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CNAGE  
CNAGE is a static General Equilibrium model. The production function is a constant 
return to scale Cobb-Douglas production function with the aggregation of labour, 
capital and energy to calculate GDP. The energy factor includes 19 commercial 
energies with 5 types suitable for final consumption. In this case, the investment 
structure is not adjusted according to different carbon tax levels. All carbon tax is 
assumed to be reinvested. Generation technology is assumed to be both independent 
to the energy cost, and energy consumption structure, and fixed within each sector. 
This results in an identical growth rate for the consumption of different energy 
products in the same sector. 
 
CNAGE is applied to analyse the short-term and long-term impacts of different 
carbon tax levels on the national economy and on different end-use sectors (Glomsrød, 
1998). 
 
3.2.2. Simulation and Input-Output Analysis 
The second commonly applied classification of Chinese IAM research is Simulation 
modelling. Two commonly used models are YE (Michelsen et al., 2008) and Liang 
(Liang et al., 2007). 
 
YE  
The YE model is a dynamic input-output model and is based on the input-output table. 
The input-output table is used in the analysis of industrial and economic structures, as 
well as in making economic forecasts. The table is a collection to account for what 
inputs of labour, capital and other factors of production are needed for a set of output 
and offers an economic snapshot of the country’ productivity. The input-output 
approach provides a useful framework for tracing energy use and other activities such 
as environmental pollution associated with inter-industry activity as specific inputs for 
labour and capital will also indicate the levels of GHG emission outputs. YE 
simulates various abatement scenarios and the impact this has on GDP levels and 
growth. Using input-output tables, YE projects the best reduction path under 
cumulative emissions control and the corresponding industrial structure adjustment 
and technical choice (Michelsen et al., 2008). 
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Liang  
The Liang model performs input-output analysis with a built in function to evaluate 
difference scenarios. The model developed by the Energy & Environmental Policy 
Research (CEEP) accounts for the impact of different social economic factors on 
energy demand and energy intensity on climate change and the macroeconomy. Final 
energy demand is a function of average consumption per capita. Liang applied his 
model to run scenarios based different growth rates of population, urbanisation and 
average incomes (Liang et al., 2007). 
 
3.2.3. Cost Minimisation and Detailed Energy-Sector Analysis 
The third commonly applied IAM classification that has been specifically applied to 
understand China is cost minimisation. Four commonly used models which could aid 
Chinese energy policy makers are MARKAL, LEAP, AIM and 3E. 
 
MARKAL 
The MARKAL Model is a highly complex and detailed multi-period linear 
programming model of energy systems. MARKAL is a non-country-specific and 
flexible analytical model which can be adapted to different energy systems at national, 
provincial and local level. The Model assesses the overall energy system costs 
resultant of different energy policy stances. In other words, it is designed to determine 
the lowest cost method of satisfying energy demand. The objective function covers 
R&D investment costs. The cost function consists of energy exploitation costs, import 
and export costs, capital costs, operation costs, distribution costs of electricity, and 
transmission costs of heating.  
 
Chinese institutions that have applied MARKAL include the Institute of Nuclear and 
New Energy Technology, Tsinghua University and Shanghai Environment Science 
Research Institute. One often cited adaptation of MARKAL was constructed by the 
Shanghai Environment Science Research Institute to estimate the repercussions of an 
adjustment in energy structures. These repercussion scenarios include changes in 
energy efficiency, generation and end-use (Chen, 2005). 
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LEAP 
The LEAP model is a scenario-based energy-environment modelling methodology. 
The model’s scenarios are based on a detailed accounting of energy consumption, 
which in turn drives energy generation under a range of assumptions on population, 
economic growth, technology and price. LEAP’s flexible data structure allows for an 
analysis with as rich technological specification and end-use detail as the user chooses. 
 
LEAP has been applied by the Energy Research Institute, the Institute of Nuclear and 
New Energy Technology (INET), Tsinghua University, and Shanghai Environment 
Science Research Institute. In 1999, the Energy Research Institute adopted the LEAP 
Model for research on the sustainable development scenarios in China. In 2003, the 
Energy Research Institute (ERI) finished the research which generated three 
sustainable development energy demand scenarios (Zhou et al., 2003). More recently, 
the Shanghai Environment Science Research Institute adopted the LEAP Model to 
better understand low carbon emission development in Shanghai to reduce energy 
demand and air pollution. The model was used to make energy policy suggestions 
relating to health and pollution issues (Heaps, 2009). More recently, Imperial College 
London’s Grantham Institute for Climate Change also used the LEAP model with 
update inputs to study China. The research focussed on policy-relevant evidence to 
inform governmental decision making on avoiding dangerous climate change brought 
on by greenhouse gas emissions (Gambhir et al., 2011).  
 
AIM 
AIM, or the Asian Pacific derivative coined APAC-AIM, is an energy technology 
model which contains detailed accounts of generation technologies. The model 
evaluates technology and emissions policies. Carbon taxes and subsidies change the 
generation costs of different technologies. Since stakeholders adopt a minimum cost 
approach, the action to reduce costs for the end-user changes the preferences of 
energy use. The resulting reduction in energy use also reduces GHG emissions.  
 
The ERI applies this methodology across the residential and commercial sectors. In 
these sectors, the Institute optimises the selection the effective technology 
combination selection based on generation costs (Jiang and Hu, 2003). 
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3E 
The 3E model is a cost minimisation model, with the aim of reducing GHG emissions. 
3E links emissions with the macroeconomy through an energy demand forecasting 
framework, with the objective function to minimise energy generation costs. The 
model is broken down into three components, namely the macroeconomic modules 
(MEM), end-use forecasting modules (EDFM), and energy system optimising 
modules (ESOM). MEM is a macro module used to estimate Chinese economic long-
term development plans. EDFM is energy demand, or end-use energy forecasting 
module. It estimates demand according to energy intensity and substitutability 
between different forms of energy use. ESOM is a multi-period linear programme 
module based on an energy flow system.  
 
Tsinghua University’s Institute of Nuclear applied this methodology. The Institute 
analyses the marginal costs, branch marginal costs, upfront expenses, upfront 
investment, and temporal distribution of expenses of CO2 emissions. They further 
analyse the energy structure shift and technical options open to different methods of 
CO2 abatement, and abatement costs under different energy development strategies 
(Michelsen et al., 2008). 
 
In reviewing the existing types of IAMs specifically used to study China, there has 
been a preference towards general equilibrium, simulation and cost minimisation 
models. There are limited applications via welfare maximisation or Hybrid 
methodology that combined welfare maximisation and cost minimisation. This 
research explores the role of Hybrid IAMs as alternative tool for providing an 
additional modelling perspective to aid Chinese policy makers made informed energy 
decisions.  
 
3.3. Hybrid IAM Methodology for China: the WITCH Model 
Each of the reviewed modelling methodologies has different strengths and 
weaknesses. After the review, a hybrid methodology seems the most appropriate. This 
section makes the case for hybrid methodology more explicitly and discusses the 
merits of WITCH specifically for Chinese energy policy studies. 
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Hybrid IAM Methodology for Chinese Energy Policy Studies 
Welfare Welfare Maximisation models are the easiest to understand by the policy 
maker and stakeholders. Given finite energy resources and carbon emission limits, the 
model seeks to establish the most consumption stakeholders can enjoy. The 
disadvantage is that Welfare Maximisation models normally take a top down macro 
view and do not look into the details of the energy sector. Cost Minimisation works on 
a similar logic and looks at minimising the budget constraints of pollution abatement, 
labour and capital for set consumption levels. The advantage is a more in-depth and 
careful look into the energy and emissions sectors. However this focus on detail 
makes the model very complex.  
 
The difference between Cost Minimisation and Welfare Maximisation methodology is 
that Cost Minimisation builds from the bottom-up a detailed view of the economy, 
energy and climate change. Welfare Maximisation, on the other hand, takes a top-
down view from an aggregated perspective of economy, energy and climate change. 
These two methodologies can co-exist in the same model by adding the detailed 
botton-up features of Cost Mimisation to the energy module, whilst Maximising 
Welfare against this nested energy module to give a overall optimised energy 
landscape.  
 
General Equilibrium and Partial Equilibrium models are more suited for stakeholders 
aiming to calculate the market clearing price for goods and services. The advantage 
would be to study the impact of price related policy actions, such as taxes and 
subsidies. For command and control type policies that set explicit emissions levels, 
the equilibrium levels would be less useful. A Simulation model would be most 
suitable for sensitivity analysis and what-if analysis. The disadvantage, is that most of 
the variables are exogenously given and not endogenously calculated, thus increasing 
the amount of data collection.  
 
By applying these IAMs to study Chinese energy policy, initial observations have 
been drawn. The review of global and Chinese IAMs has led to an important lesson. 
From the general review of types of IAMs in use globally, there were six IAM 
methodologies identified, of only three have been applied to China. The three applied 
in China are General Equilibrium, Cost Minimisation, and Simulation models. The 
studies in China have not chosen to embrace Welfare Maximisation, Partial 
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Equilibrium and Hybrid Models. If Hybrid models were assumed to be an 
amalgamation of Welfare Maximisation and Cost Minimisation models, then Welfare 
models are included within the Hybrid framework. If Partial Equilibrium models are a 
derivative of generation equilibrium models, both classifications share the same 
problems. Hence the logical evolution in Chinese IAMs uses the Hybrid IAM 
methodology that is both Welfare Maximising and Cost Minimising. To the extent 
that IAMs have already been applied to China, WITCH discussed in further details 
below, as a hybrid of welfare maximization and cost minimisation offers a different 
perspective because these two types of IAM methodologies have not been widely 
applied to China. The main advantage of the Hybrid approach by combining Welfare 
Maximisation and Cost Minimisation is the simultaneous top-down and bottom-up 
view of energy policy modelling. The top-down view is particularly useful to capture 
command-and-control type of energy policy action by the Communist Party. The 
bottom-up view is vital for a more in-depth and careful look into the energy and 
emissions sectors. General and Partial Equilibrium models are more suited to market-
based economies with free energy and carbon prices. Simulation models could be 
suitable for studying the outcome of specific energy and climate change policies in 
China. However a more suitable technique for China is the amalgamation of welfare 
maximisation and cost minimisation, as it utilises the benefits of both modelling 
techniques to offer a more rounded quantitative framework.  
 
The WITCH Model as the Choosen Hybrid IAM Methodology 
There are several key benefits of using WITCH, which are a holistic modelling 
approach and it is highly applicable to Chinese energy policy studies. WITCH offers a 
holistic and top down integrated assessment of China’s energy landscape. The study 
will not only consider energy sector simulation, but also economics and 
environmental analysis. Energy policy is not only about demand and supply of energy. 
It has far wider implication on societies. The WITCH modelling processes the holistic 
assessment platform to perform such studies. 
 
WITCH is applicable for Chinese energy studies, due to challenges in data collection 
in China China’s command-and-contorl policy landscape. Firstly, WITCH allows for 
users to make stylistic simplifications, thus reduce data requirements. Data gathering 
in China is difficult, due to the lack of market transparency. Additionally, China’s 
large footprint means using a very details simulation, input-output model very 
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difficult to simulate the nation’s various energy systems. Even having the details data 
would make analysis difficult via a simulation approach. WITCH is one of the most 
suitable ways to study Chinese energy policy due to its stylised method of analysis. It 
looks across energy, climate change and the macroeconomics not in highly in-depth 
way, but on an aggregate basis to simulate their interconnections. Secondly, WITCH 
is suitable for China, as compared to studying the UK energy landscape. China has a 
command and control system in place for policy making. One centralised energy 
policy strategy should in essence be filtered down into the various provinces and 
cities. WITCH examines pollution on a global scale. China is the largest polluter of 
atmospheric CO2. To study China, a global perspective should be taken, as it is in the 
WITCH methodology. 
 
3.4. The Feedback Loop between Chinese Energy Policy and 
Climate Modelling 
The review of Chinese IAMs also calls for a better linkage between climate and 
energy modelling with policies. The research is proposing to adopt a Feedback Loop 
that links energy policy analysis to Hybrid IAM modelling. This Feedback Loop that 
provides the link between energy policy and climate modelling. 
 
The limited literature on iterative Feedback Loops between climate models and 
energy policy analysis, suggests this research is able to deliver contributions to the 
existing body of peer-reviewed research via the use of the WITCH IAM methodology 
in conjunction with the Energy Policy Assessment Framework. There are some works 
which have taken a similar line of thought and are presented below. Firstly, Manu and 
Norton (2005) use a “what-if” simulation based IAM to test out differing policy 
actions. However this does incorporate an iterative loop that feeds policy action back 
into the climate model for another round of optimisation. Secondly, Bahn et al. (2011) 
adapt a Welfare Maximisation model to study the tipping point of climate damage in 
relations to causing natural disasters. Again, this is a linear modelling exercise that 
tries to calculate when an event will occur. This period’s output does not feed into the 
next period’s inputs. Both shows limited exploration of the Feedback Loop concept. 
To improve the usefulness of the Hybrid WITCH Model, the Energy Policy 
Assessment Framework, some linkage between climate modelling and energy policy 
analysis is called for. 
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3.5. Conclusions  
With the previous chapter (Chapter 2) having concluded that there was a wide 
spectrum of discretional energy policy that Chinese politician can implement grouped 
into Legislative, Economic and Organisational types of policy action. However, not 
all policy actions are suitable. Before starting the current chapter, Chapter 2 also 
proposed an Energy Policy Assessment Framework to ensure a balanced set of policy 
action via five policy dimensions. The five policy dimensions proposed were 
Economic Growth, Climate Change Mitigation, SoS, Social Equality, and Governance. 
The literature on energy policies and the early part of Chapter 3 having assessed and 
concluded that a Hybrid IAM methodology that combined Welfare Maximisation and 
Cost Minimisation would be a plausible model to aid Chinese energy policy makers 
make informed decision.  
 
One important research objective is to create a Feedback Loop to combine 
quantitative climate modelling with qualitative policy analysis. After reviewing the 
literature in this field, it is evident that there is limited work on the creation of a 
climate model to energy policy to climate model feedback-loop. Most energy policy 
decision support studies have combined simulation IAM methodology with discursive 
energy policy analysis.  
 
Even with the application of state-of-the-art hybrid models such as WITCH, there are 
still challenges to overcome. One such difficulty is the treatment of different regions 
and the interaction between the regions. The model this research proposes to employ 
is the World Induced Technical Change Hybrid (WITCH). This issue along with other 
difficulties are addressed in the following Chapter 4 which provides a justification for 
employing WITCH over other IAMs.  
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4. Developing a Chinese Framework for Energy Policy 
Strategy 
This chapter is based on the background research on climate modelling and reviews of 
energy policy and describes the design a Chinese Framework for Energy Policy 
Strategy (CFEPS) to help address the key research questions. The qualitative 
development of CFPES involved a literature review of energy policies and criteria for 
the assessment of success in Chinese energy policy outcomes. Drawing on the initial 
formulation of assessment criteria for energy policies from Chapter 2, an empirical 
survey of energy policy experts is performed (Section 4.1). The survey helped refine 
the set of policy assessment indicators to be used as part of CFEPS. In conjunction 
with China’s energy policy needs, a suitable modelling methodology is critically 
assessed and proposed as part of CFEPS (Section 4.2).  
 
The interplay between the qualitative and quantitative components of CFEPS are 
presented though a Feedback Loop (Section 4.3) The Feedback Loop discusses the 
interactions between qualitative energy policy analysis and quantitative climate 
modelling, which together aims to offer improvements in the outcome of Chinese 
energy policies. The objective of the study is to help Chinese politicians make 
informed energy policy choices. In doing so, the research can be extended to assist 
policy markets in other nations to set flagship energy policies. 
 
4.1. Evaluating China’s Energy Policies  
Chapter 2 undertook a literature review on energy policy assessment frameworks and 
the relevant criteria items. The literature review provided the common themes and 
sets the scope of a survey on the relevant policy assessment indicators. Since the 
surveyed assessment frameworks in Chapter 2 are not China specific, a survey 
focuses the assessment criteria to China’s energy policy strategies. The results of the 
survey of experts, discussion and feedback are presented as follows. 
4.1.1. Responses from Empirical Survey 
The proposed CFEPS assessment framework criteria items were put to a panel of 
energy sector and policy experts in December 2011. The survey results which 
followed, along with analysis for the results, are presented in the following section.  
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Experts Panel Surveyed  
Cross sections of academic, governmental and business individuals were surveyed. 
The individuals who responded are listed in Table 4.1. There is no specific attribution 
to specific interviewees in the responses presented below. The detailed responses 
from each interviewee can be obtained from Appendix 9, which lists out their full 
responses.  
 
Table 4.1: Survey responses 
# Individual & 
Institution  
Position Held Expertise in Climate Change Survey 
Date 
1 
Prof Nigel 
Brandon, 
Imperial College, 
UK 
Professor in 
Sustainable 
Development 
in Energy at 
Imperial 
College  
 
• The UK Focal Point in climate 
change, energy and environment 
with China 
• Lead UK academic contact for 
Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills with 
China in the area climate 
change, energy and environment 
22/12/11 
2 
Mr Neil Hirst, 
Imperial College, 
UK 
Senior Policy 
Fellow at 
Grantham  
• Currently working with China’s 
Energy Research Institute of 
China’s NDRC on a joint 
project on China and 
International Energy 
Governance. 
• Author of “An assessment of 
China's 2020 carbon intensity 
target”** 
23/12/11 
3 
Mr Anthony 
Foggart, 
Chatham House, 
UK 
Senior 
Research 
Fellow, 
Energy, 
Environment 
and Resource 
Governance 
• Specialises in energy security 
and particularly on emerging 
economies, with extensive work 
in China on the establishment 
and methodologies of low 
carbon economic development  
• Author of “Changing Climates: 
Interdependencies on Energy 
and Climate Security for China 
and Europe” 
05/01/12 
4 
Ms Linda 
Westman*, 
UCL, UK 
PhD student in 
Energy 
Economics 
and Modelling 
• Dr Neil Strachan is a lead author 
of the Energy Systems chapter 
in IPCC’s 5th Assessment 
Report. He builds and maintains 
IAMs with one example being 
UK MARKAL which is heavily 
used in UK energy policy 
making.  
• Ms Linda Westman is a PhD 
student working on a 
26/01/12 
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comparative study of transition 
pathways towards renewable 
energy sources in the People 
Republic of China.  
5 
Dr Chris Hope, 
University of 
Cambridge, UK 
Reader in 
Policy 
Modelling at 
Judge 
Business 
School 
• Advisor to the House of Lords 
Select Committee on Economic 
Affairs Inquiry into aspects of 
the economics of climate 
change,  
• Advisor on the PAGE model to 
the Stern review on the 
Economics of Climate Change 
• Creator of the PAGE09 IAM  
26/01/12 
6 
Mr Alain 
Bucaille, 
AREVA Group, 
France 
Senior Vice 
President, 
Research and 
Innovation  
• Advisor to the Chief Executive 
Officer on strategic 
prospectives. 
• Oversees AREVA’s R&D 
activities. AREVA is a top 
French nuclear and renewables 
company 
10/02/12 
7 
Mr Ajay 
Gambhir, 
Imperial College, 
UK 
Climate 
Change 
Mitigation 
Policy 
Research 
Fellow at 
Grantham 
Institute 
• Led the AVOID research 
programme, studies into the 
long-term low-carbon pathways 
of China and India 
• Author of “Halving global CO2 
by 2050: technologies and 
costs”*** 
13/03/12 
8 
to 
15 
Dr Hua Liao 
collected 8 
responses from 
Chinese 
academics at 
CEEP, Beijing 
Institute of 
Technology, 
China 
Lecturer at 
Centre for 
Energy and 
Environmental 
Policy (CEEP) 
• Wide spectrum of policy 
expects and climate modellers 
and policy expects 
• Although they are all based in 
BIT’s CEET, they are multi 
disciplined individuals with 
collaborations into both 
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Survey Results and Implications  
They survey’s primary objective was to assess whether the proposed synthesis of 
energy policy assessment framework indicators (CFEPS before survey suggestions 
and refinements) were sufficient for policy analysis in China. The survey’s secondary 
objective was to better understand how each of the five policy dimensions should be 
weighed. The responses on the proposed CFEPS assessment framework criteria items 
are summarised below following the order in which the questions were asked.  
 
Choosing the Appropriate Method (Question 1) 
The method was deemed appropriate by all those surveyed. However, there was a 
comment calling for the use of a more systematic and robust method for the multi-
attribute utility measurement of energy policies as developed by Edwards (1977). The 
systematic approach consist of 10 steps, namely of (1
st
) identification of stakeholders, 
(2
nd
) identification of options for action, (3
rd
) identification of attributes, (4
th
) 
identification of empirical indicators, (5
th
) ranking of attributes, (6
th
) rating of 
attributes for their importance, (7
th
) scaling of importance ratings, (8
th
) scoring option 
of each attribute, (9
th
) calculation of utilities and (10
th
) decision.  
 
The response to this question had minimal impact on the CFEPS policy assessment 
framework synthesis. The method used in this research can bypass the need for using 
the 10 step approach. The 10 step approach is more appropriate when building a 
multi-criteria policy assessment framework from scratch. This research does not seek 
to build various policy indicators from the ground up. Instead, the research takes into 
consideration various energy policy assessment frameworks already in use from the 
reviewed IAEA (2005), UN (2007), OECD (2005), WEC (2008) and Eurostat (2005) 
in Chapter 2. Thus the thesis bypasses the first phase of the 10 step method by already 
selecting policy assessment framework’s indicators from a highly relevant pool.  
 
Additional Indicators to Consider (Question 2) 
Questions 2 asked whether there were important policy assessment indicators that had 
been omitted, but should have been included. The additional indicators suggested as 
part of the survey responses are presented in Table 4.2. All five policy dimensions 
received additional indicators.  
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Table 4.2: Additional suggested indicators from interviewees 
Dimension 
(Weight) 
Sub-theme Missing Indicators 
Economic 
Growth 
(20%) 
Energy Investment Deployment costs 
Rate of urbanisation Rate of which cities expend land mass 
as % of China’s total land mass 
Labour force Population growth 
Climate 
Change 
Mitigation 
(20%) 
Other GHG Emissions Sulphur, nitrogen and mercury 
Other Emissions Water pollution and water scarcity 
Emissions intensities in 
demand sectors 
Emission and intensities for buildings, 
industry and transport 
Probability of 
catastrophes 
The increase in the probability of 
catastrophes due to pollution 
SoS 
(20%) 
Hydrocarbon and coal 
dependence 
• Imports as a % of Total GDP 
• Oil imports as a % of total oil 
consumption, dependence on foreign 
oil 
• Imports to total production 
• Coal imports as a % of total coal 
consumption 
Generation mix 
diversification 
Number of fuels types supplying greater 
than 10% of the energy mix 
Production 
diversification 
Diversity in the number of different 
energy suppliers 
Social 
Equality 
(20%) 
Income disparity • Provincial wealth disparity 
• Household welfare 
• Poverty reduction rate 
Governance 
(20%) 
Public participation • Percentage of energy data available 
in the public domain 
• Number of daily newspaper editorials 
on energy 
Regulatory quality & 
control of corruption 
Verification and punishment  
 
Economic growth received suggestions in three areas of investments, urbanisation and 
the labour force. Additional energy investments aim to capture the effect of falling 
deployment costs over time. Labour, in the form of urbanisation and population 
increases, looks towards increasing the overall population size, eligible to participate 
in the labour force. 
 
Climate change mitigation received suggestions of including other atmospheric GHG 
emitters such as sulphur, nitrogen and mercury. Oceanic and freshwater based 
emissions were also suggested by considering water pollution and water scarcity. 
Other pollutants are not considered for the research, as atmospheric carbon pollution 
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forms the main problem facing GHG abatement. Demand side indicators were 
suggested, such as intensities of use across different sectors including buildings 
industry and transport. Although demand side indicators are important, one key 
research contribution is to project the generation mix pathway, which is the supply of 
energy. To fully understand the various components of energy demand is beyond the 
scope of this research. The probability of catastrophes was called for in the responses. 
Other pollution indicators inherently assume a marginal worsening of the environment 
which can be borne. However, pollution has a tipping point, beyond which an 
additional unit of GHG emissions would cause natural disasters which cannot be 
borne and are not acceptable. The tipping point of pollution is not examined in this 
research. This study seeks to understand the marginal impact of pollution. One off 
negative impacts of severe weather conditions (assuming to occur in the short to 
medium term) would suggest that adaptation of energy use habits and emissions needs 
reduction today. The generation mix would then be 100% clean generation from day 
one. IAMs take the view of projecting a gradually changing generation mix under 
marginal abatement efforts.  
 
SoS additional indicators called for hydrocarbon and coal indicators, as China is a net 
importer of these natural resources. Generation mix diversification, in the form of 
dominating fuel types (of greater than 10% of the mix) and dominating energy 
suppliers were also suggested as revenant indicators. This indicator is not considered, 
as China (although being a net importer of coal) has enough coal reserves to last 40 
years (Melik, 2011). China’s net import status is not a true reflection of its SoS in 
specific natural resources. If coal imports were to cease it would not impact China’s 
coal supply as it has an abundance of coal. Instead, China chooses to not mine its own 
resources and import from other countries.  
 
Social equality responses call for indicators measuring income disparity in the form of 
provincial wealth disparity, household welfare accounting and reduction of poverty. 
The social elements of energy policy are soft and difficult to quantify via policy 
assessment framework indicators. This indicator is discussed implicitly via examining 
the model results. This is not explicitly measured using the IAM.  
 
Governance received responses calling for indicators in public participation by 
considering the percentage of energy data available in the public domain and the 
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number of daily newspaper editorials on energy. Additional indicators for regulatory 
quality & control of corruption concerned verification and punishment. Again, this 
soft indicator is discussed implicitly, but not explicitly assessed from model results. 
 
Weighting of Policy Assessment Framework Areas (Question 3) 
The responses called for an unequal weighting between the 5 policy dimensions. Most 
survey responses acknowledged the difficulty of not using an equal weighting and 
foresee the challenges and increase in complexity that is associated with the 
justification for different weightings. 
 
Some experts called for removing the governance dimension, as it relates to the 
efficiency and effectives of the other four dimensions. In other words, the governance 
dimension is an input rather than a measured policy output, as this dimension is the 
general setting that allows policies to channel through the cogs of Chinese 
bureaucracy. This research takes into consideration this comment by implementing a 
Feedback Loop. The model outputs are measured by governance effectiveness and fed 
back to the model as an input for another set of runs in a cyclical manner. This way, 
changes in the effectiveness of governance are accounted for as model inputs.  
 
Other experts stated that the weighting should vary depending on the needs and 
intensions of the policy makers. For example, the indicators could be ranked for 
importance by the users of the assessment framework criteria. Government officials, 
academic institutions and NGO monitoring institutions could be polled to determine 
the category weightings. This suggests that each time a new FYP is released, the 
weights between the five policy dimensions could change. 
 
For the surveyed experts who did explicitly specify weightings, the survey responses 
indicated a lower weighting for Economic Growth to 20% and Governance to 20% 
due to difficulties in measuring the intangible indicators. Stakeholder participation, 
accountability and corruption are difficult to quantify and observe. They are soft 
indicators. Additionally, CEEP responded that Governance may be inappropriate in 
non free-market countries like China. Thus following the survey suggestions, this 
policy dimension has a lower weighting, to reflect the potential difficulties in accurate 
assessment. It was recommended that Climate Change Mitigation was increased by 
10% to give greater emphasis on this often neglected policy dimension.  
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Other Strategic Items (Questions 4 and 5) 
This area offered interesting and unexpected survey responses. The more interesting 
notion was the need for differentiation between short-term and long-term goals. 
Depending on the time horizon, the emphasis of policy goals would change. For 
example, economic growth will have a higher weight in the short-term, but in the long 
term, growth is less important whereas pollution abatement should be weighted higher. 
This research takes a long-term only perspective, hence only one long-term policy 
strategy is considered. The implications of this survey feedback are that the analysis is 
more useful, if the research projects to the medium to long-term. By long-term 
projection, the model can be sense checked, whether the trend follows an explainable 
path. With greater confidence that the long-term projections can be explained, the 
short-term projections (for example the next FYP in 2015) may also offer more robust 
results. 
 
There was also a suggestion that China could benefit from more support rather than 
stricter targets. In other words, policies should offer more carrots (encouragement) 
rather than sticks (targets and punishment for missing them). Further examining of 
Chapter 2 which covered the literature review of global and Chinese energy policies, 
the research agrees this survey response. The use of carrots in analysing market based 
incentive mechanisms may foster a supportive atmosphere for private institutions to 
act in the intended manner expected by governments. This consideration is already 
built into the three categories of energy policy actions, namely the market based 
methodology. Since it is already included as one of the policy actions to take, it will 
not form part of the policy-outcome assessment framework criteria items.  
 
It was proposed that the underlying mechanism of policy change was examined. The 
mechanism that allows changes to energy policy to feed through to the economy is 
important. It was suggested that typical mechanisms including regulation (command 
and control) and market mechanisms (tax and subsidy incentives) should be included. 
This research accounts for this in a different manner. The column of the table still 
retains the five key policy dimensions parts going down. The rows of the table put 
forth different policy actions going across. These are legislative, economic incentives 
and organisational energy policy actions. 
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4.1.2. Relevant Indicators for the Policy Assessment Framework Criteria  
The outcome of the survey was extremely useful. The responses enhanced the 
objectivity of the initially proposed set of CFEPS assessment framework indicators. 
The survey also confirmed that the proposed indicators, before the survey was 
performed, were largely in line with the interviewees expectations. The survey added 
criteria items for a more complete assessment framework. The omitted criteria items 
were suggested and already presented in Table 4.2. 
 
The initial synthesis of the policy assessment framework (presented in Section 2.4.3) 
only drew upon surveyed literature with a view of assessing development policies, or 
environmental policies globally. There was limited literature which focussed on 
energy policy appraisal for China in the same way the Policy Assessment Framework. 
Following responses from the survey, Table 4.3 sets out the revised policy assessment 
framework. Appendix 10 elaborates Table 4.3 and explains the reasons for removing 
certain assessment indicators. Table 4.3 also takes the originally proposed policy 
assessment framework (from Section 2.4.3), adds the suggested criteria items from 
Table 4.2, and integrates it into a new set of policy assessment framework. Items 
newly proposed, as a result of the survey are highlighted in grey. Criteria items 
suggested from the survey responses, but not pursued are struck out and explained in 
further detail in the remainder of this section. 
 
The discussion below provides the reasoning for not pursuing specific indicators, set 
out as per the five policy dimensions of economic growth, climate change mitigation, 
SoS, social equality, and governance. The revised set of criteria items for energy 
policy assessment is used for the remainder of this research for CFEPS that still 
follows the five policy dimensions set out in Chapter 3 of Economic Growth, Climate 
Change Mitigation, SoS, Social Equality, and Governance.  
 
Table 4.3: Changes to the initial set of Policy Assessment Framework indicators  
Dimension 
(weight) 
Sub-theme Missing Indicators 
Economic 
Growth 
(15%) 
Balanced GDP 
growth 
GDP growth 
Energy consumption 
production balance 
Energy consumption to production ratio 
Energy Investment 
• Energy R&D per GDP 
• Deployment costs 
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Generation cost • Primary energy generation costs 
Rate of urbanisation 
Rate of which cities expend land mass as 
a % of China’s total land mass 
Labour force Population growth 
Climate 
Change 
Mitigation 
(30%) 
CO2 Emissions Cap on level of atmospheric CO2 
Other GHG 
Emissions 
Sulphur, nitrogen and mercury 
Other Emissions Water pollution and water scarcity 
Emissions intensities 
in demand sectors 
Emission and intensities for buildings, 
industry and transport.  
Probability of 
catastrophes 
The increase in the probability of 
catastrophes due to pollution 
Energy intensity & 
efficiency 
Energy consumption per GDP 
Emissions intensity 
Emitted CO2 per GDP 
Emitted CO2 per Energy Consumption 
SoS 
(20%) 
Hydrocarbon and 
coal dependence 
• Oil, gas and coal as proportion of primary 
energy generation 
• Imports as a % of Total GDP 
• Oil imports as a % of total oil 
consumption, dependence on foreign oil 
• Imports to total production 
• Coal imports as a % of total coal 
consumption 
Generation mix 
diversification 
• Non fossil fuels energy generation to total 
energy production 
• China’s lead in global (low carbon) 
technologies 
• Number of fuels types supplying greater 
than 10% of the energy mix 
Production diversific 
Diversity in the number of different energy 
suppliers. 
Social 
Equality 
(20%) 
Affordable Energy 
Energy generation cost as proportion of 
income 
Energy access Electricity grid coverage 
Income disparity 
• Provincial wealth disparity 
• Poverty reduction rate 
• Household welfare 
Governance 
(15%) 
Political stability & 
policy coherence 
• Key government officials turnover 
• Continuity of energy policy direction 
Public participation 
• Stakeholders consultation in decision 
making process 
• Percentage of energy data available in 
the public domain 
• Number of daily newspaper editorials on 
energy 
Regulatory quality & 
control of corruption 
• Accountability of government officials 
• Monitoring and punishment of institutions 
and officials accountable 
NB: Newly added criteria items highlighted in grey, italic font are not pursued further. 
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Economic Growth 
Deployment costs, generation cost and rate of urbanisation are not to be pursued 
under economic growth. This is because of the following reasons. Regarding 
deployment costs via energy investments, these are taken as a model input rather than 
a model output. Deployment costs as part of energy investments are a useful indicator. 
However, it this is not considered as it is a policy action (the cause). The assessment 
framework aims at assessing the end results impact policy has on the economy (the 
effect).  
 
Generation costs are not considered in the revised synthesis of CFEPS assessment 
framework criteria, as China does not provide transparent information on generation 
costs. If the energy policy assessment framework criteria are to be applied to the real 
world, there should be a theoretical optimum cost level to reality. Due to the lack of 
official published data on generation costs, it makes applying this policy indicator to 
study China’s energy sector difficult.  
 
The rate of urbanisation, represented as the rate at which cities expend land mass as 
a % of China’s total land mass, is more of an economy-focused assessment indicator. 
This assessment framework tries to specialise in factors which have relationships to 
energy policy and hence does not include this indictor. 
 
CEEP suggested including the labour force (the proportion of the population willing 
and able to work), especially when considering the relationship between economic 
growth and climate change. However, the labour variable is taken as given and is an 
exogenously input used by the climate model. Labour is not calculated as an output. 
Assessing policy based on inputs does not reflect what the climate model is predicting. 
Assessment should be on model outputs, to better understand the impact energy 
policy change has on the climate model’s outputs. Thus, this indicator will not be 
pursued in the revised policy assessment framework.  
 
Climate Change Mitigation 
Climate change mitigation will not cover other GHG emissions, emissions intensities 
in specific demand sectors and the probability catastrophes.  
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Other atmospheric pollutants, such as sulphur, nitrogen and mercury are important 
due to the enormous amount of power generated in sub-critical coal-powered plants. 
Oceanic and river water pollution is also an important indicator.  
 
Water scarcity is equally important due to extensive hydropower use. However this 
research has decided to focus on atmospheric carbon emissions from the outset 
because the IPCC (2007) provided tangible guidelines for the targeted levels of 
atmospheric carbon emissions but less clear guidelines for water pollution.  This also 
simplifies the modelling process. Hence, this research does not seek to model the 
detrimental impacts of water based pollutants. 
 
Emissions intensities in specific demand sectors (such as buildings, industry and 
transport) are not explicitly modelled. The proposed modelling framework is a supply 
focused model and does not seek to break down energy and power demand into 
buildings, industry, transport and other demand areas. Although the energy sector 
could be boosted by looking at the various demand sectors, the most suitable 
modelling frameworks are the detail bottom-up models. The chosen framework for 
this research is a hybrid approach that foregoes the very detailed bottom-up 
encapsulations of energy demand in exchange for top-down (macro) and bottom-up 
views, to provide energy policymakers at the central government and local authority 
level with policy guidance.  
 
The increase in the probability of catastrophes due to pollution is a vital indicator, as 
increases in oceanic water levels due to melting ice caps create tangible natural 
disasters. However this area is too broad to consider, as it is based on historical 
weather patterns and statistical predictions of future catastrophe scenarios. To 
simplify the research and focus on the marginal impacts of emissions, this indicator 
will also be omitted from the selected set of criteria. 
 
Security of Energy Supply 
In addition, SoS will not pursue further natural resource imports as a percentage of 
GDP, imports to total production, number of fuel types greater than 10% of the mix.  
 
Hydrocarbon dependence (including dependence on the imported oil as highlighted by 
CCEP) can be measured by additional methods such as imports as a % of total GDP, 
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oil imports as a % of total oil consumption and imports to total production. Oil 
imports as a % of total oil consumption is selected for inclusion as it is able to 
incorporate the essence of the other hydrocarbon SoS effects directly or via a proxy 
effect.  
 
For coal dependence, the SoS coal is important. This was omitted from the of policy 
indicators, as initially only the SoS of oil and gas were included. As discussed in 
Section 1.1, China became a net coal importer in 2009, importing 103 million tonnes 
(Yu, 2010). Hence the research shall include both indicators of coal as a proportion of 
primary energy generation and coal imports as a % of total coal consumption.  
 
For generation mix diversification, this research will not incorporate the number of 
fuels types supplying greater than 10% of the energy mix. This is because China is 
heavily centralised and only a few state owned enterprises control the majority of 
energy generation.  
 
Production diversification measured via the diversity in the number of different 
energy suppliers is also ignored for the same reason that China encourages 
consolidator in the generation section, as observed in the coal sector.  
 
SoS has included two additional indicators in response to the survey, which are oil 
imports and coal imports as a proportion of consumption. Since China is a net 
importer of coal, oil and gas, these indicators pay a vital role in gauging the natural 
resources shortfalls that China faces today and in the future.  
 
Social Equality  
Social equality will not cover affordability of energy and income disparity. 
Affordability of energy will not be included in the revised synthesis of the CFEPS 
energy policy assessment framework indicator. Already reviewed in Section 2.2, 
China heavily distorts its energy and electricity prices. The distortion is not for social 
equality reasons to improve energy poverty. The distortion favours the major utility 
companies ensuring they earn the level of profit that they lobbied for. Thus this area is 
not included, as it is already established in the literature review that energy prices are 
not driven by affordability. 
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Income disparity is measured by provincial wealth disparity and by the poverty 
reduction rate, which are important indicators for economic growth policies. This 
assessment framework tries to specialise in factors directly relating to energy policies 
and hence does not include this indictor. 
 
CEEP suggested adding household welfare to social equality. This policy assessment 
framework is specifically designed to aid the decision making process of energy 
policy makers. Although household welfare is vital for understanding income 
disparities, it is not directly energy related and will not be included in the revised 
assessment framework indicators.  
 
Governance 
Governance will not include further data availability and newspaper coverage, which 
were both suggested as part of the survey responses. In terms of public participation, 
the two additionally suggested indicators of percentage of energy data available in the 
public domain and of number of daily newspaper editorials on energy are both 
interesting proxies in measuring participation levels. However both are difficult to 
observe and monitor over time and hence are not included. CEEP highlighted the need 
for the verification and appropriate punishment of wrongdoings by energy policy 
makers. This indicator will be included in the research.  
 
Weighting of Dimensions 
The weighting of the five key policy dimensions has been altered in light of the 
survey results. CEEP suggested having a greater weighting towards economic growth 
(25%), with less coherent suggestions for the other four policy dimensions. A 25% 
weight to growth will again place too much attention on promoting economic 
development and side-lining emission and other areas that are necessary for 
consideration. 
 
This research takes the approach of increasing the weighting for climate change and 
reducing the weighting for growth and governance. Economic growth and governance 
have both been reduced by 5% to 15%. Climate change mitigation has been increased 
by 10% to 30%. This view agreed upon after a side discussion with Dr Liang of the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences who was responsible for authoring the Liang Model 
(2007) surveyed in section 3.2.2. She explained that the majority of Chinese climate 
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models assume there is no climate change problem, their optimisation sets out the 
understanding of how to allocate energy resources. They take the central view that 
growth should be maximised above other objectives. In light of this discovery, CFEPS 
has been adjusted to counter balance this Chinese climate modelling view. All other 
weights remain at 20%. Economic growth has been at the heart of China’s policies. 
Thus to counter balance China’s bias towards supporting GDP growth, this dimension 
has been reduced in importance. Governance is highly subjective and quantitative 
observations and measurements are very difficult. Given the potential inaccuracies of 
measuring all the indications in this policy assessment dimension, weighting has been 
reduced by 5%. The balance of weight reduction in relation to environmental 
projection has been increased by 10%. This is because China has not emphasised 
sufficiently the negative externalities associated with increasing pollution.  
 
Changing the weights of the five different dimensions is extremely useful. From the 
existing assessment frameworks survey, there was limited commentary on weighting. 
The survey responses have provided additional guidance on the weightings moving 
away from a uniform rating of importance to better reflect China’s current policy 
needs. The five different dimensions have only needed minor additions to the 
assessment framework indicators for use in the remainder of the research, as the 
outset considered a full array of commonly used policy assessment framework 
indicators.  
 
The set of selected indicators that are most relevant are presented in Table 4.4. In 
rejecting some of the indicators which were suggested by the survey, there may be 
confounding factors, where other factors not considered have great importance. For 
example a confounding factor could be the use electricity grid coverage as a proxy of 
energy poverty. The fact that rural areas have grid linked electricity does not imply 
electricity is affordable for end-users. To focus the analysis, the final set of revised 
indicators were based on the research objective which calls for setting up a tool to 
help energy policy makers in their decision making process. Additionally, the final 
revised policy assessment indicators also took a pragmatic approach by excluding 
those indicators for which the WITCH model was unable to provide detailed 
evaluation.  
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Table 4.4: Revised set of Policy Assessment Framework indicators  
Dimension 
(weight) 
Sub-theme Missing Indicators 
Economic 
Growth 
(15%) 
Balanced GDP 
growth 
GDP growth 
Energy consumption 
production balance 
Energy consumption to production ratio 
Energy Investment Energy R&D per GDP 
Climate 
Change 
Mitigation 
(30%) 
CO2 Emissions Cap on level of atmospheric CO2 
Energy intensity & 
efficiency 
Energy consumption per GDP 
Emissions intensity 
Emitted CO2 per GDP 
Emitted CO2 per Energy Consumption 
SoS 
(20%) 
Hydrocarbon and 
coal dependence 
• Oil, gas and coal as proportion of primary 
energy generation 
• Oil imports as a % of total oil 
consumption, dependence on foreign oil 
• Coal imports as a % of total coal 
consumption 
Generation mix 
diversification 
• Non fossil fuels energy generation to total 
energy production 
• China’s lead in global (low carbon) 
technologies 
Social 
Equality 
(20%) 
Energy access 
Electricity grid coverage 
Governance 
(15%) 
Political stability & 
policy coherence 
• Key government officials turnover 
• Continuity of energy policy direction 
Public participation 
Stakeholders consultation in decision 
making process 
Regulatory quality & 
control of corruption 
• Accountability of government officials 
• Monitoring and punishment of institutions 
and officials accountable 
NB: Newly added criteria items are highlighted in grey 
 
4.1.3. Revised Synthesis of the Energy Policy Assessment Framework 
Criteria 
From the survey of the five policy assessment frameworks in the previous section, 
Table 4.5 cross references three classification of energy policy action against the five 
policy assessment dimensions. The matrix set out below is now able to assess each 
policy action to see whether it satisfied the improved five policy assessment 
dimensions. One policy action (only legislative, only economic, or only 
organisational) does not always satisfy all five policy assessment dimensions. Thus it 
is important to assess the policy actions when all three policy action (legislative, 
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economic and organisation) are used in unison. The two shaded columns represent the 
base-case (before policy action) and the revised case (after policy action). One round 
of policy action does not guarantee China’s energy makeup will be an optimal 
revised-case. As long as CFEPS moved China one step closer towards an improved 
energy policy outcome, then CFEPS is deemed to have succeeded. Chinese energy 
policy is, therefore, moving in the intended direction. 
 
Table 4.5: Template of how CFEPS is applied to evaluate China’s energy policy 
outcome 
 
Starting Base-Case  
for model run 
 
Areas of Policy Action Improvements Start point 
next run 
Policy 
Dimension 
(Weight) 
Policy 
Criteria 
Items 
Initial 
Policy 
Delivery  
Policy Action Classifications Revised 
Policy 
Delivery Legislative Economic Organisational 
Economic 
Growth 
(15%) 
Bal GDP Gr    
* * * 
 
En cons:prod   
Energy invest   
Climate 
Change 
Mitigation 
(30%) 
Atmospheric 
CO2 emissions 
 
* * * 
 
 
Energy efficie 
and intensity 
 
Emissions 
intensity 
  
SoS 
(20%) 
Dependence 
Hydrocarbon 
and Coal 
imports 
 
* * * 
 
Generate mix 
diversify 
  
Social Eql 
(20%) 
Grid energy 
access 
 * * *  
Govern 
(15%) 
Political stab   
* * * 
 
Public particip   
Regulate qual   
* There are the areas to score in order to calculate the aggregate score before and after 
energy policy change 
 
The current Chinese energy strategy considered in this research is based on the 11
th
 
FYP, because the degree of energy policy outcome success from the 11
th
 FYP is 
available in published research, to test the CFEPS framework.  
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Economic Growth (15%) 
The objective assessment of energy policy via an economic growth perspective is 
broken down into three parts, which are the productivity of economy, energy 
consumption, and energy investments. 
 
Balanced GDP Growth 
Innovation and improvements in technology finds a way to reduce emissions whilst 
increasing efficiency. This way, China will not necessarily sacrifice its rate of growth 
as much, whilst pursuing a climate change reversal agenda. Innovation is best 
supported under the new technologies and R&D deployment framework. The energy 
policies reflect a recognition of the requirement to establish a highly technical 
experimental economy with a view to improving energy technologies and emissions 
abatement technologies. 
 
Improvement should ensure a GDP growth rate that also takes into consideration 
pollution and other areas of energy policy outcome, rather than just focussing on the 
maximisation economic growth. When China was a developing nation, a faster pace 
of economic growth was necessary to improve the overall welfare it its citizens. 
However, China’s goals are beyond the simple aim of promoting economic growth. 
China should seek to achieve a growth rate that balances its other important goals of 
GHG emissions, SoS, social equality, and governance.  
 
Energy Consumption to Production Ratio 
Energy consumption to production predicts the likelihood of blackouts. Following the 
Cobb-Douglas production function as discussed in Section 1.1, energy is a factor of 
production that is consumed as part of the production process. If energy consumption 
is based on expensive generation sources, the level of output in the economy will fall. 
However, to support a level of energy use, the production has to match the level of 
consumption. Thus it is assume that all energy supply fully meets energy demand, that 
there are no shortfalls.  
 
Improvements to the way China consumes energy could be via ensuring sufficient 
capacity is built so that the peak supply can meet the peak demand. Additionally 
energy demand could be controlled and reduced via a minimum efficiency standards 
set of indicators that act as thresholds of consumption efficiency for energy end-users. 
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For example they would require domestic appliances such as fridges to consume a 
specific MWh per hour at a temperature setting.  
 
Energy Investments 
Energy policies can promote economic growth from increased investments in the 
energy infrastructure grid and R&D into new innovation. Again, following the Cobb-
Douglas production function, growth accelerates under conditions of increased energy 
investment (increasing China’s capital stock) and additional spending into innovation 
(increasing the technology constant). Investments into the energy grid improve 
capacity and efficiency of the grid networks. The increased capacity and efficiency 
facilitates more electricity being distributed at lower inefficiency losses. 
 
Improvements to energy investments could be realised through public project 
initiatives and investments in R&D. Both measures are ways the government directly 
funds the energy sector in areas China and is advised to improve on. If certain areas 
are neglected by the private sector in terms of capital allocation, the central 
government can directly promote these areas.  
 
Climate Change Mitigation (30%) 
The objective assessment energy policy via a climate change mitigation perspective is 
broken down into atmospheric CO2 emissions, energy efficiency and intensity and 
emissions intensity. 
 
Atmospheric CO2 Emissions 
A cap on CO2 emissions is an explicit limit of the amount of gasses allowable to be 
released into the atmosphere. However, rather than a national policy, there is greater 
benefit in an international agreement like the Kyoto Protocol. Only via a global 
agreement, will nations be sufficiently bound to follow hard CO2 limits. The annual 
COPs have increasingly called for greater commitments and stricter emission caps. As 
the USA as the second largest CO2 and other nations sign up to the COPs, it is only a 
matter of when rather than if China will accept the strict emissions terms.  
 
Energy Efficiency and Intensity 
Emissions reduction does not only come from changing the generation mix but also 
improve the efficiency of energy use. If consumers were to conserve energy and use 
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diligently, emissions would also fall. Energy efficiency could be better targeted by 
China. The energy policies do not explicitly prescribe how stakeholders and end users 
of energy should conserve. Instead, focus is cast on energy intensity targets. If more 
guidance was provided to stakeholders (residential and commercial) on how to 
increase energy efficiency, the aim of these energy policies may be realised sooner. 
 
The energy policies recognise the importance of emissions intensity, as China 
prescribes a suite of mainly regulatory instruments. The strictest policies proposed by 
the Plan as its carbon limits and power plant generation standards. The GHG tax on 
carbon and the path towards implementing a carbon trading market also proves 
potentially to be an effective policy instrument. China’s Renewable Energy Law 
supports R&D into alternative low carbon generation technologies. However the 
GHG tax level is far lower than those proposed by the EU and OECD. Furthermore, 
there is a lack of choice for consumers. Even if consumers were properly informed 
and wanted to make socially responsible energy consumption choices, they cannot 
choose to only purchase sustainable energy. 
 
Improvements to energy efficiency and reduction in energy intensity can be achieved 
via minimum efficiency standards and investment for R&D. Minimum efficiency 
standards helps China reach a minimum efficiency level. Investment into energy R&D 
reduces the level of energy intensity required for China’s generation needs.   
 
Security of Energy Supply (20%) 
The objective assessment energy policy from a SoS perspective is broken down into 
dependence on hydrocarbon imports, hydrocarbon and coal supplies and generation 
mix diversification.  
 
Dependence on Hydrocarbon and Coal Imports 
As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, fossil fuel powered vehicles continue China’s 
reliance on crude oil imports. China, as mentioned in Section 1.1 also became a net 
importer of coal in 2009, importing 103 million tons (Yu, 2010). Not only is this a 
concern for emissions, but also for China’s SoS. There are two ways of improving 
supplies, firstly to increase exploration for more supplies, secondly to reduce 
consumption. As a nation’s generation mix moves away from consumption of 
tradition fuels, the issue of needing additional supplies of hydrocarbon diminishes. 
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China’s energy policies of moving away from traditional hydrocarbon fuels and coal 
help meet this. The use of new fuel technologies and greater fuel efficiency in the 
transport sector could reduce China’s imports of crude oil by 676 million barrels a 
year by 2020. The information dissemination and public awareness policy action 
makes the greatest difference to reducing emissions from vehicles in the long-run. If 
consumers were educated to accept hybrid and electric vehicles as being superior over 
internal combustion engines, China’s vehicle emissions, assuming the transport 
section is continuously expanding, could grow at a decelerated rate. 
 
Improvements to reducing hydrocarbon imports can be from stricter targets for use of 
low carbon sources, capital grants & subsidies for sustainable generation and feed in 
tariffs. Stricter targets for use of low carbon sources explicitly limit the dependence of 
China on oil and gas. This will encourage China to move towards electric vehicles for 
transportation (away from oil) and for heat (away from gas and coal). Capital grants 
& subsidies for sustainable generation provide upfront incentives for generation to 
move away from the imported hydrocarbons at the outset of project Feed in tariffs 
incentivise energy producers during production to generate more sustainable energy 
and receive greater levels of the tariffs.  
 
Generation Mix Diversification 
China expects to reduce its generation mix from traditional energy generation 
technologies to alternative technologies in an attempt to reduce dependence on oil and 
natural gas. China’s current generation mix is heavily skewed towards coal, 
accounting for 70% of the generation mix and hydrocarbons making up 91%, any 
policy instruments which require a reduction in emissions will naturally move China 
away from fossil fuel-powered generation towards alternative and sustainable 
generation technologies.  
 
Improvements to a more diversified energy generation mix can be realised through 
emissions restrictions for major emitters and GHG taxes and emissions quotas. As 
previously shown, the current generation mix is heavily biased towards fossil fuels, 
coal in particular. Emissions restrictions for major emitters moves the generation mix 
away from carbon heavy generation methods towards more sustainable generation 
methods. GHG taxes increases the cost to producers of carbon heavy generation 
methods. Emissions quotas cap the amount of total emissions. Both taxes and quotes 
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discourage traditional fossil fuel driven methods and diversifies the generation mix 
towards more sustainable technologies.  
 
Social Equality (20%) 
The objective assessment of energy policy via a social equality perspective is 
accounted for via grid energy access. 
 
Grid Energy Access 
The energy policies seek to increase social equality and equality of energy users. The 
energy infrastructure goal of the FYP is aimed at the electricity transmission network 
across the length and breadth of China. This improves access to grid energy for a 
greater number of consumers. The energy infrastructure is expected to be overhauled 
with a greater number of end users with access to grid electricity. Improvements to 
the energy infrastructure can only come from government funding and central work 
plans. The amount of capital expenditure to cover the vast landmass of China can only 
be effectively undertaken by public project initiatives. 
 
Improvements to grid access can be realised through supportive transmission tariffs 
and access, and public project initiatives. Supportive transmission tariffs and access 
promotes renewable energy sources to receive priority grid access. Assuming there is 
connectivity to the main grid, it ensures any renewable energy generated will not be 
rejected by the grid. Public project initiatives are more suited to large capital heavy 
project such as the electricity grid. These public initiatives increase the coverage of 
the grid so better connect the more remotely located renewable energy generation 
sites.  
 
Governance (15%) 
The objective assessment energy policy via a social equality and equality perspective 
is accounted for, under political stability & coherence, public participation and 
regulatory quality. 
 
Political Stability and Coherence  
The energy policies improve stability and coherence. The Plan sets out targets that 
stakeholders and participants in the energy industry can observe and follow. Unlike 
Western nations, where newly elected governments implement changing energy 
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policies, the Chinese FYP provides the beacon for China to take a more consistent 
stance on future energy policies.  
 
Improvements to political stability and coherence could be addressed by not altering 
the energy policies in place in an unpredictable manner. If legislative, economic and 
governance policies exhibit stability and ample warning of policy change is 
communicated with the energy stakeholders, parties will be better prepared for policy 
changes. If energy policies change on an ad-hoc basis, then energy stakeholders will 
suffer from confusion due to lack of policy coherence.  
 
Public Participation 
The policies do not encourage stakeholders and participants in the energy sector to 
participate in the energy policy decision making process. As discussed in Section 2.2, 
the central command-and-control nature of the Communist Party sets the strategic 
direction for the energy industry to follow. However, there are think tanks and 
academic institutions which feed into the decision making process of the energy 
policy decision makers. The ultimately decision still lies in with Community Party, 
thus this poses a large operational risk that the direction taken may not always yield 
the optimal solution.  
 
Improvements in public participation seek to increase the dialogue of energy 
stakeholders with the decision makers of energy policies. Instead of implementing a 
specific energy policy action, improvements in public participation depend on what 
policies are set in China. A greater degree of involvement and public participation in 
the decision making process will help improve this area. 
 
Regulatory Quality  
A broader consideration is needed of the overall quality of regulations for energy 
policies and other areas of policy making. Improvements in regulatory quality may be 
realised through increased monitoring of energy policies. Monitoring of energy 
policies may ensure policies which are sound in theory but also become realised in 
practice. Regular reviews of the intended effect versus the actual effect of energy 
policies that can allow policy makers to make adjustments to policy actions are 
advisable. This will help China move in the intended direction towards energy change.  
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4.1.4. Summary of Survey Reponses 
The review of existing literature in Chapter 3 did not discover an energy policy 
assessment framework specifically tailored to China. To overcome the lack of 
customisation, the survey responses were vital to the research methodology to fine-
tune criteria items and for allocating weighting across the different criteria groupings. 
Additional indicators suggested via the responses called for more indicators to capture 
the SoS and Governance policy dimensions. Important indicators included in the 
Policy Assessment Framework after the survey included hydrocarbon imports and 
coal imports dependence, as per discussed in Section 2.2, as China became a net 
importer of oil, gas and coal.  
 
The survey also provided greater clarity on the weighting of the five policy 
dimensions of Growth, Climate Change, SoS, and Equality and Governance. The 
survey responses called for an unequal weighting between the five policy dimensions. 
Most responses acknowledged the difficulty of not using an equal weighting and they 
foresee the challenges and increase complexity that is associated with the justification 
for different weightings. For the surveyed experts who did explicitly indicate 
weightings, the survey responses indicated a lower weighting for Economic Growth to 
20% and Governance to 20% due to difficulties in measuring these intangible 
indicators. Stakeholder participation, accountability and corruption are difficult to 
quantify and observe. They are soft indicators. Additionally, CEEP responded that 
Governance may be inappropriate in non free-market countries like China. Thus 
following the survey suggestions, this policy dimension has a lower weighting, to 
reflect the potential difficulties in accurate assessment. It was suggested that Climate 
Change Mitigation was increased by 10% to give greater emphasis to this often 
neglected policy dimension. 
 
The survey helped to establish a more refined and tailored set of policy assessment 
criteria. In order to model the impact of policy action, the research uses the WITCH 
climate model to assess this. The WITCH methodological framework is discussed in 
the next section. 
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4.2. Modelling Climate Change and Energy Strategies  
To help address the key research questions of establishing an energy policy decision 
support tool, a quantitative climate model is required, in addition to qualitative energy 
policy analysis. This section introduces the proposed quantitative climate model of 
WITCH, justifies its use and discusses the model input assumptions.  
 
4.2.1. The WITCH Model  
The World Induced Technical Change Hybrid “WITCH” is a global energy-economy-
climate model. The constituent parts that make up the WITCH model are the 
economic, energy and the climate modules. The economic module is a Ramsey-type 
optimal macroeconomic growth model in which inter-temporal global welfare is 
optimised subject to equilibrium budget constraints. The energy module provides a 
detailed energy technology specification. The climate module provides the linkage 
between economic growth, energy use and climate damage. The model groups the 
world into different macro regions that strategically interact with one another, playing 
an open-loop Nash game. The model is solved numerically in GAMS/CONOPT via 5-
yearly intervals (Bosetti et al., 2009). Appendix 11 provides a summary of the model.  
 
Hybrid IAM Methodology 
The model uses a hybrid methodology of integrated assessment and stems from (i) a 
top down view to maximise welfare defined as the present value of log per capita 
consumption and (ii) a bottom-up view of minimising energy generation costs. The 
top-down perspective enables policy makers to analyse both the geographical 
dimension (e.g. rich vs. poor regions) and the time dimension (e.g. present vs. future 
generations) of climate policy. All regions determine their optimal strategies by 
maximising social welfare. Decreasing marginal utility redistribution of wealth across 
countries increases overall welfare. Climate damage is taken into account through 
feedback from an integrated climate module. The bottom-up perspective focuses on 
minimising energy generation costs and provides detailed energy input specifications. 
Energy technology detail is significantly richer than purely top-down macro models.  
 
Regional Considerations 
Across geographies, the world is grouped into 12 separate macro regions which 
interact with one another with strategic independence, as shown in Figure 4.1 The 
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macro regions have been grouped based on similar levels of growth, development and 
income levels. Each region’s central planner chooses the optimal time paths of the 
control variables. The 12 macro regions consist of: 
1. CHINA (including Taiwan) 
2. OLDEURO (Western Europe) 
3. NEWEURO (Eastern Europe) 
4. MENA (Middle East and North Africa) 
5. USA 
6. CAJANZ (Canada, Japan and New Zealand) 
7. LACA (Latin America, Mexico and the Caribbean) 
8. SSA (Sub-Sahara Africa excluding South Africa) 
9. SASIA (South Asia) 
10. EASIA (South East Asia) 
11. KOSAU (Korea, South Africa and Australia) 
12. TE (Transition Economies, mainly located in the former USSR, acting as the 
balancer to obtain the global GDP aggregate amount) 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Regionally disaggregated analysis of the world grouped into 12 macro 
regions (Bosetti et al., 2007) 
 
Dynamic Optimisation 
WITCH is a dynamic model whereby with each time step forward-looking agents are 
simultaneously and strategically reacting to the decision from other decision makers. 
Investment strategies are optimised by taking into account both economic and 
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environmental externalities across the world. With the world grouped into 12 regions, 
the Nash game is solved iteratively. During each iteration, a policy maker takes into 
account the previous iterations’ behaviour of regions. Optimal decisions are the 
outcome of a dynamic Nash game with perfect foresight. For example investments 
depend on the dynamics of technical change, which is itself endogenous and depends 
on investment paths as well as on prices and other economic and climatic variables. 
All regions determine their optimal strategies by maximising social welfare, while 
taking climate damage into account through feedback from an integrated climate 
module. These computed choice variables are then stored and fed into the following 
round of optimisations (Bosetti et al., 2008). 
 
There is no implied carbon price used in the calculations. Carbon trading is not 
modelled to occur; there is no implied carbon price. Carbon emissions are capped in 
each region according to various emissions scenarios. For example, for the 450ppm 
case, once emissions reaches 450ppm projection from the IPCC （IPCC, 2007) the 
model limit this level as a hard cap, to ensure nations to not exceed the 450ppm 
carbon projection. The same holds for 600ppm and 750ppm scenarios, that once 
nations exceed 600ppm, or 750ppm, they are unable to produce goods and services 
beyond this point. Under the Business as Usual Case the cost of carbon not a 
constraint. Nations are allowed to produce and emit carbon unprohibitedly (Bosetti et 
al., 2008). 
 
For each region, the forward-looking central planner (n) maximises the present value 
of the objective function via (log) per capita consumption via five-year time steps that 
coincide with the China’s FYP. In each region, indexed by n, a social planner 
maximises the following utility function (1): 
     
tt
tRtnctnLtRtnLtnCUnW )(),(log),()(),(),,()(      (1) 
where:  
W is welfare  
U is instantaneous utility 
t is a 5 year time span  
C is total consumption 
c is total per-capita consumption  
L is population 
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R is discount factor 
 
The five year time spans between each iteration period result in a fixed pure time 
preference discount factor that is (2): 
 
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where: 
)(v is the pure rate of time preference which is assumed to decline over time to 
reflect that agents prefer consumption today instead of the future 
 
Interactions between the Economy, Climate Change and the Energy Sector 
The WITCH model forms a link between economic growth, energy generation and 
climate change. The most important areas of this model are the economy module, 
energy module, back stop technologies, climate module, treatment of regions, and 
endogenous growth function. The economy module is a Ramsey-type optimal growth 
(inter-temporal). The energy generation module depicts the energy sector in detail 
(technology portfolio). The climate module accounts for the damage feedback (global 
variable).  
 
At each new iteration, policy makers in each region take the behaviour of other 
players produced by the previous iteration as given and set the optimal value of all 
choice variables. This newly computed output is carried over to the following period 
as an input in the next round of optimisations. The process is iterated until each 
region’s behaviour converges in the sense that each region’s choice is the best 
response to all other regions’ best responses to its behaviour.  
 
The feedback effect considers the interactions between the modules and is shown in 
Figure 4.2, via a three-box climate module, which converts carbon dioxide emissions 
produced by the economy into atmospheric concentration, radiative forcing and 
eventually temperatures increase above pre-industrial levels. Increases in global 
temperature ultimately affect each region’s output via a climate damage function that 
translates the global warming effects into damages in each region through detrimental 
impacts on economic inputs (capital, labour and energy services) and gross output 
(Bosetti et al., 2007). 
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Figure 4.2: Linking economy, energy use and climate change (Bosetti et al., 2007) 
 
Economy Module 
The economy module is a production function that considers factors of production as 
capital, labour and energy. Through dividing the world into different macro regions 
(exact regions to be specified later in this section), a forward-looking central policy 
maker maximises the present value of per capita consumption. The policy makers 
maximise time intervals subject to strategic consideration of the choices of the other 
decision makers in the form of strategic interaction.  
 
At the same time as welfare maximisation, WITCH tries to minimise the budget 
constraint, which is also the gross output function. Gross output is a function of 
capital, labour and energy services. The budget constraint defines consumption as net 
output less investments. Consumption of the single final good obeys the economy 
budget constraint of (3): 
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where: 
Y is GDP production 
FP is total factor productivity 
reflects the proportion of the output derived from labour and capital  
 reflects the proportion of output derived between capital and labour 
c is final good stock of capital  
ES is energy services 
 is environmental damage 
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Gross output is produced via a nested CES function that combines a capital labour 
aggregate and energy; capital and labour are obtained from a Cobb-Douglas function. 
Total factor productivity evolves exogenously with time. It is set at the base year and 
does not change over the modelling horizon. Labour is assumed to be equal to 
population and evolves exogenously.  
 
Final good capital accumulates following the standard perpetual rule, but four dollars 
of private investments are subtracted from it for each dollar of R&D crowded out by 
energy R&D as specified in (4): 
),(4,)1)(,(1, && tnIt) – (nItn K) t(nK DRDRCCCC         (4) 
where: 
δc is the rate of depreciation
c is investment in final good 
DR&  is the factor that public sector has on crowding out private sector investments  
R&D is investment in energy R&D 
 
There is a single production function between all the nations, with no trade between 
the nations. The only sharing that occurs between the nations is the sharing of 
knowledge, which will be addressed in conjunction with (also in Section 4.2.1) 
Endogenous Technological Change. 
 
Energy Generation Module 
The energy module of WITCH comprises a detailed description of energy carriers and 
conversion technologies. The demand for final energy is determined via a nested 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function. Although still simplified 
with respect to other large scale energy system models of Markal (Fishbone et al., 
1983) and Message (Messner, 1997), the detailed account of energy technologies is a 
novelty for macro-growth models. This methodology enables policy makers to portray 
future energy and technological scenarios more realistically. The macroeconomy 
demands final energy as an input factor for the production of economic output. In 
return, the energy sector requires financial resources from the capital market that are 
allocated among a portfolio of alternative energy conversion technologies. The 
technology-economic characteristics of the generation sources and endogenously 
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evolving prices of energy and CO2 emissions determine the size and structure of the 
energy sector capital stock. Hence, the energy sector develops according to an 
equilibrium relationship with the remaining economy with which it is interrelated 
through capital and energy markets. A backstop technology is included to eliminate 
the effect of exponentially increasing energy costs (Bosetti et al., 2008).  
 
There is the ability to change between electic and non-electric energy forms; to use 
low carbon energy source to replace high carbon energy sources in power, heat and 
transportation. Full transition to low carbon generation technologies via the use of 
renewables is not the aim of the analysis. However, renewable energy could play an 
important part to lower emissions. 
 
Energy services are an aggregate of energy and a stock of knowledge combined with a 
CES function as presented in (5): 
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where: 
ES is energy services 
HE is the stock of knowledge in the energy sector 
EN is energy including electric and non-electric energy 
 
The stock of knowledge  tnHE ,  increases with greater R&D investments and falls 
with the depreciation of capital invested, as per (6): 
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where: 
δR&D is the rate of depreciation of invested R&D 
 
The Energy function is then further nested with a split between electric and non-
electric energy. Electric energy includes renewables, nuclear, coal and gas electricity 
generation. Non-electric energy is related to transportation, especially oil. This 
Enengy function is shown in (7): 
    ENENEN tnNELtnELtnEN NELEL
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where: 
EL is electric energy includes renewables (wind, solar, hydro), nuclear, coal and gas 
for electricity generation 
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NEL is non-electric energy and relates to transportation, especially oil as an energy 
source 
EL is the constant applied electric energy 
NEL is the constant applied non-electric energy 
 
Climate Change Module 
The Climate Module links provides the feedback system between the economy and 
energy modules. The economic module is hard-linked to the energy module via the 
climate module. Economic activity results in demand for final energy such as 
transport energy, electricity, and non-electric energy.  
 
The environmental damage function () impacting output varies with global 
temperature as shown in (8): 
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where: 
T is temperature level 
 are constants applied across time 
 
The climate damage function does not examine one region in isolation, as carbon 
emissions are a global phenomenon affecting the global environment. The study is 
explicitly about China. However only examining China and would not capture the 
true impact of carbon emissions. The WITCH model uses IPCC (2007) projection of 
global emissions, which is important, as atmospheric temperature increases will be 
felt not only in China, but on a global scale. 
 
Temperature increases through augmented radiating forcing F(t), referring to (9): 
  )()()()1()()1( 21 tTtTtTtFtTtT LO                    (9) 
where: 
F is radiative forcing which is determined by carbon emissions from fossil fuel 
combustion 
TLO is the minimum floor of global temperature 
 and  are constants applied to temperature 
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Endogenous Technological Change and Innovation  
Politicians, to gain support of the general public, have often proposed that pollution 
abatement does not lie in reducing the pace of economic growth. Instead, it is often 
believed that changes in technology will bring about the much desired de-coupling of 
economic growth from the generation of polluting emissions. However, academics are 
not always in agreement regarding this proposed solution. Some maintain the faithful 
view that technological change will automatically solve the problem. In contrast, 
others express the conviction that the process of technological change by and large 
responds to impulses and incentives, and it has therefore to be fostered by appropriate 
policy actions. 
 
Spillover between nations exists on technological innovation. International spillovers 
via learning-by-doing are present because it is plausible to assume that information 
and best practices quickly circulate in cutting-edge technological sectors dominated 
by a few major nations like China. In 2010, China as a proportion of the globe spent 
9% of R&D investment in energy (Ng and Mabey, 2011). In that sense, a change in 
Chinese generation cost reduction due to R&D investment could impact costs globally. 
This assumption is especially relevanat, since the WITCH model is constructed on 
five-year time steps, as this time lag would be a sizable gap for the flow of technology 
know-how, human capital and best practices, across the nations.  
 
The effect of technology diffusion is incorporated based on experience curves that 
reproduce the negative relationship between the investment cost (SC) of a given 
technology and cumulative installed capacity (K). Specifically, the cumulative 
installed world capacity is used as a proxy for the accrual of knowledge that affects 
the investment cost of a given technology by (10): 
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where: 
SC is investment cost of technology 
B is the constant of breakthrough inventions  
K is the cumulative installed capacity 
PR is progress ratio that defines the speed of learning 
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Technological change generally leads to the substitution of obsolete and dirty 
technologies with cleaner ones by lowering the generation costs of new/clean 
technologies. In the hybrid WITCH framework, endogenous technological change 
takes the form of both learning by doing, accumulated experiences and direct R&D 
investment. Learning-by-Doing is presented by experience curves that decrease power 
plants investment costs with accumulated installed capacity. Cheaper energy 
generation and setup costs will be used as the indicator for technological 
improvements (Bosetti et al., 2008). 
 
4.2.2. Rationale of using WITCH for China 
The Chinese application of IAMs, reviewed previously, all share similar shortcomings. 
All models are simplified representations of reality. Because the climate models need 
data support and parameter estimation, there are several criticisms of the modelling 
framework. This section discusses the problems with Chinese IAMs and possible 
solutions. WITCH offers solutions to several IAM criticisms. These solutions are 
simplification, discount rates, comprehensive input data requirements, static 
modelling framework, no optimal generation scenarios, climate damage functions, 
emissions economy linkage, economic growth, regional aggregation, regional 
interaction, technological innovation and economic response to policy (Table 4.6). 
Appendix 13 contains the full summary of WITCH’s solutions to common IAM 
criticisms.  
 
Table 4.6: WITCH’s solutions to common IAM criticisms 
Category Criticism 
General 
Simplification 
Discount Rates 
Model Flexibility 
Comprehensive Input Data Requirements 
Static Modelling Framework 
No Optimal Generation Scenarios 
Climate Change 
Climate Damage Functions 
Emissions Economy Linkage 
Energy Demand 
Economic Growth 
Regional Aggregation 
Regional Interaction 
Energy Supply Technological Innovation and Transfers 
Policy Impact Economic Response to Policy 
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Simplification 
The purpose of an integrated assessment model is to aggregate diverse strands of 
disciplines. However, this creates complexity which may render an IAM less accurate. 
This computational complexity puts a hard limit to the amount of detail that can be 
represented in the model. The trade-off is made between complex realism and stylised 
simplicity. The model outputs may not be defensible. The result from the limited 
scenario runs is that future assessments may lean too heavily on downscaled scenarios. 
The output is too coarse for regional assessment, and the precision of downscaling is 
determined by the model output that may be highly inaccurate. More importantly, 
downscaled scenarios only provide one future climate state, usually the mean. Hence, 
they are less adequate at producing the extremes around that mean. Yet it is quite 
clear that on a regional basis, extreme events will have the greatest impacts on regions. 
 
The possible solution for over simplification is to use a hybrid methodology. The 
WITCH hybrid methodology takes both a top-down view (welfare maximisation) in 
addition to a bottom-up view (energy generation cost minimisation). Models of 
complex socio-economic systems require the simplification of assumptions regarding 
energy systems and climate relationships. There are two broad approaches for 
modelling the interaction between energy, the environment and the economy. Their 
main difference is with respect to the emphasis placed on a detailed and 
technologically based treatment of the energy system, and a theoretically consistent 
description of the general economy.  
 
Top down models are general economic models with only a rudimentary treatment of 
the energy system. Using the top-down approach, they describe the energy system 
(similar to the other sectors) in a highly aggregated way by means of neoclassical 
production functions that capture substitution possibilities through substitution 
elasticities. Technological change only alters the costs of production at a commodity 
or industry level. Macro-econometric models offer a lot of economic detail, but little 
energy technology detail. However, this methodology does not provide the degree of 
disaggregation for detailed energy generation technology analysis. This severely 
constraints the analysis policies in the face of climate change, as climate change is 
closely related to the evolution of energy sector technologies. They usually do not rely 
on detailed and direct descriptions of technologies. Bottom-up modelling is based on 
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linear activity models with a large number of energy technologies to capture the 
substitution of energy carriers on the primary and final energy level, process 
substitution, process improvements (gross efficiency improvement, emission 
reduction), or energy savings. They are mostly used to compute the least-cost method 
towards meeting a given final energy demand subject to exogenous constraints of 
emission reduction targets. Bottom-up models embed new technologies and model the 
penetration of these technologies based on costs and performance characteristics. 
Technological change occurs as one technology is substituted by another. However, 
bottom-up models are not well suited to studying strategic considerations amongst 
macro regions (Loschel, 2002). A solution to this shortcoming can be realised through 
a hybrid methodology. 
 
Discount Rates 
Climate modelling requires a long-term looking-forward time window. However, the 
more weight that is placed on the future, the more optimal climate change control 
rates rise. The discount rate is critical since small changes in the yearly discount rate 
compound over many years and decades. If a low rate of time discount is used in 
models which allow for economic responses to policies, investment rates are higher 
and hence growth is higher. Hence uncontrolled emissions are higher, which further 
increases the optimal control rates. 
 
Although WITCH does not endogenously deal with issues of discount rates, a solution 
of uncertainty in the appropriate discount rate is to perform a sensitivity analysis on a 
range of rates that WITCH can accommodate. The breadth will be determined by a 
survey of discount rates used in existing climate modelling and IAM studies. To 
supplement the survey of the discount rates, support can also be drawn from the IEA, 
World Bank and the UN. These governmental agencies all have differing views on the 
discount rates that should be applied to different global regions.  
 
Input Data Requirements  
Data input is normally less problematic at China’s national macroeconomic level. 
However, data availability can be problematic at provincial microeconomic levels as 
can gathering information on the detailed energy sector. Problems of input data 
requirements are especially an issue for Simulation and input-output analysis. They 
often require highly detailed energy sector data to function. A trade-off is made 
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between the recentness of the data against its completeness. To have a more 
comprehensive overview of the energy sector, YE uses outdated input-output tables 
from 1987 and Liang uses tables from 1997. Additionally, comparing YE against 
other models, its dynamic input-output framework is not suited to long-run energy 
policy analysis. Since the input-output table projects are inaccurate in the very long 
run, YE’s model results are also inaccurate in the long-term (Teng et al., 2007).  
 
A possible solution to the lack of comprehensive input-data requirement is to reduce 
energy systems into stylised representations. Using nested production functions of 
WITCH, the energy sector can still be captured and modelled. However, any further 
stylisation will inevitably lead to inaccurate modelling. Hence a balance has to be 
struck between detailed modelling (albeit computationally difficult) and stylised 
representations (potentially inaccurate). Issues of highly detailed data inputs can be 
overcome via WITCH, as it does not have as a detailed representation of the energy 
sector as the pure Cost Minimisation models, but takes a more detailed perspective 
than pure growth maximisation models. Hence WITCH is the ideal trade-off between 
reducing data input requirements via stylisation and having a detailed enough 
representation of the energy sector to aid energy policy makers in their decision 
making process. 
 
Static Modelling Framework 
Static modelling does not account for subsequent changes in the climate, energy 
systems and the economy. The limitation of YE and Liang lies in its static analytical 
framework. For example, Liang assumes a temporal stability for direct model inputs. 
This assumption is suitable for developed countries, but less suitable for developing 
nations. The rapid change of developing nations, such as China, calls for a dynamic 
modelling framework. A behaviour-oriented model dynamic framework would enable 
energy policymakers to understand the interaction between within the economic 
system better (Teng et al., 2007). 
 
A possible solution to the static modelling framework is to use an iterative simulation 
process via a Nash game. At each new iteration, energy policy makers take the 
behaviour of other energy policy makers into account. This newly computed output is 
carried over to the following period as an input in the next round of optimisation. The 
process is iterated until each Chinese province’s behaviour converges as the best 
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response against other regions. WITCH is a dynamic model that iterates in regular 
intervals under a game theoretic framework. Each period’s outputs are fed into back 
into the model as an input. For inputs which are dependent on previous period, 
researchers do not have to exogenously set the levels each period. WITCH 
automatically calculates inputs such as energy supply and demand for the next period 
endogenously.  
 
No Optimal Generation Scenarios  
To aid the setting of energy targets, energy policy makers often prefer to project 
optimal generation scenarios and pathways. This preference can cause problem for 
Cost Minimisation models as this class of models does not propose optimal energy 
generation pathways. They merely project the least cost pathway, which could be 
suboptimal if energy policy makers also need to account for SoS issues. In other 
words, the least cost pathway is not necessarily the best. For example LEAP does 
neither generate optimised scenarios, nor produce market-equilibrium scenarios. It 
can only identify the least-cost scenario. Furthermore, LEAP does not estimate the 
impact of energy policies on GDP growth or job creation. Additionally, 3E is mainly 
driven by the ESOM module. ESOM is a multi-period linear program model based on 
the energy flow system. The module output are activity levels of kinds of technologies, 
energy consumptions of end use energy technology, intermediate transfer technology, 
pollution emissions and technology investment and cost. However these model 
outputs are according to the generation technology and not end-use sectors. Hence the 
model can only offer energy policy guidance on generation supply and not offer 
guidance on consumption demand. Since energy consumption derives the level of 
supply generation (as heat and electricity are difficult to store and have to be 
generation on demand) the model ignores a vital area of the energy sector (Teng et al., 
2007). 
 
Climate modelling can be for different purposes. One of the most common purposes 
of climate modelling is to propose energy mix targets via projecting generation 
pathways. Chinese energy policy makers are not only concerned about emissions 
abatement. WITCH allows energy policy makers to balance emissions abatement and 
GDP growth targets. Thus it is an important policy action in the arsenal for China’s 
continued fight to reduce emissions whist pursuing economic growth. 
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Climate Damage Functions 
Most of the Chinese IAM analysis takes the view that although carbon emissions are 
of concern, the research does not aim to calculate hard emissions or atmospheric ppm 
caps that restrict economic growth. The Chinese research is more focussed on gradual 
ways to reduce emissions in a way that does not radically adversely impact GDP 
growth. In the cost minimisation and input-output simulation models, researchers are 
not concerned with the optimal mix of energy generation supply and the mix of 
energy consumption sector demand. In general equilibrium analysis, researchers are 
primarily concerned with the price level to achieve the desired level of GDP output 
that the state has targeted and less focussed on include the intangible cost of emissions 
into the calculated price levels.  
 
The modelling of economic growth, emissions and temperature change has been at the 
forefront of debate on IAM analysis. Finding a solution to the correct climate damage 
function is worthy of being separated into a separate research project. A compromise 
is to use the consensus data for growth, emissions and temperature change from the 
Working Group III of the IPCC. In the same spirit, the WITCH runs various 
emissions scenarios as a function of temperature increases. The model takes 
temperature changes as exogenous inputs and dispenses with the added complexities 
of modelling energy-climate relationships. The emissions as a function of temperature 
increase draw on IPCC data. The IPCC has surveyed a range of temperature rises 
relative to economic activity. A 5% confidence interval either side of the mean would 
lead to more robust results.  
 
Emissions Economy Linkage 
Problems of lack of feedback between the macroeconomy and climate change relates 
to a disjointed modelling framework between economic growth and GHG emissions. 
This is especially problematic for Cost Minimisation models such AIM and 
MARKAL, which focus less on the macroeconomy. For example in AIM, there is a 
lack of feedback between the macroeconomic module and the climate module. As a 
result, indicators for economic losses including externalities causing a reduction to 
GDP are excluded. Additionally, IAM only consider existing generation technologies. 
Backup technologies are not included as alternatives therefore the CO2 emission 
reduction will be underestimated. Additionally, MARKAL does not model the 
relationship between the energy subsector and the general macro-economy. The 
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MARKAL Model is usually applied independently as is the economic growth, thus 
energy demand is given exogenously. The improvement made to MARKAL is the 
hard linked MARKAL-MACRO. This model is a dynamic nonlinear program, with an 
objective function that seeks to optimise total discounted utility. It incorporates a 
macroeconomic module depicted as a production function of constant elasticity of 
substation. The limitation of MARKAL-MACRO is its simplified expression of the 
macroeconomy. Different generation technologies and end-use sectors respond 
differently to price changes, with the responsiveness also altering over time. The 
model can only roughly capture the changes in energy demand resulting from changes 
in economic structure (Goldstein and Greening, 2001).  
 
WITCH is a hard-linked model because the pollution of the energy module is fully 
integrated with the rest of the economy. Linkage between growth, emissions and 
environmental damage is provided via the climate module. A climate module and a 
damage function provide feedback on the economy regarding carbon dioxide 
emissions into the atmosphere. The energy component of the aggregate production 
function has been expanded to depict the energy sector and to model the carbon 
mitigation options for the main greenhouse gases. The model tracks actions which 
impact the level of mitigation, such as R&D expenditure, investment in carbon-free 
technologies and adaptation, purchases of emission permits, or expenditure on carbon 
taxes. The hard-link nature of WITCH allows emissions or temperature increases to 
be fully reflected in a climate-economic framework. The policy maker can decide to 
fix a target in terms of maximum tolerable damage or in terms of climate damage 
reduction that needs to be accomplished and the optimal portfolio of strategies can be 
determined accordingly.  
 
Economic Growth 
Most climate modelling tie GHG emissions to industrial production either implicitly 
through emissions projections, which are based on the growth in industrial production 
or explicitly through an actual model of industrial production. Economic growth 
results directly from advances in technology and population growth, and from a high 
marginal product of capital in the developing world. If population growth were 
curtailed technological advances restricted, economic growth will also reduce, 
following the Cobb-Douglas production function as introduced in Section 1.1. With 
lower economic growth, there is less output and less associated pollution. 
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A solution to uncertainly in future economic growth rates is endogenous variables 
which are uncertain (such as capital and energy use) and exogenous variables which 
are published (namely labour). WITCH uses a Cobb-Douglas production function 
based on labour growth rates from the World Bank. Coupled with the calculation for 
capital via a Nash-Iterative game that incorporates investment and depreciation rates, 
the WITCH model captures economic growth as well as any other welfare 
maximising IAMs. 
 
Regional Aggregation 
Many IAM methodologies are globally integrated and do not consider different 
countries or regions. Globally integrated optimisation models do not account for 
differences in endowment of capital and labour. They also do not capture the degree 
of economic growth and the associated energy needs.  
 
The ideal solution to fully reflect regional disparities would be to model each country 
separately. However, this would result in a computationally heavy framework. The 
compromise that researchers have employed is to group regions with similar levels of 
energy demand (economic growth) and supply (natural resource endowment). Since 
this research focuses on Chinese energy policy, China is better advised to be a 
separate region. In WITCH, the world is grouped into 12 regions. From the 12 regions, 
there are two which consist of one country, namely CHINA and USA. In the 10 
remaining regions, seven countries are clustered together based on geographical 
proximity as are three groups of countries based on similarities in economic growth. 
The seven regions which cluster countries based on geographical proximity are 
OLDEURO, NEWEURO, MENA, LACA, SSA, SASIA and EASIA. The three 
regions clustered based on level of economic growth are CAJANZ, KOSAU and TE. 
This classification of countries is partially based on the UN’s population data (UN, 
2010). OLDEURO represents Western Europe, or the developed European countries 
which are able to accede into the European Union. NEWEURO are the Eastern 
European countries which aspire to increase levels of GDP per capita and limit 
inflationary pressures, in order to become eligible for EU accession. MENA 
represents the Middle Eastern and North African regions. This region has vast 
reserves of petroleum and natural gas reserves, making their cost of energy generation 
cheaper than areas without high natural resources abundance. The LACA region is 
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represented by Latin America, Mexico and Caribbean. There areas are culturally very 
similar and benefit from similar endowment of renewable energy resources. The SSA 
is represented by Sub-Sahara and Africa, but excludes South Africa. This mineral and 
resources rich region has low capital endowment. SASIA covers the South Asia 
region, whose energy demand and supply are dominated by India, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka. EASIA or South East Asia includes Brunei, Burma, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The CAJANZ includes 
Canada, Japan and New Zealand which have similar GDP per capita of around USD 
35,000 for 2010 (World Bank, 2011). KOSAU consists of Korea, South Africa and 
Australia which are similar in their wealth of natural resources reserves endowment. 
Transition Economies (TE), mainly located in the former USSR, act as the balancer in 
order to obtain the aggregate global GDP.  
 
Regional Interaction 
Each nation of region will behave strategically relative to policy decisions from other 
nations. Hence projecting future policy outcomes are path dependent. In other words, 
nations will not behave statically. 
 
In WITCH, strategic interaction between regions is represented through an open-loop 
Nash game. Investment strategies are optimised across each region, by taking into 
account both economic and environmental externalities. Across time, WITCH is a 
dynamic model whereby each time step looks forward for stakeholders to maximise 
welfare. Welfare is maximised strategically with respect to anticipated policy choices 
by other decision makers, in a game theoretic manner. The investment strategies are 
optimised by taking into account both economic and environmental externalities. The 
model seeks to find the optimal investment profile for each region and technology via 
an inter-temporal game. 
 
Technological Innovation and Transfers 
Technological improvement which in turn lowers energy generation costs is modelled 
through learning by doing and technological disbursements. For example, in the 
Chinese General Equilibrium models, they lack detail on the impact of technological 
change in reducing generation costs. Technological improvements lower generation 
costs, making sustainable technologies more competitive relative to its fossil-fuel 
competitors (Teng et al., 2007).  
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There are two ways in which technological improvements can reduce emissions. The 
first is supply-based, whereby innovations reduce the cost of generation both for 
installation and operation. The second way is that WITCH allows for endogenous 
technological changes that can potentially improve energy efficiency or the 
production of energy from various sources. Different energy-generating technologies 
are modelled: coal, oil, gas, wind and solar, nuclear, electricity, and bio-fuels. The 
notion of technological sharing stems from the fact that as one country develops more 
advanced technological improvements, it becomes assimilated by neighbouring 
nations. In the long-run, all nations that want to possess technological improvements 
are able to obtain them. This lowers the cost of generation across the world. To model 
this effect, all long-run costs for technologically advanced are set identically to reflect 
the leaning effect between nations. Thus, the model allows for analysis of the 
interplay between economic growth, energy costs, and changes in energy technology. 
 
Economic Response to Policy 
A problem persists between the endogenous interaction of policies implemented and 
how they are modelled. Many climate models have exogenous built-in responses by 
agents, such as an exogenous change in fuel usage at a specific energy price. However, 
an exogenous response cannot easily capture the complex relationships that go into an 
endogenous decision. Many models segregate a handful of regions of the world and 
find the optimal world GHG emissions level, but do not address how countries would 
share the burden. Those models that do divide the world regionally are better able to 
assess the benefits and costs of climate change control across regions. Such models 
must take into account the problem of designing enforceable international agreements. 
In an international agreement on climate change each country has a relatively small 
impact on the total world emissions; the incentive to cheat is strong. 
 
In WITCH the economy’s response to changes in energy policies, has been detailed in 
a way that allows characterisation of future energy and technological scenarios and an 
assessment of their compatibility with the goal of stabilising greenhouse gases 
concentrations. By endogenously modelling fuel prices (oil, coal, natural gas and 
uranium) and the cost of storing the CO2 captured, the model can be used to evaluate 
the implication of mitigation policies on the energy system in all its components. At 
each new iteration of the model, a policy maker in each region takes the behaviour of 
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other players produced by the previous iteration as given and sets the optimal value of 
all choice variables. This newly computed output is carried over to the following 
period as input in the next round of optimisations. The process is iterated until each 
region’s behaviour converges in the sense that each region’s choice is the best 
response to all other regions’ best responses to its behaviour. 
 
4.2.3. Inputs and Assumptions in Modelling 
Detailed inputs in running the model and sources are presented in Appendix 13. They 
predominantly refer to the World Bank, UN and IEA. General assumptions on 
population and growth will use data published by the World Bank and the UN. 
Detailed energy sector assumption including costs and resource endowment will come 
from the IEA. The source of data inputs are presented in Table 4.7.  
 
Table 4.7: Data sources for model inputs 
Data Input Source Publication(s) 
Carbon emissions and 
temperature change  
IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy 
Sources and Climate Change Mitigation 
GDP forecasts World Bank World Development Indicators 
Population 
projections  
United Nations World Population Prospects 
Energy sector details  IEA World Energy Outlook 
Energy Balance of Non-OECD Countries 
Energy Balance of OECD Countries 
Projected Costs of Generating Electricity 
 
The iterative process of the WITCH calculations only requires the input in the base 
year for macro and micro assumptions. The base year chosen is 2010. From this base 
year, WITCH calculates model output for the period which feeds into the following 
period as model input. The following table gives an overview of model inputs which 
are set exogenously by the user and where inputs are subsequently calculated 
endogenously by the model. 
 
Projection horizon 
The projection horizon goes up to 2050, from a base year of 2010. The rationale for 
modelling a 40 year projection horizon is that with anything shorter it became 
difficult to capture the effect of energy policy on a life of one life (referring to the 
asset lifetime of wind turbines ranging between 20-30 years and to nuclear power 
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plants ranging between 30-40 years). If modelling horizons go beyond 2050, the 
results are increasingly questionable with regards to accuracy and the validity of the 
assumption. 
 
The frequency of illustration of policy actions should be every five years, as China 
regularly updates all its policy twice per decade. Hence “modelling steps” should be 
every mid decade and at the end of the decade. 
 
Emissions Abatement Calibration 
The model incorporates three different CO2 stabilisation targets as shown in Table 
4.8WITCH adheres to the levels set by the IPCC by treating emissions as an 
exogenous constraint. COP15 sets forth a target of limiting the long-term average 
increase in the global temperature to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. According to the 
IEA (2011), this is taken to widely mean that the concentration of greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere must be stabilised at no higher than 450ppm of CO2 during the 
century. This research shall consider 450ppm as the most ambitious case, as countries 
in subsequent COP events have tried to negotiate less stringent emissions targets. To 
better understand the effect of the CO2 limits, a range of ppm limits should be 
considered between 450ppm and Business as Usual (BaU).  
 
Table 4.8: Different CO2 stabilisation targets 
CO2 emissions target Temperature Increase Above Pre-Industrial Levels 
450ppm CO2 equivalent Atmospheric concentrations must be stabilised at  
450ppm of CO2 during the century. 
600ppm CO2 equivalent Atmospheric concentrations must be stabilised at  
600ppm of CO2 during the century. 
750ppm CO2 equivalent Atmospheric concentrations must be stabilised at  
750ppm of CO2 during the century. 
Business as Usual (BaU) No limit of CO2 emissions set. 
 
Base Year Assumptions  
The main assumptions for the base year are economic, energy sector, cost, capital 
investment, depreciation, discount rate, and climate change.  
 
Economic assumptions use the base year of calibration as 2010 as the starting point 
for GDP, energy demand, population, emissions and factor prices. Prices are 
expressed in constant 2010 USD. The basic input data are energy consumption and 
prices obtained from the IEA (2010). Output and population inputs are adapted from 
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the United Nations (2010) and World Bank (2011). A survey of econometric 
estimates conducted by Burniaux et al. (1991) shows the capital-labour elasticities of 
substitution range from 0.5 and 1.5 in the USA, and between 0.5 and 0.7 in Europe 
and in the Pacific. This research used an elasticity of substitution equal to 1, which 
corresponds to a Cobb-Douglas aggregation of capital and labour; returns to scale are 
assumed to be constant. The value of capital in the base year is calibrated so that its 
marginal product equates the gross interest rate, i.e. the prevailing interest rate in the 
economy plus the depreciation rate. The Cobb-Douglas exponent associated to the 
labour input is calibrated so that the labour share of gross output is equal to 0.7 in all 
regions. This choice is as per the interval between 0.65 and 0.8 computed by Gollin 
(2002) after correcting national statistics for income from self-employment.  
 
Energy sector assumptions including electric and non-electric energies are aggregated 
using an elasticity of 0.5. Econometric estimates of the elasticity of substitution 
between non-electric and electric energy are normally higher than that assumed. This 
is due to the fact that, as noted in Burniaux et al. (1991), econometric analyses are 
frequently based on the assumption that energy and capital are weak substitutes in 
production. Firms first choose an optimal energy mix and then combine it with capital, 
assuming implicitly that multi energy technologies are available. Although 
possibilities for switching from direct energy to electricity exist in many sectors good 
examples are home heating and cooking systems, lock in investments from the past 
and large up-front costs reduce the substitutability between the two forms of energy.  
 
Costs of investment decline with cumulated installed capacity at the rate set by the 
learning curve progress ratios. For the technology specification currently represented 
in the model, this research assumes that learning occurs for wind and solar electricity 
generation only, at the progress ratio of 0.87. In other words, modelling a 13% 
investment cost decrease for each doubling of world installed capacity. Capital 
invested at 10% and depreciation is 5% per annum. Depreciation of investments in 
electricity production is set in agreement with plant lifetimes assuming that the end-
life capital value is 10% (Bosetti et al., 2009).  
 
The commonly used inter-temporal discount rate is as per Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), 
which is set equal to 3% in the base year, it declines at a constant rate of 0.25% per 
year. The decrease in discount rate for future periods is to allow for the fact that the 
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same discount rate 40 years from now would be too highly discounted and not impact 
today’s choices. Be reducing the discount rate for future periods, there is a fairer 
intergenerational adjustment between today’s choices and their impact on future 
generations. 
 
Climate change impact assumptions are also adapted from Nordhaus and Boyer 
(2000). Amounts have been adjusted for the different time step lengths and initial base 
year. Population is exogenous and follows the UN (2010) predictions. Total factor 
productivity is assumed to grow exogenously over time to reflect technological 
progress and all the other structural changes that are difficult to represent in a 
simplified Ramsey-type growth framework, especially in the case of developing 
countries (van Vuuren et al. 2005). 
 
The quantitative climate modelling methodology has been discussed, with the 
WITCH model proposed as the chosen IAM. The model makes projections to provide 
long-term guidance for policy action. Along with Section 4.1, which discussed the 
methodology behind the policy assessment framework, and with Section 4.2 that sets 
out the climate modelling methodology, the next section illustrates the Feedback Loop 
between energy policy analysis and climate modelling. 
 
4.3. Feedback Loop between Policy Analysis and Climate 
Modelling  
This section discusses the feedback effect between energy policy and climate 
modelling. In Chapter 1, the Feedback Loop between the Hybrid IAM Climate Model 
and energy policy analysis was introduced which creates an iterative cycle for policy 
decision support that helps move China towards an improved state of energy policy 
outcome. The loop starts off with the climate model as the base-case before policy 
change. From the model outputs, this research switches to energy policy assessment to 
propose policy outcome improvements (the cause), subsequently switching back to 
the climate model depicting an altered state of a nation after implementation of energy 
policy changes (the effect).  
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4.3.1. Feedback Loop Revisited 
The logic behind the Feedback Loop assumes in the base-case, there are shortcomings 
portrayed in China’s current energy policies, as supported by the literature review 
from Chapter 2. These shortcomings are assessed using the policy assessment 
framework in Section 3.4. Areas of possible energy policy outcome improvements are 
highlighted. To improve the highlighted areas, policy actions are proposed which 
revise the inputs of the next round of modelling. The new revised-case of the climate 
model inputs produces a revised state of climate model outputs. This is one complete 
loop. The loops are infinite in nature. Outputs from revised-case are re-assessed using 
the policy assessment framework to suggest and propose additional energy policy 
changes. One single loop does not address all outstanding issues highlighted via the 
policy assessment framework. Each loop only moves China marginally closer to an 
improved policy outcome state.  
 
4.3.2. Enhancements to the Feedback Loop 
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 explored energy policy assessment and climate modelling 
independently of one another. Upon linking energy policy analysis and Hybrid IAM 
Climate Modelling it was discovered that intermediate steps were needed. The two 
intermediate steps required are to firstly map energy policy assessment onto model 
output, and secondly to map energy policy action onto changes in the model inputs. 
Figure 4.3 incorporate two additional steps which are shaded in grey.  
 
The basis for adding the first additional step is to map the CFEPS assessment criteria 
with the generated model outputs from the base-case. Initially the model is run as the 
base-case (without any new policy intervention). As the model was not designed 
especially to fit the set of criteria as proposed under the Energy Policy Assessment 
Framework, there is no clear relationship. Hence outputs from the WITCH model 
have to be clearly linked against indicators from the Energy Policy Assessment 
Framework. The mapping between model output and policy assessment is discussed 
in Section 4.3.3. The second additional step is mapping the impact of discretional 
energy policy change to cause changes in the model inputs. The suggested areas of 
improvements should trigger energy policy action with a view of achieving a better 
energy policy outcome. However, there is no direct link between Energy Policy 
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Action and how the inputs in the WITCH model should change. The mapping 
between policy action and changes in model inputs are discussed in Section 4.3.4. 
 
Climate model run of base case 
• Modelling base case without policy intervention
Base Case Energy Policy Assessment 
• Apply policy evaluation criteria to model results and   
highlight areas for improvement (economic, environmental, 
SoS, social equity or institutional governance)
Energy Policy Action 
• Suggest energy policy change or additional 
policy tools to improve areas highlighted 
Revised Case Energy 
Policy Asses 
• Re-run IAM to evaluate the 
impact of proposed policy 
changes on China to make 
suggestion for improvements
CFEPS
Mapping Policy Action
to  Model Input
Mapping Policy Assessment 
to Model Output
 
Figure 4.3: Feedback Loop proposed by CFEPS 
 
4.3.3. Mapping Policy Assessment to Model Output 
Following the literature review of Policy Assessment Framework and offering 
improvements of the Framework through an empirical survey, this research proposes 
to employ 5 policy dimensions. The mapping of WITCH outputs onto indicators of 
the Policy Assessment Framework is graphically depicted in Figure 4.4. The mapping 
consists of Economic, Climate Change Mitigation, SoS, Social Equality, and 
Governance. Appendix 14 maps the changes in the CFEPS policy assessment 
framework indicators which evaluate whether the five policy dimensions are satisfied 
by the model output.  
 
Although it would be promising to see (for example, the use of energy) levels falling 
over time this may be difficult to observe, as energy policy may not always have large 
impacts. Hence in most cases, energy policy outcome will be deemed as a successful 
if the growth rate falls, rather than observing falling absolute (energy use) levels.  
 
Economic Growth 
The economic growth dimension consists of evaluating economic productivity, energy 
consumption and energy R&D investment.  
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Economic 
growth
Climate Change
Mitigation
SoS
Policy 
Dimension
Actual Policy 
Assessment Indicator
Mapping Policy Assessment 
to Model Output
ΔEnergy demand, supply, GDP
end energy R&D investments
ΔCO2 emissions, 
energy demand and GDP
ΔGeneration mix, natural resource 
demand and imports
ΔGrowth of renewables
Economic productivity
Energy consumption
Energy Investment
Fuel cost
CO2 Emissions
Energy efficiency & intensity
Emissions intensity
Hydrocarbon and coal dependence
Generation mix diversification
Affordable Energy
Energy access
Political stability & policy coherence
Public participation
Regulatory quality & corruption control
N/A (qualitative evaluation)
Social Equity
Governance
 
Figure 4.4: Mapping Policy Assessment Framework to Evaluate Model Output 
 
The economic productivity indicator evaluates how effectively energy is used in the 
production of final goods and services as represented by GDP. Evaluating this area of 
policy making using the model output is done by energy production (energy supply) 
per unit of GDP. Policy improvements will be observed via falling growth rates of 
energy supply per GDP. 
 
Energy consumption evaluates whether there are imbalances or more importantly 
shortfalls in energy supply to meet demand. This indicator is calculated as the output 
of energy demand per energy supply used. Policy improvements will be observed if 
the ratio of energy demand per energy supply moves towards one. A point to note is 
the way the WITCH model calculates energy demand and supply. WITCH matches 
energy demand and supply, as it assumes there is no storage of energy. All generated 
energy is consumed in that current year. From an energy supply and demand 
imbalance, WITCH will not be able to offer policy guidance. The Five Year Plan 
results offer greater clarity on whether the intended policy outcome has been 
successful.  
 
The energy R&D investment policy indicator measures the amount of energy R&D 
investments made. The ratio is calculated as R&D investments per unit of GDP. 
Policy improvements will be observed as R&D spending increases in growth 
compared to GDP to show the government as more committed to technological 
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improvement in generation. However there will be a point where too much R&D 
spending per GDP will be detrimental to the economy following the laws of 
diminishing returns to scale.  
 
Economic growth is mapped to the Growth Module of WITCH. It draws mainly on 
data from the United Nations (UMIFO, 2011) and the World Bank (2011). 
 
Climate Change Mitigation 
The climate change mitigation dimension of CFEPS policy assessment framework 
consists of CO2 emissions, energy efficiency & intensity and emissions intensity. 
 
The CO2 emissions indicator assesses the pathway of atmospheric CO2 over time. The 
WITCH model has been run under atmospheric CO2 scenarios of 450ppm, 600ppm 
and 750ppm. As with fuels costs, this indicator is measured from model inputs rather 
than output. Assessments are carried out each time the IPCC releases an updated 
estimates on the emissions pathways. The most up-to-date Fourth Assessment Report 
by the IPCC was released in 2007. When the Fifth IPCC Assessment Report is 
published in 2014, the carbon emissions profile will be updated. Policy improvements 
will be observed if the growth rate of this figure falls over time. 
 
Energy efficiency and intensity measures whether energy policy has increased the 
effectives of turning primary fuels into power. The model output that corresponds to 
assessing this indicator relates to energy intensity. The more efficient power is 
generated, the less energy is demanded per unit of GDP produced. Policy 
improvements will be observed if the growth rate of energy demand per GDP falls 
over time. 
 
Emissions intensity captures the high carbon energy generation used as part of 
producing output. The generation capacity may indicate a base-load and peak 
production of energy. However, China may choose to run its fossil fuel-based 
generation technologies for longer than its renewable sources. The CO2 per energy 
demand indicator helps assess whether the nation chooses to increasingly demand 
cleaner generation technologies. Policy improvements will be observed if the growth 
rate of CO2 per GDP falls over time. 
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Climate change mitigation is mapped to the Climate Change Module of WITCH. The 
most important data source is the IPCC (Arvizu, 2011). 
 
Security of Energy Supply 
The SoS dimension of the CFEPS assessment framework consists of indicators 
including hydrocarbon and coal dependence, and generation mix diversification.  
 
Hydrocarbon and coal dependence is further broken down into two sections. Firstly, 
oil, gas and coal as a proportion of primary energy generation measures the 
dependence of China generation capacity on natural resources which it will have to 
import. China is a net importer of oil, gas and coal (IEA, 2011a; Yu, 2010). The 
greater the proportion of oil, gas and coal making up generation capacity, the less 
susceptive China is to volatilities in the international spot or forward commodities 
market. Secondly, oil, gas and coal imports as a percentage of total consumption also 
capture the dependence of China on fossil fuels. The greater the proportion of a 
percentage of total consumption, the more China is exposed to the SoS risk. Policy 
improvements will be observed if the growth rate of oil, gas and coal compared to 
total power generation capacity falls over time. Policy outcome improvements will be 
observed if the growth rate of oil, gas and coal imports compared to total demand for 
these resources falls over time.  
 
Generation mix diversification consists of two subsections. Firstly, non fossil fuels 
energy generation to total energy production measures whether there is concentration 
risk in a handful of generation technologies. This indicator is measured by oil, gas and 
coal as a proportion of total generation capacity. Policy improves if there is greater 
diversification via the growth rate of oil, gas and coal compared to generation 
capacity falling over time. The way WITCH has defined non-fossil (low carbon) and 
fossil generation with no third category means that this indicator will simply be the 
remaining percentage of “oil, gas and coal as proportion of primary energy 
generation” reaching 100%. Coincidentally, China is a net importer of all three fossil 
fuels of oil, gas and coal that China is dependent on. The remaining generation 
technologies are the non-fossil clean-generation technologies. Thus, all clean 
generation technologies can be taken as aiding China in reducing the SoS risk. 
Secondly, China’s lead in global (low carbon) technologies measures the degree that 
China leads in committing to generation sources which it does not import, and are 
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clean. This is measured via model outputs of the proportion of Chinese renewables, 
hydro and nuclear generation capacity as a proportion of global renewables, hydro 
and nuclear generation capacity. Policy has improved if the growth rate of the 
proportion of Chinese renewables, hydro and nuclear as proportion of global 
generation capacity falling over time after each successive round of energy policy 
action.  
 
Security of energy supply is calculated mainly via the Energy Module of the WITCH 
model and its main data source is the IEA (2011a; 2011b; 2011c) 
 
Social Equality 
The social equality policy dimension assesses the ease of grid energy access. Lack of 
grid access, resulting in energy poverty is a critical issue facing China today given the 
large landmasses and mountainous terrains to cover under a grid connection program. 
In the power generation sector in August 2010, the China Electricity Council 
confirmed that only 55% of generation capacity was grid connected, thus requiring 
infrastructure improvements (IEA, 2011a). In the face of implement grid connecticity, 
local generation is required, which comes from renewables. 
 
One other reason for renewable energy is due to the high capital expenditure needed 
for setting up large-scale power plants. Small coal plants used to be the way to get 
local generation. In the 12
th
 FYP, the government aims to decrease the average coal 
consumption of power plants from 333g/kWh in 2010 to 325g/kWh in 2015. This is 
possible with the supercritical and ultra-supercritical coal of at least 600MW 
generation capacity (Cheung, 2011). The deployment of renewables scall will be 
much more practical in remote locations, than to build a new 600MW coal plant.  
 
Thus for CFEPS, the deployment of renewables is used as a proxy for grid access. A 
proxy to evaluate this indicator would be to measure the growth of renewable 
generation capacity as a proportion of total generation capacity. The rationale behind 
this proxy is that any new-build renewables will most likely be in remote locations. 
As more new-build renewables are installed, more sites will become grid connected to 
count as part of China’s total generation capacity. Policy is deemed to have improved 
if the growth rate of renewable power capacity rises as a proportion of total generation 
capacity. Admittedly, this proxy has some issues, in that it assumes ceteris paribus, 
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that China does not actively encourage renewables over other generation technologies. 
In other words China’s growth of renewables was only the result of better grid 
coverage. This is known not to be the case as China does actively encourage 
renewables. China is aiming for 13% of generation capacity to come from sustainable 
sources by 2015 compared to 8.8% in 2010 (Ng and Mabey, 2011). Hence this proxy 
will be used in the absence of a better measurement of the electricity grid coverage 
indicator.  
 
Social Equality is mapped to a mixture of Economic and Energy Modules of the 
WITCH module. Data is drawn from United Nations (UMIFO, 2011), the World 
Bank (2011) and IPCC (Arvizu, 2011). 
 
Governance 
The governance dimension of CFEPS policy assessment framework consists of 
political stability & policy coherence, public participation, and regulatory quality & 
control of corruption. These indicators cannot be explicitly assessed using outputs 
generated by the WITCH model. Instead, they will be assessed via a qualitative 
discussion based on the performance of the 11
th
 FYP and the goals of the 12
th
 FYP 
(Fung and Chu, 2011). 
 
Political stability & policy coherence looks at key government official turnover and 
the continuity of energy policy direction. The slower the turnover of policy makers 
and the longer the continuity of policy direction, the more policy is deemed to have 
improved. 
 
Public participation is assessed by measuring the degree of stakeholders’ consultation 
in decision making process. Policy is deemed to have improved the more end-users of 
energy are consulted in the decision making process. 
 
Regulatory quality & control of corruption breaks down into accountability of 
government officials, and monitoring and punishment of institutions and officials 
accountable. Policy is deemed to have improved if officials are held accountable with 
clear monitoring of the policy process and harsher punishment (in the case of 
corruption) to promote fairer policy making and better policy action.  
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The governance dimension is not quantitatively calculated from WITCH. Hence there 
is no mapping to a specific module. The data source to assess policy dimension will 
come from China’s Communist party, when the outcome of the 12th FYP becomes 
available.  
 
4.3.4. Mapping Policy Action to Model Input 
Referring to section 2.3, this research has selected three categories to group different 
types of energy policy actions. These categories are Legislative, Market and 
Organisational. The way each of the three types of policy action is translated to 
changes in the WITCH model input is shown graphically in Figure 4.5. Appendix 15 
maps the changes in the energy policy actions onto the climate model by showing 
how the model inputs are adjusted in response to policy changes.  
 
The mapping from energy policy action to changes in the model input was selected 
based pragmatically on whether WITCH was able to accommodate them as model 
inputs. The inputs which are assumed to be the most sensitive inputs to the model are: 
levels of emissions over time, load of generation, efficiency and generation, 
generation/operation costs and setup/investment costs.  
 
With this assumption of the most sensitive model inputs, the three categories of 
energy actions were listed and matched to their respective model input change. 
Legislative or regulatory energy policies are mapped against explicit emissions caps 
and carbon limits to enforce a sustainable energy system. Economic or market 
incentives driven policies are mapped via investment cost and O&M cost changes to 
direct the economy towards more sustainable energy use and generation. Governance 
policies are mapped via more accurate feedback between policy changes and model 
impact. This final mapping is a more qualitative discursive feedback effect that will 
be explored and refined in subsequent chapters.  
 
Legislative 
Legislative policy actions are implemented via command and control type measures 
as set out by the central government or local authorities. Since its Soviet roots, central 
resource allocation and decision making has been at the heart of Chinese energy 
policies. This policy type of policy action seeks to change the inputs used by all three 
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modules in WITCH. In the case of China, this means energy policy actions such as 
setting explicit GHG limits, improving energy generation standards, employing 
stricter targets for use of low carbon sources, enforcing a minimum efficiency 
standard, creating a supportive transmission tariffs and access, and encouraging the 
use of the best available technology. 
 
Legislative
(command control)
Economic
(incentive driven)
Organisational
(evaluation monitoring) 
Energy Policy 
Implementation Tool
GHG limits 
Generation standards
Stricter targets for use of low carbon sources
Min efficiency standards
Supportive transmission tariffs and access 
Best available technology
Emissions restrictions for major emitters
GHG Taxes
Emissions Quotas
Emissions Trading
Feed in Tariffs
Investment and subsidies for R&D
Capital grants & subsidies for sustainable generation
Public project initiatives
Increasing transparency of decision making process
Holding policy makers accountable for decisions
Actual 
Legislative Tool
Mapping Policy Action 
to Model Input
Δ Emissions Abatement 
Scenario Caps
Δ Load, or Efficiency, or both
Δ Generation Costs
Δ Setup Costs
Δ Feedback frequency 
between model input 
and policy result
 
Figure 4.5: Mapping Legislative Action to Model Inputs 
 
Amongst China’s arsenal of policy action, many of them as command-and-control 
style policies via legislation. The best example is China’s FYPs which sets explicit 
goals in five year intervals for energy and other policies to meet. For example, as 
discussed in Section 2.2, the 12
th
 FYP, which has ambitious plans to reduce carbon 
intensity, has targeted a 17% reduction per unit of GDP output produced, compared to 
2005 (Fung and Chu, 2011). The way the GHG limit policies would be reflected by 
changes to the climate model input is via reducing the emission stabilisation caps for 
the atmospheric carbon emission scenarios of 450ppm, 600ppm and 750ppm. This 
represents the change in model input resultant from a change in energy policy of the 
Chinese government initially setting a CO2 target (for example in the 450ppm 
scenario) and changing its policy stance to follow an even stricter carbon reduction 
goal.  
 
165 
The 12
th
 FYP also targets increases in energy efficiency, hoping to achieve a 16% 
reduction per unit of GDP produced (Fung and Chu, 2011). Enforcing minimum 
efficiency standards in energy generation technologies would be represented by 
increasing the efficiency model input across all generation technologies. This captures 
the impact of the government supporting (via a carrot) a faster development of 
technology and engineering skills across the energy sector and thus ensuring that 
more electricity is converted from fossil or clean fuels. Conversely the government 
could (via a stick) decommission all power generators below a minimum efficiency 
threshold, thus increasing the efficiency levels of the generation capacity which 
remain in operation. Section 2.2 described this as using carrot incentives, rather than 
sticks as punishment. This is exactly what the 12
th
 FYP hopes to achieve by 2015 in 
coal generation. The Plan makes provisions to close down smaller coal-fired plants to 
improve overall plant efficiency and reduce emissions via the initiatives to replace 
smaller coal-fired plants with larger plants of at least 600MW. In 2009, 29GW of 
smaller plants were closed (Cheung, 2011). 
 
Improving energy generation standards is a top Chinese policy objective. Investment 
in more efficient newly built power plants is expected to be RMB 2.75 trillion for new 
build plants. This is expected to rise to RMB 11.1 trillion (USD 440) from 2011 to 
2020 (Ng and Mabey, 2011). Improving energy generation standards, employing 
stricter targets for use of low carbon sources, creating a supportive transmission tariffs 
and access, and encouraging the use of the best available technology action can be 
captured via the compounded effect of simultaneously increasing loads and 
efficiencies. These policy actions have the ultimate goal of generating more energy 
with less waste. The less waste created in converting fossil fuels into other forms of 
energy, the higher the load and efficiency, therefore the greater the end generation of 
energy, whilst using the same or even less natural resources to do so.  
 
Economic 
The economic type of policy actions operate by creating incentives so that energy 
stakeholders react in the intended direction of the policy makers by reducing growth 
to environmentally sustainable levels. Economic policy actions are where climate 
model add the greatest value. This type of policy action is where climate models add 
the greatest policy value. Changing incentives are resultant from economic policy 
action. Changes in policy actions alter WITCH inputs that in turn result in a different 
166 
set of WITCH outputs. WITCH is effectively simulating the impacts of the incentives 
which form part of the Economic policy actions. The economic policy actions include 
emissions restrictions for major emitters, GHG Taxes, emissions quotas, emissions 
trading, capital grants & subsidies for sustainable generation, feed in tariffs, public 
project initiatives, and investment and subsidies for R&D.  
 
All these incentive type policy actions can be reflected via changes in input costs of 
various generation technologies. The cost differentials drive energy generation 
stakeholders to substitute the most economical technology to hopefully create the 
desired effect of moving towards cleaner generation sources. There are two types of 
costs in the climate mode. Firstly, generation costs represent the day-to-day running 
costs of the plants. Secondly, setup costs represent the one-off capital expenditure 
investment for the greenfield construction or repowering of an existing plant. To 
encourage substitution towards low GHG emission technologies, cost increases will 
be used against fossil-based generation and cost decreases will be used to support 
clean generation by WITCH.  
 
Emissions restrictions for major emitters, GHG Taxes, emissions quotas and 
emissions trading policies can be captured by increased generation costs. All these 
levies aim to increase the marginal cost of electricity generation to internalise the 
negative externality of pollution. For example using emissions trading, if energy 
producers generate electricity it will emit GHG, thus (assuming the quota is set low 
enough) it breaks the permit free quota limit of emissions and requires the purchasing 
of additional permits. The cost of purchasing these permits is effectively an increase 
in generation costs. These levies are best suited to be used against fossil generation to 
increase coal, oil and gas based generation to a level where they become less 
competitive on a relative basis and more generating stakeholders switch to cleaner 
technologies.  
 
Capital grants and subsidies for sustainable generation and public project initiatives 
can be represented by decreased setup costs. Although the WITCH model was not 
designed to model the recurring impact of subsidies on generation, this can be solved 
by running for the base case and subsequently the revise case. The WITCH model is 
firstly run under the base-case, which are without any changes. After policy change, 
the WITCH model is run as the revised case. The policy change in this scenario is 
167 
differeny the capital and operating and expenditures. For example, in the US, the 
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has been lobbying for a 30% investment tax credit to 
replace the production tax credit currently available for new nuclear construction 
(Holt, 2011). Compared to production credit, investment credit is quicker and it is 
more certain that the investor will receive the tax rebate. With production tax credits, 
the investor will need for the plant to commence operation and produce electricity. 
Investment tax credits compensate the investors on the day the investments in setup 
costs are made. This results in the earlier receipt of investment tax credits and a 
greater certainty of receipt, which promotes more investment. Public project 
initiatives are best suited for larger projects such as improving China’s grid network. 
The 12
th
 FYP exports in order to invest in its transmission network, RMB 2.55 trillion 
(USD 408bn) is to be spent by 2015 (Ng and Mabey, 2011). By offering a better 
connected grid, generating stakeholders will find it cheaper to set up in windy and 
sunny remote locations. For example, wind turbines and solar sites in remote areas 
across China will be cheaper to setup, as there will be more sites already with 
connectivity in place thus negating the need to make the additional spending on 
connectivity.  
 
Feed in tariff subsidies can be captured by decreased generation costs. Feed in tariffs 
provide a subsidy for generation that makes revenue earned by the energy producer 
higher than at the wholesale price of electricity. The increasing revenue is paid to 
ensure an attractive enough profit margin for low carbon producers. This effect can be 
captured in the model through reduced generation costs. In the absence of increase 
revenue, decreasing operating costs ensures the profit margin stays attractively high. 
Again feed-in tariffs try to encourage substituting out of fossil based generation. The 
decrease in generation costs will be observed in clean technologies with the 
generation costs in fossil technologies remaining the same.  
 
Investment and subsidies for R&D result in both decreased generation as well as 
decreased setup costs. In the WITCH model, the investment in R&D and on-going 
subsidies into R&D results in technological improvements that make building new 
plants cheaper, thus decreasing setup costs. The technological improvements also 
disperse across the industry, making repairing and running generators cheaper, thus 
decreasing generation costs. This decreased setup and generation cost is mostly 
observed in non-fossil technologies, as these clean technologies are relatively less 
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mature. Again, as many of the clean technologies are less mature, the same R&D 
would make a greater impact on decreasing costs for clean technologies than the 
incumbent fossil technologies.  
 
Organisational 
As seen in Chapter 2, the literature review suggests certain commentators believe 
China’s policy lacks efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and accountability 
(Constantin, 2007). Also shown in Chapter 2, there are organisational inefficiencies. 
Although the Communist Party of China sets the unified policy goals, the many 
different institutions that contribute to the implementation of sustainable energy 
policy in China do not always provide a unified policy outcome. The power clash 
between the NDRC and NEA/NEC is a prime example of the inefficiencies of 
implementing a sustainable energy policy. The CPC set goals, which in theory may be 
effective for pollution abatement, but in practice executing these policies becomes 
inefficient with many organisations being involved (Burke et al., 2009).  
 
In response organisational policy actions try to increase the efficiency of policy 
making, transparency of the decision making process and hold policy decision makers 
more accountable for their actions. This policy type of policy action is not explicitly 
measured by the WITCH model; it is not mapped to a specific Module in WITCH. 
Instead, the WITCH model captures the effect of organisational policy action by re-
running the policy to model to policy cycle more frequently compared to the original 
intention of running the loop every five years to coincide with updates provided by 
China’s FYP. By increasing the frequency of assessing China’s energy policy aims, 
the Feedback Loop is run more frequently. The frequent re-running of the Feedback 
Loop gives policy more opportunities to make minor policy adjustments. It also 
allows observers to assess whether the policy makers in power have moved China 
towards a more successful policy outcome. Re-running the Feedback Loop more 
frequently increases the opportunities to assess policy makers. This increases the 
transparency of the decision making process and holds policy decision makers more 
accountable. Additionally, organisational policy actions are also analysed via 
qualitative discussions. 
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4.4. Conclusions 
This Chapter has separately discussed the Energy Policy Assessment Framework and 
the Hybrid IAM Model of WITCH. The Energy Policy Assessment Framework before 
undergoing review highlighted evaluation criteria which were in agreement with the 
surveyed interviewees. The interviewees also highlighted additional evaluation 
criteria, which were discussed included accordingly. 
 
The Hybrid IAM evaluated the possible candidates and selected WITCH as the 
appropriate model to evaluate China’s energy policy landscape. WITCH was able to 
overcome the majority of shortcoming for IAM analysis that were discovered in 
Chapter 3’s literature review of global and Chinese IAMs. The greatest advantage of 
using WITCH over other IAM candidates is the ability to perform a top-down 
overview of China’s policy makeup, whist simulating enough detail of the bottom-up 
energy subsectors to provide useful policy guidance to politicians.  
 
The third part of CFEPS is the Feedback Loop between policy and model. The 
Feedback Loop was also discussed. In doing so, it was discovered that the original 
research methodology was lacking two more linkages. The two linkages were in turn 
discussed and highlighted as the map between model output and policy assessment, 
and the map between policy action and changes in the model input. With a better 
understanding of all three components of CFEPS (Policy Assessment, Hybrid IAM 
and Feedback Loop), the next chapter presents the base-case model results, to start the 
iterations of CFEPS and aid Chinese energy policy makers in making informed 
decisions.  
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5. The Interplay between Climate Change, Energy and 
Economy 
This chapter applies a Hybrid IAM Climate Model to predicate feasible energy 
strategies within the assumptions covered in Chapter 4. The research question sets out 
to analyse what policy actions can assist China in reducing emissions and ensuring 
security of the energy supply whilst maintaining economic growth. To predicate the 
energy strategies, the Hybrid IAM Climate Model (via the use of WITCH) examines 
the interplay between climate change, energy and economic growth. Emphasis is 
placed on pollution mitigation, as China is the world’s largest CO2 emitter (IEA, 
2011a).  
 
Chapter 5 puts the WITCH model into context against the 5 Policy Dimentions and 3 
Policy Actions. However, before examining the areas of climate change, growth and 
energy, it is useful to revisit the modelling methodology. 
 
5.1. Modelling Methodology Revisited 
Before presenting the results, it is useful to revisit the mechanism that WITCH 
employs to model the interplay between energy, economic growth and climate change. 
The energy sector discussions include the assessment of the energy supply, demand 
and generation mix. Before examining the modelling areas, it is beneficial to revisit 
the relationships between climate change, economic growth and the energy sector.  
 
The economy is represented by the Cobb-Douglas production function in which GDP 
is determined by capital, labour and energy. Capital is driven by the initial capital 
stock and subsequent depreciation and investments. Labour is an exogenous input. 
Energy, or total primary energy demand, is broken down into production nests with 
the ability to substitute between different energy factors. At each nested energy 
demand, it is matched to energy supply. The underlying assumption is that generated 
energy is not stored, but used up in its entirety in the current year. The nested 
economic areas that can be satisfied via electricity drives the level of electricity 
demand, which (assuming all demand is met) determines the level of electricity 
supply. From assumptions of load and efficiency, the electricity generation capacity is 
calculated from electricity supply.  
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A hard-link
14
 between the economic growth and climate change is employed. 
Atmospheric CO2 emissions are generated from generation. Under the ppm capped 
emissions pathways, a limit is set on fossil fuel generation, which reduces the energy 
demand, which in turn decreases GDP levels. The generation mix that this research 
will examine revolves around electricity generation capacity. This is for two reasons. 
Firstly, under the move to low carbon energy generation, as electricity starts playing a 
greater role for transportation, heat and other forms of energy, it could be assumed 
that in the long-run electricity supply will approach energy supply. Secondly, the IEA 
(2011b) only provide generation mix projection for electricity generation capacity. 
This research, take the view that societies are becoming increasingly low carbon 
energy generating. Traditionally fossil fuel-based uses of energy such as 
transportation and heating are increasingly becoming replaced by electric means. To 
make the results validation process easier and against the backdrop of increasing 
efforts in low carbon energy generation, this research will ultimately assess electricity 
generation capacity.  
 
Base-Case Results  
The model results presented in this chapter are in the absence of energy policy change 
(the base-case situation). The assessment of these base-case (before policy change) 
results using the CFEPS policy assessment framework criteria is not presented in this 
section. The scoring is only a relative one, measuring the effect before and after 
discretionary policy action. The scoring via the 5 policy dimensions is discussed in 
the next chapter on result sensitivities represented by changes in policy. Instead this 
chapter will discuss the trends of the constituent outputs which are the parts used for 
calculating the CFEPS energy policy assessment framework indicators. Base-case 
results are validated and presented as four main areas, namely climate change, 
economic growth, the energy sector and energy R&D investment.  
 
                                                 
 
14
 In Chapter 4, a distinction was made between hard and soft links. A soft-link accounts for climate 
change and growth through two separate models. Outputs from the climate model are fed as inputs into 
the economic growth model. A hard-link models all components together allows climate change to 
interact with economic growth more closely. 
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Validation of WITCH results is located in Appendix 16, which shows that wht 
WITCH outputs are in line with other hybrid IAM models prodictions (REMIND-R 
and IMACLIM-R), the IEA and Wordbank datasets. It is important to note that the 
model has been set to replicate the validation sources for 2050. This was done 
because 2050 results represents a greatest modelling uncertainty and the research 
intends to set some boundary limits on what may be reasonably expected in the long-
run. As a result for some outputs, counter intuitively, the divergence between WITCH 
and validation sources declines over time.  
 
5.2. Climate Change 
The research takes the work of the IPCC and maps the IPCC’s atmospheric carbon 
emissions profile to sustainable temperature change. The climate model in this 
research treats atmospheric carbon emissions over time as an exogenous input and 
constraint. Climate change outputs relate to Climate Module of WITCH, driven by 
Equations (8) and (9) from Section 4.2.1. 
 
5.2.1. CO2 Emissions  
This section examines atmospheric carbon emissions globally and for China. There 
are four emissions scenarios to be simulated by the WITCH model which are BaU, 
450ppm, 600ppm and 750ppm scenarios. All scenarios start from the base year of 
2010 at 30.6 GtCO2 per annum globally (IEA, 2011). 
 
Under BaU, countries are not committed to international treaties. It is not optimal to 
reduce CO2 emissions unilaterally as there is no formal pollution abatement 
agreement. Nations do perceive the pollution damage in the atmosphere. Since they 
are not in control of the global public good, nations do not accordingly allocate any 
resources on achieving abatement. The projections foresee a continued carbon-heavy 
economy and slow penetration.  
 
For the carbon mitigation and capped cases, the atmospheric carbon emissions 
pathways are then compared to the IPCC projections. The stabilisation pathways used 
in this research will also follow the survey range of projection from TAR for 450ppm, 
600ppm and 750ppm (the green hatched areas not brown shaded areas). The 600ppm 
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case is the average of the IPCC 550 and 650ppm cases. The 80 TAR surveyed range 
is selected over the post-TAR range as, the surveyed emissions profile offers a more 
diversified information sources (Figure 5.1). 
 
 
Used: Green hatched areas depict the IPCC surveyed range of more than 80 (Third 
Assessment Report) TAR stabilisation scenarios. Not used: Light brown shaded 
areas for CO2 emissions post TAR scenarios.  
 
Figure 5.1: IPCC review of atmospheric carbon emissions against at various 
abatement scenarios (Barker et al., 2007 and IPCC, 2007) 
 
Global Emissions Profile 
The Global emissions profile is a model input derived from the IPPC projection. For 
the research, the 450ppm case presents an interesting modelling case. Carbon 
emissions are taken from the IPCC’s projections to decrease gradually from day one 
to just under 30 GtCO2 per year. This suggests that nations have already passed the 
maximum allowable carbon emission level if following 450ppm. For the 600ppm case, 
emissions rise steadily with the growth of emissions slowing post 2035. In 2050, the 
atmospheric carbon emission stands at 42 GtCO2 per year. In the 750ppm case, 
emissions rise faster than in 600ppm. Growth steadily slows down post 2040. In 2050, 
the atmospheric carbon emissions stand at 45 GtCO2 per year as predicted by the 
IPCC (Figure 5.2).  
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Figure 5.2: Global projection of atmospheric carbon emission levels at different 
abatement levels (WITCH model’s projections following IPCC, 2007) 
 
China Emissions Profile 
China’s emissions profile is a model output. As predicted by the WITCH model, the 
CO2 emissions for China in the 2010 base-year were just under 7 GtCO2/year (IEA, 
2011c). The emissions stabilisation levels for China also follow an upwards trend in 
the 600ppm and 750ppm cases and a downwards trend for 450ppm. However, the 
inflection points for China are different to the global projections. In 2035, WITCH 
products the 750ppm case from just 10.5 GtCO2/year, with 600ppm at just under 9 
GtCO2/year and the 450ppm case at 5.3 GtCO2/year. In 2050, WITCH expects the 
750ppm case predicts marginally less than 15 GtCO2/year, with 600ppm at just under 
10 GtCO2/year and the 450ppm case at 5.3 GtCO2/year (Figure 5.3).  
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Figure 5.3: China projection of atmospheric carbon emission levels at different 
abatement levels 
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The carbon emissions under the 450ppm case for China also decrease from day 1 but 
at a much faster decline than globally. This shows that China has missed the year 
already more so than compared to globally for keeping emissions within 450ppm.  
 
The 12
th
 FYP recognises the importance of decarbonising China. Comparing China’s 
emissions trend against global emissions shows a reasonable trend. Under 750ppm, 
China’s carbon emissions increase in line with global levels. Running WITCH 
assuming the levels are 450ppm, China’s carbon emission also decreases from day 
one. The 600ppm case presents an interesting result. Globally, emissions continue to 
increase; however, China’s carbon emissions start to fall by 2035. This is consistent 
with evidence of the pace of technological improvements in clean generation 
technologies such as wind and solar. Globally, 40% of cost reductions in the last two 
decades are due to cost reductions attributed to R&D Investments. The remaining 
60% of cost reduction are due to economies of scale brought about by increased 
market volume (EWEA, 2010). China’s R&D investments are at an accelerated pace, 
explaining how China is able to reduce emissions at a less costly price. In order for 
the world to adhere to the caps set out under 600ppm, nations with more investment 
into clean generation technologies should consider curbing their emissions as it is 
relatively cheaper for them to do so, compared to less clean generating 
technologically advanced nations.  
 
5.2.2. CO2 Emissions Intensity 
CO2 emissions intensity is calculated as atmospheric CO2 emissions a year per unit of 
GDP levels generated by that abatement case. For example, in the 450ppm case, 
emission per year is divided by the 450ppm GDP production levels. A detailed 
examination of GDP levels and growth rates is presented in the next section.  
 
Global CO2 Emissions Intensity 
All intensities start off at 11% in 2010. As predicted by WITCH, the most stringent 
abatement case of 450ppm projects the fastest reduction in atmospheric CO2 
emissions to 3% in 2050. For 600ppm, emissions intensity falls to 5% in 2050. In the 
700ppm case intensities fall to 7% (Figure 5.4). 
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Figure 5.4: Global projections of atmospheric carbon emissions intensity at different 
abatement levels 
 
China CO2 Emissions Intensity 
Like WITCH’s projections of intensity globally, the most stringent abatement case of 
450ppm sees the fastest reduction in atmospheric CO2 emissions for China. All cases 
start from 11% in 2010, a 450ppm case predicts intensity to fall to 8% in 2050, 
whereas 600ppm predicts 15% and 450ppm projects 8% intensity (Figure 5.5).  
 
Although China’s decrease in carbon intensity is more drastic than global projection, 
it is worthy to note that carbon intensity in the most stringent case (450ppm) in China 
is 8% in 2050, which exceeds the most lenient global abatement case (750ppm) at 7% 
in 2050.  
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Figure 5.5: China projections of atmospheric carbon emissions intensity at different 
abatement levels 
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Comparing China’s emissions intensity against global intensity shows a reasonable 
trend. Globally, emissions intensity falls under all abatement cases from day one. The 
same trend holds for China. However the pace of fall in intensity for China is far 
greater than what is observed globally and may be to too fast. China has been setting 
out stringent abatement targets for 2015 under the 12
th
 FYP. Carbon intensity is 
targeted for only a 17% reduction per unit of GDP output produced (Fung and Chu, 
2011). WITCH has predicted a dramatic drop from 120% to around 60% for carbon 
intensity to adhere to the abatement scenarios. It is unlikely that China will be able to 
meet 450ppm, 600ppm or 750ppm.  
 
Emissions and emission intensities decline over time as technologies improve. Given 
better technologies, the same unit of natural resources gets converted more efficiently 
into electricity. Thus to sustain a similar level of GDP growth, progressively less 
natural resources are used and lower associated emissions are realised. Emissions 
increase with higher levels of economic growth. The following section examines the 
different levels of growth across BaU, and the various ppm abatement scenarios.  
 
5.3. Economic Growth 
Projections by the WITCH model for GDP are presented globally and for China in 
this section. Economic growth outputs relate to the Growth Module of WITCH, 
driven by Equations (3) and (4) from Section 4.2.1. 
 
5.3.1. Global GDP  
World output is USD63tn in the base year 2010 and grows to USD170tn in 2050 for 
BaU, 750ppm and 600ppm (Figure 5.6) as expected by WITCH. The only affected 
case is the 450ppm case, with GDP levels at USD166tn for 2050.  Although it is 
expected that growth is will be curtailed in all the abatement cases, this outcome is not 
observed here. The reason is that the model projects an optimal energy and 
development path. The energy mix is not static, but adjusts as needed. In order for 
economies to maintain a similar standard of living, they substitute away from carbon 
heavy generation technologies in order to keep within the carbon caps set forth by the 
abatement cases. This substitution effect of the generation mix is observed later in the 
chapter when reviewing the generation capacity.  
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Figure 5.6: Global GDP projection model output 
 
Under the economic law of diminishing returns to scale, output growth rates indeed 
decline. Table 5.1 shows this pathway. Growth starts at around 2.26% per year for all 
cases for 2010-2020, rising to 2.88% per year, before gradually declining to 2.25% by 
2040-2050 projected by WITCH. The 450ppm case sees a 0.05% per annum lower 
growth rates during 2010-2020 to 0.09% lower growth rate per annum for 2040-2050. 
 
Table 5.1: Global GDP growth rates from model output 
Global Growth 2020/2010 2030/2020 2040/2030 2050/2040 
BAU  
(per annum) 
25% 
(2.26% pa) 
33% 
(2.88% pa) 
30% 
(2.67% pa) 
25% 
(2.25% pa) 
750ppm  
(per annum) 
25% 
(2.26% pa) 
33% 
(2.88% pa) 
30% 
(2.67% pa) 
25% 
(2.25% pa) 
600ppm 
(per annum) 
25% 
(2.26% pa) 
33% 
(2.88% pa) 
30% 
(2.67% pa) 
25% 
(2.25% pa) 
450ppm 
(per annum) 
24% 
(2.21% pa) 
32% 
(2.82% pa) 
29% 
(2.60% pa) 
24% 
(2.16% pa) 
 
5.3.2. China’s GDP  
Fast growth is registered in China (Figure 5.7) starting at USD5.9tn in the base year 
of 2010 and rising to USD 55tn in 2050 (for BaU, 750ppm and 600ppm) under the 
simulations of the WITCH model. The 450ppm case projects USD 53tn by 2050. 
Again, China’s GDP growth is an optimal pathway, allowing the nation to substitute 
away from carbon heavy generation mixes and being able to sustain economic growth 
in the advent of emissions caps set at 750ppm, 600ppm and 450ppm. 
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Figure 5.7: China GDP projection model output 
 
China, as projected under WITCH, also exhibits diminishing returns, as BaU growth 
rates start off at around the 8.9% per annum growth for 2020-2030, before settling to 
3.5% per annum in 2040-2050. The BaU growth rates are replicated by the 750ppm 
and 600ppm cases. In the 450ppm case, growth for 2040-2050 is 3.3% per annum, as 
China cannot substitute away from carbon heavy generation technologies and hits the 
carbon cap set forth by the 450ppm abatement requirements. Comparing China 
against global growth rates, China experiences a greater reduction in growth in the 
450ppm case than the world. The 0.19% Chinese reduction in annual growth 
comparing 450ppm to BaU for 2040-2050, and compared to a global 0.09% per 
annum growth reduction comparing 450ppm to BaU is because China has to take a 
stricter path of emissions abatement to abide by the 450ppm case (Table 5.2). China 
has to “put the breaks” on growth to a greater extent than compared to the rest of the 
world in order to meet the strictest 450ppm abatement scenario. 
 
Table 5.2: China GDP growth rates from model output  
China Growth 2020/2010 2030/2020 2040/2030 2050/2040 
BAU  
(per annum) 
135% 
(8.94% pa) 
80% 
(6.04% pa) 
57% 
(4.60% pa) 
41% 
(3.47% pa) 
750ppm  
(per annum) 
135% 
(8.94% pa) 
80% 
(6.04% pa) 
57% 
(4.60% pa) 
41% 
(3.47% pa) 
600ppm 
(per annum) 
135% 
(8.94% pa) 
80% 
(6.04% pa) 
57% 
(4.60% pa) 
41% 
(3.47% pa) 
450ppm 
(per annum) 
133% 
(8.85% pa) 
79% 
(5.98% pa) 
55% 
(4.51% pa) 
39% 
(3.31% pa) 
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China’s GDP shows that the fastest growth rates in the 2010-2020 decade within the 
modelling horizon. Globally, growth is the fastest from 2020-2030, which shows the 
increasing impact of the other BRICS nations on the global GDP levels.  
 
China’s accelerated GDP growth levels under the WITCH model can also explain the 
severe decline in carbon emissions intensity in the first decade. China’s efforts under 
450ppm, 600ppm and 750ppm seek to keep the nation within its emissions limits, 
whilst allowing for greater than the 2.26% per annum global growth rates from 2010-
2020 shows the effect of switching the generation mix away from fossil to carbon 
neutral technologies. The generation mix and technological improvements are 
discussed towards the end of this chapter.  
 
China’s GDP trend compared to global GDP trends seem reasonable. Chinese growth 
rates are falling faster than global rates. Global growth rates decline to 2.25% per 
annum by 2050. China’s rate of growth also declines, but at a faster rate of decrease 
than the global growth decline, until it also reaches the global annual growth rate of 
2.25% per annum. This can be explained by the theory of growth rate convergence 
(Solow, 1956; Romer and Rivera-Batiz, 1991). The theory states that all nations will 
eventually experience the same steady state of growth. Since China is a net exporter 
of goods, it is dependent on high global growth rates to sustain its own growth rate. 
As global growth falls, China’s also falls and eventually converges to the same level.  
 
5.4. Energy Demand  
Energy demand and intensity (demand per GDP of output) are considered in this 
section for the world and specifically for China. Energy demand outputs relate to the 
Energy Module of WITCH, driven by Equations (5), (6), and (7) from Section 4.2.1. 
 
5.4.1. Energy Demand  
Energy demand is derived from economic activity. The less a region grows, the less 
output it produces and hence the less energy demand there will be. In line with the 
GDP projection the 450ppm case shows the lowest demand for energy, given its 
restrictions on economic activity due to the strict limits on emissions levels. 
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Globally, energy demand starts at 150,000TWh in 2010. In 2035, energy demand rises 
to 245,000TWh for BaU, 212,000TWh for 750ppm, 190,000TWh for 600ppm and 
150,000TWh for 450ppm. In 2050 energy demand rises to 270,000TWh for BaU, 
250,000TWh for 750ppm, 220,000TWh for 600ppm and 150,000TWh for 450ppm 
(Figure 5.8) under WITCH’s projections. 
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Figure 5.8: Global demand for energy 
 
For China, energy demand starts from 27,000TWh in 2010. In 2035, energy demand 
rises to 54,000TWh for BaU, 46,000TWh for 750ppm, 39,000TWh for 600ppm and 
33,000TWh for 450ppm. In 2050, energy demand rises to 60,000TWh for BaU, 
54,000TWh for 750ppm, 45,000TWh for 600ppm and 32,000TWh for 450ppm 
(Figure 5.9) as expected by WITCH. 
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Figure 5.9: China’s demand for energy 
 
For both globally and China, energy demand is increasing at a higher rate across BaU, 
750ppm and 600ppm. Under the WITCH model for the 450ppm case, both global and 
Chinese energy demand peaks around 2035. The 450ppm case is interesting, as it 
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shows energy demand in 2050 falls to a level below today’s demand. This presents 
the effect of increasing efficiency, which results in lower primary demand for similar 
levels of end use consumption. 
 
China’s energy demand trend compared to the world’s seems reasonable and China 
follows the trend globally. For BaU, 750ppm and 600ppm, energy demand continues 
to grow for both China and globally. Under 450ppm, both China and the world 
experiences a fall in energy demand during 2035. This could be explained by 
examining the abatement caps under 450ppm. The falling allowable carbon eventually 
forces all nations to reduce energy consumption. WITCH predicts this point to occur 
at 2035.  
 
5.4.2. Energy Demand Intensity  
Energy intensity is calculated as energy demand per unit of GDP. Global intensity of 
energy consumption as shown in Figure 5.10 is also within expectations, showing the 
450ppm case being the least energy intensive abatement scenario as projected by 
WITCH. Energy intensity starts at 2.50TWh / $ trillion in 2010. BaU energy demand 
intensity plateaus around 2.50TWh / $ trillion until 2020 before falling to 2.05TWh / 
$ trillion in 2035 and 1.60TWh / $ trillion in 2050. The 750ppm, 600ppm 450ppm 
energy intensities do not experience a plateau intensity level and immediately fall 
from 2010. In 2035, the 750ppm intensity level is at 1. 78TWh / $ trillion, 600ppm at 
1.58TWh / $ trillion and 450ppm 1.29TWh / $ trillion. In 2050, the 750ppm intensity 
level is at 1.48TWh / $ trillion, with 600ppm at 1.31TWh / $ trillion and 450ppm at 
0.90TWh / $ trillion. The plateau experienced under BaU is not shared by the three 
pollution abatement cases. This could be explained by nations under BaU not 
switching away from energy intensity industries and energy generation technologies, 
thus demanding energy at 2.50TWh / $ trillion. The abatement cases immediately 
recognise the need to reduce energy intensity from day one.  
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Figure 5.10: Global intensity of energy demand 
 
China’s energy intensity starts off at 4.60TWh / $ trillion in 2010. Using WITCH, all 
cases including the BaU case fall drastically over the first five years, with a more 
gradual fall projected post 2015 until 2050. This is explained by the fact that China’s 
energy demand intensity is too great. Even under the BaU case, it projects a drastic 
fall in energy use per GDP. In 2035, BaU expects 1.70TWh / $ trillion, whilst 
750ppm expects 1.45TWh / $ trillion, 600ppm expects 1.25TWh / $ trillion and 
450ppm expects 1.05 TWh / $ trillion energy intensity. In 2050, the BaU case this 
falls to 1.08TWh / $ trillion, with 750ppm at 0.099TWh / $ trillion, 600ppm at 
0.83TWh / $ trillion and 450ppm at 0.61TWh / $ trillion energy intensity (Figure 
5.11). 
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Figure 5.11: China intensity of energy demand 
 
Chinese energy intensity follows an accelerated path of decrease compared to global 
trends in the first half of the projection window. In the second half of the project 
window, the rate of fall in energy demand intensity for China is similar to the world in 
general. The projected drastic fall in Chinese energy demand intensity could be 
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explained by China’s current high energy waste by end users and its commitment to 
highly energy intensive industrial sectors. 
 
China’s energy demand intensity compared to global intensity differs. China’s 
intensity falls at a greater pace then globally intensity. This is explained by China 
experiencing a faster growth than the average growth rate globally. Since energy 
intensity is calculated as Energy Demand per GDP, the faster increase in the 
denominator (China’s GDP) causes the ratio to fall at an accelerated pace.  
 
China’s growth is still higher than a balance rate of GDP development. As a result, 
the energy intensity indicators that are divided by GDP are underestimated. Energy 
demand does not decrease but stays the same, whereas GDP increases. This seems as 
if energy demand falls. Greater efforts have to be made to reign in growth in a balance 
manner against other objectives of emissions and social equality. Following the 
evaluation of energy demand, attention also is case on energy supply. Section 5.4 
discusses the energy supply model outputs. 
 
5.5. Electricity Supply and Electricity Generation Capacity  
Energy supply is set to match the energy demanded as part of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function for output production. Energy supply is then scaled down to 
derive electricity supply as transportation and heat energy becomes increasingly low 
carbon energy generation. In the very far future, the energy supply and electricity 
supply gap will narrow, as all forms of energy will be powered by low carbon 
technologies that mostly generate electricity.  
 
Since the primary research aim is to project the generation mix and based on the 
premise economies become increasingly low carbon energy generation, focus shifts to 
generation of electricity supply and installed power generation capacity. Electricity 
supply outputs relate to the Energy Module of WITCH, driven by Equations (5), (6), 
and (7) from Section 4.2.1. 
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5.5.1. Electricity Supply  
Electricity supply moves in line with the GDP projection. As expected, the 450ppm 
case shows the lowest supply of electricity, given its restrictions on economic activity 
due to hard limits on emissions levels whilst the BaU case shows the highest levels of 
electricity supply  
 
Globally, electricity supply is 23,000TWh in 2010. Under WITCH, in all cases except 
450ppm, electricity supply rises in the projection horizon. For 450ppm, electricity 
supply actually falls fractionally compared to 2010 levels, as electricity is still heavily 
dependent on carbon heavy generation technologies. Before the world diversified its 
generation away from fossil fuels, electricity supply is contained by the CO2 
emissions cap as set out by the 450ppm atmospheric emissions profile. In 2035, BaU 
projects a 39,000TWh electricity supply, whereas 750ppm is at 36,000TWh, 600ppm 
is at 32,000TWh and 450ppm at 29,000TWh. In 2050, BaU predicts 50,000TWh, with 
750ppm at 43,000TWh, 600ppm at 39,000TWh and 450ppm at 33,000TWh (Figure 
5.12). 
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Figure 5.12: Global supply of electricity 
 
China’s electricity supply sees increases under all cases and does not experience the 
drop in supply for 450ppm in 2015. This is because China is increasingly committed 
to clean electricity generation technologies at a faster rate than the rest of the world. 
Hence its electricity supply is not as severely constrained under the 450ppm CO2 
compared to globally. In 2035, WITCH expected electricity supply under BaU is at 
13,000TWh, 750ppm is at 11,000TWh, 600ppm at 9,000TWh and 8,000TWh. In 
2050, electricity supply under BaU is predicted to be 19,000TWh, 750ppm predicts 
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15,000TWh, 600ppm expects 12,000TWh and 450ppm anticipates 9,500TWh (see 
Figure 5.13).  
China Electricity Supply (TWh)
-
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
BAU 750 600 450
 
Figure 5.13: China’s supply of electricity 
 
For both the world and for China, the electricity supply is increasing at a higher rate 
across all cases until 2040, when the allowable carbon emissions slow down 
drastically across the 600ppm and 750ppm abatement scenarios.  
 
China’s electricity supply compared to the global supply seems reasonable. Both 
China and the world display upward trends across all four cases. The interesting case 
to observe is the 450ppm case. Globally, supply displays falling growth rates after 
2040. China experiences an accelerated growth in electricity supply from 2045. This 
could be explained by China’s R&D investment efforts allowing it to shift towards 
cleaner generation technologies at cheaper costs compared to nations allocating less 
investment. The cleaner generation mix allows China to increase its electricity supply 
and still adhere to the strict 450ppm carbon caps.  
 
5.5.2. Electricity Generation Capacity  
The global generation capacity is shown in Figure 5.14. Global generation capacity 
starts off at 5,000GW in 2010 rising in 2020 to just under 7,500 (BaU) all the way 
down to 6,900GW (450ppm) projected by WITCH. In 2030, the generation capacity 
is over 11,000GW (BaU) compared to 8,000GW (450ppm). In 2050, it is about 
20,000GW (BaU) and about 12,000GW (450ppm).  
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Figure 5.14: Global generation capacity 
 
China’s generation capacity follows a similar path as the global one (Figure 5.15). 
Using WITCH, the Chinese generation capacity starts off at 900TWh in 2010 rising in 
2020 to just under 1,400 (BaU) and 1,100 TWh (450ppm). In 2030, the generation 
capacity is just over 2,100TWh (BaU) compared to 1,500TWh (450ppm). In 2050, it 
is over 4,000TWh (BaU) and 3,400GW (450ppm).  
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Figure 5.15: China generation capacity 
 
The 450ppm pathway offers interesting results for China. Initially generation capacity 
slows down around 2040 under WITCH, as the world switches away from carbon 
heavy sources. After a decade of generation technology substitution, the generation 
capacity grows increasingly faster, as economies are no longer as bound by the CO2 
cap as before. Hence from 2045 onwards there is acceleration in capacity building in 
low carbon technologies. 
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Electricity generation capacity compared to electricity supply seems reasonable for 
both China and the other nations. Supply is calculated as a function of load factor and 
efficiency and both follow the same upward trends.  
 
The evaluation of energy supply and electricity supply and generation follows the 
earlier trends projected by energy demand. As expected, energy supply is lower for 
the 450ppm case compared to other abatement cases and compared to BaU as 
predicted by WITCH. This is partially a function of the way WITCH determined 
energy supply. Energy supply is derived from energy demand (i.e. there is no 
assumption of energy shortfalls). Electricity supply is subsequently calculated as the 
balance from non-electric supply taken away from total energy supply. Thus as 
expected, electricity supply also follows the energy demand trends. With a better 
understanding of energy and electricity supply, the next section examines the energy 
generation pathways and mixes in the medium to long-run.  
 
5.6. Electricity Generation Mix and Projections Pathways 
The energy generation mix is foreseen to change dramatically over time at a global 
level under WITCH. As expected, the lowest emissions stabilisation targets of 
450ppm foresee switching to low carbon generation technologies at a more 
accelerated rate than the other cases. Also, as expected, the BaU is the most 
dependent on fossil fuel-based generation technologies. Electricity generation mix 
pathway outputs relate to the Energy Module of WITCH, driven by Equations (5), (6), 
and (7) from Section 4.2.1. 
 
5.6.1. Global Electricity Generation Mix  
As projected by WITCH, Figure 5.16 depicts the generation pathway globally under 
the different pollution abatement targets and scenarios, with percentages presented in 
The BaU case expects electricity generated via the cleaner fuels (nuclear, hydro and 
renewables) to increase from 33% in 2010, to 36% by 2035 as projected by WITCH. 
In 2050, fossil fuel generated electricity is 37%. For the abatement cases of 450ppm,  
600ppm and 750ppm, the cleaner technologies (nuclear, hydro and renewables) play a 
much larger role in the energy mix. For the 750ppm case, the cleaner generation 
technologies rise from 33% in 2010 to 43% in 2035 and 49% in 2050. For the  
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Figure 5.16: Global Electricity Generation Capacity Mix (WITCH model output) 
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600ppm case, cleaner technology based generation rises to 58% by 2035 and 67% by 
2050. In the most extreme case of 450ppm, cleaner technology based generation 
increases to 75% by 2035 and 91% by 2050.  
 
In 2010, the global generation mix is dominated by fossil fuels with 32% coal, 25% 
for natural gas and 9% of oil. Low carbon generation technologies include 5% 
renewables (excluding hydro), 8% for nuclear and 20% for hydro. This can be 
ovserved in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3: Global Electricity Generation Capacity Mix (WITCH model output) 
BaU 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Renew 5% 7% 9% 11% 13% 14% 14% 16% 17% 
Nuclear 8% 8% 8% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
Hydro 20% 19% 17% 16% 15% 13% 13% 12% 11% 
Low C 33% 34% 35% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 37% 
Oil 9% 8% 6% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 
Gas 25% 25% 24% 24% 23% 23% 21% 20% 19% 
Coal 32% 34% 35% 35% 35% 36% 38% 39% 40% 
Fossil 67% 66% 66% 64% 63% 64% 64% 64% 63% 
 
750ppm 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Renew 5% 8% 11% 13% 16% 19% 19% 20% 24% 
Nuclear 8% 9% 9% 10% 11% 9% 11% 12% 12% 
Hydro 20% 19% 18% 17% 16% 15% 14% 14% 13% 
Low C 33% 36% 38% 40% 43% 43% 44% 45% 49% 
Oil 9% 8% 6% 6% 5% 6% 6% 6% 5% 
Gas 25% 25% 24% 24% 24% 23% 23% 23% 22% 
Coal 32% 32% 31% 30% 29% 29% 28% 26% 23% 
Fossil 67% 64% 62% 60% 57% 57% 56% 55% 51% 
 
600ppm 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Renew 5% 8% 13% 17% 21% 27% 28% 32% 37% 
Nuclear 8% 10% 12% 13% 15% 13% 15% 16% 16% 
Hydro 20% 20% 20% 20% 19% 19% 17% 16% 15% 
Low C 33% 38% 45% 51% 55% 58% 61% 64% 67% 
Oil 9% 8% 7% 6% 5% 7% 6% 6% 6% 
Gas 25% 25% 25% 24% 24% 23% 22% 22% 20% 
Coal 32% 28% 23% 19% 15% 13% 11% 8% 6% 
Fossil 67% 62% 55% 49% 45% 42% 39% 36% 33% 
 
450ppm 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Renew 5% 9% 14% 21% 27% 37% 40% 47% 55% 
Nuclear 8% 10% 13% 16% 19% 17% 21% 21% 21% 
Hydro 20% 21% 21% 22% 22% 22% 20% 18% 16% 
Low C 33% 40% 49% 59% 68% 75% 82% 87% 91% 
Oil 9% 8% 7% 6% 4% 5% 4% 3% 2% 
Gas 25% 26% 24% 21% 17% 13% 10% 7% 5% 
Coal 32% 27% 20% 14% 10% 7% 5% 3% 2% 
Fossil 67% 60% 51% 41% 32% 25% 18% 13% 9% 
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Renewables Globally 
Renewables excluding hydropower (i.e. wind and solar power) grow significantly 
across all four cases under WITCH. In BaU, it rises from 5% in 2010, to 14% in 2035 
and 17% in 2050. For 750ppm, renewables rise to 19% by 2035 and 24% by 2050. 
The 600ppm case sees this mix increase to 27% by 2035 and to 37% by 2050. For the 
450ppm case, 2035 will expect a 37% mix with 2050 expecting 55%. Hence, wind 
and solar is projected to be the fastest growing electricity generation technology, both 
worldwide and at regional level. 
 
WITCH believes that electricity from wind and solar is generated using only setup 
and maintenance costs. The rapid development of wind and solar power technologies 
in recent years has led to a reduction in investment costs; beneficial effects from 
learning-by-doing are expected to decrease investment costs even further in the next 
few years. If the same model is run with 2015 as the base year, instead of 2010, this 
will become more apparent, as cost reductions and falling costs attributed to 
technology know-how and best practices will be reflected in this generation method. 
 
Nuclear Globally 
For BaU nuclear starts at 8% in 2010 and remains around the 9% mark until 2050 for 
WITCH. For the 750ppm case, nuclear power rises to 9% in 2035 and 12% in 2050. 
In the more stringent pollution abatement cases of 600ppm, nuclear rises to 13% in 
2035 and 16% in 2050. For 450ppm, nuclear rises to 17% in 2035 and 21% in 2050.  
 
Since nuclear power is a capital-intensive technology, fast-growing regions, such as 
China and SASIA see an increase, whilst a decline in mature economies is observed.  
This characteristic and the fact that nuclear energy does not emit CO2, make nuclear 
power an interesting option for the future. However, countries are hesitant to 
implement such a technology due to controversial difficulties such as the long-term 
disposal of waste and proliferation risks. Light Water Reactors (LWR) are the most 
reliable and relatively least expensive solution today, but a major expansion might 
revive the Fast Breeding Reactors (FBR). They re-process the spent fuel to feed the 
nuclear reactor again, and thus produce less waste and result in less waste storage 
concerns. 
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Hydropower Globally 
Hydropower equates to 20% of electricity generation capacity in 2010, before falling 
to 11 to 16% by 2050 for BaU and 450ppm respectively as per WITCH. In the BaU 
case, hydropower falls to 11% of electricity generation capacity, whereas for 750ppm 
this number is 13%, 600ppm 15% and 450ppm 16%.  
 
The reason for gradually switching away from hydropower and favouring renewable 
energy in all cases can be attributed to difficulties in locating suitable plant locations 
for additional new-build capacity. Hydropower plants not only require suitable bodies 
of water to store gravitational energy, but also often require the displacement of local 
communities or the flooding of fertile farm land. Wind turbines and solar farms, in 
contrast, are less restricted in plant location selection, as they can be located in remote 
and often arid sites.  
 
Coal Globally 
Coal remains the largest provider of electricity globally, remaining around the mid 
30% in the BaU case. In BaU, from 32% in 2010, it rises to 36% in 2035 and 40% in 
2050 under WITCH. Substantial deployment of coal is expected in Asian countries 
such as India and China. In the 750ppm case, coal steadily falls to 29% in 2035 and 
23% in 2050. This shift away from coal is even more evident in the more stringent 
abatement cases. For 600ppm, coal declines to 13% in 2035 and in 2050 it makes up 
6% of generation. For the 450ppm case, it declines to 7% by 2035 and 2% by 2050. 
 
Coal generation is, along with gas, the least expensive electricity generation 
technology in all countries. It is cheaper than gas in all regions rich in coal reserves, 
such as KOSAU, CHINA, NEWEURO, and SASIA, and it is equivalent to gas in the 
USA and more expensive than in the others. The analysis does not take into account 
the benefits of IGCC with CCS as steps towards emission reduction. 
 
Natural Gas Globally 
Electricity generated from natural gas starts off at 25% in 2010 and falls to 23% in 
2035 in the BaU, falling to 19% in 2050. Under WITCH, the 750ppm scenario 
expects gas to account for 23% in 2035 and 22% in 2050. For 600ppm, gas falls to 
23% in 2035 and 20% in 2050. For 450ppm, gas decreases to 13% in 2035 and to 5% 
in 2050.  
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The reason for the fall in gas consumption in the 450ppm case is that under pressure 
to reduce emissions, natural gas becomes expensive given its exhaustibility. Since 
gas-based electricity generation is a fuel-intensive technology and once gas prices 
increase the environmental concerns displaces gas for other generation technologies. 
 
5.6.2. China’s Electricity Generation Mix  
China expects to reduce its generation mix from traditional energy generation 
technologies to alternative technologies. Similarly to the global simulation results, the 
power mix is foreseen to change dramatically over the long term horizon. Figure 5.17 
depicts the generation mixes for China under the different pollution abatement targets, 
and scenarios, as in Table 5.4. In 2010, China’s generation mix is dominated by fossil 
fuels with 70% for coal, 2% for oil, and 4% for natural gas. Low carbon generation 
technologies include 1% for nuclear, 21% for hydro, and 2% for renewables 
excluding hydro. The BaU case expects electricity generated via the cleaner fuels 
(nuclear, hydro and renewables) to increase from 24% in 2010, to 36% by 2035. In 
2050, clean fuels hold 38% of power generation capacity. In the abatement cases of 
450ppm, 600ppm and 750ppm, the cleaner technologies (nuclear, hydro and 
renewables) play a much larger role in the energy mix. For the 750ppm case, the 
cleaner generation technologies rise from 25% in 2010 to 46% in 2035 and 52% in 
2050. For the 600ppm case, cleaner technologies based generation rises to 61% by 
2035 and 79% by 2050. In the most extreme case of 450ppm, cleaner technologies 
based generation increases to 88% by 2035 and 97% by 2050.  
 
Renewables in China 
Renewables excluding hydropower (i.e. wind and solar power) grow significantly 
across all abatement cases under WITCH. From 2% in 2010, it rises to 14% in 2035 
for BaU and to 19% in 2050. For the 750ppm case, renewables increase to 21% by 
2035 and 29% in 2050. In the 600ppm scenario, this generation technology rises to 
32% in 2035 and 51% in 2050. For the strongest abatement case of 450ppm, 
renewables increase to 49% by 2035 and 71% by 2050. Hence, wind and solar is 
projected to be the fastest growing electricity generation technology, even higher than 
nuclear. 
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Figure 5.17: China’s Electricity Generation Capacity Mix (WITCH model output) 
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Table 5.4: China Electricity Generation Capacity Mix (WITCH model output) 
BaU 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Renew 2% 6% 11% 11% 12% 14% 16% 17% 19% 
Nuclear 1% 3% 4% 5% 6% 6% 7% 8% 8% 
Hydro 21% 19% 17% 16% 16% 15% 14% 12% 11% 
Low C 25% 28% 33% 33% 33% 36% 36% 37% 38% 
Oil 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 
Gas 4% 5% 7% 7% 7% 7% 6% 6% 5% 
Coal 70% 65% 60% 59% 58% 57% 57% 57% 56% 
Fossil 75% 71% 68% 67% 66% 64% 64% 63% 62% 
 
750ppm 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Renew 2% 7% 13% 15% 17% 21% 20% 24% 29% 
Nuclear 1% 3% 6% 7% 9% 9% 11% 11% 12% 
Hydro 21% 21% 18% 18% 17% 16% 14% 13% 11% 
Low C 25% 31% 37% 40% 42% 46% 46% 48% 52% 
Oil 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 
Gas 4% 6% 8% 8% 8% 8% 7% 7% 6% 
Coal 70% 62% 54% 51% 48% 45% 46% 45% 41% 
Fossil 75% 69% 63% 60% 58% 54% 54% 52% 48% 
 
600ppm 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Renew 2% 8% 18% 22% 24% 32% 36% 44% 51% 
Nuclear 1% 4% 7% 10% 12% 13% 17% 18% 18% 
Hydro 21% 22% 20% 19% 17% 16% 14% 12% 10% 
Low C 25% 34% 46% 50% 54% 61% 67% 74% 79% 
Oil 2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 0.7% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 
Gas 4% 6% 9% 9% 9% 8% 8% 8% 7% 
Coal 70% 59% 45% 40% 36% 30% 25% 18% 14% 
Fossil 75% 66% 54% 50% 46% 39% 33% 26% 21% 
 
450ppm 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Renew 2% 9% 25% 32% 38% 49% 56% 64% 71% 
Nuclear 1% 5% 10% 14% 19% 19% 20% 19% 18% 
Hydro 21% 23% 21% 22% 22% 20% 17% 12% 9% 
Low C 25% 37% 57% 69% 79% 88% 92% 95% 97% 
Oil 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 
Gas 4% 7% 11% 9% 8% 5% 4% 2% 1% 
Coal 70% 55% 32% 20% 12% 7% 4% 2% 1% 
Fossil 75% 63% 43% 31% 21% 12% 8% 5% 3% 
 
What is interesting to observe is that renewables are favoured over nuclear power for 
the 450ppm, 600ppm and 750ppm abatement scenarios. Whereas nuclear remains 
below 20% in 2050, the mix attributable to renewables rises exponentially. This could 
be explained through seeing renewables as relatively less mature technologically. 
Hence the same USD1 of R&D expenditure into renewables gives a much greater leap 
in technological progress than a relatively more mature nuclear industry. Thus as the 
technological progress accelerates for renewables, costs fall faster than nuclear power 
and China embraces renewables more readily than nuclear from 2010 to 2050.  
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Nuclear in China 
Nuclear power’s share rises under BaU from 1% in 2010 to 6% in 2035 and up to 8% 
by 2050. Nuclear plays an increasingly large role in WITCH for the abatement cases. 
For 750ppm, nuclear power rises to 9% by 2035 and 12% by 2050. For 600ppm and 
450ppm, nuclear rises in 2035 to 13% and 19% respectively and both to 18% in 2050 
to 18%. 
 
Hydropower in China 
Hydropower’s share falls under BaU from 21% in 2010 down to 11% by 2050. The 
same trend is observed for the abatement cases for WITCH, as they also fall to around 
9 to 11% by 2020. The greatest fall in hydropower generation is seen in the 450ppm 
case. This observation may be counter intuitive at first. However, it can be explained 
by the large R&D investment forced to be spent on renewables (to meet the strict 
450ppm carbon caps) that makes wind and solar more cost competitive under the 
450ppm case.  
 
Coal in China 
Coal remains the largest provider of electricity for China for the BaU case falling 
from 70% in 2010 to 57% in 2035 and 56% in 2050 in WITCH. However for the 
750ppm case, coal falls to just under 45% in 2035 and 41% in 2050. This reduction is 
even more evident as the 600ppm case sees a fall to 30% in 2035 and 14% in 2050. 
For 450ppm, coal falls to 7% in 2035 and to less than 1% in 2050.  
 
Natural Gas in China 
Electricity generated from natural gas almost doubles from 4% in 2010 to 7% by 2035 
under BaU and falls to 5% by 2050 as projected by WITCH. For 750ppm, gas rises 
faster to 8% by 2035 but falls to 6% in 2050. For 600ppm, gas rises to 8% by 2035 
and 7% by 2050. For 450ppm, gas rises to 5% in 2035 and to less than 1% by 2050, as 
gas ultimately is still a polluting source of generation. The strict abatement cap under 
450ppm has limited natural gas’ role in the energy makeup of China.  
 
China’s 12th FYP targets by 2015 
In the WITCH model, the 750ppm case prediction in 2015 most closely matches the 
12
th
 FYP Plan in terms of generation mix. The Plan targets an energy generation mix 
of 63% coal, 2% nuclear, 8% gas, 2% renewables excluding hydro and 18% oil by 
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2015 (APCO Worldwide, 2010). For 750ppm the 2015 predictions matches 62% coal, 
3% nuclear, and 6% gas. For renewables (excluding hydro), WITCH is more 
optimistic projecting a 7% power generation share. Oil is ignored for comparison 
purposes between the 12
th
 FYP and WITCH. The WITCH model considers electricity 
generation capacity rather than overall energy generation and comparison is more 
relevant for coal, nuclear and gas.  
 
Reasonableness of Generation Mix Pathways 
China’s projected mix for low emission technologies are consistently higher than 
global emissions by 2050 under all scenarios, even though the ratio of clean to fossil 
generation starts off lower for China in 2010. This observation holds across all four 
scenarios. The model outcome is reasonable. China’s accelerated growth can only be 
sustained by commitment to clean generation technologies at a faster rate than the rest 
of the world.  
 
China’s clean generation mix starts at 25% in 2010. By 2050, BaU sees this rising to 
38%, 750ppm sees it grow to 52%, 600ppm to 79% and 450ppm to -97%. Global 
clean generation mix starts higher at 33% in 2010. By 2050, BaU sees this rising to 
37%, 750ppm sees it grow to 49%, 600ppm to 79% and 450ppm 91%. 
 
Within the clean generation technologies, renewables play a more dominating role by 
2050 than for the rest of the world. This is the most evidence of under 450ppm where 
renewables for China that is 16% higher than global renewables in 2050. Nuclear 
power is the second choice of clean generation for China under the abatement cases. 
One interesting observation for Chinese nuclear that is under 450ppm and 600ppm, 
nuclear accounts for 18% in 2050. In comparison to nuclear, by 2050, Chinese 
renewables increase to 71% for 450ppm whilst 600ppm expects 51%. WITCH has 
made an inherent assumption that renewable technology has a greater `scope for 
innovation and cost reduction. In the medium to long-term, renewables are expected 
to make a greater contribution towards sustainable generation. Another interesting 
observation to make is that global hydro power by 2050 is more important than 
nuclear power under 750ppm, whereas nuclear power is the second choice globally 
under 600ppm and 450ppm. This could be explained by the 750ppm case not 
restricting carbon emissions enough to increase R&D investment into nuclear power. 
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So by 2050, nuclear power has not benefitted from investments leading to cost 
reduction, making hydro power more cost competitive globally under 750ppm.  
 
Within the fossil based generation technologies, coal dominates under BaU for both 
China and other nations. In the emissions abatement scenarios, gas starts to substitute 
coal for electricity generation. At less than 750ppm, this substitute is not as evident, 
as by 2050, both coal and gas are evenly allocated. Under 600ppm and 450ppm, coal 
based generation dramatically falls, being replaced by gas.  
 
The energy generation mix shows promising results for the 450ppm case, as the fossil 
proportion of the generation mix globally, and more so for China, is reduced to less 
than 10% of total generation by 2050. This is an extremely promising outcome to 
show that the IPCC has set out strict, but necessary ppm guidelines. To meet the 
450ppm emissions cap with less adverse effects on growth, WITCH has assumed 
technological improvement will offset the expensive installation and production cost 
of using renewables and nuclear power stations. The trend of R&D investments under 
each of the modelling scenarios is presented next. 
 
5.7. Energy R&D Investment 
Energy is a factor of production responsible for increasing the level of GDP. Energy 
R&D investment plays an important role in determining the overall technological 
improvement of the economy that drives GDP growth. The following section 
examines energy R&D investments globally and specifically for China. The 
theoretical derivations were set out in Section 4.2. 
 
5.7.1. Global Energy R&D Investment 
Starting off at USD 302bn of global energy R&D investment (Luderer et al., 2011), 
the BaU, 750ppm and 600ppm cases follow a similar trend, increasing gradually to 
USD 510bn, USD 560bn and USD 610bn respectively in 2050. The 450ppm case 
calls for an accelerated rate of investment, resulting in just under USD1 560bn in 
2050 (Figure 5.18).  
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Figure 5.18: Global Energy R&D Investment 
 
5.7.2. China’s Energy R&D Investment 
The main way China’s FYPs expect to increase the pace of innovation is through 
additional R&D spending. The 12
th
 FYP expects R&D spending to reach 2.2% of 
GDP by 2015 and 2.5% of GDP by 2020. The amount of energy R&D investment for 
China follows the same trend as the world. Starting from USD27bn in 2010 
(Baumstark and Leimbach, 2011), the BaU, in the cases of 750ppm and 600ppm 
move together. In 2050, the BaU case expects USD160bn, whilst 750ppm predicts 
USD220bn and 600pm anticipates USD250bn. The 450ppm case accelerates at a 
much faster rate than the other cases to USD590bn by 2050 (Figure 5.19).  
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Figure 5.19: China Energy R&D Investment 
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China is increasing its share of R&D spending compared to the globe. In 2010, China 
spent 9% compared to the globe. In all cases (including 450ppm), by 2050 China 
spends roughly 40% of global R&D investment in energy.  
 
China’s energy generation technology R&D investments are closely linked to global 
investment trends. Both global and Chinese trends are reasonable. China’s pace of 
investment intensity falls at a greater pace then globally intensity. As expected, 450 
ppm requires the greatest investments from China and globally to reduce costs of 
clean generation technologies to compete with the incumbent fossil generation 
sources. The 600ppm, 750ppm and BaU cases show investment amounts that move 
closely together. This is makes sense, as the emissions caps imposed under 600ppm 
and 750ppm do not exert such a strong impetus for additional R&D investments, 
compared to 450ppm.  
 
5.8. Conclusions 
China has a different electricity generation pathways compared to the rest of the 
world. This is expected given the differences in generation cost assumptions and 
initial resource endowments. The difference in natural resources endowment and 
generation costs between China and the rest of the world, results in a divergence of 
generation mix for some years.  
 
Results from WITCH suggests that renewables make the greatest contribution for 
China, followed by nuclear, to reduce emissions whilst improving SoS and not 
sacrificing economic growth. From the projections as set out in the WITCH model, 
China’s future electricity generation capacity shows the strong roles that wind and 
solar play in additional to nuclear power. Hydropower’s share of China’s generation 
capacity sees a gradual reduction leading up to 2050. This was especially shown to be 
true under the 450ppm, 600ppm and 750ppm pollution abatement cases. The research 
question asked for China to sustain its accelerated pace of economic growth, whilst 
being pollution responsible. In response to this challenge, the results of WITCH 
indicates that it would be expected China dedicates over 50% of its generation mix to 
clean technologies for 750ppm in 2050, whilst this goes up to just under 80% for 
600ppm, and 97% for 450ppm. In 2010, clean generation capacity only accounted for 
25%. Within the clean generation technologies category, China expects wind and 
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solar to rise by 2050 to 29% in 750ppm, 51% in 600ppm and 71% in 450ppm. This is 
a drastic rise, as wind and solar only accounted for 2% in 2010. Nuclear remains the 
second most important clean generation technology in all cases. However, following 
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant incident on 11 March 2011, the Chinese 
government has temporarily put on hold approvals for new nuclear plants. Additional 
research is required on how China can adjust in the short-run to recent events in Japan 
to further diversify its energy generation mix. The validity of long-term energy 
projection pathways for China should also be examined.  
 
More interestingly, China is increasing its share of R&D spending compared to the 
globe. In 2010, China spent 9% compared to the globe. In all cases (including 
450ppm), by 2050 China will spend roughly 40% of global R&D investment in 
energy. The increase in spending suggests that China, according to WITCH, will be a 
cost leader, in terms of lower generation and setup costs for clean generation 
technologies. This result is in line with the Five Year Plans which aggressively 
promote clean generation technologies in a bid to reduce emissions (Ng and Mabey, 
2011).  
 
Having a more comprehensive overview of possible climate abatement scenarios, the 
following section endeavours to extract what the results mean in terms of energy 
policy action and legislation.  
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6.  Implication of Low-Carbon Energy Strategy and Policies 
The chapter describes the application of CFEPS which leads to suggestions for the 
revision of energy strategy and policies. Discussion on the implications of revised 
policies will also be given in this chapter. CFEPS will be initially run on a base-case 
policy assessment with Feedback Loops aiming at a convergent outcome. 
Subsequently, the implication of the taking Policy Action is elaborated through a 
comparison between the scenarios of “before policy action” and “after policy action”. 
 
6.1. Feedback Loop Mechanism 
The Feedback Loop alternates between the Energy Policy Assessment Framework and 
the Hybrid IAM Climate Model. As the Feedback Loop complete one turn, CFEPS 
highlights where improvements can be realised in the outcome of energy policy and 
makes policy suggestions to realise these improvements. For CFEPS to be a valid tool 
there is an assumption that China’s energy policies warrant improvement. A literature 
survey in Chapter 2 has shown that many observers believe there is great scope for 
improvement in Chinese energy policy making and that improvements are possible 
(Hannon et al., 2011 and Zhou et al., 2011). Responses from interviewees also 
showed suggestions that China could benefit from more support rather than stricter 
targets. In other words, policies should offer more carrots (encouragement) rather than 
sticks (targets and punishment for missing them). The application of CFEPS and its 
Feedback Loop is intended to improve China’s choice of energy policy and thus 
enhance energy policy outcomes.  
 
One complete rotation of the Feedback Loop is demonstrated in Figure 6.1 and is 
illustrated by an example of the need to reduce emissions. CFEPS starts in Step 1 by 
assessing the current Chinese energy policy landscape through the use of the Policy 
Assessment Framework which is referred to as the Base-Case. The Policy Assessment 
Framework (mapped onto the Hybrid IAM Climate Model outputs) breaks down the 
various goals of a balanced energy policy into five dimensions of Growth, Climate 
Change, SoS, and Equality and Governance. Within the five dimensions, potential 
improvements are highlighted. For example, one improvement discovered though the 
Policy Assessment Framework is the need to reduce emissions which falls under the 
Climate Change Policy Dimension.  
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(ii)
(i)
Step 1: Energy Policy Assessment 
of the base-case 
Climate Change Policy Dimension: 
e.g. model output shows emissions 
are greater than IPCC set levels
Step 3: Energy Policy Assessment 
of the revised-case 
Climate Change Policy Dimension: 
e.g. model outputs shows lower 
emissions, so policy moves China 
in desired direction
Step 4: Energy Policy Actions
to change revised case 
Legislative Policy Action: 
e.g. continue to enforce energy 
policy with stricter carbon caps, 
goes back to Step 3  for another 
round of incremental improvement
Base
Case
Revised
Case
(i) (ii)
Step 2: Energy Policy Actions
to change the base-case 
Legislative Policy Action: 
e.g. stricter carbon caps 
(i) Mapping Policy Assess Criteria to Evaluate Model Outputs
(ii) Mapping Energy Policy Action to Changed Model Inputs
(iii) Iterative Feedback Loop
(iii)
Employing the Hybrid IAM Climate Model to project Chinese climate change, 
economic growth and energy sector after policy action has been taken
Employing the Energy Policy Assessment Framework to assess whether current energy 
policies are sufficient, or if a specific dimensions could benefit from improvements 
 
Figure 6.1: Steps of the Feedback Loop  
 
After potential areas of improvements are identified to energy policy outcomes, 
CFEPS moves onto the policy recommendation phase in Step 2. There are three 
categories of Policy Action (mapped onto changing inputs of the Hybrid IAM Climate 
Model) that Chinese energy policy makers can employ. The three categories of Policy 
Action are Legislative, Economic and Organisational. For example the policy 
objective of reducing emissions is highlighted via the Policy Assessment Framework 
and can be improved via Legislative type Policy Action through stricter carbon 
emissions caps. The Legislative type Policy Action of stricter emissions caps changes 
the model inputs, as WITCH now adheres to a lower emissions profile in all three 
abatement cases of 450ppm, 600ppm and 750ppm.  
 
A revised case is produced as the result of Legislative type Policy Action’s impact on 
WITCH model inputs as per Step 3. The changes inputs in the WITCH model produce 
a different energy production and consumption pathway. The revised state of China is 
again assessed by the Policy Assessment Framework (mapped onto the Hybrid IAM 
Climate Model outputs). Under the Climate Change dimension of the Policy 
Assessment Framework, it is shown that the Legislative type Policy Action has 
resulted in a relatively improved policy outcome of emissions reduction. However an 
improvement in the policy outcome is only marginal. One loop of CFEPS will not 
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resolve all of the climate change and others issues; future loops of CFEPS are needed. 
However, changes to China’s energy policy outcome are not always expected positive, 
it is a trial error process to implement policy action in theory, which may give 
negative impacts in practice. The frequent iterative loops helps to ensure policy action 
that result in negative energy policy outcome is identified early and terminated. 
 
The assessment of the revised case indicates the Legislative type Policy Action 
(mapped onto changing inputs of the Hybrid IAM Climate Model) was appropriate in 
Step 4. China, under the Climate Change policy dimension of the Policy Assessment 
Framework, moved to a better policy outcome. Additional efforts regarding emissions 
reduction are needed through Legislative type Policy Action for stricter emissions 
caps. The Policy Action produces another revised case that is assessed using the 
Policy Assessment Framework (reverting back to Step 3.) to continue the iterative 
Feedback Loop.  
 
The revised case represents Policy Actions simultaneously taken across all categories, 
including Legislative, Economic and Organisational. Each individual Policy Action 
has to be studied separately to understand its relative importance. The study of 
individual policy is performed by a sensitivity analysis, each time only examining one 
specific Policy Action. Sensitivities evaluate two impacts on the model outputs, 
namely a mild case (a 5% change in model inputs) and a strong case (a 10% change in 
model inputs). Thereafter this chapter presents the revised case, which incorporates 
improvements in the energy policy outcome.  
 
6.2. Energy Policy Assessment of the Base-Case  
The base-case of WITCH starts from the 11
th
 FYP and represents the energy policy 
make-up of China before the application of CFEPS (cf Figure 6.1, Step 1.). The FYPs 
targets are communicated every five years that incorporate new energy policy action. 
When the FYP is updated, Chinese policy makers can compare whether the goals that 
was set five years ago have been met and which policy actions were instrumental in 
meeting these goals. If policy makers are weary that policy action may not be moving 
in the intended direction, CFEPS can also be run every year. CFEPS can assess the 
policy evolution annually and not wait for the end of the five year window. To test the 
effectiveness of CFEPS, the 11
th
 FYP was chosen as the base-case energy policy 
205 
makeup instead of the 12
th
 FYP. The targets of the 12
th
 FYP are set for 2015 and can 
not yet be observed. The most recent back-test period is via the 11
th
 FYP from 2006 to 
2010. The following section evaluates whether the 11
th
 FYP goals were successfully 
implemented in 2010 via CFEPS and by reviewing literature that assesses the 
effectiveness of the 11
th
 FYP.  
 
The evaluation of the 11
th
 FYP is a back-test of the Energy Policy Assessment 
Framework. The following section assesses whether the actual policy outcome in 
2010 has been a success, relative to the goals set out in 2006. It does not use the 
Hybrid IAM or Feedback Loop component of CFEPS. The Energy Policy Assessment 
Framework suggests that none of the 5 policy dimensions have scored full marks 
meaning that there is scope for improvement in each of the five policy assessment 
dimensions. The five policy dimensions and scoring of the 11
th
 FYP is discussed in 
further detail, which are economic growth, climate change mitigation, SoS, social 
equality, and governance. 
 
6.2.1. Economic Growth Before Policy Action 
Economic Growth scores a success in one of three (1/3) indicators. There are three 
indicators under Economic Growth, which are GDP growth, energy consumption to 
production ratio and energy investments.  
 
China’s GDP growth is not balanced against other objectives, such as pollution 
abatement. WITCH predicts an 8.9% annual growth rate over the next decade. The 
Chinese government’s target growth rate was 7.5% per annum from 2010 to 2015, 
which is already higher than the 7.2% per annum growth estimated for 
environmentally balanced economic development (Yang, 2008). However, the period 
experienced double digit growth rates (Levine et al., 2010). Using the Energy Policy 
Assessment Framework, it has emered that the Economic Growth policy dimensions 
have been less than successful to deliver energy policy outcome improvements. 
 
The energy consumption to production balance was not set by the 11
th
 FYP. This 
could result in energy shortages and blackouts, if energy supply is less than energy 
demand. This area of policy making is targeted and there is no clear guideline to 
balance energy supply and demand. Thus it has not scored a policy outcome success.  
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Energy investment of 2% was proposed and the literature review indicates that the 
government has delivered on the 2% of GDP spending on R&D (Fung and Chu, 2011). 
The real test on this area of policy would be to assess the composition of the spending. 
As it emerges from the modelling by WITCH, the more effective R&D spending 
would be on the energy generation technologies that are less established such as 
renewables. This area of policy making has scored a policy outcome success, as R&D 
spending has indeed increased as a proportion of GDP, thus offering greater 
technological improvement to clean energy generation technologies. This observation 
is based on the assumption that the R&D investment go into the areas of industry 
where funding is necessary and not retained at local governmental level.  
 
6.2.2. Climate Change Mitigation Before Policy Action 
Climate Change Mitigation scores one of three (1/3) indicators. The three indicators 
under Climate Change Mitigation are atmospheric CO2 emissions, energy intensity 
and efficiency and emissions intensity.  
 
Atmospheric CO2 emission is a narrower goal than the 11
th
 FYP’s aim for 2010 of 
reducing chemical oxygen demand (COD) and SO2 by 10% from 2005 levels. The 
World Bank (2009) believes that it will be difficult for China to reach its 10% 
reduction of COD and SO2 by 2010. Using this analysis as a proxy for the CO2 
emissions indicator shows that that CO2 emissions policy indicators not been a policy 
outcome success, as emissions has not fallen to levels as set out under the 11
th
 FYP. 
 
Energy intensity and efficiency is measured through the 11
th
 FYP’s energy intensity 
reduction goal of 20% by 2010 compared to mid-decade. Despite China’s efforts, and 
taking a strict assessment stance, energy intensity only reduced by 19% by 2010 
(Fung and Chu, 2011). This area of policy making has not scored a policy outcome 
success. 
 
Emissions intensity is not a target set out in the 11
th
 FYP. It is however explicitly 
mentioned in the 12
th
 FYP, which sets out a 17% reduction of CO2 per unit of GDP 
output produced, compared to 2005 (Levine et al., 2010). Since this target is 
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emissions based, and CO2 per GDP was not mentioned in the 11
th
 FYP, this area of 
policy making has not scored a policy outcome success.  
 
6.2.3. Security of Energy Supply Before Policy Action 
SoS scores zero out of two (0/2) indictors. The two indicators under SoS are 
atmospheric dependence of hydrocarbon imports and generation mix diversification.  
 
Dependence on hydrocarbon and coal imports is captured in part by the 11
th
 FYP’s 
balanced external trade budget. However, this measure takes into account all import 
and exports of goods and services. A balanced budget has been achieved in 2010 
(Fung and Chu, 2011). A balanced budget does not ensure good security of energy 
supply. A balanced budget can also be achieved by exporting final goods and 
importing vast amounts of oil and gas. The trade balance is a less important indicator 
of dependence on carbon heavy technologies. Hence, the assessment of China’s net 
energy imports cannot be effectively evaluated and this area of policy making has not 
scored a policy outcome success. 
 
Generation mix diversification is not captured by the 11
th
 FYP. This indicator of 
energy policy is set out by the 12
th
 FYP by targeting a 13% generation capacity from 
sustainable sources by 2015 compared to 8.8% in 2010 (Fung and Chu, 2011). 
 
6.2.4. Social Equality Before Policy Action 
Social Equality scores zero out of one (0/1) indictors. The indicator under social 
equality is grid access.  
 
Grid energy access has not been explicitly set out in the 11
th
 FYP, but is an aim for 
the 12
th
 FYP. The 12
th
 FYP’s aim to increase grid connectivity includes RMB 2.55 
trillion (USD 408bn) for power grid construction, RMB 500bn (USD 80bn) 
investment on ultra-high voltage (UHV) lines by 2015. Since the 11
th
 FYP does not 
explicitly set a target on this indicator for 2010, it did not score a policy outcome 
success. 
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6.2.5. Governance Before Policy Action 
Governance scores one out of three (1/3) indictors. The three indicators under 
governance are political stability, public participation and regulation quality.   
 
Political stability is a target under the 11
th
 FYP. By 2010, this remains strong by the 
very nature of the command and control nature of clear energy policy goals set out by 
the FYPs, with the 12
th
 FYP continuing this energy policy stability. This indicator 
scored a policy outcome success. 
 
Public participation and education programs were promoted by the 11
th
 FYP and did 
lead to programs such as the Best Practices in Sustainable Building for Design 
Professionals course in the Solar Valley of Dezhou, in China’s Shandong province. 
However, these sessions were not delivered to the mass populous by 2010 and a wider 
level of participation is needed. The residential end-users are still not able to 
participate in the decision making process of energy policies (Burke et al., 2009). This 
indicator did not score a policy outcome success. 
 
Regulation quality under the 11
th
 FYP aims to establish a system for monitoring, 
evaluating, and public reporting of energy use and intensity. The World Bank’s 
assessment noted that the Plan did not have adequate management information 
systems or monitoring frameworks which enable the systematic tracking of policies, 
programmes, and investments at the various levels of government. Many key 
provincial level energy officials have remained in place throughout the period, 
without new institutes dedicated to energy efficiency and energy intensity reduction 
best practices being established in support of the Plan’s goals. Additionally, gathering 
data in order to measure the degree of energy policy outcome success could also 
benefit from improvements. In certain cases, municipal officials have not reported 
energy intensity data under the 11
th
 FYP and the reporting system has been far from 
uniform (World Bank, 2009). 
 
The 12
th
 FYP offers additional targets which were not addressed via the 11
th
 FYP. 
The additional targets that were previously not mentioned but have appeared in the 
12
th
 FYP are targets on emissions intensity, generation mix diversification and grid 
energy access. The next round of CFEPS energy policy assessment framework to be 
implemented once data on 2015 is available will be easier, as the 12
th
 FYP has a wider 
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range of policy goals more in line with the Energy Policy Assessment Criteria of 
CFEPS.  
 
6.2.6. Scoring of Base-Case Before Policy Action 
The 11
th
 FYP has set out a wide array of policy goals including energy policy targets 
for 2010. The assessment policy outcome success is based on whether it meets the 
various areas of the CFEPS policy assessment framework criteria items and indicators. 
Any area that the chosen CFEPS energy policy assessment framework deems to be 
important, but is not explicitly targeted by the 11
th
 FYP, will receive a negative mark. 
This is based on the assumption that any area not targeted is not deemed as important 
by the Chinese energy policy makers and efforts to rectify this are neglected. The 11
th
 
FYP is allocated a score of 20% under CFEPS, which is calculated and shown in 
Table 6.1 and presented with greater detail in Appendix 17, which also presents the 
discussions of the five policy dimensions in a tabular form. Appendix 18 plots the 
base-case graphs in accordance with mapping performed between model outputs and 
the CFEPS energy policy assessment framework indicators. These figures are 
presented below and will be discussed and compared in detail during sensitivity 
analysis in the next section.  
 
Table 6.1: Assessment framework the 11
th
 FYP and scoring  
Policy Dimension Weight x Scoring 
Economic growth 15% x 1/3 
Climate Change Mitigation 30% x 1/3 
SoS 20% x 0/2 
Social Equality 20% x 0/1 
Governance 15% x 1/3 
Aggregate Total 20% 
 
The score from the energy policy base-case is not normative. It is a relative 
measurement to assess the score for this time with the score from last time. A 80% 
score is not twice as better as a 40% score. It simply means that a 80% score has a 
relative better energy policy outcome than a 40% score. Since the score for the 11
th
 
FYP is not 100%, there is room for policy improvements in China. The score only 
offers a guide, for a before and after comparison of whether Policy Actions aided 
China’s energy landscape towards a success policy outcome.  
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The 20% score is partially due to the many areas the 11
th
 FYP does not set goals for 
2010, especially in SoS. The Plan is penalised for not addressing specific target areas, 
as guidance is expected to be provided, but was not given. In the subsequent 12
th
 FYP, 
many of the previously missing policy areas are addressed and targeted. It should be 
noted that CFEPS has highlighted areas of energy policy that China is advised to 
focus and make Policy Action on.  
 
6.3. Key Energy Policy Actions to Change the Base-Case 
After highlighting the possible areas for improvement to the outcome of Chinese 
energy policies, CFEPS makes suggestions of Policy Actions that politicians can take 
(cf Figure 6.1, Step 2). The policy actions were reviewed in Chapter 2 and presented 
in Table 2.6. Chapter 2 classified Policy Action into the three categories, which are 
Legislative, Economic Driven and Organisational. Table 6.2 reintroduces the three 
categories of Policy Action and highlights the most useful Policy Actions to be taken 
in as emerged from the application of CFEPS on the 11
th
 FYP.  
 
Table 6.2: Lessons learnt from Chinese Energy Policy 
Legislative  
(command-control) 
Economic  
(incentives driven) 
Organisational 
(evaluation monitoring) 
Detailed 
Implementation 
Steps 
• Integration of international 
• emissions, energy and 
• technology agreements 
• Subsidies and Costs 
alterations including Feed-
in Tariffs 
• Standardisation 
• Monitoring 
• Accountability and 
• Responsibilities 
• Transparency of 
Measurement 
• Data 
• Increasing Public 
Awareness of 
Participation 
 
6.3.1. Legislative Energy Policies 
Command and control type policies are already implemented widely in China, 
following on from its socialist roots and Soviet style governance history. If there was 
one area of command-control type policy improvements, it would be to have detailed 
steps. 
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Implementation Steps  
According to the output from CFEPS, detailed implementation steps are needed to 
provide central and local authorities with the necessary policy changes to achieve the 
proposed energy targets. In the absence of step-by-step plans, local authorities may 
have an incorrect interpretation of the way energy policies should be imposed. Given 
that China, to an extent, is still a command and control system, this would be a natural 
step towards sustainable energy generation and consumption.  
 
From the industry experts surveyed, there was a tendency to suggest an overly 
commanding energy policy landscape, requiring greater encouragement than strict 
rules. To strike a balanced energy policy landscape, politicians should seek to increase 
the use of the two other types of policy classifications, namely economic and 
instructional policy actions. 
 
6.3.2. Economic Energy Policies 
Market inventive driven energy policies have been implemented successfully to an 
extent, but China’s current economic and political system is not particularly attuned to 
accepting market signals and acting on free market incentives. If there were to be one 
improvement in economic driven policies, it would be to adopt the global climate 
change regime. 
 
Integration of International Emissions, Energy and Technology Agreements 
GHG emissions are of a global nature. To encourage China to adhere to emissions 
agreements, all its neighbours should also agree to a common framework to offer a 
level playing ground and encourage cost competitive energy producers to produce 
greater levels of energy. This reduces energy generation and investor costs globally. 
Closer integration of emissions markets regionally and globally will address concerns 
over how to reconcile global emissions trading and sustainable energy investment. 
Creating a global framework helps transfer technology from developed and 
developing countries. This will greatly help countries develop technologies meeting 
their energy priorities, and develop local skills.  China’s should also raise its GHG 
and carbon prices in line with the rest of the world.  
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Subsidies and Costs alterations including Feed-in Tariffs 
The effect of subsidy increases is mirrored by cost decrease. Each type helps to 
promote clean generation technologies to meet increasing electivity demand whilst 
limiting the increase in greenhouse gasses. One important policy tool is Feed-in 
Tariffs. Feed-in tariffs are important in China as all types of clear energy are 
competing against the cheap generation costs of coal. In 2010, it accounted for 70% of 
electricity generation capacity. Projecting into the future, in the BaU scenario, coal 
still accounts for more than half of all electricity generation capacity. In the absence 
of Legislative-type carbon caps, subsidies from feed-in tariffs play a major role in 
providing additional revenue to renewables higher than at the wholesale price of 
electricity. Whether a feed-in tariff will effectively encourage substituting out of fossil 
based generation depends on organisations’ energy policies. Increased monitoring and 
accountability of officials, which forms part of Organisation energy policies, are 
discussed in the next section.  
 
6.3.3. Organisational Energy Policies 
China could vastly benefit from improvements in standardisation, monitoring, 
accountability, transparency and public awareness. 
 
Standardisation  
Second catalogue of energy efficiency labelling for consumer products (Sept 2006); 
Third catalogue of energy efficiency labelling for consumer products (Jan 2008). 
 
Monitoring  
Continued monitoring of policy impact is the final vital area that needs improvement. 
In conjunction with accountability of responsibilities, on-going monitoring is required 
to highlight any policy deviation early.  
 
China would be well placed to not wait until 2015 to confirm whether it has met its 
policy goals of the 12
th
 FYP. Before waiting for 5 years from 2010 to 2015, it would 
already be efforts to monitor whether it has achieved the goals, at least partially. 
China could make interim measurement of the progress it is making and if it is 
moving in the intender policy outcome direction. One energy policy outcome 
improvement would be to enact a law to continuously monitor China’s policy 
213 
performance. The application of the best technologies available internationally could 
also be mandatory in all major new energy production, conversion, and consumption 
investments and for vehicles and appliances for sale in the domestic market.  
 
Accountability and Responsibilities  
Accountability of responsibilities for governmental institutions will aid China in its 
pursuit of action for a successful energy policy outcome. The roles and 
responsibilities of the policy institutions should be clarified.  
 
A key barrier to effective and efficient policy is that the state does not address the 
problem of Fragmented Authoritarianism. Currently, several governmental 
institutions at similar levels fight for policy control. From the review in Section 2.2, 
the most notable dispute is between the NDCR and NEC on setting energy prices. 
With both institutions vying for the control of energy price setting, chronic policy 
inefficiencies will continue. The continuing power struggle between different 
governmental institutions will continue to hamper the successful implementation of 
energy policy outcomes across China. 
 
From Section 2.2, it was established there was once a super-ministry to set policies 
related to energy production and consumption. This could once again be established. 
Alternatively, a watchdog could be tasked to consult, inform, and react to proposals 
for energy policies, programmes, and measures and to implement policies for energy 
sustainability (Ng and Mabey, 2011). 
 
Transparency of Measurement Data 
The data used to measure the successfulness of policy outcomes has been questioned 
by researchers. The review conducted during Section 3.2 discussed the difficulties 
sometimes facing data transparency and availability for China. To overcome this, as 
independent body could be put in place to provide an impartial measurement of 
emissions and energy use. This enhances the credibility of China’s energy policies.  
 
Increasing Public Awareness of Participation in the Policy Making Process 
Raising public awareness of how the transport sector can play an important role in 
more efficient energy use, through changes in urban planning, energy efficiency 
measures, and technology in use. 
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The sensitivity analysis breaks down each of the effect that policy action had on 
China. Section 6.3 examines whether the policy actions set forth in each of the 
sensitivities make a positive, neutral or negative contribution to the Chinese policy 
landscape.  
 
6.4. Constructing the Revised Case Results through Sensitivity 
Analysis  
The revised case represents a simultaneous change in all areas of Policy Action. 
Before presenting the revised case, it is important to examine the impact of Policy 
Action in isolation, before combining all the impacts together to form the revised case. 
The impact on China’s energy, growth and climate change by individual Policy 
Actions are constructed through a sensitivity analysis. An individual Policy Action is 
assessed in isolation and its impact on China documented. By extracting the common 
sensitivity from Appendix 15 of mapping the impact of policy action to changes in 
model inputs, the cases run are more stringent ppm caps, increased load, increased 
efficiency, changes in generation costs, changes in setup costs, better model-policy 
feedback, and combinations of more than one sensitivity. The summary table is 
presented in Appendix 19. A common feature of the sensitivities run is that across all 
three abatement cases as well as BaU, there is little differentiation compared to the 
base-case. Both the 5% weak case and the 10% strong cases follow the same trends 
and growth rates as set out before policy change. 
 
6.4.1. Harsher Emissions Caps for 450ppm, 600ppm and 750ppm 
Scenarios 
More stringent emissions caps for 450ppm, 600ppm and 750ppm sensitivities are in a 
parallel decline in the allowable atmospheric carbon emissions across all time periods 
during the projection horizon. This sensitivity sets out to capture the legislative 
category of energy policy change.  
 
This sensitivity analysis is performed imposing stricter emissions caps. The base-case 
emissions profile for 450ppm is reduced across the projection window by 5% or 10% 
depending on the strength being assessed. The observable impact is a parallel 
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downward shift of allowable emissions across all years under consideration, of 95% 
compared to the base-case and 90% of the base-case.  
 
The most notable improvements in capping emissions across all years under 
consideration are in climate change mitigation, SoS and social equality. This 
sensitivity diversifies the generation mix towards low carbon technologies and 
increases the speed of acceptance of renewables. The harsher emissions caps results in 
a faster proliferation of low carbon generation technologies in China. The weak case 
increases low carbon generation by just less than 1% in 2035 and 2050. The strong 
case increases low carbon generation by about 1.5% in 2035 and 2050.  
 
6.4.2. Increased Load  
Increased load sensitivities relate to a greater load for generation plants to run at. 
What the sensitivities analysis hopes to explore is, given a level of electricity 
consumption, whether an increased load would reduce the power generation capacity 
needed to satisfy the levels of demand. The sensitivity analysis relates to a more 
supportive policy regime under regulatory command-and-control type energy policies, 
such as improved generation standards and employing the best available generation 
technologies. 
 
This sensitivity analysis is performed increasing the base-case load across all 
technologies in the base year by 5% and 10%. Since future year loads are derived 
from the base-year, the immediate impact of the 5% and 10% increase is observed 
through the projection window. 
 
The most notable improvement is in economic growth. The increased load allows for 
greater energy supply (and energy demand) for a given generation capacity and set of 
emissions. In other words, against strict emissions constraints, China is able to 
increase its GDP level by 0.3% with the strong case under 450ppm. Under BaU, 
growth increases by 0.1% with a 10% load increase. It is a smaller GDP increase, as 
there was no carbon constraint in the first place to adhere to.  
 
216 
6.4.3. Increased Efficiency 
Increased efficiency sensitivities capture the effect of more efficient generation for 
power producers; one tonne of fossil fuel generates a greater MW of electricity. The 
sensitivity reflects regulatory policies promoting improvements in efficiency across 
all technologies.  
 
This sensitivity analysis, much like the load increase is performed by increasing the 
base-case efficiency across all technologies in the base year by 5% and 10%. Since 
future year efficiency levels are derived from the base-year, the immediate impact of 
the 5% and 10% increase are observed in the model outcomes. 
 
The most notable improvement, like increased load, is for economic growth. The 
increased efficiency allows for greater energy supply (and energy demand) for a given 
generation capacity at set of emission levels. In other words, against strict emissions 
constraints, China is able to increase its GDP level by 0.2% with the strong case under 
450ppm. Under BaU, growth increases marginally by less than 0.1% with a 10% 
efficiency increase.  
 
6.4.4. Increased Load and Efficiency 
Increased load and efficiency represents the simultaneous improvement of two 
important variables in energy generation. The sensitivity tried to understand how 
China’s energy reacts to a blended effect. The sensitivity reflects regulatory policies 
promoting stricter targets for use of low carbon sources, as stricter targets naturally 
result in more stringent specification of generation plants and better yields in energy 
generation. Additionally increased load and efficiency also relates a more supportive 
transmission tariffs and access, as less energy is wasted during the transportation 
phase.  
 
Sensitivities show a multiplicative effect compared to just increased load, or just 
increased efficiency. A 5% to 10% increase in load and efficiency is applied 
simultaneously. China’s GDP level increases by 0.5% for the strong case under 
450ppm. For for BaU, a 10% increase in load and efficiency increases GDP by 0.3%.  
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6.4.5. Increased Generation Costs  
Increased on-going generation costs relate to more expensive operation and 
maintenance running costs of generation technologies. The sensitivity is performed 
only on generation costs for high carbon generation technologies (coal, oil and gas), 
as increasing generation costs on all technologies including low carbon methods 
would not achieve switching to sustainable generation. Base year operations and 
maintenance (O&M) costs are increased for coal, oil and gas by 5% to 10%, whilst 
other technologies are unchanged. Consequently, the next round of iteration takes into 
account the higher base-year costs for the polluting generation technologies. This 
sensitivity relates to a market incentive based policy action, whereby the central 
government seeks to change the generation behaviour of altering the relative 
costliness across generation technologies.  
 
The most notable improvement is in climate change mitigation. The increased cost for 
fossil-based generation shifts the capacity away from coal and gas towards 
renewables and nuclear. China is able to increase its share of low carbon generation 
by 0.5% in the strong case under 450ppm and 0.3% under BaU.  
 
6.4.6. Decreased Generation Costs  
Decreased on-going generation costs relate to cheaper operation and maintenance 
running costs of generation technologies. This sensitivity is performed only on 
generation costs for low carbon generation technologies (nuclear, renewables and 
hydro), in an attempt to move producers to focus on operating low carbon generation 
methods. Base year operations and maintenance (O&M) costs are decreased for 
nuclear, renewables and hydropower by 5% to 10%, whilst other technologies are 
unchanged. Along similar lines to increase generation cost, this sensitivity relates to a 
market incentive based policy action, whereby the central government seeks to 
changes generation behaviour by altering the relative costliness across generation 
technologies. 
 
Like in the case of increased generation cost in high-carbon generation technologies, 
the most notable improvement is climate change mitigation. The decreased generation 
cost for low carbon generation, whilst holding the cost in high-carbon technologies 
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contact, moves China towards renewables. China is again able to increase its share of 
low carbon generation by 0.5% in the strong case under 450ppm and 0.3% under BaU.  
 
6.4.7. Increased Capital Costs  
Increased initial capital or setup costs relate to more expensive capital expenditure 
costs of initially constructing the generation facilities. This sensitivity is performed 
only on setup costs for high carbon generation technologies (coal, oil and gas), as 
increasing the initial investment cost on all technologies including low carbon 
methods would not achieve switching to sustainable generation. Base year setup or 
capital construction costs are increased for coal, oil and gas by 5% to 10%, whilst 
other technologies are unchanged. The sensitivity relates to a market incentive based 
policy action, whereby the central government seeks to change the generation 
behaviour of altering the relative costliness across generation technologies.  
 
The most notable improvement is for climate change mitigation. The increased setup 
cost for fossil-based generation again shifts the power capacity from coal and gas 
towards renewables and nuclear. China is able to increase its share of low carbon 
generation by 0.8% in the strong case under 450ppm and 0.5% under BaU. This shift 
is more pronounced than the generation cost sensitivities, as the initial setup costs are 
higher than the day-to-day generation costs.  
 
6.4.8. Decreased Capital Costs 
Decreased initial setup or capital costs relate to cheaper capital expenditure costs for 
initially constructing the generation facilities. This sensitivity is performed only on 
setup costs for low carbon generation technologies (nuclear, renewables and hydro), 
in an attempt to move producers to focus on building greater capacity for low carbon 
generation technologies. Base year setup or capital construction costs are decreased 
for nuclear, renewables and hydropower by 5% to 10%, whilst other technologies are 
unchanged. The sensitivity relates to a market incentive based policy action, whereby 
the central government seeks to change generation behaviour by altering the relative 
costliness across generation technologies.  
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The most notable improvement is for climate change mitigation. The decreased setup 
cost for low carbon generation again shifts the power capacity from coal and gas 
towards renewables and nuclear. China is able to increase its share of low carbon 
generation, just like the previous sensitivity, by 0.8% in the strong case under 450ppm 
and 0.5% under BaU.  
 
6.4.9. Decreased Generation and Capital Costs 
Decreased generation and capital costs relate to better R&D. This sensitivity is 
performed only on setup costs and generation for low carbon generation technologies 
(decreased for nuclear, renewables and hydro, whilst other technologies are 
unchanged), in an attempt to move producers toward focussing on building more 
capacity for low carbon generation technologies. Again, the sensitivity relates to a 
market incentive based policy action, whereby the central government seeks to change 
generation behaviour by altering the relative costliness across generation technologies.  
 
The combined effect of decreasing both types of costs for low carbon generation 
technologies results in substituting the power capacity from coal and gas towards 
renewables and nuclear. China is able to increase its share of low carbon generation 
by 1% in the strong case under 450ppm and 0.8% under BaU.  
 
6.4.10. Improved Feedback between Model Input and Policy Result  
Improved feedback between model and energy policy was a more challenging 
sensitivity to study. The background behind capturing this effect lies in the way China 
regularly updates its policy position across all sectors. The FYPs provides a signpost 
for energy stakeholders every five years. However setting policy signposts every five 
years may be too infrequent, in case the desired energy policy does not move in the 
intended direction from the outset. This sensitivity relates to the organisational based 
policy action, whereby better monitoring, information sharing and public participation 
should better align the interests of energy producers to energy end-users. 
 
The mild case requires policy makers to check every 3 years whether the policy 
actions have achieved the desired impact. The strong case calls for policy makers to 
check every year whether policies have yielded in the intended end result. The weak 
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case is not quantitatively assessed. The steps to performing this sensitivity it to 
decrease the time gaps between the iterative stages from once every five years to once 
every three years or once every year.  
 
A qualitative discussion expects that discretionary energy policy actions are more 
frequency revisited than once every five years as per the FYP. This fine-tuning of 
policy actions, ensure the monitoring of the policy effect if carried out on a more 
regular basis. If the initial policy setting moves in the opposite direction than what 
was intended, there is less time “wasted” to make new policy adjustments. The strong 
case is expected to magnify this positive impact. However re-running the model every 
year to assess the impact on the economy may be too frequent. Time is needed for a 
top-down policy decision to filter down to local authority level. Making fine-tuning 
adjustments to energy policy will send mixed signals to the energy stakeholders. A 
three-year window for new energy policies offers a more stable macro policy setting.  
 
6.4.11. Revised Case Simultaneously Altering all Sensitivities 
The China’s revised case attempts to capture improvements in all given policy 
dimensions. It simultaneously reduces emission profiles (except for running as BaU), 
increases loads, increases efficiencies, increases generation costs for fossil 
technologies, decreases generation costs for low carbon technologies, increases 
capital costs for fossil technologies, decreases capital costs for low carbon 
technologies, and creates an improved feedback between model and policy analysis. 
Once again, the results are presented at the weak case of 5% change and strong case 
of 10% change. The way they can be executed as policy tools is summarised in 
Appendix 20, with the graphical depiction of the revised-case outputs (versus base-
case outputs) as per the CFEPS criteria set out in Appendix 21.  
 
For most of the outcomes under the revised case for China, the results are as 
anticipated. The strong case encourages more Chinese clean technology energy 
generation and results in lower energy intensities. The two extremes of pollution 
abatement, which are BaU and 450ppm, are again discussed as the other abatement 
scenarios fit in between the two extremes for the revised case. 
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BaU shows minor improvements all policy dimensions. As expected, growth is not 
sacrificed, showing a -0.1% decrease between the base-case and the strong and weak 
revised case. The small decline in growth can be explained by the fact that under BaU, 
there is no atmospheric emissions cap to adhere to. From the sensitivity analysis, it 
has been shown that more stringent emissions caps have the greatest impact on 
growth reduction. The most effective policy actions are market and incentive-driven 
cost policies. The weak revised case has shown a greater commitment to clean 
generation technologies, mostly due to the greater initial capital costs and on-going 
generation costs for fossil based technologist, whilst lowering these costs for clean 
technologies. The impact range is just under a 1% greater proportion for clean 
generation in the weak case and 1.3% greater proportion for clean generation for the 
strong case across the modelling horizon.  
 
450ppm also shows different revised case results than under BaU. The greatest policy 
change impact under the 450ppm case, were legislative policy actions. Legislative 
policy actions though stricter emissions caps were the most useful policy actions. 
Stricter emissions caps force China to adhere to a 5% reduction to the 450ppm 
emissions path under the weak case and a 10% reduction to the 450ppm path under 
the strong case. The switching to clean generation was 1.2% for the weak case and 
1.7% for the strong case. A far greater proportion os switching may have been 
anticipated comparing BaU and 450ppm. However, the switching to clean generation 
under 450ppm is compared to a base-case of 450ppm before policy action, which 
already followed a high usage of clean generation technologies compared to other 
ppm cases. 
 
The sensitivities have been shown to move China positively towards an energy policy 
with a greater awareness of pollution reduction under the pollution abatement 
scenarios. In reality, policy tools will not be used in isolation. All the tools will be 
used in unison to help model China’s policy landscape changes. The following section 
discusses the combined positive impact through the revised case of energy policy 
assessment.  
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6.5. Revised Case Energy Policy Assessment 
The revised case (Figure 6.1, Step 3) represents China when all Policy Actions have 
been used in the pursuit of improvements to the current Chinese energy policy 
landscape. The overall effect of the Plan and the subsequent energy policy 
suggestions are assessed together to better understand how energy policy actions can 
offer changes to China’s energy policy outcome. Section 2.3 and Table 2.6 originally 
introduced the three types of policy actions.   
 
The discretional changes to energy policy can be ultimately captured by under the 
three major policy action areas of Legislative, Economic and Organisational:  
• Legislative Policy Actions are changes in emission caps, load and efficiency 
• Economic Policy Actions are changes to initial setup and on-going operational 
costs 
• Organisational Policy Actions are changes to the frequency of feedback of model 
runs 
 
WITCH captures these three areas of policy action to compare the scope before policy 
action (the base-case) against after policy action (revised case) Again, the potential 
improvements offered though policy action are discussed in the context of the five 
policy dimensions, namely Economic Growth, Climate Change, SoS, Social Equality, 
and Governance. 
 
6.5.1. Economic Growth After Policy Change 
Economic growth has not been affected to the same extent as some of the other policy 
dimension after policy action. Conceptually, legislative policy actions which increase 
efficiency and load, along with economic policy actions that alter costs, should result 
in a positive impact on economic growth. However China’s problem is not lack of 
growth, but excessive growth rates in the context of controlling emissions. The aim is 
to obtain an appropriate growth rate which takes into account the negative 
externalities creating atmospheric carbon pollutants.  
 
The most interesting (albeit initially counter-intuitive) outcome under 450ppm has 
been growth rates. It is expected that growth rates would fall under the weak and 
strong case of 450ppm. However, under the weak case, growth rates are up to 5% 
223 
higher between 2015 and 2020 than the base case. This can be explained by China 
adapting to harsher emissions caps. One way of adapting to harsher emissions caps is 
to put more effort into reducing dependence on fossil fuels. As it is forced to embrace 
clean generation technologies, China gives itself more headroom to grow without 
hitting the emission caps. Thus China is able to grow faster than under the 450ppm 
base-case. Growth projections are 0.4% lower under the strong revised-case (10% 
change), as compared to the 450ppm base-case. 
 
6.5.2. Climate Change Mitigation After Policy Change 
Climate change mitigation sees improvements in both atmospheric CO2 emissions as 
well as a reduction in emissions intensity. Legislative policy actions such as stricter 
emission caps and economic policy actions to alter costs sees China substitute its 
incumbent fossil-based generation technologies towards low carbon alternatives 
including renewables and nuclear power.  
 
In the BaU scenario, the weak case expects a decrease in low carbon generation for 
China compared to the globe at around 2.5% across the modelling horizon. The weak 
case expects a decrease of 5%. For 450ppm, there is very little variation for the weak 
revised case. However, in the strong revised case, it rises initially to 20% higher 
compared to the base-case in 2030, rising a further 50% compared to the base-case by 
2050.  
 
Under China’s BaU case, the weak revised-case sees demand fall by 2% and the 
strong revised-case sees demand fall by 3%. For 405ppm, the 5% case sees demand 
fall to around 50% in the case year (as the optimal abatement point has already passed, 
so the first year is making up for lost time). 
 
6.5.3. Security of Energy Supply After Policy Change 
SoS has improved both its indicators which are a reduction on the dependence of 
hydrocarbon and coal imports and a greater generation mix diversification. 
Improvements to both indicators have come about via legislative policy actions, 
including stricter emissions caps and economic policy actions to alter costs. The 
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legislative policy action sees China substitute its incumbent fossil-based generation 
technologies towards low carbon alternatives including renewables and nuclear power.  
 
In the BaU scenario, the weak case expects a marginal decrease in fossil generation. 
In the strong case, using the CFEPS helps to assess the significant impact as WITCH 
predicts over a 35% increase in clean generation technologies across the modelling 
horizon. In WITCH, there are two broad categories of energy generation technologies. 
There are the clean generation technologies of nuclear, hydro, wind and solar power. 
There are also the fossil generation technologies of coal, oil and gas. China is a net 
importer of oil gas and coal. By reducing China’s dependence on fossil-based 
generation also allow China to improve its SoS. The strong case of 450ppm calls for a 
35% reduction on the dependence of oil, gas and coal. By 2050, China is under 3% 
dependent on generation technologies that it is a net importer in. By moving to clean 
generation technologies, China is less dependent on imports of raw materials and 
improving its SoS. 
 
6.5.4. Social Equality After Policy Change 
Social Equality, which uses a proxy via the growth of renewable energy, has also 
improved. As observed, after policy action, renewable energy increase drastically, 
especially under strict pollution abatement scenarios. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
increased renewables is taken in CFEPS to mean greater grid connectivity, as 
renewables projects are normally in remote locations.  
 
The BaU scenario sees little increase in renewables generation. The 450ppm weak 
revised-case also projects small increases in renewable generation, as compared to the 
450ppm base-case. In the revised case of 450ppm, there is significantly higher growth 
in renewable generation, of around 20% from 2025 onwards. The greater the use of 
renewables, the wider the grid connection and the more Chinese citizens are 
electricity grid connected. Grid connection reduces fuel poverty, which the Social 
Equality dimension of the energy policy criteria are concerned about.  
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6.5.5. Governance After Policy Change 
Governance is expected to be improved via improved feedback between energy policy 
and climate modelling. As the empirical survey already expected, governance has 
proved to be the most difficult policy dimension to accurately model and to analyse in 
terms of energy policy change. WITCH does not offer outputs to measure this Policy 
Assessment Framework dimension. Whereas the other four policy dimensions offer 
tangible targets which can be monitored and action to be taken if goals are not met, 
governance creates the most difficulty in measuring policy improvements. It is also 
with governance that the most scope for energy policy improvements rest. This 
dimension is the bedrock that all other policy outcome success will be determined. 
With the best planned energy policies, if execution and monitoring fails, expected 
policy improvements will not materialise. 
 
6.5.6. Scoring of Revised Case After Policy Change Implementation 
Though the application of CFEPS, China’s revised policy landscape generates an 
improved score of 90% (Table 6.3), the scoring of energy policy outcome is a relative 
and not an absolute measure. In other words, a score of circa 90% (at revised case) 
does not imply the revised energy policies are 3.5 times better than the 20% score (at 
base-case). It only shows that efforts have been made towards addressing areas 
previously neglected. CFEPS has been useful for the process energy policy decision 
making, as it has demonstrated there is room for improvement in the policy outcome. 
The areas where energy policy outcome improvement can be realised are across all 
five policy dimensions. The full assessment and scoring is located in Appendix 22, it 
can be seen that China’s energy policies makers can observe relative improvements 
Climate Change Mitigation, SoS, Social Equality, and Governance. Economic Growth 
was not an area of improvement observed, as China’s command economy keeps 
growth at high levels despite targeting a reduction in emissions.  
 
Table 6.3: Reassessment of China's energy policy outcome after Policy Action  
Policy Dimension Weight x Scoring 
Economic growth 15% x 1/3 
Climate Change Mitigation 30% x 3/3 
SoS 20% x 2/2 
Social Equality 20% x 1/1 
Governance 15% x 3/3 
Aggregate Total 90% 
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Through the 90% scoring for the revised case, CFEPS has shown improvements in 
China’s energy policy landscape. However, it also shows that there is still scope for 
further improvements. As discussed in Section 4.3, when improvement in the energy 
policy outcome is observed which are not scoring 100%, additional policy action can 
be executed via further iteration of the Feedback Loop to pursue continued 
improvements in the outcome of China’s energy policies.  
 
The base case and revised case scores show a degree of robustness, because the scores 
are only on a relative basis. Even with differing weights between the 5 policy 
dimensions, it can be observed that the relative measure will still give a better policy 
outcome. For example, if an equal 20% weighting was allocated for all 5 dimentions 
(as it was initially, before any weights adstments following the survey), the base case 
would have scored 20% and the revised case a score of 87%. In case, there is a 
weighting in each category of at least 1% (i.e. no category with zero weighting) and 
all weights add up to 100%, the relative score of the dimentions will always show an 
improvement or deterioration.  
 
6.6. Conclusions 
The application of CFEPS and its Feedback Loop has improved the choice of energy 
policies and thus enhance its policy outcomes. The energy policy implications for 
China are that Legislative, Economic and Organisation policy actions have to work 
together to move China towards satisfying all five policy dimensions of Economic 
Growth, Climate Change, SoS, Equality and Governance. Areas where China is the 
weakest are climate change mitigation, SoS, and Social Equality. As demonstrated by 
WITCH, the most beneficial policies to address weaknesses in the three mentioned 
dimensions are Legislative and Economic Policy actions. The revised-case model 
results show stricter ppm profiles and changing costs exerted the greatest impact on 
China’s economy. The sensitivities have shown that improvements can be achieved, 
especially in pollution abatement and SoS through the use of Legislative Policy 
Action. Legislative Policy Action that CFEPS has suggested include reduced growth 
targets, stricter GHG limits, toucher generation standards and higher proportion to be 
allocated for low carbon generation technologies.  
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Another important conclusion from the Feedback Loop the Organisational type of 
Policy Action is also extremely important in fostering a positive policy making 
environment. In the absence of proper monitoring, the best intentions of energy policy 
outcome may not be successfully be implemented. However, the WITCH model is 
unable to demonstrate the impacts of Organisational Policy action as well as 
Legislative and Economic Policy actions. This shortcoming, along with others, is 
discussed in Chapter 8 under future works. Having highlighted the need for all three 
categories of policy action to work in unison, the following chapter examines the 
energy policy lessons learnt and revisits each research question in turn. 
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7. Research Outcomes and Critical Evaluation 
The application of CFEPS, as discussed in Chapter 6, has led to a set of outcomes 
which will be further elaborated in this chapter. By comparing the CFEPS outcomes 
and Chinese government’s practice, this chapter also discusses possible areas for 
improvement in the outcome of energy policy. The three proposed areas of policy 
action (legislative, market and organisational) have to be used in unison in order to 
realise improvements in the five identified dimensions of climate policy assessment. 
The area of policy that can offer greater improvements for China is legislative action, 
through the capping the emissions profile. To improve the effectiveness of legislative 
action, economic incentives through cost changes (increased costs for fossils and 
decrease cost of clean generation) is also necessary. To complement legislative and 
economic power action, Legislative policy actions are also important via stricter 
monitoring during the policy implementation stage. Of the five policy dimensions, 
Climate change, SoS and Governance show the greatest scope for improvement in the 
outcome of post policy action. The implications of CFEPS can be broken down into 
several parts consisting of China’s energy policy lessons learnt, China’s electricity 
generation mix projection, transferability of China’s lessons learnt for use in other 
nations, and the appropriateness and limitations of the CFEPS methodology. In 
considering the different types of users of CFEPS, China’s energy policy makers will 
be most concerned about energy policy lessons learnt, whereas academics will be 
most concerned about the appropriateness and limitations of the CFEPS methodology. 
Emphasis on policy makers and academic users of CFEPS will be discussed 
accordingly.  
 
7.1. Chinese Energy Policy Lessons Learnt 
The five-yearly plans align the economy with top energy policy goals and to 
communicate this directive throughout the government bureaucracy. The plans are 
designed to be roadmaps for regulators and provincial officials, who are responsible 
for their implementation. Five year plans can thus be understood as key indicators of 
the directions and changes in development philosophy, at the highest levels of 
Chinese leadership. However, as with any best policy intention, there are issues that 
need to be resolved.  
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For energy policy makers, the synthesis of CFEPS policy assessment framework 
indicators alongside the Feedback Loop shows that China’s current energy policies do 
not encompass all the areas of successful policy outcome. The analysis shows that 
legislative, economic and governance-type policies all make significant improvements 
to China’s policy landscape. This is more evident for the policy criteria of governance 
and calling for enhanced monitoring of key policy decision makers. However, the 
changes in consumption and production patterns are fundamentally costly. If the 
consumer bears the burden to move away from cheaper (coal based) fuels towards 
clean energy generation technologies, end-use energy prices will rise. If the 
government subsidises energy prices, the long term time frame for subsidised energy 
prices is not sustainable from a development growth perspective. Hence the increase 
in costs is still an issue that remains unsolved under today’s technological 
assumptions. If R&D today can reduce generation costs through technology, the new 
energy strategy is more likely to create sustainable development growth.  
 
Chinese lessons learnt from CFEPS are the result of the Feedback Loop comparing 
the base-case (Section 6.1) to the revised-case (Section 6.3). The comparison of the 
base-case, which is before implementation of Policy Action, versus the revised-case 
shows that all five dimensions could be improved, which are economic growth, 
climate change mitigation, SoS, social equality, and governance. 
 
7.1.1. Five Key Policy Assessment Dimensions 
The Feedback Loop and CFEPS framework, China’s energy policies and strategies 
propose ambitious targets in the pursuit of sustainable energy generation, improving 
energy efficiency and reducing GHG emissions, as can be seen from Section 2.2.4. 
Although China has dedicated significant resources and favourable legislative 
stimulus to reduce emissions, there are still several fundamental problems. The energy 
policy making constitutes an important process for the development of the energy 
sector, taking into consideration the energy developments and incorporating multiple 
and often three conflicting objectives (climate change mitigation, cost minimisation 
and ensuring strong SoS). Assessing commonly used frameworks from governmental 
institutions, two additional objectives are also vital. These are social equality, and 
governance. From Appendix 17, CFEPS shows that the base-case delivery of policies 
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faces issues in all five key policy dimensions. The five key dimensions are Growth, 
Climate Change, SoS, Social Equality, and Governance.  
 
Growth 
Growth rates have exceeded sustainable levels of development. From the base-case 
results shown in Appendix 18, growth is 8.9% for 2010-2020, dropping to under 3.5% 
per annum towards the 2050. Under BaU, as seen in Appendix 21, growth falls by 
0.1% in the strong revised-case leading up to 2015. The 600ppm and 750ppm cases 
also follow the growth pathways as per the BaU case, as the carbon emissions 
reduction effect does not hinder economic development to the extent that growth is 
limited, in order to adhere to the 600ppm and 750ppm abatement cases. For 450ppm, 
growth falls in the strong revised-case by 0.5% leading up to 2015. The main cause of 
the fall in growth towards a more socially responsible level is due to a stricter cap on 
emissions (legislative) policy action. The marginal decrease signifies an improvement 
in the balance of policy goals and recognises the importance of pollution abatement. 
However the magnitude of change was small. China should continue to implement 
stricter carbon emissions caps with a view of reducing growth to below double digit 
figures. From the literature review, it was established that Yang (2008) believes a 
7.2% growth rate for China is a balanced rate in order to account for emissions 
abatement. The level of emissions abatement was set by the IPCC (2007). Although 
the literature of Yang (2008) and the IPCC (2007) seem dated, they take a long-term 
view of economic growth. Any earlier years with growth rates higher than the 
balanced 7.2% rate of growth will have to be compensated for by even slower growth 
rates in future years to be on the path towards reduced emission rates as set forth by 
the IPCC (2007). The growth rate at 8.9% per annum leading up to 2020 is too high, 
from an emissions perspective.  
 
Climate Change Mitigation 
Climate change issues highlighted by CFEPS include sustained high carbon emissions 
and continued high emissions intensity. The base-case results from Appendix 18 show 
that as expected, emissions under the capped scenarios are lower. It is interesting to 
observe changes to the base-case in Appendix 21 due to policy action. One of the 
most powerful indicators is energy demand per GDP. In both the BaU and the 
450ppm revised cases, energy demand per GDP falls drastically. Under 450ppm, this 
alone falls by 48% in the weak case and by over 50% in the strong case, showing the 
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highly effectiveness of the combined policy actions. The policy action that once again 
had the greatest impact was the command and control action through the use of 
stricter emissions caps.  
 
Energy intensity, calculated as energy demand per unit of GDP did not fall in the 
revised case under the abatement scenarios significantly. This can be partially 
explained by the problem of waste and concentration of energy intensive industries as 
mention previously. Consumers have a low incentive to conserve energy as electricity 
prices are heavily subsidised. However, adjusting subsidies or removing them all 
together is a policy strategy that WITCH is currently unable to address; the WITCH 
model only examines the effect of price changes via subsidies via a proxy from feed 
in tariffs and R&D support for new technology.  
 
Artificially low prices encourage waste and result in blackouts, as previously 
discussed in Section 2.3.1. Another challenge, it could also be traced to a lack of 
consumer choice. As presented in Section 2.2.4, consumers can only purchase power 
from state-owned monopolies. The hard ppm caps for emissions reduction eliminated 
waste, but did not detrimentally affect economic growth as much. 
 
Security of Energy Supply 
SoS issues as evaluated by CFEPS in the base-case, are shown in Appendix 18. China 
is an importer of all the fossil fuels. Under BaU, imports for the fossil fuels increase 
over the projection window. Imports are static for the abatement cases and fall under 
450ppm. The indicator that demonstrated this improvement the clearest is the 
percentage of fossil fuels as a proportion of total generation. In the revised case, 
Appendix 21, the strong revised case of 450ppm shows that a reduction in the 
proportion of fossil fuel generation in comparison to the base-case 450ppm (which is 
already reduced) ranges from 20% to 45%. This is an extremely encouraging result 
due to policy action. The policy action responsible for the switch from fossil to 
cleaner generation technologies may again be due to stricter emissions caps. However, 
additional policy action is needed in terms of reduced costs for cleaner technologies 
whilst increasing costs for fossil energy generation technologies.  
 
Strengthening SoS is important for China as it became a net importer of oil in 1993 
and a net importer of natural gas in 2007. Furthermore, China became a net importer 
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of coal since 2009, importing 103 million tons, as mentioned in Section 2.2.3. The 
switch away from hydrocarbons and coal deposits not only increases China’s energy 
depence on imports, but also reduced emissions. 
 
Social Equality 
Social Equality has shown an improvement between the base-case from Appendix 18 
and the revised case in Appendix 21. The most obvious improvement is observed in 
the 450ppm scenario, whereby the strong revised case expects up to 20% increased 
renewable generation (compared to an already high renewables proportion for 
450ppm) than the base-case. As mention in Chapter 2, most renewable power 
generators are located in remote areas. The fact that renewables are being made grid 
connected shows a broader electricity grid and more rural areas with access to energy, 
reducing energy poverty across China. The policy action for increasing renewables 
and grid connectivity has again benefitted from the contribution of lower costs of 
cleaner technologies and increased costs of fossil generation technologies (legislative 
policy action). It goes without saying that the command and control policy action 
remains paramount, as the greatest improvement was observed under the 450ppm case. 
However the incremental affect before and after the policy change was also 
contributed to by lower costs for renewables.  
 
Governance  
All indicators under governance are accounted for by qualitative discussions and not 
explicitly plotted by WITCH. Subsequently, a thought experiment was carried out. 
The fundamental reason for introducing policy governance was due to challenges 
surrounding the lack of transparency and accountability of policy makers, alluded to 
in Section 2.3.3. If the Feedback Loop was run more frequently as proposed 
previously and the monitoring circle completed more regularly, then Chinese energy 
policy makers and other stakeholders can observe whether the policy action is having 
the intended effect, or at least a small effect in the right direction. 
 
Chinese energy policy making institutions and regulators face problems of lack of 
transparency in the decision making process and accountability of individual policy 
makers. The one party one rule system leaves little room for understanding how the 
decision making process works or for questioning of policy makers. Officials are not 
questioned and do not expose themselves to losing face. There are no complaint 
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mechanisms for all minority groups, such as ombudspersons, consultative bodies and 
inspection panels on development projects. In theory China always meets its energy 
and emissions targets, as there are no independent third parties to verify China’s 
energy performance. Thus to increase the potency of overall policy actions, it is 
recommended to have stricter policy governance to speed up policy action in the right 
direction. 
 
7.1.2. Policy Action Lessons for China 
Policy action for China can again be subcategorised following the three policy action 
groupings from Section 2.3 into Legislative, Economic Driven, and Organisational 
repsectively. 
 
Legislative Action Lessons 
The strongest policy contributor from the Feedback Loop shown was the stricter 
emissions caps. Out of all cases, the best results in terms of a more balanced economy 
giving greater consideration to the environment and other important goals were in the 
450ppm strong-case scenarios. Often for BaU, the before and after policy change did 
not alter the state of the Chinese economy. China was able to absorb the various 
different types of energy policy actions and continue as normal. In the absence of 
legislative GHG limits, policy action would be marginal in the revised cases. 
 
Economic Driven Lessons 
The greatest contributors in the revised cases of incentive-driven tools were the 
changing costs. The increase of generation and setup costs for fossil fuels, coupled 
with the decrease in generation and setup costs for clean generation technologies 
results in the revised case moving towards a more balance resource consumption and 
production level. Needless to say, the greatest improvements were observed under the 
450ppm scenario in the strong-case. Thus, for economic driven policy actions to see 
their full potential, they have to be used in conjunction with legislative policy action 
in the form of stricter GHG controls.  
 
Organisational Lessons 
Organisational policy action lessons call for the greatest frequency for which the 
policy Feedback Loop is applied. If each Feedback Loop makes a small, but positive 
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contribution, then the greater the frequency of completing one Feedback Loop and the 
faster China moves towards a better revised state of energy policy. The speed at 
which the policy Feedback Loop goes round can be theoretically carried out by 
running the loop more frequently than once every five years. In practice, it would 
mean that policy goals are set shorter than the given year time gaps. For example, 
setting the policy goals once every year is effectively equivalent to running the 
Feedback Loop once a year. Positive policy improvements can be promptly 
highlighted and improved upon, allowing China to reach a better revised state at a 
faster pace. This is equivalent to having better monitoring of policy goal successes. 
Better monitoring allows policy makers to understand whether their policy actions are 
having the desired impact on China. Faster Chinese energy policy improvements are 
realised through better policy monitoring. 
 
7.1.3. Challenges Facing the Chinese Energy Policy Makers 
From the review of the literature and the quantitative climate modelling, there are still 
fundamental problems that policy makers have to overcome for a better energy policy 
landscape. China is a command and control type economy best suited to legislative 
driven policy action. The other two types of policy action face challenges of effective 
employment in China. 
 
Economic Driven Policy Action and Issues of No Market Clearing Prices 
Economic or incentive driven policy action depends on market prices of energy to be 
freely set. The Chinese energy market is not entirely driven by market forces. As a 
result, energy prices do not converge to market clearing levels. From the literature 
review, it was suggested the Chinese economy does not function like a classical 
perfect market. Already discovered in Section 2.2.2, the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) takes the central role of price fixing. Residential 
electricity prices are agreed between the provincial NDRC and the grid companies 
many months in advance to ensure a level that covers costs and yield a reasonable 
profit for utility companies. In the absence of market cleaning prices, the 
methodology may fail to function. To use WITCH as a policy assessment tool, market 
cleaning prices are required.  
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However, it was also shown that taxes and subsidies which change the capital and 
generation costs of different generation technologies were effective policy actions. 
The initial criticism of lack of market clearing prices in the Chinese market may be 
beneficial. China’s NDRC electricity price setting abilities are akin to energy 
generation tax and subsidies applied to market clearing prices in western nations. 
Sustainable energy generation price support makes an effort to move energy prices 
from market clearing to discretionary levels. Thus centrally set energy prices can help 
promote clean generation technologies and discourage fossil based generation.  
 
Organisational Policy Action and Issues of Fragmented Authoritarianism 
Organisational policy action depends on the various policy setting institutions 
working in unison and a watchdog, or regulator to ensure the institutions are 
functioning in the best interest of energy stakeholders. The challenge facing Chinese 
energy policy makers, which undermines the Governance dimension of effective 
policy making, is fragmented authoritarianism. Fragmented authoritarianism refers to 
the disjointed decision making process and implementation. Even if there were no 
market based impediments, multiple governmental agencies prevent the proper 
implementation of energy policy. This inefficient policy setting mechanism was 
reviewed in Section 2.2.2. The three reasons behind the fragmented authoritarianism 
are the lack of a super ministry, bargaining and de facto federalism.  
 
There is no super ministry to govern different parts of the energy industry. The 
Legislative Policy Action requires a centralised and coordinated policy stance. China 
lacks a government structure and is not able to manage its energy sector efficiently. 
When the Ministry of Energy (the centralised body of energy policy making) was 
disbanded in 1993, it was replaced by the National Energy Commission (NEC). 
However, the NEA is severely under resourced with only 112 personnel, compared to 
the US DoE’s 110,000 staff. The labyrinth of regulatory control does not offer the 
integrated governmental structure with the clean policy message that Legislative 
Policy Action needs.  
 
Bargaining occurs between policy institutions of equal rank. This is especially evident 
between the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and NEC. The 
NEC and National Energy Administration (NEA) are tasked with governing the 
energy industry; however they are not able to control energy prices. The NDRC sets 
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electricity prices. As a result, the NDRC’s action often prevents a coordinated policy 
effort across industries and ministries. This further impedes the Organisation Policy 
Actions. 
 
De facto federalism refers to the inability by the CPC to effectively institute reforms. 
It has been established that short and medium-term plans are vital to ensure to meet 
regular milestones and achieve long-term pollution abetment targets. Local authorities 
and a myriad of other local SEOs have substantial influence over policy action at local 
provincial level. The central message of the FYP gets diluted in the bargaining and 
negotiation process. Provincial and local governments need to define, among other 
elements, the respective responsible institutions, the specific guidelines and 
programmes, the role and reach of the relevant monitoring systems. This is vital, as 
highlighted by the Governance policy dimension. 
 
Policy lessons learnt for China suggests there is still scope for improvement in 
China’s Policy landscape. What is also vital to understand, to supplement the energy 
policy decision making process, is how China’s electricity generation mix behaves 
over the modelling horizon. The electricity generation pathway under BaU and the 
pollution abatement scenarios are presented as follows.  
 
7.2. Future Chinese Electricity Generation Mix and Robustness of 
the Results 
WITCH is the modelling framework that projected future state of China under the 
different abatement scenarios, in addition to the BaU case. As societies are becoming 
increasingly low carbon energy generation, the most important guidance of WITCH 
on CFEPS is how China should generate its electricity to meet energy demand. The 
electricity mix projections along with the robustness of these results are discussed 
below.  
 
China’s Future Generation Mix 
China’s future electricity generation capacity, as projected by WITCH, shows the 
strong roles that wind and solar play in additional to nuclear power, though less for 
hydropower. This was especially shown to be true under the 450ppm, 600ppm and 
750ppm pollution abatement cases. The research question asked for China to sustain 
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its accelerated pace of economic growth, whilst being pollution responsible. In 
response to this challenge, under the WITCH model, China in the year 2050 will 
dedicate over 50% of generation mix to clean technologies for 750ppm, whilst this 
goes up to just under 80% in 600ppm, and 97% in 450ppm. In 2010, clean generation 
capacity only accounted for 25%. Within the clean generation technologies category, 
China in 2050 expected wind and solar to rise by 2050 to 29% in 750ppm, 51% in 
600ppm and 71% in 450ppm. This is a drastic rise, as wind and solar only accounted 
for 2% in 2010. Nuclear remains the second most important clean generation 
technology in all cases.  
 
The results seem plausible; in light of the speed renewable energy has seen global 
acceptance since early 2000. Even if solar and wind power are costly technologies to 
install and operate compared to traditional coal-fired power plants, the natural 
resource uncertainty and the associated issues of SoS have forced China to embrace a 
higher proportion of renewables. As the world starts to embrace clean generation 
technologies, it is reasonable to expect China, as a low cost producer of turbines and 
solar panels to lead in this change. 
 
Results Robustness 
In terms of the robustness of the results, they are compared to other recent IAM 
literature. Some research only offer projections of electricity generation globally for 
example in IMACLIM–R (Jakob et al., 2009), but not specifically on China’s energy 
generation. Others literature focus on China using REMIND-R (Lauder et al., 2009), 
but do not present results under the 450ppm pollution abatement scenario. The 
WITCH model is able to project China specific results for abatement scenario 
including the 450ppm case. Thus the output generated by WITCH is more relevant for 
Chinese energy policy makers and academics studying Chinese energy polices.  
 
The study from the IEA (2011b) offers the closest like-for-like comparison to WITCH, 
projecting the electricity generation mix under BaU and 450ppm for China. Under the 
BaU scenario, the WITCH model results are in line with the IEA’s prediction. In 2020, 
low carbon generation technologies account for 33% of power generation capacity, 
which is close to 32% from the IEA. For 2030, this low carbon set of generation 
sources accounts for 33% of capacity, whereas the IEA is 34%. WITCH projects 
clean generation to be 36% by 2035, whereas the IEA stays stable at 35%. Under the 
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450ppm scenario, the WITCH model results display some discrepancies The stricter 
emissions caps set by WITCH compared to the IEA means that cleaner generation 
proliferates to the economy faster and earlier. By 2020, WITCH predicts that there 
will be 57% clean electricity generation compared to the IEA’s 25%. In 2030, 
WITCH projects there will be 79%, whereas the IEA predicts 58%. In 2035, WITCH 
expects clean generation to be 88%, whereas the IEA calls for 60%. Comparisons 
against the IEA were only made under the WITCH base-case, as the revised-case via 
the Feedback Loop is a new contribution to the existing body of research. There was 
no literature found to compare the revised case after the proposed policy actions.  
 
What sets the results from the WITCH model apart from its comparables is the way 
CFEPS uses the WITCH results. Whereas other analysis project energy consumption 
and generation patterns in isolation, the WITCH results are used as part of CFEPS. 
One of the greatest challenges of long-term energy projection is uncertainty over time. 
Although WITCH is able to project long-term energy pathways until 2050, CFEPS 
only uses the short to medium-term part of the projection window to help policy 
makers implement informed energy policy decisions. CFEPS is able to recommend 
Policy Action, based on the next decade or a two-decade window of WITCH results. 
CFEPS seeks to continuously run the Feedback Loop and make small steps (every 5 
years, or every year) in the improvement of policy outcomes. CFEPS does not require 
a very long-term projection window to be useful in energy policy guidance. The short 
to medium-term projection requirement of CFEPS thus improves the results 
robustness by selecting a period with greater certainty and accuracy.  
 
Placing emphasis on generation capacity to address the research question has several 
strengths, but also weaknesses. The strength of analysing electricity generation mix is 
the simplicity of the analysis. China’s mix can be analysed and compared to global 
projections over time. The Chinese mix can also be compared to the carbon emissions 
caps set forth under the abatement profiles. The visual impact that the generation mix 
allows for understanding China’s energy strategy makes it an important policy action. 
The weakness of analysing electricity generation via the mix also concerns simplicity. 
By taking a stylised and simple approach many other important model outputs are 
ignored and may lead to a skewed policy outcome. Thus it is vital to employ the 
electricity generation mix in conjunction with the other WITCH model outputs in 
making energy policy decisions. Additionally, WITCH does not consider other 
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resource constraints, such as scarcity of suitable land for solar panels, or appropriate 
water-side location for setting up new power plants. These simplifications may have 
overlooked China’s ability to embrace clean generation technologies to the extent 
projected by WITCH. 
 
Having discussed Chinese energy policy lessons learnt in Section 7.1 and commented 
on the implications of China’s policies on its electricity generation mix, attention is 
shown to global energy policy lessons learnt, as presented in Section 7.3 
 
7.3. Global Energy Policy Lessons Learnt  
From the review of the FYP and other Chinese centralised energy policies, there are 
several lessons which are transferable and applicable for other nations. For example 
the lessons can be applied to non-OECD countries such as India. These are 
highlighted in Table 7.1 and elaborated in the remainder of this section. 
 
Table 7.1: Lessons learnt from China’s energy policies for the rest of the world 
Benefits of 
Centralised China’s 
Energy Plan 
Drawbacks of China’s 
Centralised Energy Plan 
Uncertain Impacts of 
China’s Centralised 
Energy Plan 
Transparent energy 
policy commitment. 
 
Still does not account for 
the cost of pollution and 
emissions. 
Additional task of 
monitoring to ensure 
adherence and confidence. 
Clear policy stance 
changes. 
Disconnect between macro 
targets and micro level 
guidance. 
No transparent intermediate 
targets. 
 
7.3.1. Benefits of China’s Energy Policies 
Greater transparency of energy policy chance is offered by the medium-term targets. 
This may be advantageous compared to Western nations, which experience a 
changing green political stance depending on the party in power. A clearer and more 
centralised policy sends signals of what the government is committed to in the 
upcoming years to all stakeholders affected by changing energy policies. For Western 
nations, green policies may be a function of which political party is in power, which 
in turn drives the amount of subsidies commitment to reducing emissions. 
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Clear policy stance changes are visible. All stakeholders affected by changes in 
energy policy are able to see how policy trends have been progressing and compare 
current five yearly commitments to prior commitments. This may also prove to be a 
useful method to predict future plans, in response to the various growth, climate 
change, and energy sector external shocks.  
 
7.3.2. Drawbacks of China’s Energy Policies 
For energy policy makers globally, there are two drawbacks to China’s centralised 
energy policies. Firstly, there is heavy price subsidy leading to over consumption. 
Secondly, there is a disconnection between macro and micro level energy policies. 
 
Centralised energy plans should try to internalise the cost of pollution to consumers of 
energy. However, China still very much follows a command and control economy in 
its energy supply with growth as its top priority. As a result fuel and electricity prices 
are subsidised to encourage more than optimal consumption with an associated effect 
in boosting GDP output. This was evident in the fact that Chinese GDP grew at 10% 
instead of the 7% climate stable rates for the previous decades. Additionally, the 
utilities along with the NDRC sets prices which does not put climate change impact 
first. If energy prices can take into account pollution externalities, then the centralised 
energy policies will prove to be more effective than democratic policies at reducing 
emissions.  
 
There is disconnection between macro level energy target policies and micro level 
step-by-step guidance. The top echelons of government set visible energy use and 
generation targets. However, it is less known how these targets are to be realised. If 
the five yearly plans could be more prescriptive on what, as well as how, it would 
become a formidable policy action in tackling emissions.  
 
7.3.3. Uncertain Impacts of China’s Energy Policies 
The impacts of China’s energy policy action are not always predictable. Comparing 
the base-case results in Appendix 18 to the revised case results of Appendix 21, in 
some BaU cases, the revised case gave perverse outcomes. Two indicators which 
illustrate these unexpected outcomes are shown as follows.  
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Energy R&D per GDP 
In the Energy R&D per GDP indicators the revised case expects R&D to increase in 
proportion to GDP (Figure A21.3). However, in the BaU case, policy action had the 
opposite impact, as R&D declined after policy action. This could have been caused by 
two factors: by R&D falling, or by GDP increasing. Since the change in GDP levels 
before and after policy action was marginal, it can only be explained by falling R&D. 
R&D may have fallen due to the increasing costs to fossil generation sources. Since 
under BaU, fossil fuels’ proportion of the generation mix for China remains at two-
thirds through the modelling window (up to 2050), any cost increase to fossil 
generation technologies discourages new investments. This discouragement of new 
R&D would be substantial compared to total R&D reduction, as the R&D amount 
may mirror the two-thirds generation mix of fossil generation technologies. 
 
Oil, gas and coal as proportion of total primary generation 
Oil, gas and coal as a proportion of total primary generation, perversely increased in 
the BaU case after policy action were taken in the pursuit of pollution abatement. 
(Figure A21.8). In the revised BaU case, fossil generation increased by 6% in the 
weak case, and over 10% in the strong case. This could be explained by the fact that 
in the absence of any ppm carbon caps, China would pursue the path of least 
resistance and increase its generation mix in fossil fuels. One policy action that could 
have caused this is the increase in efficiency and load effect in all technologies. A 
greater percentage in efficiency means a greater MW of generation per kg of natural 
resources burnt. From the inputs assumed from Appendix 13, renewables have greater 
efficiencies. Thus a percentage increase in efficiency would have resulted in the 
(already highly efficiency) renewables to increase in their proportion of the generation 
mix. The only explanation is then the load argument. From the inputs in Appendix 13, 
loads for coal, oil and gas are higher at 0.85. Coal is already a large proportion of the 
mix. Any proportional increase in the load would boost coal and other fossil fuels 
higher in the generation mix, in the absence of ppm caps (as was the case for the BaU 
scenario). 
 
There are many policy lessons learnt for China and globally. These lessons learnt are 
based on the CFEPS and employment of the WITCH methodology. The 
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appropriateness of the methodology used in this research warrants further discussion 
and is presented in Section 7.4. 
7.4. Appropriateness and Limitations of the CFEPS Methodology 
CFEPS has been shown to work and highlight areas of energy policy improvements. 
Additionally, the Feedback Loop has also demonstrated its ability to iteratively switch 
between climate modelling, energy policy analysis and back to climate modelling 
with a view of marginally making policy improvements. With this in mind the 
following section examines more closely the appropriateness and limitations of the 
policy assessment framework, hybrid IAM climate model, and the Feedback Loop. 
This is especially relevant for academic users, which seek to improve the currently 
methodological limitations of CFEPS. 
 
7.4.1. Appropriateness of the Policy Assessment Framework 
The Policy Assessment Framework has demonstrated where potential improvements 
lie in China’s energy policy landscape. This was enhanced through the survey, which 
allowed the framework to be fine tuned according to comments from industry and 
academic experts. However there are still shortcomings as follows. 
 
Pragmatic nature of the policy indicators selection process 
The proposed policies have not encompassed all the useful indicators. In not selecting 
some of the indicators as suggested in the survey, there may be confounding factors, 
where other factors not considered have great importance. To focus the analysis, the 
final set of revised indicators were based on the research objective which calls for 
setting up a tool to help energy policy makers in their decision making process. 
Additionally, the final revised policy assessment indicators also took a pragmatic 
approach by excluding indicators that the WITCH model was unable to provide 
detailed evaluation. For example, referring to Table 4.3, policy assessment indicators 
such as the rate of urbanisation was not accounted for as the research decided to focus 
on energy policy specific indicators. Additionally, imports as a proportion of total 
energy consumption was not chosen, as there was a lack of data availability. For a 
well-rounded and complete set of energy policy assessment indicators, additional 
work needs to be undertaken to reintroduce those policy dimensions which were not 
accounted for in CFEPS, but were mentioned in the survey. 
243 
 
Social Equality and Governance  
Social equality and governance are soft indicators. These soft indicators are less 
tangible than calculated indicators. The CFEPS policy assessment framework was not 
able to calculate these soft indicators. Instead, a thought experiment was undertaken 
to perform the analysis. One way to increase the objectivity of analysis, is to carry out 
a survey of just the qualitative energy policy indicators. The survey would again ask 
leading experts in Europe and China, but this time, focus on how they see the current 
12
th
 FYP performing in light of the social equality and governance (non quantitative) 
indicators. 
 
Scoring 
The Policy Assessment Framework has demonstrated that in the revised case a 90% 
score can be achieved, which is 3.5 times better than the 20% score in the base-case. 
However, the scoring of energy policy outcome is a relative measure and not an 
absolute measure. In other words, a score of circa 90% (at revised case) does mean 
that policy is 70% better than the 20% score (at base-case). It only shows that 
noticeable improvements have been made towards addressing areas previously 
neglected. If this policy assessment methodology were to be applied to reward 
politicians, it would be difficult to reward based on performance, as only a “better” or 
“worse” policy outcome can be determined. The absolute level of improvement 
cannot be established.  
 
7.4.2. Appropriateness of the Hybrid IAM Climate Model Applied 
WITCH offers a robust climate modelling framework to guide Chinese energy policy 
makers in their decision making process. IAMs or WITCH in particular, aids energy 
policy decision making. There are, however, several weaknesses of the WITCH 
methodology. All these weaknesses are predominantly related to stylisation and 
simplification of the modelling process. The holistic nature of the WITCH model 
makes the modelling process easier, but at the expense of some loss of details. 
Simplifying assumptions have been made to make it easy to update inputs and run the 
model in a frequent basis. But this practical/operational advantage comes with 
weaknsses that the model not being able to endogenise and treat, which falls into the 
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previously mentioned categories of general, climate change, energy demand, energy 
supply and policy impact. 
 
Discount Rate 
The present value of utility and welfare is not constant across all time periods. During 
periods of low growth, low interest rates and inflation, the discount rate should be low. 
However, in times of high growth, high interest rates and high inflation, the discount 
rate should be high. As observed in the projection, WITCH predicts a period of high 
growth in the first quarter of this century with lower growth expected in the second 
quarter of this century. The impact of a uniform interest rate across long and low 
growth periods does not reflect how agents would have behaved in WITCH’s game 
theoretic context. For example in high interest period, savings capital instead of 
spending capital would be pursued. Thus in period of high interest rate there is less 
capital expenditure on new build power station. Under the uniform interest rate, the 
full decision making process at each five-year iterative step is not as accurately 
modelled.  
 
Regional Interactions and Regional Energy Policy Impacts 
The WITCH model carries out analysis on a regionally disaggregated basis, allowing 
the user to examine China. The game theoretic setup allows each nation to behave 
strategically relative to policy decision from other nations. For simplicity in the 
WITCH model, the world is aggregated into 12 regions according to similar 
characteristics. This does not fully account for real world differences of nations in 
terms of energy markets (infrastructure for power grids, transportation and pipelines) 
energy policy, endowments of natural resources, or even cultures.  
 
The impact of this on the climate modelling exercise has insufficient granularity 
amongst China’s neighbours. Since Asia Pacific is combined into one category, the 
model does not attempt to differentiate China’s neighbours individually in their game 
theoretic behaviour to China’s energy policy actions. However this issue is limited, as 
China itself is treated separately, as the research sets out to understand China, with 
limited focus on its neighbours. 
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Limiting Technologies 
Whist there have been attempts to internalise technological change into the economic 
module by WITCH via learning by doing, the simplification and stylisation are 
limited to capture real-world effects. The WITCH model assumed global participation 
in climate policy in the near-term and shift technology transfer across regions.  
 
The impact on WITCH is an overly optimistic assumption of political willingness to 
undertake technological transfers and share technologies. There may be large 
incumbents (in the coal-power industry) with vested interests in traditional fossil fired 
power plants. They would lobby against new legislation supporting generation 
technologies with low carbon emissions, in an attempt to remain the dominating 
energy supplier. This is a minor consideration for China compared to other nations. In 
other nations, lobbying has a real impact on governments, as they are elected and 
some require funding to get into power. As the CPC is not elected, it is not dependent 
on fund raising from large corporations (with lobbying intention), the objectives 
should be more in favour of the generation populous.  
 
Natural Catastrophes 
The value of lives lost cannot be estimated accurately. In the absence of accurate loss 
estimations, it is difficult to estimate the fat tail and extreme climatic disasters. At the 
outset, the research only considered marginal impacts of energy generation on the 
economy. WITCH does not take into consideration extreme climatic events, or “cliff” 
scenarios. Highly improbable and extremely weather events, such as hurricanes, are 
not included as working assumptions. Statistical analysis would be better suited to 
these fat tailed events. The impact on extreme climatic events is large on the WITCH 
model. For example, in the aftermath of Fukushima, Germany decided to phase out all 
nuclear generation by 2022. This exogenous shock to the energy generation mix is not 
accounted for in WITCH. In the context of studies on China, the aftermath of 
Fukushima was limited. China has suspended granting permits to newly proposed 
nuclear power plants. Those nuclear plants that already have permission will be 
constructed in the usual manner. Hence it seems that China is more resilient to shocks 
and the WITCH model does not need to account for these shocks in China, as it would 
have to for other nations (e.g. Germany). One solution would “bolt on” a statistical 
trigger for hurricanes or tsunamis if atmospheric CO2 reached a certain levels and 
factor in the economics damage. If these negative externalities are factors into the 
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macroeconomics side of the equation, then it would show a stronger case for stricter 
abatement. 
 
Economic Response to Policy 
The stakeholders affected by energy policy suffer from irrationality. The practical 
human factor of energy policy could counter-act theoretical predictions of policy 
outcomes. Hence it is difficult to predict with certainty how local authorities and 
energy firms would act in light of radical policy changes. Future work on irrationality 
and policy behavioural studies should be considered. 
 
The impact on WITCH is difficult to predict. If irrationality determines the CPC’s 
energy policy setting decisions, then the next FYP may not follow up items from the 
previous FYP. This makes following a consistent policy message of China’s energy 
policies challenging. However, from history, China’s energy policies have followed a 
progressive path towards reducing emissions and have not undertaken unexpected and 
drastic energy policy reversals.  
 
GHG Representation 
The modelling framework has only considered atmospheric carbon emissions as the 
focal point of pollution abatement. It has not considered CH4 and N2O or other 
harmful gasses. It has also chosen to ignore water based pollutants in salt and 
freshwater environments. 
 
The implication for WITCH is an incomplete accounting of pollutants. Since the 
IPCC only provided guidelines on atmospheric carbon emissions, this research based 
its ppm scenarios only on carbon emissions in the atmosphere. The additionally 
mentioned pollutants are all additional complexities to consider. 
 
Emissions Trading 
There is no incorporation of the possibility of future global emissions trading markets 
or of carbon reduction credits. As per the EU ETS and anticipated carbon trading 
schemes in Australia, China may eventually implement such a scheme given the 
increasing pressures from the COP meetings.  
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The implication for WITCH is the need for future versions of the model to incorporate 
such mechanisms. As the COP increasingly calls for a unified carbon market, WITCH 
has to be altered to reflect carbon trading, before China accedes to a global carbon 
market. 
 
7.4.3. Appropriateness of the Feedback Loop 
The Feedback Loop has not been widely used before in the energy policy decision 
making process. Hence the appropriateness of the Feedback Loop component 
warrants great attention because of the following highlighted shortcomings. The loop 
is a good framework for aiding the policy making process because it creates a balance 
between simplification and usability. If the feedback loop had too many components, 
the modelling procedures would render the loop too cumbersome to use on a regular 
basis. For example, if China was not considered in its entirety, but village by village, 
then the modelling process would take so long that by the time the model was run, the 
data becomes out of date. The loop specifically addresses well the degree of policy 
force, mapping between policy and climate change, and longer term analysis. 
 
Degree of policy force advisable 
The research has chosen to use different degrees of policy strength. The indicators are 
a qualitative assessment of energy policy effectiveness. The mild case of policy action 
was represented through a 5% change from the base-case and 10% change for a strong 
policy case. However, it is difficult to accurately represent a “5% increase in load and 
utilisation” as a policy action in the model. It does not seek to offer assessment of 5% 
or 10% improvement in policy effectiveness. Instead it is a relative comparison of 
whether today’s policies have improved relatively on those of 5 year ago. For 
example there is no guarantee the intended 5% load or power plant utilisation 
increases as per the original policy action will be reflected the same way as a 5% 
increase in the model. Thus it is more important to establish the plausible impact on 
the economy from changes in variables selected for sensitivity analysis. 
 
The implications for this research on the undertaken evaluation only offer a signpost 
on where efforts should be made. Implications are not made for the amount of force 
the policy should be applied. For example, a 1% increase in efficiency does not 
translate to 1% of savings of carbon emissions due to efficiency increases. There is a 
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black box in the translation of 1% of change input towards a 1% change of an output. 
Thus it is more important to understand how the economy moves to changes in model 
input variables as a result of energy policy changes and to analyse the exact impact of 
energy policy changes on the economy. The policy assessment framework can only be 
applied on a relative evaluation basis of before and after discretionally energy policy 
changes. 
 
Stylised mapping the energy policy analysis onto the climate model 
The outputs of the energy policy analysis lead onto a determination of the policy 
actions which may become the new inputs to the climate model. It has been observed 
that such mapping can be difficult on determining the right indicators for the model. 
The survey suggested that the final set of indicators must be adequately selected that 
affects the end results from the models. Therefore, a robust tool has been required to 
aid energy policy makers in their decision making process.  
 
Another aspect of stylised mapping between policy actions and indicators for the 
model was recognised by Dr Neil Strachan of UCL as per my survey of CFEPS policy 
assessment framework criteria items. In January 2012, he especially highlighted the 
extent “whether a high level method like an IAM can delve deep enough into the 
driver of Chinese Energy policy to identify key policy issues and to enable analysis in 
more detail”. In the context of this research, Dr Strachen’s observations are reflected 
in the fact that WITCH is only able to roughly simulate the impact changes in energy 
policies (through changes in the IAM inputs) on the wider economy. It is not precise 
enough to accurately simulate what each Chinese province would do. For a provincial 
level energy policy decision support framework, WITCH would need to be modified, 
whereby “each of the 12 global regions” becomes “each of China’s 22 provinces”, 
with game theory played between the Chinese provinces.  
 
Medium and Long-Term Analysis 
Climate change policies are very long-term in nature. Only over many decades can the 
fruits of climate change policies be observed by the stakeholders. For medium and 
long-term energy policy analysis, the WITCH model is re-run every three to five year 
intervals with updated base-year input data. The five year intervals conveniently 
coincide with the updates in China’s FYPs. In the context of this research, WITCH is 
restarted to compare the initial projections of economic, environmental and energy 
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sector behaviours in 2010 against updated inputs at base-year 2015 or base-year 2020. 
This has two benefits. Firstly, the robustness of projections can be assesses. 
Predictions for 2015 using base-year 2010 data can be compared actual 2015 
outcomes. Secondly, updated inputs data that vary from one base-year to another also 
forms as sensitivity analysis to examine how WITCH behaves to changes in the 
starting year. However, the re-running of the model required a continued update of 
base-year data. The model is very sensitive to the base-year starting point. Given the 
difficulties of getting comprehensive and updated data from the Chinese central 
government, the WITCH model may not always start with the correct base-year data. 
 
 
Altering the Feedback Loop Configuration 
The CFEPS Feedback Loop could be run in a different way. Currently, the loop starts 
with the policy assessment of the energy landscape before policy action. Subsequently, 
legislative change is implemented and the energy landscape is assessed after policy 
action. Alternatively, the Feedback Loop could be used, not to propose new policy 
action, but to assess other policy makers’ legislative change. Energy policies are 
centrally set by the CPC in China. An alternative use of CFEPS would be to simply 
understand the implication on the economy from legislative change, not make new 
policy suggestions.  
 
7.5. Validation and Validity of the Work 
This work has been incrementally validated throughout the research process, with a 
focus on the internal and external validity.  
 
7.5.1. Internal validity 
Internal validity refers to causal relationships between the exogenous and endogenous 
variables. It assess to what degree a study produces a single, unambiguous 
explanation for the results, that is free from confounds, hidden variables and spurious 
relationships (Aronson et al., 2007 and Brewer, 2000). To ensure the internal validity, 
the study has to control for minimal risks from confounding, history, maturation and 
selection bias factors. 
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Confounding risks are changes in the dependent variable not completely determined 
by independent variables, but attributed to a third party variable that is related to the 
independent variable (Trochim, 2006). The mapping between policy and modelling 
may be subject to confounding factors if a third party variable is overlooked. WITCH 
was not specifically designed to capture real world impacts of China’s Energy Policy 
Assessment Framework and of Chinese Policy Actions. A mapping exercise was 
undertaken to proxy the effect of changing WITCH outputs onto the Policy 
Assessment Framework, and to proxy the impact of Policy Action onto changing 
WITCH inputs. Confounding effects may be present between the mapping of WITCH 
outputs onto Energy Policy Assessment Framework. The Social Equality dimension 
of the Policy Assessment Framework uses growth of renewables to measure 
affordability of energy and energy access. The rationale behind this mapping was 
renewable energy, especially wind and solar farms, are normally located in remote 
locations. As more wind and solar farms are set up, the grid connection in China will 
expand, improving affordability of energy and access to grid supply of electricity. The 
mapping did not directly consider cost of energy in its affordability measure of energy. 
Energy cost is a confounding factor as its omissions overlooks the causal relationship 
with energy affordability. Additionally, energy access assumes that all new built 
renewable generation are located in remote locations and that all new built renewable 
will become grid connected. If some renewables are built close to existing cites, or 
choose not to be grid connected and only supply to local villages, then the grid 
connectivity in China may not necessarily increase. The confounding factors risk is 
less of an issue with tangible and quantifiably policy dimensions such as Economic 
Growth, Climate Change Mitigation, and SoS. The aggregate weighting of Economic 
Growth, Climate Change Mitigation and SoS accounts for approximately two-thirds 
of the Policy Assessment Framework weighting. The research acknowledges the 
confounding factors risk for the remaining two policy dimensions of Equality and 
Governance, which been included into the recommendation in Chapter 8 for the future 
work.  
 
History risks are exogenous events outside of the study scope, especially from large 
scale events, that affect policy makers’ attitudes and behaviours. It becomes 
impossible to determine whether any change on the dependent variable is due to the 
changes from the independent variable, or the exogenous shock (Levine and 
Parkinson, 1994). The most likely exogenous events are natural climatic disaster and 
251 
weather events. The best example was Fukushima in March 2011, whereby in 
response, Germany decided to phase out all nuclear generation by 2022. China’s 
response was to put on hold the granting of new permits for nuclear power plants. 
Existing plants with permits already granted proceeded as planned with existing 
plants. It is unlikely that China will phase out nuclear power, expecting to its double 
nuclear generation capacity by 91GW in the next five years. Even with the accident 
occurring on China’s doorstep, it has not taking drastic actions against nuclear power 
in response to Fukushima. Although it is unclear how China will react if a disaster 
occurred on Chinese soil, the history risk does not seem significant following 
Fukushima.  
 
Maturation risks occur when the subjects under investigation change during the 
course of the study (Shadish et al., 2002). The modelling horizon is intended to 
capture Chinese energy system until 2050. During this time, current politicians will 
have retired and new policy makers will be in charge. As new generations of energy 
policy makers come into power, their perception of climate change may alter. The 
projected path of energy consumption and generation may not adhere to a set course. 
The projected energy path may experience jumps during the changeover of energy 
politicians. In China, the Premier’s term in office comes up for renewal every five 
years. Wen Jiabao could potentially step down as early as March 2013 if his term is 
not renewed. The new Premier may have a different environmental agenda, which 
will be reflected in the next FYP from 2016 to 2020. The maturation risk is small for 
China. China is a one party system. There are no opposing parties. Unless the Chinese 
Communist Party takes policy u-turns, there is a small risk that changing politicians 
would result in drastic energy policy changes, limiting maturation risk. 
 
Selection Bias risks refer to issues between different parties interacting with the 
independent variables (Watt and van den Berg, 2002). Through their interaction with 
independent variables, certain parties may exert biased influence towards the 
observed outcome. The survey of Policy Assessment Framework criteria may have 
been subject to selection bias. The survey proposed a set of Policy Assessment 
Framework criteria items and asked industry experts to improve the Policy 
Assessment Framework. The survey did not ask participants to create criteria items, 
but proposing a set of already constructed criteria. In doing so, selection bias could 
have been introduced that guided the survey participants to agree with the final 
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proposal criteria items of the Energy Policy Assessment Framework. This was 
realised in the outset of the survey and overcome by several rounds of informal 
discussions with potential participants before the questionnaire for the survey was 
finalised. Additionally, scoring bias does not significantly impact the results; scoring 
is done on a qualitative, rather than qualitative basis. The relative nature of 
comparisons between better/worse policy outcomes renders minor stylisations of 
criteria scoring less crucial. 
 
7.5.2. External validity 
External validity examines the extent to which findings can be generalised across 
alternative settings. Results from CFEPS may be generalised from unique and 
idiosyncratic settings, conditions and beyond the initial considered time period 
(Liebert and Liebert, 1995, and Mitchell and Jolley, 2001). For CFEPS, the two major 
external validity risks are time period and location issues.  
 
Time periods risks relate to using CFEPS beyond the original modelling period up to 
2050. The Hybrid IAM was calibrated with IEA (2011b) energy and carbon emissions 
projections across the modelling time window. To apply the Hybrid IAM across time 
periods, in the very long run and beyond 2015 would be challenging. There is much 
greater uncertainly in the very long-run and the base-case results have limited basis 
for comparison against reputable energy and emission projections. As WITCH 
already project until 2050, there is little additional time period risk that undermines 
CFEPS’ external validity.  
 
Location risks revolve around applying China’s energy policies to similar countries 
such as BRICS. CFEPS was designed to study and aid decision making for Chinese 
energy policies. The Policy Actions, which were divided into Legislative, Economic 
and Governance, were composed based on Chinese energy legislation. Applying 
CFEPS to western economies, or its Asian neighbours would lead to issues of 
Location risks to the external validity. For example, India suffers from a large energy 
deficit, whereby India’s planning commission projects that dependence on energy 
imports could rise to over 50% by 2030, compared to 25% at the start of the century 
(Yep, 2011). CFEPS’s SoS weighting is at 20%. India’s SoS weighting would need to 
be increased to reflect its bourgeoning energy requirements and associated energy 
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policy goals. Without understanding the specific energy needs and policy objectives 
of the nations under investigation, CFEPS cannot be applied to other BRICS nations 
as the weighting or policy assessment emphasis will not be optimal. This risk is 
acknowledged and will be addressed in Chapter 8 within future work. 
 
7.6. Research Questions Revisited 
The research has addressed one primary question and four secondary questions as 
raised in Chapter 1 and revisited in Table 7.2. The theoretical and methodological 
contributions are mainly relevant for academic users, which may seek to adapt and 
improve CFEPS for future versions. Practical contributions are mainly relevant for 
policy makers, who seek to apply CFEPS to make actual policy changes to China. 
 
Table 7.2: Addressing the Research Questions  
 Research Question Addressing the Questions Contribution 
M
ai
n
 Q
u
es
ti
o
n
 
What kind of overarching framework 
is suitable, and what qualitative and 
quantitative elements are appropriate 
to help Chinese policy makers take 
informed energy policy actions for 
reducing CO2 emissions in light of its 
ambitious economic growth targets 
and SoS issues? 
CFEPS has been used to demonstrate it is a 
suitable framework for energy policy making 
in China. Its qualitative element is the Energy 
Policy Assessment Framework. Its 
quantitative element is the Hybrid IAM 
methodology. The Feedback Loop bridges 
both qualitative and quantitative elements. 
Theoretical and 
methodological 
(mainly relevant  
for academic 
users)  
S
ec
o
n
d
ar
y
 Q
u
es
ti
o
n
s 
Do clean generation sources such as 
nuclear, hydropower, wind and solar 
power offer a viable alternative 
generation mix for China in the future 
to reduce emissions, minimise energy 
security issues, whilst boosting 
growth? 
Clean generation sources, from WITCH 
shows, they play an important role in China, 
especially in the stricter emission abatement 
scenario of 450ppm. In IPCC suggested 
emissions path of 450ppm, by 2050, 97% of 
electricity generation capacity is expected 
from clean sources with wind and solar 
accounting for 71%. 
Practical (mainly 
relevant for policy 
makers) 
What energy policy lessons can be 
learnt for China? 
All three policy actions (Legislative, 
Economic and Organisation) are important 
and have to be used in unison to improve 
China’s energy policy landscape. The areas of 
policy improvement needed the most in China 
are SoS, Equality and Governance 
Practical (mainly 
relevant for policy 
makers) 
What is the value of generalisation of 
the assessment methodology and 
The most important lesson from China is the 
need for better monitoring and accountability 
Theoretical and 
methodological 
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policy lessons learnt, for application 
to China’s neighbouring nations? 
of responsibilities globally, to offer stronger 
policy guidance in the short-term, hence 
building up top long-term policy confidence. 
(mainly relevant  
for academic 
users) 
To what extent is the proposed 
methodology (including the use of 
IAMs) appropriate for energy policy 
making? 
CFEPS accomplishes the goal of suggesting 
where policy action is needed and what the 
before and after implications are on the 
Chinese energy system. However, due to the 
simplification of the assessment process, there 
are some potential improvements to be made. 
Theoretical, 
methodological 
and practical 
(mainly relevant  
for academic 
users) 
 
7.6.1. Main Research Questions 
The main research question was what framework and which qualitative and 
quantitative components are appropriate for policy makers to achieve in China to 
reduce carbon emissions in light of its ambitious economic growth targets and SoS 
issues. The CFEPS Feedback Loop from energy policy to climate modelling back to 
energy policy provides a useful method for highlighting where energy policy 
improvements can be made and evaluates the impact of proposed energy policy action. 
CFEPS has shown that all three areas of policy action are necessary to be used in 
unison. Legislative policy action through stricter climate caps is most effective for 
China. Other policy action of incentives via cheaper costs for cleaner technologies 
and more expensive costs for fossil power sources are also effective. All forms of 
policy can be improved via organisational action in improving policy monitoring the 
accountability of responsibilities for policy makers. 
 
7.6.2. Sub Research Questions 
Sub research questions proposed to establish what the role of clean generation 
technologies in China’s energy mix. Clean technologies includes nuclear, renewable 
and hydropower. Renewables plays the largest role and shows the fastest increase in 
the generation mix, for all abatement scenarios but especially under the 450ppm case. 
Nuclear also plays a vital role in the energy generation mix under the abatement 
scenarios. Hydropower, given its requirements for suitable sites sees a fall in 
importance for Chinese electricity generation capacity. Under BaU, fossil fuels 
continue to dominate due to the cheaper generation costs. For China, low carbon 
generation technologies only accounted for around 25%.In the abatement cases of 
450ppm, 600ppm and 750ppm, the cleaner technologies (nuclear, hydro, and 
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renewables) to play a much larger role in the energy mix. For the 750ppm case, the 
cleaner generation technologies rise from 25% in 2010 to 46% in 2035 and 52% in 
2050. For the 600ppm case, cleaner technologies based generation rises to 61% by 
2035 and 79% by 2050. In the most extreme case of 450ppm, cleaner technologies 
based generation increases to 88% by 2035 and 97% by 2050.  
 
Other sub research questions asked what policy lessons have been learnt for China 
and if they can be applied to other countries. All three policy actions (Legislative, 
Economic, and Organisation) are important for China and have to be used in unison to 
improve China’s energy policy landscape. China’s energy policies can benefit from 
improvements in all five policy assessment dimensions (Economic Growth, Climate 
Change Mitigation, SoS, Social Equality, and Governance). The WITCH model along 
with the Feedback Loop quantitatively calculated that all areas can benefit from 
improvement, with the greatest areas of improvement being SoS, Social Equality, and 
Governance. Global lessons learnt calls for better monitoring and accountability of 
responsibilities to offer stronger policy guidance in the short-term, hence building up 
top long-term policy confidence. 
 
The additional secondary research question on the appropriateness of the 
methodology for Chinese and global energy policy making shows that CFEPS and its 
Feedback Loop has successfully aided the energy policy decision making process. 
There are no crucially missing areas to the proposed methodology, as CFEPS 
accomplishes the goal of suggesting where policy action is needed and what the 
before and after implications are on the Chinese energy system. However, due to the 
simplification of the assessment process, there are some potential improvements to be 
made. One notable improvement for climate modelling is to include other air-based 
pollutants (CH4 or N2O) and water based pollutants (fresh and oceanic bodies). Other 
areas of improvement can be realised through assessing the impact of emissions 
trading. Possible improvements to energy policy assessment would be to include 
additional indicators as proposed under the survey, but were not selected, due to 
WITCH’s simplification of assumptions. These limitations are discussed in greater 
detail in the following chapter.  
 
This research has shown that the methodology adopted generates useful results. In 
light of the difficulties highlighted in the evaluation of the climate model, policy 
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evaluation framework and Feedback Loop, CFEPS proves to be a valuable tool for 
Chinese energy policy makers to decide on policy strategies over the medium and 
long-term. The methodology adopted has addressed each of the key research 
questions initially set out in Chapter 1 and was validated in Section 7.5. 
 
7.7. Conclusions 
The research outcomes have shown that CFEPS proves to be a useful tool in the 
decision making process for China energy policy makers. Conveniently, CFEPS is 
composed of three parts, namely the Energy Policy Assessment Framework, Feedback 
Loop (with Policy Actions) and the Hybrid IAM methodology.  
 
The research outcomes have shown that the Energy Policy Assessment Framework 
highlighted all five dimensions could be improved, which are economic growth, 
climate change mitigation, SoS, social equality, and governance. The areas where the 
greatest policy outcome improvements can be realised is in the governance 
dimensions, which suggest better monitoring and accountability of energy decision 
makers is required.  
 
The Feedback Loop highlighted that the most effective type of Policy Action were 
Legislative legislation, with stricter emissions caps as the most effective as modelled 
by WITCH. Incentive based policy action was also crucial, when policy makers did 
not know with certainty that the correct level of emissions, or growth were. 
Organisation policy actions deal with the need for greater monitoring and policy 
maker accountability.  
 
The Hybrid model results were shown to be relatively robust. The projections of the 
electricity generation mix for China and globally are in line with expectation from 
comparable studies by IEA (2011b), IMACLIM–R (Jakob et al., 2009), REMIND-R 
(Lauder et al., 2009) across the different scenarios considered.  
 
CFEPS has not only provided Chinese policy markers with lessons learnt, but 
potentially to the nations with a similar environmental and economic characteristic as 
China. The main benefit of the centralise decision making process of China is that it 
has the greatest potential for being transparent. The Five Year Plans, in theory, 
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provides all stakeholders a regular and comprehensive road map of what to the energy 
and other sectors. However the there is a disconnection between the top level policy 
setting and the local governmental energy policy execution due to lack of monitoring 
and punishment of failed policy implementation.  
 
The appropriateness of, along with internal and external validation for CFEPS show 
that the modelling methodology offers a robust framework to guide Chinese energy 
policy makers in their decision making process. The internal and external validation 
process has highlighted the presence of confounding factors including omitted 
variable bias and time period risks of projection too far into the future. Some 
shortcomings to the research are presented in the next Chapter along with the 
conclusions.  
 
In summary, CFEPS has proved effective in addressing the key and sub-research 
questions. CFEPS offers a decision support tool for China’s energy policy makers to 
improve policy choice and to enhance policy outcomes.  
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8. Conclusions  
The simulation under CFEPS has demonstrated it could provide a useful tool for 
energy policy making in China. CFEPS has identified the need for energy policy 
action in China. Under the hypothesis set out from the research questions, the IAM 
methodology, Policy Assessment Framework and the Feedback Loop are useful 
policy assessment tools.  
 
Furthermore, CFEPS has a robust theoretical foundation, following the literature 
review of energy policies in Chapter 2, review of climate modelling research in 
Chapter 3 and survey of energy policy experts in Chapter 4. From the results in 
Chapter 6 (Appendix 22), and the interpretation of the results in Chapter 7, it is 
observed from CFEPS that China can benefit from improvement to its energy policy 
landscape. CFEPS has demonstrated its added value of CFEPS for Chinese energy 
policy makers.  
 
The Hybrid IAM methodology of WITCH provides the means to simulate China via 
an iterative process. In conjunction with the Policy Assessment Framework the 
simulation is used to identify policy outcome improvements in China’s energy 
makeup. The Hybrid IAM methodology provides suggestions for policy change and 
actions to take. Assuming the IAM’s simulations are correct, this quantitative analysis 
provides the analytical starting point for qualitative discussions on how to improve the 
energy policy outcomes for China. Based on these energy generation mixes, Chinese 
policy makers are able to simulate that emissions are sufficiently abated (alongside 
other important areas of energy policy goals).  
 
The added value from the Feedback Loop ensures China’s energy policies, as 
simulated in the WITCH model, continue to move in the correct direction, and that 
each round of policy action results in one step closer to satisfying all five Policy 
Dimensions. Since it is sometime difficult to accurately predict the outcome of one 
policy change in isolation, the Feedback Loop could aid Chinese energy policy 
makers adjust its policies in incremental steps, until the desired policy outcome if 
achieved. This way, it avoids the risk of launching policy reform in the opposite 
direction to that of a successful policy outcome. The conclusions are the main 
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research findings, academic research contributions, potential practical contributions 
and future works.  
 
8.1. Main Findings  
There are four major research findings for energy policy makers to bear in mind when 
making strategic policy decisions. The most important finding is Chinese energy 
policy lessons learnt and the feedback methodology for understanding China’s energy 
makeup and to allow the user to lean the policy lessons. Additional findings include 
the future of China’s electricity mix for understanding for the nation’s electricity 
make-up will change under the different scenarios simulated. Some common aspects 
of Chinese energy policy lessons learnt could be extracted and potentially be applied 
to nations similar to China. These are presented in global energy policy lessons learnt. 
 
Chinese Energy Policy Lessons 
China’s energy policies can benefit from improvements in all five policy assessment 
dimensions. The WITCH model along with the Feedback Loop quantitatively 
calculated where improvements can occur. After qualitative assessment, it seems that 
China’s Governance aspect of policy making could also be improved. China’s energy 
policy landscape seems to be bound together by the FYPs and other command and 
control type policies. However, after careful examination, there is fragmentation when 
proposed policies are put into implementation.  
 
IAM and Feedback Methodologies for Energy Policy Decision Making in China 
The climate model using the WITCH IAM, Energy Policy Assessment Framework 
and the Feedback Loop has worked in unison to offer Chinese policy makers 
insightful decision support tools. The iterative cycle allows policy makers to prescribe 
marginal adjustments to the current policy landscape and progressively move China 
towards an altered, and hopefully, improved state. However, after examining each of 
the methodologies in turn, shortcomings were highlighted in the methodology, mainly 
born out of the need to simplify the real-world into a stylised representation. These 
shortcomings are further discussed in the Future Works section of this Chapter. From 
the main findings, the research has made key contributions to the existing body of 
research. This is discussed in Section 8.2. 
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Future of Electricity Generation Mix in China 
The research takes the view that moving to lower carbon generation technologies is 
becoming more prevalent. Hence the generation capacity of electricity (rather than all-
encompassing energy) comes to the forefront of analysis and debate. As expected, 
China’s proportion of clean generation to fossil based generation does not show 
significant improvement under the BaU case over the modelling horizon. However, as 
China moves towards the pollution abatement case, with the 450ppm case in 
particular, the dominance of clean generation becomes apparent. WITCH expects 
China in 2050 to dedicate over 50% of its generation mix to clean technologies under 
750ppm conditions, whilst this goes up to just under 80% in 600ppm, and 97% in 
450ppm. In 2010, clean generation capacity only accounted for 25%. Within the clean 
generation technologies category, China in 2050 expects wind and solar to rise by 
2050 to 29% in 750ppm, 51% in 600ppm and 71% in 450ppm. This is a significant 
rise, as wind and solar only accounted for 2% in 2010. Nuclear remains the second 
most important clean generation technology in all cases. 
 
Global Energy Policy Lessons 
The exercise of analysing Chinese energy policy strengths and shortcomings allows 
this research to also offer guidance of generic policy pitfalls that could potentially be 
applied to other nations. China offer greater energy policy transparency in its FYP 
sets goals five years in advance. However to create credibility in the climate change 
policies, nations are advised to offer better monitoring and accountability of 
responsibilities than China’s current policy makers. There is disconnection between 
macro level policy target and micro level policy action. If nations can overcome these 
shortcoming of China’s energy policy landscape, the FYP model as used today offers 
strong policy guidance in the short-term, building up long-term policy confidence 
across other nations. 
 
8.2. Academic Research Contributions 
The research contributions are made on theoretical, methodological and practical 
fronts. Theoretical and methodological contributions were demonstrated in CFEPS 
through the adaptation of the Energy Policy Assessment Framework, Hybrid IAM 
Climate Model on China, to Model Mapping and the Feedback Loop.  
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Hybrid IAMs 
This research was amongst the first to combine a Welfare Maximisation with a Cost 
Minimisation IAM methodology to study China’s energy sector. From the literature 
review in Chapter 4, it was shown that many studies in China had been using general 
equilibrium analysis, cost minimisation and simulations type studies. A hybrid 
combination of welfare maximisation and cost minimisation was shown to add value. 
This combination had not been applied before to study Chinese energy policy and 
generation mix for a better understanding of the role of low carbon energy 
technologies. The usefulness of the Hybrid WITCH IAM is further enhanced with the 
use of the Feedback Loop, as discussed below. The modelling methodology was 
further discussed in Chapter 7, which confirmed that existing methods were either 
cumbersome of inappropriate for the energy policy analysis on China. 
 
The utilisation of a Hybrid IAM Climate Model on China’s energy systems is a new 
way of analysing China’s energy sector. The Model benefits from the advantage of 
using two classes of IAM methodologies, whilst overcoming some disadvantages if 
only one class of IAM methodology was employed. If the definition of the Hybrid 
model in this thesis was assumed to be an amalgamation of Welfare Maximisation 
and Cost Minimisation models, then welfare models are included within the Hybrid 
framework. If Partial Equilibrium model are a derivative of General Equilibrium 
models, both classification share the same problems. Hence the logical evolution in 
Chinese IAM modelling would be to use Hybrid IAM methodology that both embrace 
Welfare Maximising and Cost Minimising. The hybrid methodology offers both a top-
down perspective (i.e. welfare maximisation) of policy, as well as the bottom-up view 
(i.e. cost minimisation) of the energy subsectors.  
 
The hybrid IAM allows the policy setting process to overcome the many decision 
makers at various levels of central to local government who are involved in 
implement policy change. The large land mass of China requires an energy policy 
strategy that guides both central government and local authorities. Otherwise, there 
could be a separation between top level policy setting and local authority policy 
action. The hybrid IAM methodology is set up to allow model inputs from the central 
government as top-down macro-level targets.  
 
262 
Energy Policy Assessment Framework 
For a successful policy outcome, there must be a set of evaluation criteria to help set 
the policy in the first place and subsequently to evaluate the policy. Energy policy is 
no exception. This research produced a synthesis of multi-criteria indicators for the 
purposes of energy policy evaluation through the survey of European and Chinese 
energy and climate change academics.  
 
The policy assessment framework was made more robust and rigorous in the way it 
assesses the impact on the economy. This included a primary survey of Chinese and 
European energy policy academics and other stakeholders for which areas are 
necessary for a balanced energy policy stance. In Chapter 3, this survey helped tailor 
the final set of criteria put in use for assessing energy policy effectiveness. Existing 
literature did not offer as much customisation of policy assessment criteria to China. 
To overcome this, the survey responses were vital to the research methodology to 
fine-tune criteria items and for allocating weighting across the different criteria 
groupings. Survey responses called for more indicators to capture the SoS and 
Governance policy dimensions. The survey make many important suggestion on 
which indicators to include and which to exclude. Two most important indicators that 
the survey called for inclusion were hydrocarbon imports and coal imports 
dependence.  
 
The survey also provided greater clarity on the weighting of between the five policy 
dimensions of Growth, Climate Change, SoS, Social Equality, and Governance. 
Before the survey, the research proposed an equal weighting between the give policy 
dimensions. Through the feedback from survey participant, there were suggestions for 
unequal weighting between the five policy dimensions. The proposed weighting of the 
dimensions did not received unanimous responses. Most responses acknowledged the 
difficulty of not using an equal weighting and foresees the challenges and increase 
complexity that comes associated with the justification for different weightings. For 
the surveyed experts who did explicitly specify weightings, the survey responses 
indicated a lower weighting for Economic Growth to 20% and Governance to 20% 
due to difficulties in measuring the intangible indicators. Stakeholders’ participation, 
accountability and corruption are difficult to quantify and observe. Stakeholders’ 
participation, accountability and corruption are soft indicators and difficult to 
objectively model and analyse using WITCH. Instead they are qualitatively discussed. 
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Additionally, CEEP responded that Governance may be inappropriate in non free-
market countries like China. Thus following the survey suggestions, this policy 
dimension has a lower weighting, to reflect the potential difficulties in accurate 
assessment. It is recommended that Climate Change Mitigation is increased by 10% 
to give greater emphasis on this often neglected policy dimension. 
 
Energy Policy to Modelling Mapping 
To propose theoretical improvements as per CFEPS to China’s energy sector, two 
mapping exercises were taken. One to map climate model outputs into a policy 
assessment method, in order that policy improvements can be suggested. Another 
mapping undertaken was to transfer the implications of energy policy change to an 
altered state of climate model inputs. This mapping exercise assumes that the two 
relationships are “mapable”. The degree of “mapability” was discussed in Chapter 7 
under internal validity. There are always confounding factors present when mapping 
the relationships between the model and energy policy and possible improvements are 
discussed in future works toward the end of this chapter.  
 
The outcome of mapping the outputs from the Hybrid IAM Climate Model onto the 
Energy Policy Assessment Framework has shown to be successful to offer a 
systematic way of identifying where energy policy improvement can be made. The 
assessment criteria are split into five major policy dimensions for a balance energy 
policy, namely Economic Growth, Climate Change Mitigation, SoS, Social Equality, 
and Governance. Using the five dimensions, possible shortcoming in China’s energy 
policy landscape can be systematically identified. It is also important to note, the five 
policy dimensions and their sub-categories are themselves the outcome of primary 
data from the analysis of the survey.  
 
The mapping of discretionally energy policy change into altered model inputs for 
computing an altered state post policy action was also a crucial contribution. There 
are three areas of Policy Actions, namely Legislative, Economic and Organisation 
policy tools. Depending on the type of Policy Action, each had a different impact on 
the inputs of the WITCH model. The mapping of Policy Action onto WITCH inputs 
offers a systematic way of transferring the implications of energy policy action onto 
an altered state of the Chinese energy sector. 
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Feedback Loop 
The thesis has presented a looped application to examine China’s current energy 
policy effectives (static application), this has set the ground work for future 
applications. Future works would be to run assessment framework continuously to 
assess future energy policy outcomes (dynamic application). As can be seen in 
Chapter 3, reviews on IAM applications suggest much research has either only 
examined energy-climate modelling, or only reviewed energy policy actions. Existing 
research by Bahn et al. (2011) and Manu and Norton (2005) have only focussed on 
climate modelling, or only explored in detail energy policy making. Studies that 
incorporate a Feedback Loop between policy and climate modelling have been limited.  
 
CFEPS implemented a tethered approach linking together Hybrid IAM Climate 
Model and energy policy analysis via an iterative Feedback Loop. By adopting the 
iterative loop, the research creates a more dynamic before-and-after policy change 
assessment indicator with a view of offering policy suggestion for the continuous 
improvement for Chinese energy policies. The feedback loop employed between 
climate modelling and energy policy analysis creates an iterative policy decision 
support approach to help move China towards a better state with respect to climate 
change, SoS and growth, as described in the Policy Trilemma. This is one of the first 
pieces of research which offers a detailed review of climate modelling in conjunction 
with energy policy assessment for China. The iterative process of re-running the 
model is particularly useful for China because of the way it updates its energy (and 
other) policies every five years.  
 
The Feedback Loop could not have been closed without the climate modelling to 
energy policy mapping exercise. The climate model outputs are assessed through the 
energy policy assessment criteria. From the energy policy assessment, possible policy 
improvements are suggested. The policy improvements are discretionary policy 
actions which change the state of the economy and alter the climate model inputs of 
the new state. Changing climate inputs produces an altered state of output, which are 
again assessment and further improved upon. In the absence of the model for policy 
mapping, this iterative loop cannot be repeated, with a view of marginal improvement 
to the energy sector at each model run.  
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Research Value Added for Chinese Energy Policy Studies 
The added value this research particularly brings to Chinese energy policy study is 
twofold. Firstly, the top-down and bottom-up methodologies acknowledge the 
different stakeholders that affect China’s energy policy making in the form of central 
government and local authorities. The large land mass of China requires an energy 
policy strategy that guides both central government and local authorities. Otherwise, 
there could be a separation between top level policy setting and local authority policy 
action. The hybrid IAM methodology is set up to allow model inputs from the central 
government as top-down macro-level targets. The hybrid IAM methodology also 
allows model inputs from local authorities to set their own bottom-up micro-level 
targets. In return it offers policy to help central government and local authorities work 
together in a joint energy policy strategy.  
 
Secondly, the iterative process of re-running the model is particularly useful for China 
because of the way it updates its energy (and other) policies every five years. Climate 
change policies are long-term in nature. However, guidance is needed in the medium 
to short term to check whether progress is made in the right direction. China checks 
its progress twice a decade via its Five Year Plan. The climate model is run in relation 
to the targets of the current five year plan (the base-case). Energy policy analysis is 
performed on whether China can achieve those five-yearly targets. If the targets are 
deemed not achievable or insufficient, improvements to the current targets are 
highlighted and improvements to policy actions suggested. The model is re-run to 
capture the improved-case, which completes one turn of the Feedback Loop. For 
example, re-running the Feedback Loop once a year, allows Chinese policy markets to 
fine-tune their policies multiple times and meet their targets at the five year 
milestones.  
 
8.3. Potential and Practical Contributions to Existing Research 
Not all existing literature offers a clear view of climate modelling together with 
energy policy analysis. Most only establish an energy policy assessment framework; 
and literature only explores the merits of specific energy policy tools. This research 
has set to provide both an energy policy decision support framework and to propose 
policy action. Since the policy actions are not tested by Chinese policy makers, the 
practical contributions are also potential in nature.  
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Energy Generation Pathways 
The research offers practical policy suggestions in terms of which generation 
technologies to target. The hybrid IAM methodology allows model inputs from local 
authorities to set their own bottom-up micro-level targets to help project future energy 
generation strategies. China has acknowledged the importance of renewable power 
generation in its 12
th
 FYP which spans from 2011 to 2015. Furthermore, China is 
making progress towards reducing its dependence on traditional fossil fuels. Along 
with renewable, with nuclear power and hydro power at the forefront of the latest 
FYP’s agenda, China has great potential to improve its energy policy outcomes. 
However, following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant incident on 11 March 
2011, the Chinese government has temporarily put on hold approvals for new plants. 
Additional research is required on how China can adjust in the short-run to recent 
events in Japan to further diversify its energy generation mix. The validity of long-
term energy projection pathways for China should also be examined. 
 
Energy Policy Action 
The research also suggests energy policy options. In return it offers policy to help 
central government and local authorities work together in a joint energy policy 
strategy. Energy policy improvements are required in all five policy dimension areas 
of Economic Growth, Climate Change Mitigation, SoS, Social Equality, and 
Governance. To address these possible required areas of improvements, China should 
use all three Policy Actions, namely Legislative, Economic and Organisational in 
unison. The area where China needs drastic improvement is in Governance. 
Governance deficiencies have undermined China’s ability to implement 
Organisational Policy Action effectively and efficiently. Better monitoring and greater 
responsibility of policy makers are vital for China to successfully address the goal of 
economic growth, whilst ensuring SoS and lowering pollution. The research can be 
extended to capture real-life energy policy implications in a more comprehensive 
manner. Future works are presented in the next section which presents those research 
ideas that were deemed as important, but not pursued to stay focussed on answering 
the key research questions. 
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8.4. Future Work 
This CFEPS energy policy assessment framework and analysis is only the first step in 
better understanding China’s policy needs. As mentioned in the previous sections, 
both energy policy analysis and climate modelling experience limitations. Future 
works discusses improvement in practical policy making. Also, in keeping with the 
methodology flow as used throughout the thesis, the areas of future works are 
presented under energy policy analysis, climate modelling, mapping, Feedback Loop 
and FEPS beyond China.  
 
Practical Policy Making 
There is a need to evaluate the model in a real life situation. The usefulness of CFEPS 
can only be tested, it offered to real policy makers in China, to assess whether the 
policy action suggested lead to improvements in the Chinese energy sector. It would 
be ideal to roll out the testing of CFEPS on a small scale at municipal level. However, 
under the command-and-control policy making mechanism, radical energy policy 
changes are implemented by the central government. CFEPS would to be 
implemented at the NEA or NDRC level to fully gauge its effectiveness.  
 
Additionally, as reviewed in Chapter 2, the proposed policy changes from CFEPS are 
based on flagship legislations across the globe and what China has traditionally 
implemented for energy reform. Current policies in use across other countries and 
China’s previous energy policies may not be appropriate for a nation facing past-
paced changes. A survey of energy policy makers and academic would help fine-tune 
which types of Policy Action are appropriate as China prepares to embrace the 13
th
 
FYP. The survey would still follow the Policy Action grouping of Legislative, 
Economic and Organisational. However, the survey could give an indication on what 
weighting to apply the actual Policy Action within the three groups. For example, if 
politicians and academic believed the emissions cap policy change was the most 
appropriate legislation, this policy change would increase in weighting when a 
Legislative Policy Action was called for by CFEPS.  
 
Energy Policy Analysis 
Future work for energy policy analysis can apply the same methodology for other 
BRICS nations. If the methodology is shown to have worked, other nations, apart 
from China, can benefit from the same methods of policy analysis. 
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Categorisation of the three policy areas could be improved. The definition of the three 
energy policy actions can be sub-divided into more detailed sections. Simply placing 
all policies into either legislative, economic, or governance type policies may be too 
coarse. This is not a difficult improvement to make; however, the more types of 
policies are introduced the more likely there is no critical mass of many policy tools 
per each category. To keep a critical mass of several energy policies falling within out 
type of Policy Action, the three categories have been used.  
 
The policy indicators used in this research are limited. Future work may find 
additional indicators to the policy dimensions. For example, additional research can 
include all the suggested indicators as proposed under the survey. Some additional 
indicators were not selected due to the WITCH model having limited scope for 
calculating the indicators and CFEPS not been able to deliver concrete policy 
suggestions. A risk of confounding factor was highlighted for the Equality and 
Governance dimensions of the Policy Assessment Criteria. The Equality dimension 
for affordability of energy did not taking into account energy costs. Future analysis on 
energy cost is needed to eliminate this risk. The limitations to analysing the 
Governance dimensions from the Policy Assessment Framework can be overcome by 
further surveying policy experts on their view of governance in China. Introducing 
more than five policy dimensions is not a difficult task. However the additional 
dimensions have to be mapped to WITCH. The solution would be to alter WITCH to 
be able to cope with more policy indicators. This is a difficult task, as it implies that 
the climate model was altered to calculate the additional indicators. This is further 
discussed in the next section regarding future works on the climate model.  
 
The survey called for the weighting of each of the five policy dimensions to be 
tailored to the needs of the user. In future applications of five policy dimensions, the 
users should be asked for their opinion on the weightings.  
 
Climate Modelling  
Climate modelling future works are all related to making WITCH more complex to 
solve the issues that have resulted due to simplification and stylisation. WITCH 
would be improved to incorporate other pollutants in addition to carbon. This could be 
CH4 or N2O. This is potentially a difficult task, as additional empirical linkages 
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between non carbon atmospheric pollutants have to be linked to temperature increases. 
Also, there is there is the possibility of considering oceanic and soil based pollutants. 
Again, this is potentially a difficult task, as empirical surveyed linkages have to be 
established between oceanic pollutants and global temperature increases.  
 
The effect of extreme climatic events as a result of pollution has not been examined. 
Future work could move towards a better understanding the impact of natural 
disasters due to increases in global temperatures. To build this complexity into the 
WITCH model would be a difficult task, as extreme climatic outcomes have very 
skewed statistical distributions. To find a distribution that accurately reflects nature 
realistically is challenging.  
 
Regional inequality was not at the forefront of modelling. One of the five policy 
dimensions calls for greater social equality. WITCH could be altered to account for 
regional inequality across different nations. Social elements are subjective and 
difficult to measure accurately. Thus this part of policy assessment would prove as a 
challenging additional criteria item.  
 
The WITCH model currently has a backstop technology to ensure energy demand can 
always be met by sufficient supply. Future work could be to remove the backstop 
technology, which assumes there will be an infinite amount of energy, as long as there 
are sufficient funds to pay for it. The removal of the backstop technology would 
become an explicit cap on the energy as a factor of production. The budget constraint 
is then limited by more variables related to energy supply. However there is a risk that 
without a backstop, very strict pollution abatement scenarios cannot be met. In other 
words, WITCH would not be able to derive a plausible solution. Thus the including of 
a backstop is vital to ensure WITCH is able to obtain optimisation solutions.  
 
Currently, WITCH does not explicitly include the effects of taxes and subsidies into 
model inputs. Future work could see WITCH being altered to study one type of 
energy policy in detail. Taxes and subsidies have been proxied via increases and 
decreases in cost. To explicitly include their effects, the model would be set up to run 
scenarios whereby taxes increase at a faster rate when pollution increases at greater 
speeds. This dynamic taxation effect can be achieved by setting tax rates this period, 
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based on incremental increases in pollution in the previous period. This effect is also 
discussed in the next section on the Feedback Loop mapping.  
 
Mapping between the WITCH Model and Energy Policy Making 
The mapping of model output to CFEPS policy assessment framework indicators can 
be improved. Better mapping of CFEPS policy assessment framework criteria items to 
valuate model output by not overly depending on proxy measures can be conducted. 
WITCH for example is unable to calculate the true indicators across Economic 
Growth, Climate Change, SoS, Social Equality, and Governance. Instead, the research 
makes do with the outputs WITCH is able to calculate. For example a WITCH would 
be built just to understand the impact of dependence on increased fuels costs, 
hydrocarbon dependence, grid access and public consultancy. Some additional 
features are less challenging than others. For example, increased fuel costs can be 
modelled by increasing the operational costs of energy generation. However, grid 
access is difficult to model accurately. The lack of data availability for remote areas 
of China makes analysing electricity grid coverage difficult. It is the remote Chinese 
locations which suffer the most from limited electricity grid coverage and need the 
greatest assistance for improving social equality. However, most of the data on China 
focuses on urban energy production and consumption. The combination of requiring 
data for remote Chinese locations to study electricity grid coverage and the lack of 
data from remote locations makes analysing Chinese grid coverage a challenging task. 
 
Feedback Loop  
The Feedback Loop is re-run every time the base-year input data is update. The thesis 
has run 1.5 loops to show the mechanics of the link between IAM modelling and 
policy analysis. Future work would be to run the analysis in a dynamic fashion (with 
more iterations) to get greater accuracy. Future work could re-run the loop in 2015 to 
every year, not only 1.5 times. Currently, the base-year data is 2010. Revisiting the 
generated results today for 2015 and comparing those to what actually happened in 
2015 would be a testament to the accuracy of WITCH. Improvements in WITCH 
could also be realised in re-running the feedback loop more frequently. Instead of 
every 5 years, the loop could be run every year. New model run could be performed 
each time additional official data is released. 
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FEPS beyond China 
Another important further work is for CFEPS to be extended for other BRICS nations, 
for example an Indian Framework for Energy Policy Strategy (IFEPS). The two 
papers produced from this research will hopefully spur enthusiasts of energy and 
climate modelling and of policy analysis to undertake additional research on this field. 
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Appendix 1: Global Flagship Energy and Climate Change 
Policies 
The comprehensive depiction of flagship global climate change and energy 
legislations is summarised in Table A1.1.  
 
Table A1.1: The global flagship energy and climate change policies (Marchal et al., 
2011; Townshend et al., 2011) 
 
Country 
Coverage of energy-climate legislation  
Flagship national 
legislation 
Carbon 
pricing 
Energy 
Eff 
Renew-
ables 
Trans- 
port 
Adaptation 
Australia      Clean Energy Act 
Brazil      National Policy on 
Climate Change 
Canada      Canadian 
Environmental 
Protection Act and 
Efficiency Act 
Chile      National Climate 
Change Action Plan 
China      Five Year Plan 
EU      Climate and Energy 
Package 
India      National Action Plan 
on Climate Change 
Indo’sia      Presidential 
Regulation on the 
National Council for 
Climate Change 
Japan      Law Concerning the 
Promotion of 
Measure to Cope 
with Global Warming 
Mexico      Inter Secretariat 
Commission on 
Climate Change 
Russia      Climate Doctrine 
S Africa      Vision Strategic 
Direction and 
Framework for 
Climate Policy 
S Korea      Framework Act on 
Low Carbon Green 
Growth 
UK      Climate Change Act 
US      Executive Order 
13514, American 
Recovery and Re-
Investment Act 
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Appendix 2: Historical performance of Chinese energy 
policies 
The key statistics of how China has performed from 2005 to 2010 is shown in Table 
A2.1. 
 
Table A2.1: The historical performance of Chinese energy policies (World Bank, 
2009) 
Category  Indicator  
2005 
actual 
2007 
actual  
2010 
estimation  
Economic 
growth  
GDP (RMB trillion)  18.4 25 35 
GDP per capita (RMB)  14,103 18,885 19,270 
Economic 
Structure 
Share of services in GDP (%)  39.9 40.1 43.3 
Share of services in total employment (%)  31.4 33.2 35.3 
Ratio of R&D expenditures to GDP (%)  1.2 1.4 2 
Urbanization Rate (%)  43 44.9 47 
Population, 
resources  
Total Population (100 mln)  13.1 13.2 13.6 
Reduction of energy use per unit of GDP (%)  0 4.6 20 
Efficiency coefficient of irrigation water  0.45 0.46 0.5 
Reduction of pollutants emission (%) for:    
   Carbon Dioxide na  2.1 10 
   SO2  na  3.2 10 
Public 
services and 
quality of life 
 
Average number of years of schooling (yr)  8.5   9 
Population covered by basic urban pension (100 
mln)  1.7 2 2.2 
Coverage new rural coop. health system (%)  75.7 85.7 80 
New urban employment in five years (mln)     45 
Rural labor force transferred in five years (mln)     45 
Registered urban unemployment rate (%)  4.2   5 
Per capita disp. income urban households (RMB)  10,493 13,790 13,390 
Per capita net income rural households (RMB)  3,255 4,140 4,150 
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Appendix 3: China’s 11
th
 Five Year Plan 
This appendix contains the summary in Table A3.1 for the 11
th
 FYP as the part of 
China’s energy policy in recent history.  
 
Table A3.1: China’s 11th Five Year Plan (Levine et al., 2010; World Bank, 2009) 
Policy Areas 11 FYP Target 2010 Level 
Economic 
development 
• 7.5% GDP growth over the 5 year period (compared to 9.5% achieved 
over the previous FYP). 
• 2% share of GDP to be spent on R&D (compared to a target of 1.5% of 
GDP for 2005). 
• Remove remaining distortions in the tax system that subsidises 
manufacturing, including the VAT system as well as remaining 
preferential tax treatment of FDI. 
Environmental 
and pollution 
abatement 
• 20% intensity reduction via decreasing energy consumption per unit of 
GDP. 
• 10% reduction of emission of major pollutants. 
• Implement “Ten Key Projects”. 
• Implement “Top 1000 enterprises energy conservation action”. 
• Establish a national energy conservation centre and promote energy 
efficiency and conservation in government agencies / private 
enterprises. 
• Strengthen existing and create new financial incentives for energy 
efficiency, including preferential tax policies on energy conservation. 
Energy imports • Balanced trade 
Social 
inequality and 
urbanisation 
• Government spending on rural issues is budgeted to increase from 1.6 
percent of GDP in 2005 to 2.0 percent of GDP in 2008. 
• Urbanisation rate to increase to 47% from 43% in 2005.  
Monitoring and 
responsibilities 
of 
governmental 
institutions 
• Establish a system for monitoring, evaluating, and public reporting of 
energy intensity 
• Strengthen government programs to gather energy data 
• Expand media programs; strengthen training of energy conservation 
professionals 
Source: Levine et al. (2010) and World Bank (2009) 
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Appendix 4: China’s 12
th
 Five Year Plan 
The main policy areas of China’s 12th FYP, as part of flagship Chinese energy and 
climate change legislations (see Table A4.1). 
 
Table A4.1: Policy areas and 12
th
 FYP (Fung and Chu, 2011; Ng and Mabey, 2011) 
Key Policy Target Areas 12 FYP Target 2015 Level 
Decarbonisation 
Carbon 
intensity  
17% reduction per unit of GDP output produced, 
compared to 2005 (3.5% in 2011) 
Pollutants 
reduction  
8% to 10% emissions reduction target of other pollutants 
such as sulphur dioxide, chemical oxygen demand and 
nitrogen oxides 
Power 
generation 
sector 
• New thermal power plants capped at 260-270 GW 
next five years 
• Coal production capped at 3.8 billion tonnes over the 
next five year 
GHG Tax 
(exp intro 
2012) 
Tax rate will start from RMB 10 per tonne of CO2 
emitted, rising to RMB 40 per tonne by 2020 
Alternative 
Energy 
Increase in 
sustainable 
(non-fossil 
fuel) 
generation 
• 13% of generation capacity from sustainable sources 
by 2015 compared to 8.8% in 2010. 
• RMB 2-3 trillion in renewable energy over the next 10 
years: RMB 1.5 trillion for wind and RMB 200-300 
billion for solar 
• Non-fossil fuel power generation capacity to be 474 
GW by 2015 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Energy 
intensity  
16% reduction per unit of GDP produced 
Energy 
Infrastructure 
Investment 
into the power 
industry 
RMB 2.75 trillion for power plant construction. To 
invest RMB 11.1 trillion from 2011 to 2020 
Investment 
into the Grid 
• RMB 2.55 trillion for power grid construction by 
2015  
• RMB 500 billion investment on ultra high voltage 
(UHV) lines by 2015 
• RMB 4 trillion investments on “smart grids” by 2020 
Transportation 
Road based 
• RMB 100 billion government investment in 
alternative-energy vehicles industry by 2020 
• Annual sales of 1 million units of new energy vehicles 
by 2015 
Rail based 
RMB 3-4 trillion investment on its high-speed rail 
network between 2011-2015, which is expected to reach 
more than 16,000 km by 2015 
Innovation 
% of R&D 
spending as 
part of GDP  
• R&D spending to reach 2.2%of GDP by 2015 
• R&D spending to reach 2.5%of GDP by 2020 
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Appendix 5: Energy Policy Assessment Framework Review 
The multi-criteria are currently used as CFEPS policy assessment framework 
indicators. It sets out the various policy assessment criteria items and indicators. The 
research presents the frameworks following a common format in Table A5.1 - A5.6. 
In general, each sub-theme is the most detailed level of consideration and the sub-
themes correspond to its own indicator. 
 
Table A5.1: Convention to present policy themes, sub-themes and indicators 
Policy Dimension  Theme Sub-theme Indicator 
Broad Policy Area Important themes 
within a broad policy 
area 
More detailed 
measurements of 
themes 
Actual measurement 
methods for the 
detailed sub-theme 
 
Table A5.2: IAEA policy assessment framework indicators (IAEA et al., 2005) 
Policy 
Dimension 
Policy 
Theme 
Policy  
Sub-theme 
Energy Indicator 
Social 
Dimension 
Equality 
Accessibility 
Share of households (or population) without 
electricity or commercial energy, or heavily 
dependent on non-commercial energy 
Affordability 
Share of household income spent on fuel and 
electricity 
Disparities 
Household energy use for each income group 
and corresponding fuel mix 
Health Safety 
Accident fatalities per energy produced by fuel 
chain 
Economic 
Dimension 
Consump 
and Gen 
Patterns 
(econom) 
Overall Use Energy use per capita 
Overall 
Productivity 
Energy use per unit of GDP 
Supply 
Efficiency 
Efficiency of energy conversion and 
Distribution 
Production Reserves and Resources to production ratio 
End Use 
Industrial, agricultural services, household and 
transportation energy intensity 
Diverse (Fuel 
Mix) 
Fuel sources share, non-carbon share and 
renewable energy share of energy generation 
Prices End-use energy prices by fuel and by sector 
Security 
(SoS) 
Imports Net energy import dependency 
Strategic Fuel 
Stocks 
Stocks of critical fuels per corresponding fuel 
consumption 
Climate 
Change 
Dimension 
Atmosp 
Climate 
Change 
GHG emissions from energy production and use 
per capita and per unit of GDP 
Air Quality Air pollutant emissions from energy systems 
Water Water Quality 
Contaminant discharges in liquid effluents from 
energy systems including oil discharges 
Land 
Soil Quality 
Soil area where acidification exceeds critical 
load 
Forest Rate of deforestation attributed to energy use 
Solid Waste 
Management 
Ratio of solid and radioactive waste generation 
to units of energy produced 
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Table A5.3: UN Indicators for Sustainable Development 
Theme Sub-theme Core indicator 
Poverty 
(social equality) 
Income poverty 
Proportion of population living below national 
poverty line  
Income inequality 
Ratio of share in national income of highest to 
lowest quintile 
Sanitation 
Proportion of population using an improved 
sanitation facility  
Drinking water 
Proportion of population using an improved 
water source 
Access to energy 
Share of households without electricity or 
other modern energy services 
Living conditions Proportion of urban population living in slums 
Governance 
 
Corruption Percentage of population having paid bribes  
Crime 
Number of intentional homicides per 100,000 
population  
Health 
(social equality) 
Mortality 
Under-five mortality rate 
Life expectancy at birth 
Health care delivery 
Percent of population with access to primary 
health care facilities  
Immunization against infectious childhood 
diseases 
Nutritional status Nutritional status of children 
Health status and risks 
Morbidity of major diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis 
Education 
(social equality) 
Education level 
Gross intake ratio to last grade of primary 
education 
Net enrolment rate in primary education 
Adult secondary (tertiary) schooling 
attainment level 
Literacy Adult literacy rate 
Demographics 
(economic) 
Population Population growth rate and dependency ratio 
Tourism 
Ratio of local residents to tourists in major 
tourist regions and destinations 
Natural hazards 
(climate 
change) 
Vulnerability to natural 
hazards 
Percentage of population living in hazard 
prone areas 
Disaster preparedness 
and response 
Human and economic loss due to natural 
disasters 
Atmosphere 
(climate 
change) 
Climate change Carbon dioxide emissions 
Ozone layer depletion Consumption of ozone depleting substances 
Air quality 
Ambient concentration of air pollutants in 
urban areas 
Land 
(climate 
change) 
Land use and status Land use change 
Desertification Land affected by desertification 
Agriculture Arable and permanent cropland area 
Forests Proportion of land area covered by forests 
Oceans, seas 
And coasts 
(climate 
change) 
Coastal zone 
Percentage of total population living in coastal 
areas 
Fisheries 
Proportion of fish stocks within safe biological 
limits 
Marine environment Proportion of marine area protected 
Freshwater 
(climate 
change) 
Water quantity 
Proportion of total water resources used 
Water use intensity by economic activity 
Water quality Presence of faecal coliforms in freshwater 
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Biodiversity 
(climate 
change) 
Ecosystem 
Proportion of terrestrial area protected, total 
and by ecological region 
Species Change in threat status of species 
Economic 
development 
(economic) 
Macroeconomic 
performance 
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
Investment share in GDP 
Sustainable public 
finance 
Debt to GNI ratio 
Employment 
Employment-population ratio 
Labour productivity and unit labor costs 
Share of women in wage employment in the 
non-agricultural sector 
Information and 
communication 
technologies 
Internet users 
per 100 population 
Research and 
development 
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D as a per 
cent of GDP 
Tourism Tourism contribution to GDP 
Global 
economic 
partnership 
(economic) 
Trade Current account deficit as percentage of GDP 
External financing 
Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
given or received as a percentage of GNI 
Energy 
Consumption 
and production 
patterns 
(economic) 
Material consumption  Material intensity of the economy 
Energy use 
Annual energy consumption, total and by main 
user category 
Intensity of energy use, total and by economic 
activity 
Waste generation and 
management 
Generation of hazardous waste 
Waste treatment and disposal 
Transportation Modal split of passenger transportation 
 
 
Table A5.4: OECD Economic, Environmental and Social Themes and Indicators 
Theme  Sub-theme Indicators 
Population and 
migration 
(economic) 
Total population Evolution of the population 
Regional population 
Elderly population Ageing societies 
Elderly population by region 
International 
migration 
Immigrant population 
Trends in migration 
Migration of the highly educated 
Macroeconomic 
trends 
(economic) 
Gross domestic 
product  
Size of GDP 
National income per capita 
Regional GDP 
Economic growth Evolution of GDP 
Household saving 
Investment rates 
Inflation 
Steel production 
Productivity Labour productivity 
Multi-factor productivity 
Economic structure Value added by activity 
Evolution of value added by activity 
Small and medium-sized enterprises 
Prices Prices and interest Consumer Price Indices (CPI) 
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(economic) rates Producer Price Indices (PPI) 
Long-term interest rates 
Purchasing power and 
exchange rates 
Rates of conversion 
Effective exchange rates 
Energy 
(SoS) 
Energy supply Energy supply 
Energy supply and economic growth 
Energy supply per capita 
Electricity generation 
Renewable energy 
Energy production 
and prices 
Energy production 
Oil production 
Oil prices 
Labour Market 
(economic) 
Employment Employment rates by gender 
Employment rates by age group 
Part-time employment 
Self-employment 
Hours worked 
Unemployment Standardised unemployment rates 
Long-term unemployment 
Regional unemployment 
Science and 
Technology 
(economic) 
Research and 
development 
Expenditure on R&D 
Investment in knowledge 
Researchers 
Patents 
Information and 
communications 
Technology 
Size of the ICT sector 
Investment in ICT 
Households Internet access  
Communications Exports of information and communications 
equipment 
Environnent 
and Natural 
ressources 
(climate 
change) 
Air, water and land Emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
Water consumption 
Municipal waste 
Nutrient use in agriculture 
Natural resources Fisheries 
Forests 
Education 
(economic) 
Outcomes International student assessment 
Tertiary attainment 
Expenditure on 
education 
Expenditure on tertiary education 
Public and private education expenditure 
Public Finance 
(economic) 
Government deficits 
and debt 
Government deficits 
Government debt 
Public expenditure 
and aid 
Social expenditure 
Law, order and defence expenditure 
Agricultural support estimates 
Government support for fishing 
Official development assistance 
Taxes Total tax revenue 
Taxes on the average production worker 
Quality of Life 
(social equality) 
Health Life expectancy 
Infant mortality 
Obesity 
Public and private health expenditure 
Leisure Tourism: hotel nights 
Recreation and culture 
Society Youth inactivity 
Income inequality 
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Crime Prison population 
Victimisation rates 
Transport Road network 
Road motor vehicles and road fatalities 
Economic 
globalisation 
(economic) 
Trade Share of trade in GDP 
Import penetration 
Trade in goods 
Trade in services 
High, medium and low technology exports 
Trading partners 
Balance of payments 
International 
investment 
FDI flows and stocks 
Activities of multinationals 
Tsunami aid Tsunami aid 
 
 
Table A5.5: World Energy Council’s Sustainable Energy Policy Criteria (WEC, 2008) 
Policy Dimension 
(Weight) 
Theme Indicator 
Political Strength 
(8.3%) 
Political Stability Political stability 
Regulatory Policy Regulatory quality 
Effectiveness of Government Effectiveness of government 
Societal Strength 
(8.3%) 
Control of Corruption Control of Corruption 
Rule of Law Rule of Law 
Quality of Education Health index 
Quality of Health Education index 
Economic Strength 
(8.3%) 
Macroeconomic Stability Macro-economic stability  
Cost of Living Expense 
Cost of housing, water, electricity, 
gas and other fuels  
Individual consumption 
expenditure by households  
Availability of Credit Domestic credit to private sector  
Social Equality 
(25.0%) 
Affordability of petrol Petrol price 
Affordability of electricity 
Individual consumption 
expenditure by households  
Proportion of households with 
access to electricity  
Emissions 
Mitigation (25.0%) 
Energy Intensity 
Total Primary Energy 
Consumption   
Emissions Intensity 
Total carbon dioxide emissions 
from energy consumption  
Electricity Generation 
Efficiency  
CO2/kWh from electricity and heat 
generation 
Air and Water Pollution 
Air and water pollution on humans 
and the environment 
Energy Security 
(25.0%) 
Consumption Growth 
Total Primary Energy 
Consumption  
Energy Production to 
Consumption Ratio 
Total Primary Energy 
Consumption and Production  
Wholesale prices on petrol 
prices 
Retail price of most common type 
of premium gasoline 
Retail price of gasoline tax bracket 
Electricity Generation Diversity 
Production of electricity by various 
generation mixes 
Resources Imports to Exports  Net import of natural resources 
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Table A5.6: Eurostat policy assessment framework indicators (Eurostat, 2005) 
Policy 
Dimension 
Theme Sub-theme Indicator 
Economic 
Economic 
development 
Investment  
Growth rate of GDP per capita  
Investment as % of GDP by 
institutional sector (total/public/ 
business)  
Competitiveness 
Labour productivity per hour 
worked  
International price competitiveness 
(Real effective exchange rate)  
Employment 
Life-long learning  
Total employment rate 
Social 
Poverty and 
social 
exclusion 
Monetary poverty  
Access to labour 
markets 
At risk of poverty rate after social 
transfers  
At persistent risk of poverty rate  
Total long-term unemployment rate  
Early school leavers 
Ageing 
society 
Pension adequacy  
Demographic 
changes  
Current and projected old age 
dependency ratio  
Ratio of median household 
equalised income of persons aged 
65+ to median household equalised 
income of persons aged >65  
Life expectancy at age 65 by 
gender  
Public finance 
stability 
General government consolidated 
gross debt as % of GDP 
Public health 
Human health 
protection and 
lifestyle  
Healthy life years at birth by 
gender  
Percentage of overweight people, 
by age group  
Food safety and 
quality 
Resistance to antibiotics 
(Streptococcus pneumoniae 
pathogens)  
Chemicals 
management 
Salmonellosis incidence rate in 
human beings  
Index of production of chemicals, 
by toxicity class  
Health risks due to 
environmental 
conditions 
Proportion of population living in 
households considering that they 
suffer from noise and from 
pollution 
Climate change 
Climate 
change and 
energy 
Climate change  
Energy 
Total greenhouse gas emissions  
Gross inland energy consumption 
by fuel  
GHG emissions by sector  
Energy intensity of the economy  
Final energy consumption by sector  
Gross electricity generation by fuel 
used in power stations  
Share of renewable energy, by 
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source 
Production 
and 
consumption 
patterns 
Eco-efficiency 
Consumption 
patterns 
 
Total material consumption and 
GDP at constant prices  
Domestic Material Consumption 
and GDP at constant prices  
Agriculture 
Corporate 
responsibility 
Emissions of acidifying substances 
and ozone precursors and GDP at 
constant prices, by source sector  
Municipal waste collected per 
capita  
Electricity consumption per 
dwelling for lighting and domestic 
appliances  
Share of area under EU agri 
environmental support in total 
utilised agricultural area  
Livestock density index  
Enterprises with an environmental 
management system (EMS) 
Management 
of natural 
resources 
Marine ecosystem  
Fresh water 
resources  
Population trends of farmland birds  
Fish catches outside safe biological 
limits 
Land use 
Groundwater abstraction as % of 
available groundwater resources  
Built-up area as a % of total land 
area 
Transport 
Transport growth  
Energy consumption by transport 
and GDP at constant price 
Social and 
environmental 
impact of transport 
Car share of inland passenger 
transport  
Road share of inland freight 
transport  
Emissions of air pollutants 
(particulate matter and ozone 
precursors) from transport 
activities  
Greenhouse gas emissions by 
transport activities, by mode 
Participation 
(Governance) 
Good 
governance 
Policy coherence 
Public participation 
Level of citizens’ confidence in EU 
institutions  
Number of infringement cases 
brought in front of the Court of 
Justice, by policy area  
Voter turnout in national 
parliamentary elections  
E-government on-line availability 
Global 
partnership 
Financing for 
sustainable 
development 
Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) as % of Gross National 
Income  
Resource 
management 
EU imports from develop products 
and agriculture 
Sales of selected fair-trade labelled 
products 
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Appendix 6: Preliminary Synthesis of Policy Assessment 
Framework  
This appendix sets out the list of CFEPS assessment framework criteria items in its 
preliminary form, before empirical survey studies are performed (Table A6.1). 
 
Table A6.1: Preliminary synthesis of policy assessment framework criteria items 
Dimension (weight) Sub theme Indicator 
Economic Growth 
(20%) 
Balanced GDP 
growth 
GDP growth 
Energy consump to 
production balance 
Energy consumption to production ratio 
Energy Investment Energy R&D investment per GDP 
Generation costs Primary energy generation costs 
Climate Change 
Mitigation 
(20%) 
CO2 Emissions Cap on level of atmospheric CO2  
Energy efficiency 
& intensity 
Energy consumption per GDP  
Emissions intensity 
Emitted CO2 per GDP 
Emitted CO2 per Energy Consumption 
SoS 
(20%) 
Hydrocarbon and 
coal dependence 
Oil, gas and coal as proportion of primary 
energy generation 
Generation mix 
diversification 
Non fossil fuels energy generation to total 
energy production 
Social Equality (20%) 
Affordable Energy 
Energy generation cost as proportion of 
income 
Energy access Electricity grid coverage 
Governance 
(20%) 
Political stability & 
policy coherence 
Key government officials turnover 
Continuity of energy policy direction 
Public participation 
Stakeholders consultation in decision making 
process 
Regulatory quality 
& control of 
corruption  
Accountability  of government officials 
Monitoring and punishment of institutions 
and officials accountable 
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Appendix 7: Global IAM Applications 
This appendix depicts the findings in Table A7.1 and Table A7.2 from the literature 
review on global climate modelling methods and techniques.  
 
Table A7.1: Summary of global IAM applications (Stanton and Ackerman, 2000; 
Stanton et al., 2008) 
Class Global Aggregate Regionally Disaggregated Evaluation 
W
el
fa
re
 M
ax
im
is
at
io
n
 
• DICE-2007 
(Nordhaus, 2008) 
• ENTICE-BR 
(Popp, 2006) 
• DEMETER-1CCS 
(Gerlagh, 2008) 
• MIND* (Edenhofer 
et al., 2006) 
• RICE-2004 (Yang and Nordhaus, 
2006) 
• FEEM-RICE (Bosetti et al., 2006) 
• FUND (Tol, 1999) 
• MERGE (Manne and Richels, 2004) 
• CETA-M (Peck and Teisberg, 1999) 
• GRAPE (Kurosawa, 2004) 
• AIM/Dynamic Global (Masui et al., 
2006) 
• REMIND-R* (Leimbach et al., 2009) 
• WITCH* (Bosetti et al., 2010) 
Dynamic optimisation 
techniques are 
commonly used for 
welfare optimisation. 
These models solve for 
all time periods 
simultaneously and 
decisions are made with 
perfect foresight 
G
en
er
al
 E
q
u
il
ib
ri
u
m
 
• JAM (Gerlagh, 
2008) 
• IGEM (Jorgenson 
et al., 2004) 
• IGS/EPPA (Babiker et al., 2008) 
• SMG (Edmonds et al., 2004) 
• WORLDSCAN (Lejour et al., 2004) 
• ABARE-GTEM (Pant, 2007) 
• G-CUBED/MSG3 (McKibbin and 
Wilcoxen, 1999) 
• MS-MRT (Bernstein et al., 1999) 
• AIM (Kainuma et al., 1999) 
• IMACLIM-R (Crassous et al., 2006) 
• WIAGEM (Kemfert, 2001) 
Requiring all factor 
prices to clear makes 
General Equilibrium 
models suitable for 
recursive dynamics. 
Next period’s prices are 
based on solutions in 
the current period and 
perfect foresight is not 
assumed 
P
ar
ti
al
 E
q
u
il
ib
ri
u
m
 
- • MiniCAM (Clarke et al., 2007) 
• GIM* (Mendelsohn and Williams, 
2004) 
Avoids the trade-off 
between increasing 
returns to scale and 
multiple equilibria. 
Although Partial 
Equilibrium models 
circumvent the problem 
of increasing returns, it 
is at the expense of a 
loss in generality. In 
some cases, there 
appears to be a problem 
of spurious precision in 
overly elaborated 
models of the economy, 
with projections of 
long-term growth paths 
for dozens of economic 
subsectors. 
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S
im
u
la
ti
o
n
 
- • PAGE-2002 (Hope, 2006) 
• ICAM-3 (Dowlatabadi, 1998) 
• E3MG (Barker et al., 2006) 
• GIM* (Mendelsohn and Williams, 
2004) 
Well suited for 
representing uncertain 
parameters and for 
developing IAM results 
based on well-known 
scenarios of future 
emissions, but their 
energy policy 
usefulness is limited by 
a lack of feedback 
between their climate 
and economic 
dynamics. 
C
o
st
 
M
in
im
is
at
io
n
 • GET-LFL 
(Hedenus et al., 
2006) 
• MIND* (Edenhofer 
et al., 2006) 
• DNE21+ (Sano et al., 2006) 
• MESSAGE-MACRO (Rao et al., 
2006) 
• REMIND-R* (Leimbach et al., 2009) 
• WITCH* (Bosetti et al., 2010) 
Seeks to minimise the 
explicit energy 
generation costs, as 
well as the implicit 
negative externality 
costs of increase 
pollution. 
*IAM is a Hybrid methodology and falls under more than one classification 
 
Table A7.2 Global IAM applications in greater greater (after Stanton and Ackerman, 
2009; Ortiz and Markandya, 2009; Goodess et al., 2003; Tol and Frankhauser, 1998) 
Type Segg 
Model Global / 
Regional 
GHG 
Gasses 
Number of 
Economic 
Sectors 
Time 
Span 
Damage 
Function 
Damage 
Function 
Sectors 
W
el
fa
re
 M
ax
 
G
lo
b
al
 
DICE-2008 One 
Global 
Region 
CO2  One single 
sector 
10-year 
periods 
up to 
2200 
A fraction of 
world´s 
output; 
polynomial 
function of 
global mean 
temperature 
change 
Agriculture, 
health, sea-level 
rise (flooding), 
non-market 
damages and 
catastrophic 
damages 
  
DEMETER-
1CCS  
One 
Global 
Region 
CO2 3 sectors 5-year 
periods; 
for 150 
years 
No damage 
treatment 
N/A 
  
MIND* One 
Global 
Region 
CO2 and 
SO2 
2 sectors of 
fossil and 
non fossil 
fuel 
generation 
5-year 
periods; 
from 
1995 to 
2300 
No damage 
treatment 
N/A 
 
R
eg
io
n
al
 
FEEM- RICE 10 
regions:  
CO2 One single 
sector 
10-year 
periods 
up to 
2200 
A fraction of 
world´s 
output; 
polynomial 
function of 
global mean 
temperature 
change 
Agriculture, 
health, sea-level 
rise (flooding), 
non-market 
damages and 
catastrophic 
damages 
  
FUND  9 regions Industrial 
CO2 
One single 
sector 
1-year 
periods; 
from 
1950 to 
2200 
Specific 
model; 
includes 
intangible 
impacts 
Loss of species 
and ecosystems. 
human 
amenities, 
deaths, 
agricultural 
damage, 
hurricane, forced 
migration, 
coastal 
protection, 
dryland loss, and 
wetland damage 
 
 MERGE 9 regions CO2, CH4, 
N2O 
2 sectors 
electric and 
non-electric 
generation 
10 years 
from 
1990 to 
2050; 25 
Market and 
non-market 
(WTP), both 
as a fraction 
Agriculture, 
health, sea-level 
rise (flooding), 
non-market 
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years 
from 
2050 to 
2200. 
of GDP damages and 
catastrophic 
damages 
 
 CETA-M 2 
regions: 
OECD/ 
non 
OECD 
CO2 2 sectors 
electric and 
non-electric 
generation 
5 year 
periods 
1990 until 
2200. 
GHG 
abatement 
costs 
consisting of 
a  single 
linear or 
quadratic 
damage 
function  
Wetland loss, 
ecosystem loss, 
heat and cold 
stress, air 
pollution, 
migration, 
tropical 
cyclones, coastal 
defense, dryland 
loss, agriculture, 
forestry, energy, 
water 
 
 AIM/Dynamic  9 regions CO2 One single 
sector 
5-year 
period 
from 
1995 to 
2000; 10-
year 
periods 
from 
2000 to 
2100 
Endogenously 
calculation of 
damage from 
CO2 based on 
the criterion 
of equal 
marginal 
reduction cost 
Land use and 
industrial 
processes 
 
 REMIND-R*  11 
regions 
CO2, CH4 
and N2O 
3 sectors  5-year 
period 
from 
2005 to 
2150 
Endogenous 
damage 
function 
based on 
effects of 
atmospheric 
CO2, CH4 and 
N2O 
concentration  
Transportation 
and distribution 
 
 WITCH* 12 
regions 
CO2 One single 
sector 
5-year 
periods; 
for 100 
years 
A fraction of 
world´s 
output; 
polynomial 
function of 
global mean 
temperature 
change 
Agriculture, 
health, sea-level 
rise (flooding), 
non-market 
damages and 
catastrophic 
damages 
G
en
er
al
 E
q
u
il
ib
ri
u
m
 
G
lo
b
al
 
IGEM USA 
Only 
CO2, CH4, 
N2O, 
HFC’s, 
PFC’s 
and SF6. 
35 sectors Annual 
projection 
from 
2006-
2050 
Emissions 
coefficients 
for fuel use 
for CO2 and 
marginal 
abatement 
curves for 
non-CO2 
Agriculture, 
residential and 
commercial 
energy use 
 
R
eg
io
n
al
 IMACLIM-R  5 regions CO2 10 sectors 1-year 
period; 
from 
1997 to 
2100 
No damage 
treatment 
N/A 
P
ar
t 
E
q
u
il
 
G
lo
b
al
 
MiniCAM 11 
regions 
CO2, CH4, 
and N2O 
7 sectors 15-year 
time steps 
from 
1990 to 
2095. 
Drawn from 
MERGE 
Drawn from 
MERGE 
S
im
u
la
ti
o
n
 
R
eg
io
n
al
 
PAGE-2002 8 regions  CO2, CH4, 
SF6 
N/A 10-year 
(1990-
2000); 
20-year 
(2020-
2100) and 
25-year 
(2125-
2200) 
Sum of 
economic and 
intangible 
impacts as 
polynomial 
function of 
temp 
Economic and 
non-economic 
sectors; follows 
the FUND 
model 
 
 ICAM-3 12 
regions 
CO2 Energy types: 
oil, gas coal 
and non-
fossil 
5-year 
periods; 
from 
1975 to 
2100 
Depends on 
the rate of 
temperature 
changes 
Agricultural 
sector as a 
fraction of the 
economy and 
coastal zone 
damages due to 
sea level rise 
  E3MG One CO2 Energy sector 5-year No damage N/A 
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Global 
Region 
(2000-
2030); 
10-year 
(2030-
2050) and 
25-year 
(2050-
2100) 
treatment 
C
o
st
 M
in
 
G
lo
b
al
 
GET-LFL One 
Global 
Region 
CO2 3 end-use 
energy 
sectors: 
electricity, 
transportation 
and heat 
30 years No damage 
treatment 
N/A 
 
 
R
eg
io
n
al
 
DNE21+  77 
regions 
CO2 Energy sector 5 year 
(2000-
2030); 
10-year 
(2030-
2050) and 
25-year 
(2050-
2100) 
No damage 
treatment 
N/A 
  MESSAGE-
MACRO 
11 
regions 
CO2, CH4, 
SO2, and 
NOx 
Highly 
complex 
energy 
subsectors 
10 years 
(flexible 
end 
period) 
Non-linear 
damage 
function 
Highly complex 
pollutant 
contributing 
sectors 
* Hybrid model; also uses cost minimisation methodologies 
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Appendix 8: Chinese IAM Applications 
This appendix presents the detailed survey of Chinese IAM features in Table A8.1.  
 
Table A8.1: Results of the survey of Chinese IAM features (Michelsen et al., 2008) 
Name Institution Description Objective 
Welfare Maximisation 
- - - - 
General Equilibrium 
HE 
J. He, 
CASS, China 
• Static CGE model  
• 9 sectors: coal mining, oil and natural 
gas, agriculture, electricity, 
manufacturing, construction, 
transportation and communication, 
commercial, services 
• CES production function  
• Unit carbon tax collected on the fossil 
fuel production 
To analyse the 
impacts of a 
carbon tax on the 
national economy 
PRCGEM 
Y. Zheng, M. Fan 
and CASS, 
Monash 
University 
• Dynamic CGE model 
• 118 sectors version and 34 sectors 
version 
• Energy is aggregated with other 
factors through CES, while coal, oil, 
natural gas and electricity are 
aggregated through Cobb-Douglas. 
The nested fashion is (K,L) E 
• Only one representative consumer 
• Only the emission caused by fossil 
fuel combustion is considered 
• A unit tax on the carbon content in 
fossil fuel instead of carbon dioxide 
emission 
• To analyse the 
impacts of trade 
liberalization 
• Carbon tax also 
can be analysed 
when energy is 
included as a 
productive 
factor 
TEDCGE 
C. Wang 
Tsinghua 
University, China 
• Dynamic CGE model 
• 10 productive sectors: agriculture, 
heavy industry, light industry, 
transportation, construction, services, 
coal, oil, natural gas and electricity 
• Nested CES production function with 
(K,E)L nested fashion  
• Two reprehensive consumers: urban 
resident and rural resident 
• An eclectic treatment for emission 
based on the carbon content of fuel, 
the fraction of stored carbon, the 
fraction of carbon oxidized 
• The carbon tax is collected on the 
production and import of the primary 
energy. Also includes the carbon 
dioxide emission from the industrial 
process, especially the cement 
production. 
To analyse the 
impacts of a 
carbon tax on the 
national economy 
CNAGE 
Norwegian 
Bureau of 
Statistics 
• Static CGE model 
• Constant return to scale Cobb-
Douglas production function with the 
To analyse the 
impacts of a 
carbon tax on the 
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aggregation fashion of (L, E, K) 
• 19 commercial energy products 
while 5 types for final consumption 
• The labour market is not clear for the 
unemployment and determined by 
the profit maximization behaviour of 
producers 
• The investment structure is not 
adjusted according to different 
carbon tax levels. All carbon tax is 
assumed to be reinvested 
national economy 
IPAC-SGM 
K. Jiang and X., 
Energy Research 
Institute, 
Northwest 
Laboratory, USA 
• Recursive dynamic CGE 
• The economic system includes the 
residential sector, government sector, 
agriculture, energy and other sectors 
• Two kinds of labour: urban labour 
and rural labour to show the cost 
difference between these two types 
of labour 
• The investment for nuclear power 
and hydro power is under the control 
of central government 
To analyse the 
impacts of a 
carbon tax on the 
national economy 
and possible 
strategy for 
abatement 
Partial Equilibrium 
- - - - 
Simulation 
YE 
Y. Ye, 
Tsinghua 
University, China 
• Dynamic input output model.  
• Data based on is the 33 sectors. from 
a 1987 input-output model 
• The electricity sector is divided into 
the hydropower sector, the nuclear 
power sector, the normal coal-fired 
power sector, the advanced coal-fired 
power sector, and the renewables 
sector.  
Top-down analysis 
of different 
abatement 
schemes and 
impact on GDP 
Liang 
Q. Liang, CAS, 
China 
• Input-output analysis and scenario 
analysis 
• Dataset from 1997 covering 40 
sectors input-output tables 
• Scenario setting: 6 scenarios are 
considered: A, statistic data in year 
1997; B, based on A while technical 
progress is considered; C, based on B 
while population growth is 
considered; D, based on C while 
average income increase and change 
of living patterns are considered; E, 
based on D while urbanisation rates 
and change of consumption patterns 
are considered; F, based on E but 
with a more aggressive prediction for 
population growth and urbanization 
rate 
Forecast of 
energy demand 
and energy 
intensity under 
different scenarios 
MARKAL 
Applied by 
W. Chen, 
Tsinghua 
University, China 
• Mitigation of pollution and overall 
energy system costs of energy policy 
options, strategies 
• 1995-2050; five year intervals 
Bottom up cost 
minimisation 
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• The basic capital stock, the added 
value of capital ratio in GDP, capital-
labour elasticity of substitution for 
energy services 
• Sectors: five sectors: agriculture, 
industry, resident, service and 
transport, 30 sub-sectors in detail. 
• Generation areas: 20 coal 
transmission technology, 3 natural 
gas transmission system, 3 oil 
transmission system and 9 renewable 
energy technology and 1 nuclear 
technology 
LEAP 
Applied by ERI, 
INET, Shanghai 
Academy of 
Environmental 
Science, China 
• Evaluation of climate change 
mitigation strategies.1999-2030; 
• Macro economic factors: GDP, 
population, household scale, transport 
turnover, main industrial production 
and so on 
• Energy demand data: sector/subsector 
energy demand, end-use activity level 
and energy intensity 
• Energy transmission data: efficiency, 
product capacity, fuel mix 
• Energy supply data: capital stock.  
• Available technology data: new 
technology capital and operation cost, 
efficiency 
Bottom up cost 
minimisation 
AIM 
Integrated Policy 
Assessment 
Model for China 
(IPAC) and Japan 
National Institute 
for Environmental 
Studies, 
• Model adopts the minimum cost 
analysis, and thereby selects the 
minimum cost technology for energy 
service provision 1990-2100 
• Macro economic data: population, 
GDP growth rate, GDP mix, 
international trade  
• Energy technology efficiency, energy 
technology annual margin cost 
increment 
• Non-conventional energy utilisation, 
the proportion of renewable energy  
• Energy utilisation by sector 
Bottom up cost 
minimisation 
3E model 
J. ZHANG, 
INET, China 
 
• Bottom-up; based on the energy flow 
system, includes macroeconomic 
model, end-use forecast model and 
energy system optimization Model 
from 2000-2050 
• The macroeconomic parameters of 
population the energy service/end-
use energy consumptions of 
industries, agriculture, transportation, 
commercial services and residential 
sectors, total of 5 sectors and 31 
sections from 2000-2050 
• Energy import separately come from 
mining, net import and renewable 
energy  
• This model included 1 renewable 
Bottom up CO2 
mitigation cost 
minimisation 
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energy technology, 6 fuel energy 
exploitation technologies, 9 energy 
import technologies, 69 energy 
transfer technologies, 123 end-use 
energy application technologies 
• The investment cost, operation and 
maintenance cost, energy net import 
and annual emission tax 
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Appendix 9: Survey of Policy Assessment Framework and 
Responses 
The following survey and questions were sent out to industry experts as part of better 
understanding the energy policy assessment framework criteria items. The responses 
shortly followed the survey description.  
 
Survey 
This research aims to better understand the energy policy assessment framework to 
help Chinese energy policy makers address energy concerns at a strategic level. The 
framework uses an Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) to project the energy 
pathways today without energy policy intervention (Figure A9.1). The outcomes will 
be evaluated against the policy criteria (Table A7.1) to highlight those broad policy 
dimensions (economic, climate change, SoS, social equality, or governance) would 
could benefit from policy modifications. After formulating energy policy changes, the 
IAM will be re-run, and the outcome again evaluated against the energy policy 
assessment framework criteria items. With further iterations of the process, a range of 
‘optimised’ strategic energy policy approaches for China, and their outcomes, will be 
synthesised. The responses are presented in Table A9.2. 
 
Energy policy assessment framework 
 
Figure A9.1: logic of the energy policy assessment framework  
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Purpose of this survey 
This survey seeks to gather views on the energy policy outcome assessment criteria 
(not on the overall research methodology). The table below sets out the strategic 
criteria against which each policy pathway will be evaluated.  
 
The list of policy indicators are derived from a survey of five institutions that publish 
their variation of policy assessment framework indicators. The table is a synthesis 
derived from a survey of the following institutions: 
• IAEA (2005) Energy Indicators for Sustainable Development 
• UN (2007) Indicators for Sustainable Development 
• OECD (2005) Economic, Environment, Social Themes & Indicators 
• WEC (2008) Energy Policy and Practices Index 
• Eurostat (2005) Indicators of Sustainable Development 
 
The indicators listed in the table below were selected from the 5 surveyed institutions 
and based on what the IAM method could calculate. For example, the IAM method 
can calculate GDP and well as energy demand. Hence the energy intensity indicator 
becomes “energy consumption per GDP”.  
 
Survey questions 
1) Is the chosen method for the evaluation of policy outcomes appropriate for the 
research intention, keeping in mind that the primary objective is to evaluate the 
interactions between carbon emissions and economic growth at a strategic level? 
 
2) What critical areas, if any, are missing from the policy outcome assessment 
criteria? 
 
3) Is the 20% weighting to each of the five policy areas appropriate? 
 
4) Do you have any comments on the way the policy outcome assessment criteria 
were derived? 
 
5) Do you have any other comments, or questions to add that should have been asked? 
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Table A9.1: Proposed energy policy assessment framework indicator for comments 
Policy 
Dimension 
(weight) 
Sub-theme Indicator to evaluate subtheme 
Economic 
Growth 
(20%) 
Balanced GDP growth GDP growth 
Energy consumption to 
production balance 
Energy consumption to production ratio 
Energy Investment Energy R&D per GDP 
Generation costs Primary energy generation costs 
Climate Change 
Mitigation 
(20%) 
CO2 Emissions Cap on level of atmospheric CO2 
Energy intensity and 
efficiency 
Energy consumption per GDP 
Emissions intensity Emitted CO2 per GDP 
Emitted CO2 per Energy Consumption 
SoS 
(20%) 
Hydrocarbon and coal 
dependence 
Oil, gas and coal as proportion of primary 
energy generation 
Generation mix 
diversification 
Non fossil fuels energy generation to total 
energy production 
Social Equality 
(20%) 
Affordable Energy Energy generation cost as proportion of 
income 
Energy access Electricity grid coverage 
Governance 
(20%) 
Political stability & 
policy coherence 
Key government officials turnover 
Continuity of energy policy direction 
Public participation Stakeholders consultation in decision making 
process 
Regulatory quality & 
control of corruption 
Accountability of government officials 
Monitoring and punishment of institutions 
and officials accountable 
 
Table A9.2: The responses to the survey from the industry experts 
Individual 
Surveyed 
Q1 Appropriate 
method? 
Q2 Missing 
Areas? 
Q3 Equal 
Weighting? 
Q4 Derivation 
of Criteria? 
Q5 Missed 
Questions? 
1 
N Brandon 
Consider energy 
demand areas separately 
by splitting 
“manufacturing, 
residential and 
transport”. 
• For 
“Hydrocarbon 
dependence” to 
add dependence 
on coal 
• For “Affordable 
Energy” to add 
provincial wealth 
disparity 
No comment No comment No comment 
2 
N Hirst 
 
Simplify by using 
policy options like the 
DECC “calculator” for 
the UK. 
Additional 
indicators: 
• Imports as a % 
of Total GDP  
• Oil imports as 
a % of total oil 
consumption 
• Rate of 
urbanisation 
• China’s lead in 
global (low 
carbon) 
technologies 
• Non-CO2 
pollution 
(sulphur, 
nitrogen, 
mercury) 
• Water 
requirement. 
• Poverty 
reduction 
Should 
“Governance” be a 
separate area, or is 
it in part a measure 
of success against 
the other criteria? 
Reasonable.  
Also should 
consider:  
• IEA literature. 
• European 
Parliament 
Economic and 
Monetary 
Affairs 
Committee 
• IMF’s World 
Economic 
Outlook 
For “Regulatory 
quality & control of 
corruption”, avoid 
punishment. The 
Chinese system 
already relies too 
much on 
“punishment” 
rather than 
incentivisation and 
good management. 
3 IAEA is the only Additional Weightings should No comment Need to introduce 
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A Foggart technology specific 
agency whose policy 
assessment indicators 
considered. Need to 
balance the survey of by 
examining agencies 
representing other 
sectors, for example 
coal and renewables. 
indicators: 
• Energy 
Investment to 
also include 
deployment 
costs  
• Climate Change 
Mitigation to 
also include 
other 
environmental 
issues and risks, 
for example post 
Fukushima 
China China has 
not started any 
new build 
nuclear which 
may reduce 
meeting CO2 
objectives  
• SoS to also 
include coal 
dependence 
not be equal. 
However, any 
adjusted 
weightings need to 
be justified which 
increases the 
complexity.  
changing 
importance of 
policies over time. 
Policies change 
over time. Short 
term policy 
priorities may not 
be important over a 
longer term 
timescale. A 
timetable may need 
to be produced to 
alter the 
importance of 
policy concerns 
over time. 
4 
L 
Westman 
No comment • For climate 
change, to 
include SO2 
emissions, due 
to the enormous 
amount of 
power generated 
in sub-critical 
coal plants 
• For climate 
change, also 
include water 
scarcity due to 
extensive 
hydropower 
• For SoS to 
include 
proportion of 
fossil fuels out 
of total energy 
production and  
• For SoS to also 
include 
proportion of 
imports to total 
production. 
• For SoS to also 
include the 
reliability of 
transportation 
(coal needs to be 
shipped from 
west to east by 
rail) 
Economic growth 
should not be 
assigned the same 
importance level 
as climate change 
mitigation to 
incorporate the 
intangible 
damages. 
No comment Foresee difficulty 
in measuring key 
stakeholders 
participation. Most 
relevant energy 
policy is drafted 
with heavy 
influence from 
industry interests. 
Hence difficult to 
distinguish where 
public participation 
play roles.  
Foresee difficulty 
in measuring 
accountability and 
corruption. The 
corruption at 
different levels 
(ranging from 
central to local 
government) is 
hard to quantify 
and measure 
5 
C Hope 
To use a 10 step 
technique for multi-
attribute utility 
measurement a 
developed by Edwards 
in 1977 of (1) 
identification of 
stakeholders, (2) 
identification of options 
for action, (3) 
identification of 
attributes, (4) 
identification of 
empirical indicators, (5) 
ranking of attributes, (6) 
rating of attributes for 
their importance, (7) 
scaling of importance 
ratings, (8) scoring 
option of each attribute, 
• For climate 
change, to 
include SO2 
emissions 
• For climate 
change, to 
include 
probability of 
catastrophes 
• For SoS to 
include net 
imports of fuels 
as % of total use 
• For SoS to 
include diversity 
in the number of 
different energy 
suppliers 
• For SoS to 
include the 
The weightings of 
relative importance 
for the 5 different 
categories and 
their individual 
indicators should 
be ranking by the 
users of the 
assessment 
criteria. For 
example by the 
government 
officials, academic 
institutions and 
NGO monitoring 
institutions.  
No comment No comment 
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(9) calculation of 
utilities and (10) 
decision. 
number of fuels 
types supplying 
greater than 10% 
of the energy 
mix 
• For public 
participation to 
include % of 
energy data 
available in the 
public domain. 
• For public 
participation to 
include number 
of daily 
newspaper 
editorials on 
energy 
6 
A Bucaille 
To better identify 
Chinese’s leaders on 
technologies.  
To better understand 
interaction between 
China and USA towards 
climate change. 
No comment No comment No comment No comment 
7 
A 
Gambhir 
The criteria are all 
relevant to the 
interaction between 
energy and economic 
growth, as well as 
having a specific 
category on CO2 
emissions. 
The criteria exclude 
important sub-
criteria, such as 
demand-side 
sectoral (i.e. 
buildings, industry, 
transport) 
emissions and 
emissions 
intensities 
SoS should be 
40%, climate 
change mitigation 
20% and economic 
growth 20%.  
Institutions are an 
input than outcome 
so difficult to say 
what their 
weighting should 
be. 
Other sources 
(e.g. IEA) might 
be better or 
worth adding. 
There seems to be 
an element missing 
which is what 
constitutes the best 
actual policy mix – 
is it regulation, 
market 
mechanisms, taxes, 
or subsidies.  
8 CEEP (i) Acceptable Social equality 
should include 
household welfare  
Weighting should 
be different for 
different countries. 
No comment No comment 
9 CEEP 
(ii) 
Acceptable SoS should include 
dependence on 
foreign oil 
Weighting for 
governance should 
lower than others 
for developing 
countries. For 
example weighting 
should be 25%, 
25%, 20%, 20%, 
10%. 
No comment No comment 
10 CEEP 
(iii) 
Appropriate method Energy consuming 
structure should be 
considered 
Weighting should 
be different 
between 
developing and 
developed 
countries.  
No comment No comment 
11 CEEP 
(iv) 
Acceptable None missing Weighting for 
Economic 
Development and 
Environmental 
Protection should 
be higher than 
other areas. 
No comment It is difficult to 
assess Governance. 
 
12 CEEP 
(v) 
Acceptable None missing Weighting should 
be determined via 
a more scientific 
method. 
No comment No comment 
13 CEEP 
(vi) 
Acceptable Analysing the 
interactions 
between economic 
growth climate 
change should 
consider population 
growth 
Economic growth 
weight should be 
increased, 
Governance 
weight should be 
decreased. 
‘Energy 
consumption per 
GDP 
Emitted CO2 per 
GDP 
Emitted CO2 per 
Energy 
Consumption’ 
will have 
problems of 
colinearity. 
No comment 
14 CEEP 
(vii) 
Reasonable method In the part of 
Institutional 
Weighting of 
policy areas should 
No comment No comment 
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Governance, it may 
appropriate to add 
"Verification" and 
"Penalties" etc. to 
complete the area 
depending on 
policy maker’s 
ultimate goals. 
Weighting for each 
should be made 
case-by-case 
analysis as per the 
goals of the policy 
makers. 
15 CEEP 
(viii) 
Acceptable Nothing critically 
that is missing 
Economic 
Development 25% 
Environmental 
Protection  20% 
Security of Energy 
Supply  15% 
Social Equality  
15% 
Institutional 
Governance 25% 
No comment Some criteria may 
be inappropriate in 
non free-market 
countries like 
“Stakeholders 
consultation in 
decision making 
process”. 
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Appendix 10: Revised Synthesis of Policy Assessment 
Criteria Items 
This appendix contains the list of CFEPS assessment framework criteria items in its 
preliminary form, after empirical survey studies are performed (see Table A10.1). 
 
Table A10.1: Revised set of policy assessment framework indicators post survey 
Dimension 
(weight) 
Sub-theme Missing Indicators Comments 
Economic 
Growth 
(15%) 
Balanced GDP 
growth 
GDP growth  
Energy consumption 
production balance 
Energy consumption to 
production ratio 
 
Energy Investment 
• Energy R&D per GDP 
• Deployment costs 
Deployment cost 
deleted as it is a 
policy action (the 
cause) 
Generation cost 
Primary energy generation 
costs 
Removed as lack of 
official data. 
Rate of urbanisation 
Rate of which cities expend 
land mass as a % of China’s 
total land mass 
Removed, as focus 
on energy policy 
issues 
Labour force Population growth 
Removed, as 
population to be 
exogenous 
Climate 
Change 
Mitigation 
(30%) 
CO2 Emissions 
Cap on level of atmospheric 
CO2 
 
Other GHG 
Emissions 
Sulphur, nitrogen and mercury 
Removed, as focus 
on atmospheric 
emissions 
Other Emissions 
Water pollution and water 
scarcity 
Emissions intensities 
in demand sectors 
Emission and intensities for 
buildings, industry and 
transport.  
Probability of 
catastrophes 
The increase in the probability 
of catastrophes due to 
pollution 
Removed, as only 
consider marginal 
cases not extreme 
climatic events 
Energy intensity & 
efficiency 
Energy consumption per GDP  
Emissions intensity 
Emitted CO2 per GDP  
• Emitted CO2 per Energy 
Consumption 
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SoS 
(20%) 
Hydrocarbon and 
coal dependence 
• Oil, gas and coal as 
proportion of primary 
energy generation 
• Imports as a % of Total 
GDP 
• Oil imports as a % of total 
oil consumption, 
dependence on foreign oil 
• Imports to total production 
• Coal imports as a % of total 
coal consumption 
Removed, as 
hydrocarbon 
imports are proxied 
via projecting 
generation 
pathways 
Generation mix 
diversification 
• Non fossil fuels energy 
generation to total energy 
production 
• China’s lead in global (low 
carbon) technologies 
• Number of fuels types 
supplying greater than 10% 
of the energy mix 
Removed, as fuel 
mix diversification 
is proxied via 
projecting 
generation 
pathways 
Production 
diversification 
Diversity in the number of 
different energy suppliers. 
Removed as China 
faced monopoly of 
suppliers 
Social 
Equality 
(20%) 
Affordable Energy 
Energy generation cost as 
proportion of income 
 
Energy access Electricity grid coverage  
Income disparity 
• Provincial wealth disparity 
• Poverty reduction rate 
• Household welfare 
Removed, as have 
experienced 
difficulty in 
gathering data 
Governance 
(15%) 
Political stability & 
policy coherence 
• Key government officials 
turnover 
• Continuity of energy policy 
direction 
 
Public participation 
• Stakeholders consultation 
in decision making process 
• Percentage of energy data 
available in the public 
domain 
• Number of daily newspaper 
editorials on energy 
Removed, as have 
experienced 
difficulty in 
gathering data 
Regulatory quality & 
control of corruption 
• Accountability of 
government officials 
• Monitoring and punishment 
of institutions and officials 
accountable 
 
NB: Newly suggested indicators highlighted in grey. Italic font text for those criteria 
which are not taken further in the research 
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Appendix 11: WITCH Key Features  
The appendix sets out the key WITCH model features in Table A11.1.  
 
Table A11.1: The key WITCH model features (Bosetti et al., 2009) 
Key Feature Description 
Macroeconomic 
core and solution 
concept 
Intertemporal optimisation with Ramsey growth module and 
Negishi approach for regional aggregation.  
Expectations of 
the future  
Perfect foresight.  
Substitution 
possibilities 
within the 
macroeconomy  
Nested CES function for production of generic final good from 
basic factors capital, labour, and energy use.  
Link between 
energy system 
and macro 
economy 
Economic activity determines demand; energy costs 
(investments, generation costs, operation and maintenance) 
which are included in macro-economic budget constraint. The 
model uses a hard link methodology, whereby the energy 
module and economy module are optimised in tandem.  
Production 
function in the 
energy system 
and substitution 
possibilities 
Linear substitution between competing technologies for 
secondary energy production. Supply curves for exhaustible 
(cumulative extraction cost curves) as well as renewables 
(grades with different capacity factors) introduce convexities.  
International 
Trade 
Single market for all commodities (non-sustainable fuels and 
permits).  
Implementation 
of climate policy 
targets 
Pareto optimal achievement of atmospheric pollutant 
concentration and climate policy targeting emissions levels. 
Allocation rules for distribution of emission permits among 
regions.  
Technological 
Change and 
Learning 
Top down R&D expenditure and bottom up learning by doing 
for sustainable technologies. A global learning curve is assumed. 
Technological spill overs such as learning by doing are 
internalised.  
Representation of 
end-use sectors 
Distinction between different energy end-use sectors: end-use 
energy consumption, energy generation and transportation.  
Strategic 
interaction 
between regions 
Nash equilibrium considering fully cooperative and non-
cooperative games.  
Discounting  Constant rate of pure time preference (2.5%).  
Technology and 
investment details  
Stylised but expanded technology description. Adjustments for 
vintages for energy supply technologies, adjustment costs for 
acceleration of capacity expansion in the energy system.  
Modelling engine Uses GAMS/CONOPT to project over in the medium to long-
term in five-yearly periods 
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Appendix 12: Rationale for using WITCH to address IAM 
Criticisms  
This appendix presents the rationale for choosing WITCH over other IAMs in Table 
A12.1.  
 
Table A12.1:The Critique to WITCH and IAMs 
Category Criticism Solutions offered by WITCH to IAM Criticisms 
General Simplification Employing a hybrid state of the art top-down and 
bottom-up hybrid methodology. 
Discount Rates Survey of the consensus rate used in other models 
Model 
Flexibility 
Comprehensive 
Input Data 
Requirements 
Using nested production functions. 
Static Modelling 
Framework 
Iterative projection process 
No Optimal 
Generation 
Scenarios 
Optimal generation mix to balance emissions 
abatement and GDP growth targets 
Climate 
Change 
Climate Damage 
Functions 
Hard linked between the economy and climate 
change; checked via a survey of the IPCC consensus. 
Emissions 
Economy Linkage 
Hard linked approach to emissions and the economy. 
Energy 
Demand 
Economic Growth Using a Cobb-Douglas production function to link 
growth to energy demand. Population projections and 
levels of capital are exogenous and derived from the 
World Bank. 
Regional 
Aggregation 
Employing a regionally disaggregated approach to 
optimisation. Grouping economies not by 
geographical proximity, but by economic 
development. 
Regional 
Interaction 
Strategic interactions between neighbouring countries, 
modelling via a Nash equilibrium and game theoretic 
iterative approach. 
Energy 
Supply 
Technological 
Innovation and 
Transfers 
Endogenous dynamic technological change to lower 
energy technology investment and generation costs, 
and higher generation efficiencies 
Policy 
Impact 
Economic 
Response to Policy 
Generating a Feedback Loop which feeds back policy 
suggestion into the model and back to policy.  
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Appendix 13: WITCH Input Assumptions 
The inputs and assumptions used to support the models are divided into technical 
parameters for electricity generation, power investment costs, power operational costs, 
and word population projections. 
 
Technical parameters for electricity generation  
Inputs concerning the different generation technologies uses data published by the 
IEA (2005 and 2010), and Bosetti et al. (2007). The figures are assumed to be 
constant for the entire modelling horizon. W&S corresponds to wind and solar 
generation (Table A13.1).  
 
Table A13.1: Technical parameters for electricity generation (IEA, 2005 and 2010, 
and Bosetti et al., 2007)  
 Coal IGCC Oil Gas Nuclear Hydro W&S 
Load Factor 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.50 0.30 
Efficiency  0.35 0.40 0.39 0.50 0.33 1.00 1.00 
Depreciation 5.60% 5.60% 8.80% 8.80% 5.60% 5.00% 7.40% 
 
Power Plant Initial Setup and Investment Costs  
Power plant costs and investment costs are presented below in Table A13.2. Referring 
to IEA (2005 and 2010), figures are presented in USD/kWe per year in USD2010 
terms.  
 
Table A13.2: Plant investment costs (IEA, 2005 and 2010) 
 Coal   IGCC Oil   Gas   Nuclear   Hydro   W&S   
USA  2300 3000 900 700 3000 2400 2500 
OLDEURO  2500 3000 1000 1200 3000 2400 2500 
NEWEURO  3000 3000 1000 1700 3000 2400 2500 
KOSAU  1500 3000 800 900 3000 2400 2500 
CAJANZ  2500 3000 1200 1900 3000 2400 2500 
TE  2000 3000 1000 1700 3000 2400 2500 
MENA  2000 3000 800 700 3000 2400 2500 
SSA  2000 3000 1200 1900 3000 2400 2500 
SASIA  2200 3000 900 1400 3000 2400 2500 
CHINA  700 3000 900 1400 3000 2400 2500 
EASIA  2000 3000 900 1900 3000 2400 2500 
LACA  2300 3000 2000 1400 3000 2400 2500 
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Power Plant On-Going Operation and Maintenance Costs  
Power plant operation and maintenance costs are derived from (IEA, 2005 and 2010) 
and Bosetti et al. (2007). Presented in Table A13.3, the numbers are presented in 
USD/kWe per year in USD2010 terms. 
 
Table A13.3: Plant operation and maintenance costs (IEA, 2005 and 2010, and Bosetti 
et al., 2007): plant O&M costs 
 Coal   IGCC Oil   Gas   Nuclear   Hydro   W&S   
USA  44 51 27 23 136 51 24 
OLDEURO  52 60 32 27 143 57 24 
NEWEURO  35 40 32 27 147 41 24 
KOSAU  26 30 30 25 131 55 24 
CAJANZ  46 53 29 24 161 67 24 
TE  31 36 27 23 113 53 24 
MENA  52 60 32 27 161 67 24 
SSA  52 60 32 27 161 67 24 
SASIA  27 31 28 23 128 54 24 
CHINA  34 39 28 23 126 48 24 
EASIA  30 35 28 23 127 51 24 
LACA  17 20 12 10 133 54 24 
 
World Population Projections  
Estimations of the world population make reference to publications from the UN 
(2010). As presented in Table A13.4, the population projections are presented in 
millions. 
 
Table A13.4: World population estimates (UN, 2010) 
 2010 2030 2100 
Population Population 2030/2010 Population 2100/2010 
USA  322  381  118% 530  165% 
OLDEURO  302  325  107% 355  117% 
NEWEURO  163  170  104% 156  96% 
KOSAU  74  85  115% 99  134% 
CAJANZ  174  183  105% 167  96% 
TE  304  291  96% 243  80% 
MENA  445  602  135% 893  201% 
SSA  758  1,229  162% 3,268  431% 
SASIA  1,716  2,166  126% 2,392  139% 
CHINA  1,367  1,442  105% 1,061  78% 
EASIA  598  718  120% 772  129% 
LACA  599  720  120% 769  129% 
WORLD  7,001  8,517  122% 10,917  156% 
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Appendix 14: Mapping Model Outputs to Policy Assessment 
This appendix presents the mapping CFEPS policy assessment framework criteria 
items for evaluating the Eval model outputs in Table A14.1.  
 
Table A14.1: The Criteria used for evaluation of the results 
D
im
e
n
 
Policy Assessment 
Framework Sub-
theme 
Policy Assessment Framework 
Indicators 
Mapping Policy Assessment 
Framework Criteria items onto 
Model Output 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 
G
ro
w
th
 Economic productivity Energy production per GDP Energy Supply / GDP 
Energy consumption Energy consumption to 
production ratio 
Energy Demand / Energy Supply 
Energy Investment Energy R&D per GDP R&D Investment / GDP 
C
li
m
at
e 
C
h
an
g
e CO2 Emissions Cap on level of atmospheric 
CO2 
Emissions profile caps on 
450ppm/600ppm/750ppm 
Energy efficiency & 
intensity 
Energy consumption per GDP Energy Demand / GDP 
Emissions intensity Emitted CO2 per GDP CO2 / GDP 
Emitted CO2 per Energy 
Consumption 
CO2 / Energy Demand 
S
o
S
 
Hydrocarbon and coal 
dependence 
Oil, gas and coal as proportion 
of primary energy generation 
Oil, gas and coal as proportion of 
total Chinese generation capacity 
Oil, gas and coal imports as a % 
of total consumption 
Resource import / Resource 
demand 
Generation mix 
diversification 
Non fossil fuels energy 
generation to total energy 
production 
Low carbon technologies as 
proportion of total generation 
capacity 
Lead in global (low carbon) 
technologies 
China’s renewables, hydro and 
nuclear as proportion of global 
renewable, hydro and nuclear 
generation capacity 
S
o
ci
al
 Energy access Electricity grid coverage Growth in renewable generation 
NB: all indicators relates to China’s figures, unless indicated otherwise. 
G
o
v
er
n
an
ce
 
Political stability & 
policy coherence 
Key government officials 
turnover 
N/A (qualitative discussion) 
Continuity of energy policy 
direction 
N/A (qualitative discussion) 
Public participation Stakeholders consultation in 
decision making process 
N/A (qualitative discussion) 
Regulatory quality & 
control of corruption 
Accountability of government 
officials 
N/A (qualitative discussion) 
Monitoring and punishment of 
institutions and officials 
accountable 
N/A (qualitative discussion) 
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Appendix 15: Mapping Policy Action to Model Inputs 
This appendix presents the mapping legislative action to alter model inputs in Table 
A15.1.  
 
Table A15.1: The energy policy impacting on the model inputs (Sims et al., 2007) 
Categorisation of Policy 
Actions  
Actual Policy Action Mapping Legislation onto 
Model Input 
Legislative  
(command control) 
GHG limits  Harsher emissions caps* on 
450ppm/600ppm/750ppm  
Generation standards Increase load and efficiency 
Stricter targets for use of low 
carbon sources 
Increase load and efficiency 
Min efficiency standards Increase efficiency 
Supportive transmission 
tariffs and access  
Increase load and efficiency 
Best available technology Increase load and efficiency 
Economic Driven 
(incentives) 
Emissions restrictions for 
major emitters 
Increase generation costs 
GHG Taxes Increase generation costs 
Emissions Quotas Increase generation costs 
Emissions Trading Increase generation costs 
Capital grants & subsidies for 
sustainable generation 
Decrease setup costs 
Feed in Tariffs Decrease generation costs 
Public project initiatives Decrease setup costs 
Investment and subsidies for 
R&D 
Decrease generation and setup 
costs 
Organisational 
(evaluation monitoring) 
Increasing transparency of 
decision making process 
Improved feedback between 
model input and policy result 
Holding policy makers 
accountable for decisions 
Improved feedback between 
model input and policy result 
* COP15 targets the increase in the global temperature to 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels, taken to equate to no higher than 450ppm of CO2 during the century (IEA, 
2011). 
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Appendix 16: Model Results Validation 
The validation of the WITCH results follows the same logic as the main body, firstly 
discussion emissions, then economic growth, moving onto the energy sector and lastly 
energy R&D investment. 
 
CO2 Emissions  
The IEA’s World Energy Outlook (2011b) projects China’s energy generation related 
atmospheric CO2 emissions for China up to 2035. The IEA predicts an envelope of 
emissions levels which is enclosed by Current Policies Scenarios (equivalent to BaU) 
at the high end and 450ppm at the low end. By 2035, BaU is expected to generate 
12.6 GtCO2/year, whereas 450ppm is expected to generate 5.2 GtCO2/year (Figure 
A16.1). 
 
The WITCH model generated results are reasonable from 2010 to 2035. In 2035, the 
WITCH model generates a range from 10.5 GtCO2/year for 750ppm and 5.3 
GtCO2/year for 450ppm. At the top end, 750ppm fits within the envelope falling 
below the IEA BaU scenario at 12.6 GtCO2/year in 2035. However at the bottom end 
of the envelope, the calculated 450ppm scenario result in 2035 exceeds the 5.2 
GtCO2/year set out by IEA.  
 
 
Figure A16.1: China energy-generation related CO2 emissions under current BaU 
policies and 450ppm scenarios (IEA, 2011b).  
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Global GDP  
These WITCH model outputs are compared to projections of global GDP levels from 
REMIND-R and IMACLIM–R (Lauder et al., 2009 and Jakob et al., 2009). For BaU, 
both models predict a GDP level of around USD167tn for 2050. Also, both models 
suggest that the difference between BaU and 450ppm growth levels (the two extreme 
cases) are similar. One reason to explain the small difference between BaU and 
450ppm is the incorporation of CCS into the 450ppm cases in both REMIND-R 
(Figure A16.2) and IMACLIM-R (Figure A16.3). This allowed economies to continue 
employing carbon heavy generation sources, whilst adhering to 450ppm, as they 
utilise the impact of CCS. This is feature is not present in the WITCH model. Hence 
growth was not as jeopardised in order to cap emissions for REMIND and IMACLIM 
as it was for WITCH.  
 
Figure A16.2: IMACLIM-R Global GDP levels (Lauder et al., 2009 and Jakob et al., 
2009) 
 
Figure A16.3: REMIND-R Global GDP levels (Lauder et al., 2009 and Jakob et al., 
2009) 
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The WITCH model output for GDP levels closely follows the average of REMIND-R 
and IMACLIM-R all falling within a 5% discrepancy window. Figure A16.4 shows 
the percentage difference between WITCH and the average GDP levels of REMIND-
R and IMACLIM-R. This is calculated as (WITCH minus Average of Comparables) / 
WITCH. The WITCH outputs are higher than comparables in all period under BaU. 
Under 450ppm, WITCH results are higher than comparables in all period except 2050.  
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Figure A16.4: Global GDP levels difference of WITCH to average of REMIND-R 
and IMACLIM-R 
 
The WITCH model output for growth closely follows the average of REMIND-R and 
IMACLIM-R all falling within a 5% discrepancy window (Figure A16.5). The 
percentage difference of GDP growth rates between WITCH and the average GDP 
levels of REMIND-R and IMACLIM-R is calculated as (WITCH Growth minus 
Average of Comparables Growth)/WITCH Growth. The WITCH growth rates are 
higher in 2010-2020 and 2030-2040. WITCH growth rates are lower than 
comparables in 2020-2030 and 2040-2050.  
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Figure A16.5: Global GDP growth difference of WITCH to average of REMIND-R 
and IMACLIM-R 
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China GDP  
When validating China’s GDP projection results, a different source is used to 
compare, since REMIND-R and IMACLIM-R do not specifically focus on China. To 
validate China’s GDP levels, this research turns to BaU GDP projection from 
Hawksworth and Tiwari (2011) based on data sets from the World Bank (Figure 
A16.6) and shows that by 2050, BaU GDP levels are USD 55tn.  
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Figure A16.6: World Bank Dataset of Chinese BaU GDP levels (Hawksworth and 
Tiwari, 2011) 
 
The WITCH model output for China GDP levels closely follows the predictions of 
Hawksworth and Tiwari (2011) for BaU all falling within the 4% discrepancy window 
(Figure A16.7). China’s GDP % differences are calculated as (WITCH China GDP 
minus World Bank China GDP) / WITCH China GDP. The GDP projects by WITCH 
are higher in all periods. 
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Figure A16.7: China GDP levels % difference of WITCH to World Bank 
 
331 
The WITCH model output for growth closely follows the rates as predicted by 
Hawksworth and Tiwari (2011) all fall within the 3% discrepancy range (Figure 
A16.8). China’s GDP % decade growth differences are calculated as (WITCH China 
GDP Growth minus World Bank China GDP Growth) / WITCH China GDP Growth. 
The WITCH model projects growth levels lower in 2010-2020 and 2040-2050. In 
between 2020-2030 and 2030-2040, WITCH predicts higher GDP growth levels per 
decade.  
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Figure A16.8: China GDP growth % difference of WITCH to World Bank 
 
Energy Demand  
Validation for the remainder of this section will be drawing on the figure projected by 
the IEA (2011b). Even though the IEA only forecasts up to 2035, it has the benefit of 
breaking down energy and climate results for China, whereas REMIND-R and 
IMACLIM-R are China focussed. The drawback of using the IEA for validate is that 
results can only be compared for up to 2035.  
 
The IEA (2011b) predicts total primary energy demand globally to rise to 213,000 
TWh by 2035 under BaU, whilst for 450ppm, total primary energy demand will rise 
to 173,000 TWh. For China, total primary energy demand is expected to 51,000 TWh, 
whilst under 450ppm, it is expected to reach 37,000 TWh (Figure A16.9 and A16.10). 
 
Globally, the percentage difference between WITCH and IEA shows that the range of 
energy demands predicted by WITCH is wider than of IEA, falling within the 15% 
differential boundary and showing signs of divergence. The percentage difference is 
calculated as (WITCH Global Energy Demand minus IEA Global Energy 
Demand)/WITCH Global Energy Demand. WITCH computed demand projections are 
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higher than the IEA for the BaU case and WITCH computed demand is lower than 
IEA for the 450ppm case (Figure A16.11).  
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Figure A16.9: IEA Global and China energy demand levels for BaU and 450ppm 
(IEA, 2011b)  
 
Demand (TWh) 2020 2030 2035 
World BaU 175,860  199,686  212,814  
World 450 164,942  169,314  172,907  
China BaU 40,186  47,302  50,709  
China 450 37,047  36,605  36,651  
Figure A16.10: IEA global and China energy demand levels for BaU and 450ppm 
(IEA, 2011b)  
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Figure A16.11: Global energy demand % difference of WITCH to IEA 
 
The difference between the WITCH and IEA energy demand result could be partially 
explained by different technological improvement assumptions. Under WITCH, the 
energy demand is lower than IEA for 450ppm, as WITCH may have assumed better 
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efficiencies and less energy waste. For the BaU case, energy demand is greater under 
WITCH than the IEA. This could be explained by that economic growth under BaU 
could have been assumed to have been greater under WITCH than under the IEA thus 
demanding more energy.  
 
China’s energy demand shows a large diverge between WITCH and IEA, especially 
for 2020 under the 450ppm case of 33%. All other comparisons are within 16% the 
discrepancy window. The percentage difference is calculated as (WITCH China 
Energy Demand minus IEA China Energy Demand)/WITCH China Energy Demand. 
Under BaU, WITCH energy demand projections are lower in 2020 than the IEA, 
whilst WITCH is higher in 2030 and 2035. For the 450ppm case, WITCH is 
consistently lower than IEA (Figure A16.12).  
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Figure A16.12: China energy demand % difference of WITCH to IEA 
 
The 33% discrepancy in 2020 for 450ppm could be explained by a strict 450ppm low 
emissions allowance allocated to China by the IEA. This capping effect would reduce 
China energy demand more so than compared to WITCH. 
 
Energy Demand Intensity  
This validation is completed assuming the same GDP growth rates for the BaU and 
450ppm case. The IEA did not release different GDP levels under 450ppm. The IEA 
predicts a similar trend in the reduction of intensity for the world and China across 
BaU and 450ppm leading up to 2035. The IEA projects world intensity to be 183% 
under BaU and 1.48TWh/$ under 450ppm by 2035. For China, the IEA expects 
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intensity to be 1.66TWh/$ under BaU and 1.20TWh/$ under 450ppm by 2035 (Figure 
A16.13 and A16.14).  
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Figure A16.13: IEA global and China intensity of energy demand (IEA, 2011b) 
  
Intensity (TWh / USDtn) 2020 2030 2035 
World BaU 2.34 1.96 1.83 
World 450 2.20 1.66 1.48 
China BaU 2.90 1.95 1.66 
China 450 2.67 1.51 1.20 
Figure A16.14: IEA global and China intensity of energy demand (IEA, 2011b) 
 
The discrepancy between WITCH and the IEA on global energy intensity follows the 
same as global energy demand. Globally, the percentage difference between WITCH 
and the IEA, it shows that the range of energy demand intensities predicted by 
WITCH is wider than of the IEA, falling within the 15% differential boundary. The 
percentage difference is calculated as (WITCH Global Demand Intensity minus IEA 
Global Demand Intensity)/WITCH Global Demand Intensity. WITCH computed 
demand intensities are higher than the IEA for the BaU case and WITCH computed 
demand is lower than IEA for the 450ppm case (Figure A16.15).  
 
The difference between the WITCH and IEA energy demand intensity could be 
against explained by different technological improvement assumptions. Again 
WITCH may have assumed better efficiencies and less energy waste for 450ppm. 
WITCH could again assumed greater growth under BaU that was achieved via energy 
intensive sectors, thus being more energy intensive.  
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Figure A16.15: Global energy demand intensity % difference of WITCH to IEA 
 
China’s energy demand intensity also follows a similar pattern as when energy 
demand was compared between WITCH and IEA. Again, a large discrepancy is 
observed in 2020 under the 450ppm case of 33%. All other comparisons are within 
16% the discrepancy window. The percentage difference is calculated as (WITCH 
China Demand Intensity minus IEA China Demand Intensity)/WITCH China Demand 
Intensity. Under BaU, WITCH energy demand projections are lower in 2020 than the 
IEA, whilst WITCH is higher in 2030 and 2035. For the 450ppm case, WITCH is 
consistently lower than IEA (Figure A16.16).  
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Figure A16.16: China energy demand intensity % difference of WITCH to IEA 
 
The 33% discrepancy in 2020 follows the explanation offered for energy demand that 
for 450ppm could be explained by a strict 450ppm low emissions allowance allocated 
to China by IEA. This capping effect would force China to pursue less energy 
intensive industries.  
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Electricity Supply  
Electricity supply projected by the IEA shows world BaU levels at 39,000 TWh and 
450ppm levels at 32,000 by 2035. For China, BaU levels are expected to be 11,400 
TWh and 450ppm at 8,200 TWh by 2035 (Figures A16.17 and A16.18). 
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Figure A16.17: IEA global and China electricity generation supply (IEA, 2011b) 
 
Capacity (Gw) 2020 2030 2035 
World BaU  28,569   35,468   39,368  
World 450  26,835   30,393   32,224  
China BaU  7,537   10,023   11,407  
China 450  6,858   7,840   8,216  
Figure A16.18: IEA global and China electricity supply (IEA, 2011b) 
 
Globally, the percentage difference between WITCH and the IEA shows that the 
range of electricity supply predicted by WITCH is consistently below that which is 
predicted by the IEA and falling within the 15% differential boundary. The 
percentage difference is calculated as (WITCH Global Electricity Supply minus IEA 
Global Electricity Supply)/WITCH Global Electricity Supply (Figure A16.19).  
 
The difference between the WITCH and IEA electricity supply result could be 
explained the different split between electric and non-electric energy supply. 
Electricity supplies would differ depending on assumptions on the speed of moving to 
lower carbon technologies globally. If WITCH assumes slower movement to  low 
carbon technologies, so still dependent on non electric supplies, then the WITCH 
power supply would be lower than the IEA’s projections.  
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Figure A16.19: Global energy supply % difference of WITCH to IEA 
 
China’s electricity supply shows a large diverge between WITCH and IEA, especially 
for 2020 under the 450ppm case of 39%. All other comparisons are within 14% the 
discrepancy window. The percentage difference is calculated as WITCH China 
Electricity Supply minus IEA China Electricity Supply)/WITCH China Electricity 
Supply. Under BaU, WITCH energy demand projections are lower in 2020 than the 
IEA, whilst WITCH is higher in 2030 and 2035. For the 450ppm case, WITCH is 
consistently lower than IEA (Figure A16.20).  
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Figure A16.20: China energy supply % difference of WITCH to IEA 
 
The 39% discrepancy in 2020 for 450ppm could be explained by a strict 450ppm low 
emission allowance allocated to China by IEA. This capping effect would reduce 
China energy supply, including electricity supply, more so than compared to WITCH. 
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Electricity Generation Capacity  
The IEA projects the global BaU case to reach 9,500 GW and under global 450ppm 
case of 9,100 GW of power generation capacity by 2035 (Figure A16.21 and A16.22). 
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Figure A16.21: IEA global and China energy generation capacity (IEA, 2011b) 
 
Capacity (Gw) 2020 2030 2035 
World BaU 6955 8544 9484 
World 450 6923 8346 9126 
China BaU 1764 2294 2563 
China 450 1687 2120 2280 
Figure A16.22: IEA global and China generation capacity (IEA, 2011b) 
 
Globally, the percentage difference between WITCH and the IEA shows that the 
range of electricity generation capacity predicted by WITCH is consistently above 
IEA’s calculation, apart from BaU in 2020 and falling within the 35% differential 
boundary. The percentage difference is calculated as (WITCH Global Electricity 
Generation Capacity minus IEA Global Electricity Generation Capacity)/WITCH 
Global Electricity Generation Capacity (Figure A16.23).  
 
The comparison that WITCH is above the IEA in most cases is counter intuitive, as 
WITCH electricity supply levels are all below the IEA. This can be explained by the 
different power generation load factors assumed by WITCH compared to the IEA. A 
lower load factor means more generation capacity is needed for the same and even 
lower electricity supply. So electricity supply and electricity generation capacity do 
not necessarily have to move in tandem.  
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Figure A16.23: Global electricity generation capacity % difference of WITCH to IEA 
 
China’s electricity generation capacity shows a large diverge between WITCH and 
IEA. In 2020 the 450ppm case of 55% observes a particularly wide divergence. The 
percentage difference is calculated as WITCH China Electricity Generation Capacity 
minus IEA China Electricity Generation Capacity)/WITCH China Electricity 
Generation Capacity. Under both BaU and 450ppm, WITCH is lower than the levels 
from IEA (Figure A16.24).  
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Figure A16.24: China electricity generation capacity % difference of WITCH to IEA 
 
This discrepancy of WITCH consistently below for 450ppm, is in line with 
expectations. For China electricity supply WITCH was also below IEA. However for 
the BaU case, the electricity supply and power generation capacity results do not 
follow the same trend. This could again be explained by the load factor playing the 
role.  
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Global Electricity Generation Mix  
Comparisons are made for the BaU and 450ppm cases (Figure A16.25). These two 
scenarios represent the two extremes of the energy generation pathway projections 
and sets the IEA boundary of what constitutes as reasonable model results for the 
WITCH.  
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Figure A16.25: IEA global electricity generation mixes (IEA, 2011b) 
 
For BaU, the WITCH model results are in line with the IEA’s prediction. In 2020, 
WITCH shows low carbon generation technologies account for 35% of power 
generation capacity, which is close to the 37% from the IEA. For 2030, this WITCH 
low carbon set of generation sources account for 36% of capacity, which corresponds 
to the 35% from the IEA. In 2035, WITCH predicts clean generation to be 37%, 
whilst the IEA projects clean generation to be 40%.  
 
For 450ppm, the WITCH model results display some discrepancies The stricter 
emission caps set by WITCH compared to the IEA means that cleaner generation 
proliferates to the economy faster and earlier. By 2020, WITCH predicts 49% of clean 
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generated compared to the IEA’s 40%. In 2030, WITCH is at 68%, whereas the IEA 
predicts just under 55%. In 2035, WITCH expects clean generation to be just under 
75%, whereas the IEA calls for 60%. 
 
The global energy generation pathway is a useful guide when it is considered in 
conjunction with energy policies implemented in the rest of the world. However to 
call for a coercive long-term policy strategy in China, a closer examination of Chinese 
generation pathways is necessary. Chinese energy generation pathways are presented 
in the following section. 
 
China Electricity Generation Mix  
For China, again the BaU results are again similar to the IEA, with the 450ppm results 
calling for faster use of clean generation mixes (Figure A16.26).  
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Figure A16.26: IEA China electricity generation mixes (IEA, 2011b) 
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For BaU, the WITCH model results are in line with the IEA’s prediction. In 2020, low 
carbon generation technologies account for 33% of power generation capacity, which 
is close to 32% from the IEA. For 2030, this low carbon set of generation sources 
accounts for 33% of capacity, whereas the IEA is 34%. WITCH projects clean 
generation to be 36% by 2035, whereas the IEA stays stable at 35%. 
 
For 450ppm, the WITCH model results display some discrepancies The stricter 
emission caps set by WITCH compared to the IEA means that cleaner generation 
proliferates to the economy faster and earlier. By 2020, WITCH predicts 57% of clean 
generated compared to the IEA’s 25%. In 2030, WITCH exceeds 79%, whereas the 
IEA predicts 58%. In 2035, WITCH expects clean generation to be 88%, whereas the 
IEA calls for 60%.  
 
Energy R&D Investments 
The validation of energy R&D investment is challenging, as this variable captures the 
energy sector’s contribution to technological improvements. Academic will represent 
energy technological improvement different depending on the way their models are 
set up. Validation shall be carried out by comparing energy R&D investment against 
another WITCH model output. Using GDP levels to compare energy R&D 
investments is the most logical, as increases to energy investment would directly 
result in increased GDP levels.  
 
Global energy R&D investment per global GDP shows that from 0.5% in 2010, 
percentage investment falls for BaU and 750ppm. The 600ppm case initially rises in 
2015, but also falls afterwards. The only case that sees progressive increases in 
percentage energy R&D investments is the 450ppm case, especially observed from 
2010 to 2020, to ensure the necessary improvements in low carbon generation sources 
is developed at a rate that allows the world to adhere to the 450ppm emission caps 
without overly sacrificing GDP growth. In 2050, percentage investment is 0.3% for 
BaU, 0.33% for 750ppm, 0.36% for 600ppm and 0.94% for 450ppm (Figure A16.27). 
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Figure A16.27: Global energy R&D investment per global GDP 
 
China’s energy R&D investment per China GDP shows that a similar trend to that of 
observed for analysis at the global level. Like the world, China also experiences a fall 
in percentage investment for BaU and 750ppm from the outset. The 600ppm case also 
sees an increase in percentage investment until 2015, falling thereafter. The 450ppm 
case rises sharply in 2015 and continues to increase but at a slower pace. From 0.5% 
in 2010, percentage investments are project to reach in 2050 to 0.3% for BaU, 0.4% 
for 750ppm, 0.45% for 600ppm and 1.1% for 450ppm (Figure A16.28). 
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Figure A16.28: China energy R&D investment per China GDP 
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Appendix 17: Base-Case Delivery of Chinese Energy Policies 
This appendix shows the base-case delivery (before CFEPS) of the Chinese energy 
policy in Table A17.1. 
 
Table A17.1: The base-case delivery of the Chinese energy policy 
Policy Dimens 
(Weight) 
Policy Criteria Items 11
th
FYP Goal by 
2010 
Actual Achieved in 
2010 
Economic 
Growth 
(15%) 
Balanced GDP growth 7.5% Gr 10-12%  
Energy consumption to 
production balance 
Non set Energy shortage  
Energy investments 2% on R&D 2% on R&D  
Climate 
Change 
Mitigation 
(30%) 
Atmospheric CO2 
emissions 
-10% Less than -10%  
Energy intensity and 
efficiency  
-20% -19%  
Emissions intensity* Non set Target missing  
SoS  
(20%) 
Dependence on 
hydrocarbon and coal 
imports  
Balanced budget Not achieved  
Generation mix 
diversification** 
Non set Target missing  
Social Equality 
(20%) 
Grid energy access*** Non set Target missing  
Governance 
(15%) 
Political stab  Strengthen 
government 
program 
Strengthened  
Public participation Media program Need wider 
participation 
 
Regulate quality Monitoring 
system 
Need to Improve  
Score    20% 
Key: improves (), worsens (), unable to evaluate (-) 
 
* Emissions intensity: 17% cut in carbon intensity (carbon emitted per GDP) in 2015 
** Generation mix diversification: non-fossil primary generation to 11.4% by 2015 
*** Grid energy access: RMB 2.55 trillion (USD 40bn) for power grid by 2015 
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Appendix 18: Base-Case Graphs for Policy Assessment 
Framework  
In the base-case (before application of CFEPS), this appendix contains the following 
figures that are graphical depictions set forth in Appendix 15 for mapping climate 
modelling output to Policy Assessment Framework. Again they are set out accordance 
with the 5 policy dimensions of economic growth, climate change mitigation, SoS, 
social equality, and governance. 
 
Economic Growth  
 
Balanced GDP growth per annum 
Figure A18.1 calculates from base year to 2050 the growth rates by annum of China 
under the different scenarios.  
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Figure A18.1: China GDP growth per annum 
 
Energy consumption to production ratio 
The way WITCH accounts for energy supply and demand, is that the model sets 
supply equal to demand. Thus this calculation would always equal 1 and is not plotted. 
 
Climate Change Mitigation  
 
Energy R&D per GDP 
Energy R&D per unit of GDP in China is shown in Figure A18.2.  
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Figure A18.2: China Energy R&D investments per Chinese GDP 
 
Cap on levels of atmospheric CO2 
The caps of carbon emissions under the three abatement scenarios is shown in Figure 
18.3. 
China Emissions caps on 450ppm/600ppm/750ppm (Gt c)
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Figure A18.3: China emissions caps under the abatement scenarios 
 
Energy consumption per GDP 
China energy demand per unit of GDP is displayed in Figure A18.4. 
China Energy Demand / GDP (TWh / $tn)
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Figure A18.4: China energy demand per GDP 
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Emitted CO2 per energy consumption 
Carbon emitted per unit of energy demand is illustrated in Figure A18.5. 
China CO2 / GDP (Gtc / $tn)
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Figure A18.5: China CO2 emissions per GDP 
 
Security of Energy Supply  
 
Oil, gas and coal as proportion of total primary generation 
The proportion of fossil fuels as a proportion of total generation is shown in Figure 
A18.6. 
China fossil generation as proportion of total capacity (%)
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
BaU 750ppm 600ppm 450ppm
 
Figure A18.6: China fossil fuel generation as proportion of total primary power 
generation  
 
Oil, gas and coal imports as a % of total consumption 
The proportion of fossil fuels natural resources which China is a net importer in are 
oil gas and coal. The proportion of oil, gas a coal out of total electricity generation 
capacity is the same as Figure A18.6, as the net imported fuels so happens to be all 
the fossil fuels used in electricity generation.  
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Non fossil fuels energy generation to total energy production 
China’s clean generation technologies as a proportion of total generation is as per 
Figure A18.7 
China low C generation as proportion of total capacity (%)
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Figure A18.7: China low carbon generation as proportion of total generation 
 
Lead in global (low carbon) technologies 
China’s clean generation as a proportion of total global clean generation capacity is 
displayed in Figure A18.8. 
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Figure A18.8: China low carbon generation as proportion of global low carbon 
generation 
 
Social Equality  
Electricity grid coverage 
The growth in renewable energy generation capacity is as per Figure A18.9. 
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Figure A18.9: China growth of renewables generation 
 
Governance  
All indicators under governance is accounted for via qualitative discussions and not 
explicitly plotted by WITCH. 
 
Key government officials turnover 
N/A (qualitative discussion) 
 
Continuity of energy policy direction 
N/A (qualitative discussion) 
 
Stakeholders consultation in decision making process 
N/A (qualitative discussion) 
 
Accountability of government officials 
N/A (qualitative discussion) 
 
Monitoring and punishment of institutions and officials accountable 
N/A (qualitative discussion) 
 
350 
Appendix 19: Sensitivity Analysis and Feedback Loop 
This appendix shows the performing sensitivity analysis in Table A19.1 to better 
understand the Feedback Loop between the climate model and energy policy. 
 
Table A190.1: The sensitivity analysis and feedback 
Scenario Policy Change Case  Range Model Impact 
Harsher caps 
on 
450ppm/600p
pm/750ppm 
scenarios 
1) 750ppm fall in carbon caps  5% & 
10% 
The weak case increases low 
carbon generation by just less 
than 1% in 2035 and 2050. 
The strong case increases low 
carbon generation by about 
1.5% in 2035 and 2050.  
2) 600ppm fall in carbon caps 5% & 
10% 
3) 450ppm fall in carbon caps 5% & 
10% 
Increased 
load  
4) BaU increased load across all 
generation technologies  
5% & 
10% 
Increase its GDP level by 
0.3% with the strong case 
under 450ppm. Under BaU, 
growth increases by 0.1% 
with a 10% load increase. 
 
5) 750ppm increased load 
across all generation 
technologies 
5% & 
10% 
6) 600ppm increased load 
across all generation 
technologies 
5% & 
10% 
7) 450ppm increased load 
across all generation 
technologies 
5% & 
10% 
Increased 
efficiency 
8) BaU increased efficiency 
across all generation 
technologies  
5% & 
10% 
Increase its GDP level by 
0.2% with the strong case 
under 450ppm. Under BaU, 
growth increases marginally 
by less than 0.1% with a 10% 
efficiency increase. 
9) 750ppm increased efficiency 
across all generation 
technologies 
5% & 
10% 
10) 600ppm increased 
efficiency across all generation 
technologies 
5% & 
10% 
11) 450ppm increased 
efficiency across all generation 
technologies 
5% & 
10% 
Increased 
load and 
efficiency 
12) BaU increased load and 
efficiency across all generation 
technologies  
5% & 
10% 
Sensitivities show a 
multiplicative effect 
compared to just increased 
load, or just increased 
efficiency. China’s GDP level 
increases by 0.5% for the 
strong case under 450ppm. 
For BaU, a 10% increase in 
load and efficiency increases 
GDP by 0.3%.  
13) 750ppm increased load and 
efficiency across all generation 
technologies 
5% & 
10% 
14) 600ppm increased load and 
efficiency across all generation 
5% & 
10% 
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technologies  
15) 450ppm increased load and 
efficiency across all generation 
technologies 
5% & 
10% 
Increased 
generation 
costs (O&M) 
16) BaU increased generation 
costs only in fossil fuels (coal, 
oil and gas)  
5% & 
10% 
Increase its share of low 
carbon generation by 0.5% in 
the strong case under 450ppm 
and 0.3% under BaU. 
17) 750ppm increased 
generation costs only in fossil 
fuels (coal, oil and gas)  
5% & 
10% 
18) 600ppm increased 
generation costs only in fossil 
fuels (coal, oil and gas)  
5% & 
10% 
19) 450ppm increased 
generation costs only in fossil 
fuels (coal, oil and gas)  
5% & 
10% 
Decreased 
generation 
costs (O&M) 
20) BaU decreased generation 
costs only in non-fossils fuels 
(nuclear, renewables, hydro)  
5% & 
10% 
Increase its share of low 
carbon generation by 0.5% in 
the strong case under 450ppm 
and 0.3% under BaU. 21) 750ppm decreased 
generation costs only in non-
fossils fuels (nuclear, 
renewables, hydro)  
5% & 
10% 
22) 600ppm decreased 
generation costs only in non-
fossils fuels (nuclear, 
renewables, hydro)  
5% & 
10% 
23) 450ppm decreased 
generation costs only in non-
fossils fuels (nuclear, 
renewables, hydro)  
5% & 
10% 
Increased 
setup costs 
(Capex) 
24) BaU increased setup costs 
only in fossil fuels (coal, oil and 
gas)  
5% &  
10% 
Increase its share of low 
carbon generation by 0.8% in 
the strong case under 450ppm 
and 0.5% under BaU. This 
shift is more pronounced than 
the generation cost 
sensitivities, as the initial 
setup costs are higher than the 
day-to-day generation costs. 
25) 750ppm increased setup 
costs only in fossil fuels (coal, 
oil and gas)  
5% &  
10% 
26) 600ppm increased setup 
costs only in fossil fuels (coal, 
oil and gas)  
5% &  
10% 
27) 450ppm increased setup 
costs only in fossil fuels (coal, 
oil and gas)  
5% &  
10% 
Decreased 
setup costs 
(Capex) 
28) BaU decreased setup costs 
in only non-fossil fuels 
(nuclear, renewables, hydro)  
5% & 
10% 
Increase its share of low 
carbon generation, just like 
the previous sensitivity, by 
0.8% in the strong case under 
450ppm and 0.5% under 
BaU. 29) 750ppm decreased setup 
costs in only non-fossil fuels 
(nuclear, renewables, hydro)  
5% & 
10% 
30) 600ppm decreased setup 5% & 
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costs in only non-fossil fuels 
(nuclear, renewables, hydro)  
10% 
31) 450ppm decreased setup 
costs in only non-fossil fuels 
(nuclear, renewables, hydro)  
5% & 
10% 
Decrease 
generation 
and setup 
costs  
32) BaU decreased generation 
and setup costs in only non-
fossil fuels (nuclear, 
renewables, hydro)  
5% & 
10% 
Increase its share of low 
carbon generation by 1% in 
the strong case under 450ppm 
and 0.8% under BaU. 
33) 750ppm decreased 
generation and setup costs in 
only non-fossil fuels (nuclear, 
renewables, hydro)  
5% & 
10% 
34) 600ppm decreased 
generation and setup costs in 
only non-fossil fuels (nuclear, 
renewables, hydro)  
5% & 
10% 
35) 450ppm decreased 
generation and setup costs in 
only non-fossil fuels (nuclear, 
renewables, hydro)  
5% & 
10% 
Improved 
feedback 
between 
model input 
and policy 
result 
36) Mild case of policy makers 
to check every period whether 
each policy impact calculation 
date matches the original 
intention (update base year data 
and run model every period) 
3yrs &  
1yr 
Fine-tuning of policy actions, 
ensure monitoring of policy 
effect if carried out on a more 
regular basis. If initial policy 
setting moves in the opposite 
direction than what was 
intended, there is less time 
“wasted” to make new policy 
adjustment. The strong case is 
expected to magnify this 
positive impact. 
NB: Operating costs (opex) and setup investment costs (capex) as proxies to LbD, as 
technology sharing reduces operating and setup costs.  
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Appendix 20: Revised Case of Possible Areas for Policy 
Change  
This appendix highlights the possible areas where energy policy improvements can 
make a positive contribution to China’s energy sector, as identified via the application 
of CFEPS (Table A20.1). 
 
Table A20.1: Potential areas of improvements highlighted for policy action  
 Starting point  
for model run 
 
Changes to Energy Policy Actions 
Policy 
Dimension 
(Weight) 
Policy 
Criteria 
Items 
11
th
 FYP 
Base-
Case  
Types of Energy Policy Actions 
Legislative * Economic Organisational 
Economic 
growth 
(15%) 
Bal GDP Gr   Increased eff 
& load  
Δ Costs 
 
 
En Prod:Cons  
Energy invest  
Climate 
Change 
Mitigation 
(30%) 
Atmospheric 
CO2 emiss 
 Stricter 
emmiss Cap  
 
Δ Costs  
 
 
Energy 
intensity and 
efficiency 
 
Emissions 
intensity* 
 
SoS 
(20%) 
Dependence 
Hydrocarbon 
and Coal 
imports* 
 Stricter 
emmiss Cap 
 
Δ Costs  
 
 
Generate mix 
diversify* 
 
Social Eql 
(20%) 
Grid energy 
access* 
 Stricter 
emmiss Cap 
Δ Costs 
 
 
Governanc
e 
(15%) 
Political stab     Improved 
feedback 
 
Public particip  
Regulate qual  
Score  20%    
Key: improves (), worsens (), unable to evaluate (-) 
* Not set in 11
th
 FYP, but explicitly targeted in 12
th
 FYP 
Emissions intensity: 17% cut in carbon intensity (carbon emitted per GDP) in 2015 
Generation mix diversification: non-fossil primary generation to 11.4% by 2015 
Grid energy access: RMB 2.55 trillion (USD 40bn) for power grid construction by 
2015 
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Appendix 21: Revised Case Assessment Graphs  
In the revised-case after energy policy action (after executing CFEPS), all policy 
changes are simultaneously implemented envisaging improvements in the criteria as 
set out under CFEPS. From the revised case of inputs, a new set of model results are 
produced and compared to base-case results in the graphical form from Appendix 18. 
Only the two extreme bases are shown below, as all other climate abatement cases in 
between BaU and 450ppm. Again, the order of presentation follows the logic from the 
base-case assessment graphs of Appendix 18.  
 
Regarding the differentiation between the weak and strong case, the cases 
simultaneously change for all inputs. For example in the weak case, all inputs 
including ppm caps, load, efficiency and costs are adjusted 5% to present the weak 
revised-case. The same logic holds for the strong case changing all inputs by 10%.  
 
The BaU and 450ppm scenario show improvements to energy use and generation. 
However in many of the weak revised cases (especially for BaU), there is only a 
marginal improvements. Since the model does not expect only small positive steps at 
each iteration, it could be interpreted that a marginal improvement has been made to 
slow growth down to a balance level, when pollution mitigation objectives start taking 
higher priorities. In other words, since the changes are in the right direction (although 
small), they help China move towards a better energy policy makeup.  
 
Economic Growth  
Balanced GDP growth per annum 
For both BaU and 450ppm, the revised cases reduce growth. However, there is only a 
small decrease or at more -0.1%, the revised case growth rates under both weak and 
strong for BaU and 450ppm are still above the balance growth rates as discussed in 
Chapter 2. Figure A21.1 calculates the BaU GDP growth rates comparing base-case 
against the 5% and 10% revised cases.  
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Figure A21.1: BaU Base-Case versus Revised Case of China GDP growth per annum 
 
For 450ppm, the weak case does not impost as much of a limit of emissions at the 
strong case. Hence at 5% revised case, the growth increases by circa 5% across the 
modelling window. In the 10% revised case, growth is marginally curtailed. Figure 
A21.2 calculates the 450ppm GDP growth rates comparing base-case against revised 
cases.  
450ppm Comparison of China GDP growth per annum (%)
-1.00%
0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
4.00%
5.00%
6.00%
2010-
2015
2015-
2020
2020-
2025
2025-
2030
2030-
2035
2035-
2040
2040-
2045
2045-
2050
B
a
s
e
 C
a
s
e
 v
e
rs
u
s
 5
%
 a
n
d
 1
0
%
 
R
e
v
is
e
d
 C
a
s
e
450ppm 5% v 450ppm 450ppm 10% v 450ppm
 
Figure A21.2: 450ppm Base-Case versus Revised Case of China GDP growth per 
annum 
 
Energy consumption to production ratio 
The way WITCH accounts for energy supply and demand, is that the model sets 
supply equal to demand. Thus this calculation would always equal 1 and is not plotted.
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Climate Change Mitigation (30%) 
Energy R&D per GDP 
Under the BaU case, R&D per unit of GDP declines, as energy producers are 
suffering greater costs of production and generation, hence investing less overall into 
the energy sector. Figure A21.3 calculates in the BaU scenario the energy R&D per 
unit of GDP in China, comparing BaU base-case against the 5% and 10% revised 
cases. The 10% revised case sees R&D investments per GDP fall to almost 1.5 times 
the 5% revised case. 
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Figure A21.3: BaU Base-Case versus Revised Cases of China Energy R&D 
investments per Chinese GDP 
 
For 450ppm, like the BaU 5%, the 450ppm revised case sees dropping R&D 
investment of up to 25%, due to the increased generation and setup costs imposed on 
the energy produces. However, under the 10% revised case, there is strong enough of 
an emissions cap to encourage R&D investments to increase by just under 2% 
compared to the 450ppm base-case (Figure A21.4).  
 
Cap on levels of atmospheric CO2 
Under the 450ppm scenario, the cap on levels of atmospheric CO2 sees improvements 
for the 5% and 10% revised case, as compared to the base-case. The figures are not 
presented here, as the 5% revised case would simply be the profile of the base-case, 
decrease by 5% across the modelling horizon. Similarly, the 10% revised case would 
see emissions caps reduce in a parallel fashion across by 10% across all years 
considered.  
 
357 
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Figure A21.4: 450ppm Base-Case versus Revised Cases of China Energy R&D 
investments per Chinese GDP 
 
Figure A21.5 calculates in the BaU scenario the energy consumption per GDP in 
China, comparing BaU base-case against the 5% and 10% revised cases. The 5% case 
see demand fall by 2% and the 10% case sees demand fall by 3%. 
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Figure A21.5: BaU Base-Case versus Revised Case for China energy demand per 
GDP 
 
For 405ppm, the 5% case see demand fall to around 50% in the case year (as the 
optimal abatement point has already passes, so the first year is making up for lost 
time). Subsequently energy demand per GDP declines by 4% for the weak case and 
8% for the strong revised case (Figure A21.6).  
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Figure A21.6: 450ppm Base-Case versus Revised Case for China energy demand per 
GDP 
 
Emitted CO2 per energy consumption 
Under the 450ppm scenario, the carbon emitted per unit of energy demand for the 5% 
and 10% revised case, as compared to the base-case.  
 
The weak case revised case under 450ppm predicts a mixed result, with almost no 
change to the 450ppm base-case. The strong revised case expects just under a 0.5% 
decline in the carbon emitted per TWh of energy consumed (Figure A21.7).  
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Figure A21.7: 450ppm Base-Case versus Revised Case for China CO2 emissions per 
GDP 
 
Security of Energy Supply (20%) 
Oil, gas and coal as proportion of total primary generation 
Under the BaU scenario, proportion of fossil fuels as a proportion of total generation 
increases for the revised case. 
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Figure A21.8 calculates in the BaU scenario the proportion of fossil fuels as a 
proportion of total generation in China, comparing BaU base-case against the 5% and 
10% revised cases. The weak case sees this increase to 6%, whilst the strong case 
expects over a 10% increase in fossil generation as a proportion of total primary 
generation.  
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Figure A21.8: BaU Base-Case versus Revised Case of proportion of fossil fuels as a 
proportion of total generation 
 
The weak case of 450ppm expects a marginal decrease in fossil generation, however 
the strong case predicts over a 35% reduction in fossil generation across the 
modelling window (Figure A21.9). 
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Figure A21.9: 450ppm Base-Case versus Revised Case of proportion of fossil fuels as 
a proportion of total generation 
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Oil, gas and coal imports as a % of total consumption 
The proportion of fossil fuels natural resources which China is a net importer in are 
oil gas and coal. The proportion of oil, gas a coal out of total electricity generation 
capacity is the same as Figures A21.8 and A21.9, as the net imported fuels so happens 
to be all the fossil fuels used in electricity generation.  
 
Non fossil fuels energy generation to total energy production 
Under the BaU scenario, clean generation technologies as a proportion of total 
generation decreases for the revised case. Meaning more generation is switched 
towards fossil fuels under the BaU revised cases.  
 
Figure A21.10 calculates in the BaU scenario the clean generation technologies as a 
proportion of total generation, comparing BaU base-case against the 5% and 10% 
revised cases. The weak and case expects a decrease in low carbon generation for 
China compared to the globe at around 2.5%. The weak case expects a decrease of 5%.  
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Figure A21.10: BaU Base-Case versus Revised Case of China low carbon generation 
as proportion of total generation 
 
For 450ppm, there is very little variation for the weak revised case. However, in the 
strong revised case, rises initially to 20% higher than the base-case, then to 50% 
compared to the base-case towards the end of the modelling horizon (Figure A21.11).  
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Figure A21.11: 450ppm Base-Case versus Revised Case of China low carbon 
generation as proportion of total generation 
 
Lead in global (low carbon) technologies 
Under the BaU scenario, China’s clean generation as a proportion of total global clean 
generation capacity increases for the revised case. China takes a stronger lead in 
renewables compared to the rest of the world after energy policy action.  
 
Figure A21.12 calculates in the BaU scenario for China’s clean generation as a 
proportion of total global clean generation capacity. Comparing the BaU base-case 
against the 5% and 10% revised cases expects around a 1% increase in both cases.  
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Figure A21.12: BaU Base-Case versus Revise Case for China low carbon generation 
as proportion of global low carbon generation 
 
For 450ppm, there is very little variation for the weak revised case. Interestingly, in 
the strong revised case, China initially lags behind the rest of the world in terms of 
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capacity, but this one nation is expected to overtake global generation capacity by 
2035, to meet is growing renewable energy demand (Figure A21.13). 
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Figure A21.13: BaU Base-Case versus Revise Case for China low carbon generation 
as proportion of global low carbon generation 
 
Social Equality (20%) 
Electricity grid coverage 
Under the BaU scenario, the growth in renewable energy generation capacity for the 
revised case sees a mixed result.  
 
Figure A21.14 calculates in the BaU scenario for China growth of renewables 
generation. Comparing the BaU base-case against the 5% and 10% revised cases, the 
results are mixed with some years offering greater growth and other years offering 
smaller growth under the revised cases.  
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Figure A21.14: BaU Base-Case versus Revised Case for China growth of renewables 
generation 
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Comparing 450ppm against the BaU base-case against the 5% and 10% revised cases, 
the 450ppm weak revised case sees little variation to the base-case of 450ppm. In the 
revised case, there is significantly higher growth after 2025 of around 20%. There is 
little, or negative growth of renewables in the early years, as there is already huge 
growth assumed in renewable for the base-case 450ppm scenario (Figure A21.15). 
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Figure A21.15: 450ppm Base-Case versus Revised Case for China growth of 
renewables generation 
 
Governance (15%) 
All indicators under governance is accounted for via qualitative discussions and not 
explicitly plotted by WITCH. 
 
Key government officials turnover 
N/A (qualitative discussion) 
 
Continuity of energy policy direction 
N/A (qualitative discussion) 
 
Stakeholders consultation in decision making process 
N/A (qualitative discussion) 
 
Accountability of government officials 
N/A (qualitative discussion) 
 
Monitoring and punishment of institutions and officials accountable 
N/A (qualitative discussion) 
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Appendix 22: Revised Case Delivery of Chinese Energy 
Policies  
This appendix provides with the revised China’s energy policy action as suggested by 
CFEPS to improve China’s energy landscape in Table A22.1. Applications of 
suggested energy policy change as highlighted by CFEPS, show a score improvement 
from 20% to 90%, by using the weighted policy dimensions method. Although this 
does not represent a 70% increase, this model approach demonstrated China’s 
improvement in it energy policy landscape, which confirmed the value added of 
CFEPS on the Chinese energy policy making process.  
 
Table A22.1: Revised delivery of Chinese energy policies 
 Starting point  
for model run 
 
Changes to Energy Policy Actions Start 
point 
next run 
Policy 
Dimension 
(Weight) 
Policy 
Criteria 
Items 
11
th
 FYP 
Base-
Case  
Types of Energy Policy Actions Revised 
Policy 
Case Legislative 
* 
Economic Organisational 
Economic 
growth 
(15%) 
Bal GDP Gr   Increased eff 
& load  
Δ Costs 
 
  
En Prod:Cons  - 
Energy invest  - 
Climate 
Change 
Mitigation 
(30%) 
Atmospheric 
CO2 emiss 
 Stricter 
emmiss Cap  
 
Δ Costs  
 
  
 
Energy 
intensity and 
efficiency 
  
Emissions 
intensity* 
  
SoS 
(20%) 
Dependence 
Hydrocarbon 
and Coal 
imports* 
 Stricter 
emmiss Cap 
 
Δ Costs  
 
  
Generate mix 
diversify* 
  
Social Eql 
(20%) 
Grid energy 
access* 
 Stricter 
emmiss Cap 
Δ Costs 
 
  
Governance 
(15%) 
Political stab     Improved 
feedback 
 
 
Public particip   
Regulate qual   
Score  20%    90% 
Key: improves (), worsens (), unable to evaluate (-) 
* Not set in 11
th
 FYP, but explicitly targeted in 12
th
 FYP 
 Emissions intensity: 17% cut in carbon intensity (carbon emitted per GDP) in 2015 
 Generation mix diversification: non-fossil primary generation to 11.4% by 2015 
 Grid energy access: RMB 2.55 trillion (USD 40bn) for grid construction by 2015 
